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PREFACE 
THE NEED FOR CONVERSATION 
I first began to think about the relationship between Japanese Studies and International 
Relations (IR) in 1994, when I returned from Japan to Australia with an MA degree in 
International Politics from Kôbe University. My Masters dissertation dealt with 
Japanese security relations in the Asia -Pacific region and, upon my return, I intended to 
extend this line of research into a broader work about Japan's future global role, 
concentrating primarily upon issues of military security and other areas where Japan was 
already acknowledged to be a major actor (e.g. the global economy). The timing seemed 
perfect. Amid the general sense of uncertainty associated with the end of the Cold War, 
one of the few IR themes acknowledged as having some certainty attached to it was 
Japan's role as a major actor in the 20 century. 
Pondering this theme, I began to feel that I still knew very little about what was meant 
by a `global role' in the first place. This feeling was prompted by two discoveries. The 
first was the discovery that `International Relations' encompassed a far wider range of 
concerns, issues and perspectives than I had been aware of during my years as an 
undergraduate and graduate student in Japan. In particular, I now became aware of a 
whole body of critical IR literature which, instead of starting from the `givens' of an 
orthodox IR education - e.g. states, power, the security dilemma, etc. - sought to 
question the whole process by which we assume these issues to be `given,' in order that 
we might address the international- cum -global arena in more comprehensive, inclusivist 
and, hopefully, less dangerous ways, in the wake of the Cold War. 
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My second discovery was that among the large and diverse Japanese Studies community 
in Canberra, there were a number of people engaged in a similar kind of enterprise, as 
they explored a complex, multifaceted Japanese society, itself seeking to engage with 
and adapt to the new conceptual and structural parameters of the post -Cold War era. It 
struck me then that in the orthodox IR literature I had read for my MA, there had been 
IittIe or no mention of domestic Japanese society. The impression gained from this 
literature was that the `inside' of Japan did not really matter in terms of the foreign 
policy processes that define Japan on the `outside;' i.e., in the international system as 
global actor. 
After speaking with a range of people in the Japanese Studies community, and reading 
the literature that influenced them, I then began to notice how much of it complemented 
(implicitly if not always explicitly) the IR literature that was, by now, beginning to 
influence my thinking and that of a generation of IR scholars at the ANU. And yet the 
more I engaged the two analytical communities, the more it became apparent that they 
were effectively unaware of each other. It was at this point, I suppose, that I decided 
that I wanted to explore the possibilities of bringing these literatures together, in order to 
contribute to the beginning of a conversation that I increasingly felt was crucial to a 
more complete understanding of Japan and of International Relations in a changing, 
volatile world. 
The thesis that follows is my contribution, albeit rudimentary, to this conversation. It 
deals with a range of issues, some involving complex philosophical themes that I have 
often found very difficult, and to be honest, intimidating. But the more I have engaged 
them, the more I have come to realise how important it is that we expose and seek to 
vi 
critically re- address the first principles of the knowledge form -as- political power that is 
International Relations. This, however, is not meant to be a `theoretical' work per se, 
but rather one of connection, between (often hidden) theoretical first principles and 
everyday social and political practice, and between effectively divorced yet intrinsically 
engaged scholarly communities, seeking in their different ways to make sense of `Japan' 
in International Relations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POST -COLD WAR ANXIETIES 
1. "We Told You So." 
The Japanese economic miracle itself seems to have been discredited, which has 
been especially sobering to a journalist like me, since its a miracle I had hailed here 
on the News Hour in our 1987 Japan series. You may even remember some of the 
images we showed you back then: Loyal, well -trained workers who ran rather than 
be late to work; focused, efficient businesses; farsighted investors; and working with 
them hand in glove, brilliant government bureaucrats whose long -term industrial 
policy, Japan, Inc., discouraged everything American from large discount stores to 
boxers weighing more than 140 pounds. 
Paul Solomon, 1999.1 
The question is whether they have the moral leadership - the moral capital, if you 
like - to play the role. Since they haven't reformed themselves, they're not a very 
credible player in telling other countries to reform. In a way they've been through 
the Asian crisis, the stock market crash, the land market crash, you know, a number 
of years ago, and they've been sitting with the luxury of being a much wealthier, 
stronger economy. They've been sitting and really not responding to it for a long 
time. 
Paul Krugman, 1998.2 
Japan is a millstone around the neck of the global economy 
Unidentified U.S. bureaucrat, 1999.3 
Using the above selection of excerpts, and others like them, one could make the case 
that a certain sense of triumphalism, even smugness, has permeated the debate about 
Japan in International Relations (IR) of late. The onset of the Asian currency crisis 
during the mid 1990s saw Japan, along with many other countries in the region, 
1 Paul Solomon, "Bursting the Bubble," May 03, 1999. Sourced from PBS Online at 
http://www.pbs.org/plweb-cgi/. 
2 Interview with Paul Krugman, Steve Levinson, Michael Armacost and Winston Lord by Jim Lehrer, 
for PBS, January 12, 1998. Sourced from PBS Online at http: / /www.pbs.com. 
3 Solomon, "Bursting the Bubble," op. cit. 
I 
plunged into an economic recession from which it has only recently begun to 
extricate itself. Moreover, the efforts of Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and 
economists to formulate new responses to the challenges lumped collectively under 
that ubiquitous term, ` globalisation,' have generated, for the most part, only further 
charges of inadequacy and ineptness, both inside and outside Japan. Nowhere is this 
scorn more prevalent of course, than in the United States, where stories of corporate 
failure, fiscal incompetence and political dislocation emanating from a society so 
recently promoted as structurally unique, and superior to its Western counterparts, 
cannot but buoy up the current sense of satisfaction associated with America's strong 
economic performance in recent years. 
Both self -congratulation and criticism have also been reflected in the current 
`theoretical' backlash against the Japanese economy. Once hailed as an economic 
`miracle,' Japan is now regarded in many circles as being the representative par 
excellence of a particular type of "developmental capitalism" that is not only out of 
date, but, quite possibly, fundamentally to blame for the Asian economic crisis. The 
result, as one analyst points out, has been an increasingly vociferous chorus of 'we- 
told- you- so's,' in response to ongoing Japanese (and Asian) economic difficulties. 
Having `won' the Cold War against Soviet -style collectivism, no sooner is one bout 
of triumphalism over than liberalism is now gleefully protesting its superiority over 
the `developmental statist' approach towards capitalist economic development. The 
speeches of senior US policy makers and opinion formers have been peppered with 
references to the need to jettison the remaining vestiges of the developmental statist 
model. 
Yet if assumptions about Japan's status as an economic superpower have been, at 
best, moderated in this context, the more general themes concerning its role as a post - 
Cold War international power have not, I argue, changed fundamentally since their 
4 Richard Higgot, "The Asian Economic Crisis: a Study in the Politics of Resentment," New Political 
Economy 3:3 (1998): 333 -356, on p. 339. The drop in enthusiasm concerning a once -feted Asian 
dynamism, is reflected in the works of writers such as the economist Ross Gamaut, who has moved 
from titles such as Sustaining Export Development: Ideas from East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), to East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One? (London; 
New York: Routledge, 1998). 
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initial articulation during the early to mid- 1990s, when the dominant perception of 
Japan was of a state that, in many ways, had emerged as the true victor of the Cold 
War, but which also needed to assert itself as a major actor in the global arena. In 
1992 for example, the prominent journalist Yôichi Funabashi described Japan as 
remaining "an immature political player;" a state with "a first -class economy [but] 
with `economy class' politics," that badly needed to establish a better international 
self image. At the same time Funabashi, and many others, saw possibilities for this 
image change in the broader changes taking place in international affairs, where: 
Japan's unorthodox power portfolio ( "economic giant and military dwarf ") should 
not be viewed as an unstable and transitional phenomenon. On the contrary, the 
portfolio's very nature gives Japan a golden opportunity to define its power and role 
in the radically changing world of the 1990s. The changing nature of power in the 
increasingly interdependent world will upgrade economic and technological 
capacity, educational quality, and the developmental model effect in which Japan 
excels.5 
Paul Kennedy was even more direct than Funabashi when he described Japan in 1993 
as a "new kind of superpower;" a natural world leader in a re- configured global 
hierarchy where technological development, capital wealth and market access had 
emerged as the new indicators of national and international power. Thus, `while 
global forces bear down on all societies," Kennedy argued, "some peoples are better 
prepared than others to handle the biotech revolution, or the population explosion, or 
the consequences of global warming and sea -level rises... [because] as in all other 
revolutions and significant changes in history, there will be winners and losers. "6 
Similar views are articulated in Frank Langdon's notion of "post- hegemonic order,'" 
Hans W. Muall's conception of Japan as one of the "new civilian powers," 8 Richard 
5 Yôichi Funabashi, "Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s," in Yôichi Funabashi (ed.), 
Japan's International Agenda (New York & London: New York University Press, 1994), 11. 
6 Paul Kennedy, "Japan: A Twenty-fist Century Power ?," in Craig Garby and Mary Brown Bullock 
(eds.),Japan: A New Type of Superpower? (Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1994), 
194. 
7 Frank Langdon, "The Post -Hegemonie Japanese -U.S. Relationship," in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank 
Langdon ( eds.),Japan in the Posthegemonic World (Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner Publishes, 
1993), 75. 
8 Hans W. Muall, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," Foreign Affairs 69:5 (1991): 90- 
106, on p. 91. 
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Rosecrance's "new concert of powers, "9 and the "global partnership" rhetoric that 
punctuated the public exchanges between the Bush and Miyazawa administrations in 
the early 1990s.10 
These themes, then: the radically changing global context, global economic 
interdependence, global environmental change, and the growing importance of 
technology, remain central to the discussion on Japan's international future, even if 
anxiety about Japan's capacity to adapt to these circumstances is currently higher 
than ever before. This is not to suggest either, that `conventional' (i.e., military) 
power dynamics have disappeared from consideration. Indeed, it is in the realm of 
military security that Japan is regarded by the international community (again; 
particularly that sector of it located in the U.S.) as having most to do in order to fulfil 
the responsibilities expected of it as a great (post -Cold War) power. This, moreover, 
is a perception increasingly prevalent among Japan's own political and policymaking 
elite, judging by the initiatives taken by successive Japanese governments in defence- 
related affairs since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. During this time, Japan's 
potential capacity to play a military role in regional security has increased to levels 
which, Iittle more than a decade ago, would have been politically unthinkable. 
The continuity of certain themes however, cannot override the appearance of other 
dimensions to the debate over Japan's global persona - dimensions which, until 
quite recently, had little or no status in the broader lexicon of concern associated with 
IR analysis, and its definitions of geo- political and/or global economic reality. Most 
of these new debates are connected by the recognition of a growing sense of crisis 
and division within Japanese society itself. Crisis articulated, for example, in the 
advice given to Tokyo and Osaka mothers to cease breast- feeding their babies, 
because of unprecedented levels of poisonous dioxin levels detected in urban 
9 Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs 71:2 (1992): 64 -82, on p.64. 
"Five great bases of power," Rosecrance wrote, "again control the organisation of the world order: 
the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China." /bid., 65. 
1° Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 257. 
4 
environments." In record levels of stress -related death and illness among `white - 
collar' workers; and in record voter cynicism towards a governing elite riddled with 
corruption, and hopelessly stagnant in its responses. Division, articulated in the 
increasingly vocal attempts of people to gain acknowledgement of their particular, 
and diverse experiences of what it means to be Japanese. At one end of the 
archipelago, for example, Ainu people assert an ethnic and cultural identity 
subsumed and dispersed for centuries under the twin colonial discourses of national 
unity and racial homogeneity; while at the other, Okinawan citizens with a complex, 
multiethnic heritage, struggle to create a future for themselves as something other 
than the supporting cast for American military power in the Pacific Ocean. Japanese 
women everywhere intensify their contest against deeply entrenched assumptions 
about gender -based social roles, and ethnic Korean and Chinese people living in 
Japan work to deconstruct centuries of racial prejudice. Finally, a fast -dwindling 
band of former "comfort women," prisoners of war, and slave labourers, some within 
Japan, many more outside, continue to fight for justice and redress for the abuses 
committed upon them more than fifty years ago, their efforts part of an increasingly 
bitter public wrangle over Japan's modem history. 
One of the main questions I want to ask in this thesis concerns the still -uncertain 
status of issues such as these in the context of Japan's international relations. More 
precisely, it concerns the question of why these issues continue to feel peripheral to 
what really matters about Japan in terms of its role as a major global actor. From 
some perspectives, of course - i.e., those perspectives hailing from the more 
mainstream sectors of the IR community - it is an easy enough question to answer, 
given that the issues invoked above simply do not come under a mainstream IR 
agenda. While undoubtedly important, they are `internal,' `ethnic,' `gender,' 
`sociological,' and `cultural' issues, rather than `IR' issues per se. In short, even in 
the age of international political economy (IPE) and a broadened agenda of politico- 
11 "Toxic Waste in Japan: The Burning Issue." The Economist, July 25,1998. Sourced online at 
5 
analytical concern, the question of Japan remains, fundamentally, a question of state - 
as -actor in a world which follows traditional (Westphalian) patterns of power -politics 
behaviour and structural constraint. 
In the chapters to follow, I aim to problematise the conventional approach outlined 
above, and indicate why it is vital that the dominant framework of understanding on 
Japan be opened up to include the complex, changing dimensions of Japanese Iife at 
the end of the 20`h century - dimensions which, I suggest, are still effectively 
ignored in the great majority of IR theory and practice. In this regard, I argue that 
debate on Japan in an IR context continues to be centred on a narrow, highly 
selective, even clichéd image of Japanese society. I argue that IR continues to cling 
to this image of Japan, in the teeth of evidence attesting to its inadequacy for 
understanding and responding to the crises and opportunities faced by millions of 
Japanese people at the end of the century. Finally, and somewhat more 
controversially, I argue that those literatures and discussions which do evoke a more 
`complex' Japan, with all its attendant problems, are not as effective as they could be 
because of their tendency to remain cloistered within a `Japanese Studies' 
community, whose connections with IR debate are too sporadic and tenuous. 
At one level, accordingly, this thesis is a `theoretical' engagement with the ideas, 
assumptions and beliefs that give meaning to our perceptions of global reality - in 
particular to our perceptions of Japanese reality. At the same time it is intrinsically 
concerned with the everyday implications of this meaning- making process - the 
implications of IR theory as practice.'» As such, it shares a general concern with 
many scholars in the contemporary era, who seek to open up effectively closed 
theoretical spaces, in order to at least indicate the possibility for more sophisticated 
(and less dangerous) social and political practices. 
http: / /www.corpwatch.or trac /comer /worldnews /other /185.html. 
12 As with many of the ideas expressed in this work, the notion of `theory as practice' cannot be 
attributed to any single textual source. Its usage in this particular context is derived from Jim 
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One of the more notable contributions in this context has been that of John Lewis 
Gaddis, the eminent (and conservative) Cold War historian. Gaddis is also one of the 
very few `mainstream' scholars who, in the immediate aftermath of the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, had the courage to suggest that 
these events demanded a response other than the proclamation of Western `victory' 
in conventional politico- analytical terms. On the contrary, he argued, the dominant 
analytical techniques involved in charting the Cold War and its conclusion, known as 
Realism or neo- Realism, ensured that `both the historians and the theorists got it 
wrong. "13 The main error arose, Gaddis suggested, "from the way we calculated 
power during the Cold War years" - a calculation invoked: 
almost entirely in monodimensional terms, focusing particularly on military indices, 
when a multidimensional perspective might have told us more. The end of the Cold 
War made it blindingly clear that military strength does not always determine the 
course of great events: the Soviet Union collapsed, after all, with its arms and armed 
forces fully intact. Deficiencies in other kinds of power - economic, ideological, 
cultural, moral - caused the USSR to lose its superpower status, and we can now 
see that a slow but steady erosion in these non -military capabilities had been going 
on for some time t4 
Here, Gaddis is taking to task a whole generation of postwar scholarship, which, for 
most of the post -WW2 period, assured us that the Soviet Union could only be 
understood in the "monodimensional" (i.e., Realist, and later, neo- Realist) terms to 
which he refers. It is his broader point however; i.e., that concerning the general 
inadequacy of simple, clichéd models of global reality, which has most import for 
this thesis, and which has been reiterated and developed by scholars across the 
political and analytical spectrum, in relation to a variety of post -Cold War issues. 
From Stanley Hoffmann's meditations on the traditional, power -politics- inspired 
response that generated the hi -tech carnage of the Gulf War,15 to David Campbell's 
George's Discourses of Global Politics:A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994), 15. 
13 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 
284. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Stanley Hoffman, 'Delusions of World Order," New York Review of Books April 9, 1992: 37 -42. 
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deconstruction of the horrors that befell Bosnia during the break -up of former 
Yugoslavia,16 there is a growing sense that conventional thought and practice in IR is 
facing a watershed; the feeling that things "simply cannot go on as they have done. "t7 
It is this feeling that I wish to analyse in the context of Japan's post -Cold War 
international role, at a time when its future as one of the great powers of the 21' 
century is generally acknowledged to be one of the few certainties in an age of 
chronic uncertainty. And, while the Japan context is perhaps not as dramatic as that 
associated with the former Soviet Union, what I am suggesting here is that there are 
some important analogies to be drawn between the one -dimensional, caricatured 
representations of Soviet life and society that underwrote the Cold War Soviet 
`threat,' and contemporary representations of Japan as international actor. This is 
perhaps most obvious, as I will seek to demonstrate, in the way that debate on 
Japan's international role, particularly in the United States, has been prone to 
oscillate - between, on the one hand, continuing invective against Japan as a threat 
to global and regional security (i.e., U.S. economic hegemony -as- security) and on the 
other, nagging demands for Japan to undertake a greater real -world contribution 
towards upholding global security and stability. In a period when more nuanced and 
complex insights into Japanese reality are readily available, this is a framework 
which badly needs updating and expanding. Before this can happen however, some 
fundamental questions need to be asked: about how we speak about `international 
roles' in the first place, and how certain aspects of social reality are deemed relevant 
or important to discussing international agency, while others are not. 
In asking these questions, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the 
contemporary debate on Japan as an international actor. It does not, however, aim to 
provide definitive answers to these questions, or construct a replacement agenda for 
16 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998). This work is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
17 R. B. J. Walker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1988), 14. 
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Japan's international future. Indeed, this thesis is far less a project of construction, 
than it is one of connection - between texts, voices and ideas which, despite their 
crucial points of convergence, remain strangely separated from each other. As I wilt 
demonstrate in the course of the chapters to come, a whole range of literature, debate 
and commentary already exists within `Japanese Studies,' which offers opportunities 
for thinking about Japan in different, more incisive and productive ways. Yet, rarely 
if ever does this body of work find its way onto the IR agenda on the question of 
`Japan.' In the chapters to follow, I will explore why this is so, and how this 
situation might be changed. For now, however, I will return to the major issues 
surrounding Japan's international role as they are generally represented in 
mainstream debate, and explore a little further the question of how this debate 
developed, historically and intellectually. 
2. Modern Japan: Defining and Re- Defining an International Role. 
Looking at the broad themes which have tended to dominate discussions of Japan's 
international role in the world over the past century and a half, a certain sense of 
continuity emerges. For the purposes of this thesis, my discussion begins with the 
emergence of the modern Japanese state through the Meiji Restoration (Meiji Ishin), 
in 1868, when a group of political leaders drawn from the samurai class succeeded in 
establishing a new centralised political authority, headed by a revived imperial 
structure.18 The Restoration however, was not just an internal 'revolution from 
above.' Rather, and as a number of scholars have pointed out, it was a response to 
the increasingly urgent perception among the Japanese elite, that Japan needed to 
assert and defend its existence, in a world order that was by now irrevocably defined 
in terms of Western concepts of space and time.19 Thus, as Japan began to import the 
technologies and structures that had enabled the West to encroach upon its autonomy 
18 Marius Jansen, "The Meiji State: 1868 -1912," in Tim Megarry (ed.), The Making of Modern Japan 
(Dartford: Greenwich University Press, 1995), 67 -85. 
19 Tessa Morris- Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 
1998), 20-21. 
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in the mid -nineteenth century, its governing elite also worked to solidify the image of 
Japan as a united, centralised modern state. 
As Stefan Tanaka and others have argued, the circumstances of Japan's emergence as 
a modern state necessitated particular ways of representing Japan's place in the world 
- a place geoculturally connected to Asia, but which also had to be recognised as 
historically equivalent to the modern West, if Japan were not to suffer the same fate 
as colonised China 20 In this sense, the phrases and slogans coined to express Japan's 
post -Restoration destiny - such as Bunmei Kaika ("civilisation and 
enlightenment "), and the more famous Datsu -A -Ron (disassociation from Asia 
theory), conveyed neither the abandonment of Japanese cultural identity, nor the 
unambiguous celebration of Western superiority 2t Rather, they were meant to 
express Japan's unique location, both geographically and historically, as the mediator 
of Western civilisation and modernity (which, as Tanaka has shown, were by no 
means necessarily one and the same) to the East - and the representative of Eastern 
civilisation and culture to the West.22 
Inevitably however, as Japanese and Western strategic interests came increasingly 
into conflict in the region - and particularly after the Japanese defeat of Russia in 
1905 - this relatively benign view began to change. Instead of the emphasis on 
mediation, and Tôzai bunmei chôwa (the harmonisation of Eastern and Western 
civilisation), Japan's role came to be seen increasingly as protector and guide to the 
cultural and geographical space of Asia against the expansionist ambitions of the 
West, with the emphasis now more upon the inherent incompatibility of Eastern and 
20 Stefan Tanaka, Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 26. 
21 Datsu -A, Nyû -O (literally: "out of Asia, into Europe ") was coined by the nineteenth century 
educator Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835 -1901), one of the most famous figure in Japan's nineteenth 
century modernisation. Stefan Tanaka suggests, however, that such slogans were not simply about 
leaving a backward Asia behind and `Westernising;' rather, they reflected the ideal of a truly 
universal knowledge (which happened to come from the West), which Japan had to emulate if it were 
to survive and prosper as a modern state. Tanaka, Japan's Orient, 37 -38. 
22Ibid. 
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Western civilisation (Tôzai bunmei taiketsu) 23 The broad rationale for Japanese 
leadership remained more or less the same: Japan, it was argued, was the best 
qualified to lead Asia (with which it remained culturally and ethnically connected), 
against Western domination, precisely because it had, by now, temporally surpassed 
the rest of Asia in modernising achievement 24 And, as some have noted, it was a 
rationale that was initially welcomed by many other Asian, particularly in Malaysia, 
Burma and Vietnam, where there was experience of Western, but not Japanese 
colonialism25 
The tragic events of Japan's pre -war and wartime colonial adventure have been well 
documented elsewhere, and need not be reiterated here. My point for now is that 
when Japan's home -grown model of Asian hegemony finally disappeared in a puff of 
carcinogenic ash in August 1945, few people envisaged that it would be ever be 
resurrected. Yet it was; the very circumstances of Japan's defeat ensuring for it a 
postwar international role that would be, in many respects, a mere modification of 
the original Meiji /Shôwa vision. Occupied by the United States, and locked into the 
rapidly developing Cold War confrontation between the postwar superpowers, Japan 
would lead Asia again, but this time as the protégé and junior partner of postwar U.S. 
hegemony; an integral link in the bulwark of Free World defence against the threat of 
Soviet expansionism in the Pacific. It was envisaged, as the historian Bruce 
Cummings expresses it, in terms of a rolling back of the clock, "to an earlier 
conception of Japan's place in the world, before it went on the lamentable bender that 
23 Yamamuro Shin'ichi, "Ajia Ninshiki no Kijiku" (Criteria for Japanese Perceptions of Asía), in 
Furuya Tetsuo (ed.), Kindai Nihon ni Okeru Ajia Ninshiki (Perceptions of Asía in Modern Japan; 
Kyoto: Kyoto University Humanities Research Centre and Kyôdô Insatsu, 1994), 25 -27. 
24 Ydzô Yamamoto, "'Dai Tôa kyôeí maké' kôsô to sono kôzô" (Structure and Rationale in the 
Greater Eastern Co- Prosperity Sphere), in Tetsuo Furuya (ed.), Kindai Nihon no Ajia Ninshiki (Kyoto: 
Kyoto University Humanities Research Centre and Kyôdô Insatsu, 1994), 46. 
u John Dower, for example, describes how Ba Maw, the leader of Burma during the 1930s, evoked 
the vision of "a thousand million Asiatics." Later, bitterly disillusioned by the reality of Japanese 
`leadership' in Asia, Ba Maw would denounce Japanese "brutality, arrogance and racial pretensions." 
War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 6 -7. 
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ended with Pearl Harbour: an economic conception rather than one that would again 
loose a Japanese army on Asia. "26 
To this end, Japan had to he re -made in the image of American capitalist democracy; 
a project captured in the famous twin Occupation objectives of democratisation and 
demilitarisation. In later years, this prophetic coupling of slogans would come to 
signify many of the tensions and contradictions associated with Japan's international 
role.27 In the interim, however, democratisation and demilitarisation found 
permanent expression in the new Constitution, promulgated in 1947 under 
Occupation supervision. In particular, they were enshrined in the now -famous 
Article Nine, which states that: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use 
of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, 
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of 
the state will not be recognised 28 
Almost as soon as it came into force, Article Nine came to be regarded, by both the 
U.S. and Japanese conservative elite, as fundamentally incompatible with Japan's 
new role as Cold War ally of the West. Consequently, by the time of the Korean 
War in 1950, Occupation "reverse- course" policies had already begun to jettison 
many of the initial, more radical reforms carried out in the name of democratisation 
and demilitarisation. By the war's end, Eisenhower's administration had upgraded, 
from "desirable" to "imperative," Japan's role as an "active participant" in the 
containment of communist expansionism in Northeast Asia 29 This objective was 
partially achieved through the signing of the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty in 1953, 
26 Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," in Andrew Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan 
as History (Oxford, England: University of California Press, 1993), 46. 
27 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (London: Allen Lane, 1999), 
73-83, and 526 -527. 
28 The Constitution of Japan, Article Nine, 58. 
29 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 533. 
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which re- equipped Japan with a standing army of 180,000 "Self- Defence" personnel, 
and confirmed virtually unlimited U.S. access to Japan as a major conventional and 
nuclear base in the Pacifica° It was only the beginning of a long, steady erosion of 
Article Nine, through successively lenient "interpretations" (kaishaku) of it under 
Japanese law. These interpretations were unsuccessful to the extent that Article Nine 
remains, even today, a powerful rallying point for those opposed to Japan assuming 
an international military profile again, but they would prove effective enough in 
propelling Japan, albeit unwillingly, toward a more `normal' participation in military 
security. 
If Japan, as a `peace state,' continued to be a thorn in the side of U.S. Cold War 
military strategy, its role as a bulwark of capitalism was to evolve beyond anything 
which the founders of Pax Americana could have dreamed of in the early 1950s. The 
procurements bonanza precipitated by the Korean War kick -started the postwar 
Japanese economy, paying for more than a quarter of Japanese imports between 1951 
and 1956.31 Massive capital and technological inflow, and access to foreign markets 
under U.S. sponsorship allowed re- industrialisation and economic rationalisation to a 
degree that simply would not have been possible otherwise32. A mass consumer 
culture began to develop, as did a postwar power elite, whose conservative political 
hegemony eventually became known as the "1955 System;" a symbiotic set of 
relationships between big business, conservative (right -wing) politicians, and a 
powerful bureaucracy that eventually came to achieve almost disciplinary status in 
own right among postwar Japan analysts. And, it is typical of the fractured, 
paradoxical history of U.S. -Japan relations that, despite being the quintessential 
30 More will be said on this topic in Chapter Seven. 
31 Tessa Morris- Suzuki, Shôwa: An Inside History of Hirohito's Japan (Sydney: Methuen Australia, 
1984), 141. 
32 Particularly in industries such as iron, steel, and petroleum refinement, where the improvement of 
Japanese products would form an important basis for later prosperity. Laura E. Hein, "Growth 
Versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective," in Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan 
as History (op. cit., 1993), 109. 
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legacy of Occupation policy, the 1955 System would eventually become a major 
target of the U.S. critique in the 1980s. 33 
Japan's emergence as an economic power during the 1960s was important in both 
consolidating the 1955 system, and re- casting Japanese perceptions of what an 
international role for Japan should be. International prominence re- awakened 
feelings of national pride, if not exceptionalism, in Japan's miraculous postwar 
recovery. Inevitably, it also reopened tensions in the U.S. -Japan relationship that 
dated back to the signing of the San Francisco Treaty. U.S. discontent with the rise 
and rise of Japanese economic strength, particularly its penetration of U.S. domestic 
and foreign markets, re- awakened resentment concerning Japan's perceived "free 
ride" in both economic and military security. It was further exacerbated by the 
escalation of U.S. involvement in Indochina towards the end of the 1960s. 
In Japan, the major effect of the Vietnam war and its aftermath was a desire for 
increased sovereignty and independence in the world, that, not surprisingly, 
resonated across the political spectrum, albeit for very different reasons. Japanese 
military bases, particularly Okinawa, were indispensable to the U.S. war in Vietnam, 
but the televised devastation of another Asian society in the name of the "free 
world," of which Japan was emphatically part, awakened widespread feelings of 
public doubt and resentment. The Japanese grassroots organisation beheiren, or 
People's Organisation for Peace in Vietnam, played a significant role in the social 
protests that rocked Japanese urban society through much of the late 1960s, along 
with other public groups campaigning on sensitive policy issues of the day (e.g. 
33 Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," in Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History (op. 
cit., 1993), 14 -15, and, more expansively, in the final chapter of Embracing Defeat (op. cit., 1999), 
547 -64. The "reverse course" policy involved, among other things, the rehabilitation of prominent 
political figures who had been purged by the MacArthur administration because of their wartime 
associations, the easing of restrictions on the giant conglomerates, or zaibatsu, which had been the 
core of the imperial war effort, and the tightening of labour restrictions; especially those concerning 
industrial unionism. In 1950, the reverse swing became even more dramatic as McCarthyism 
extended to Japan. A succession of Red Purges between 1950 and 1952 saw over 700,000 workers 
lose their jobs in factories, public enterprises and the media. William K. Tabb, The Postwar Japanese 
System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 79. 
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relations with China, Okinawa, and the renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty} 34 
Meanwhile, conservatives who supported Japan's general adherence to the U.S. 
vision of capitalist security and stability in Asia were increasingly unhappy with 
what they saw as continued Japanese subservience to U.S. strategic and economic 
interests. Subsequent, and decidedly unilateral American initiatives to change the 
bilateral relationship (Nixon's unannounced visit to China in 1971, and the 
announcement of his "new economic policy ") only confirmed the perception, 
whatever one's political convictions, that Japan's place in the world was being 
dominated from "outside." And, while many specific points of difference would be 
officially resolved by the mid- 1970s, the feeling that the 'special' postwar 
relationship was out of kilter remained prominent on either side of the Pacific. It 
would find new, and powerful forms of expression in the 1980s. 
"Burden- sharing" During the 1980s: The Lead -up to the Gulf War 
The Vietnam war fuelled another timely economic boom in Japan, one that proved a 
major turning point in terms of Japan's location within the global political economy. 
Even by the end of the 1970s, Japan was not yet, as Ezra Vogel so famously 
expressed it, "number one; "35 yet its growing economic strength, accentuated by the 
relative decline in U.S. fortune, made it clear that the gap was closing. By the mid 
1980s, another enormous blow had been dealt to traditional images of the U.S. -Japan 
relationship, when the U.S. became the world's largest debtor country and Japan the 
world's great creditor. Japan was now undoubtedly an economic superpower, a fact 
that created immense structural and psychological problems for the U.S., and 
tensions within the U.S. -Japan relationship that would be pivotal to the `burden 
sharing" debate of the 1990s 
It must also be noted that during this period, Japan came under the prime 
ministership of Nakasone Yasuhiro (1983- 1987), a committed supporter of the 
34 Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 22 -24. 
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(U.S.) view that Japan should accept a greater share in the military defence of the 
region. Under Nakasone, accordingly, the Japanese government breached self - 
imposed guidelines on Japanese military spending, jettisoned embargoes on the 
export of weapons and military- related manufactures, and opened access to advanced 
Japanese technology to assist Reagan's "Star Wars" vision. 36 Such policies were 
reinforced, on the U.S. side, by a renewed commitment to Japan as America's most 
important regional strategic ally, Yet, it was also during this period that Japan 
`bashing,' particularly in the realm of economic relations, reached new, ugly and 
often hysterical heights. Foreign criticism, most of it from the U.S. media, blasted 
continuing Japanese economic growth as "adversarial," and "neomercantilist," and 
the continuing closure of its domestic market as `unfair.' °7 In Japan, meanwhile, 
`internationalisation' or kokusaika was becoming the public catch -cry of the 1980s, 
representing a new, more cosmopolitan Japan to the world. As I will explain in 
Chapter Seven, kokusaika was itself underwritten by a particular sense of nationalism 
which, as Japan moved from success to success, was to manifest itself in equally 
chauvinistic, "counter- bashing" terms towards the U.S., and in a renewed sense of 
superiority toward other `Asian' foreigners 38 More and more, Japanese 
interpretations of the incredible postwar recovery would play down the influence of 
`external' factors (such as American patronage and war booms) in Japan's success, 
preferring to dwell instead on the `uniqueness' of Japanese identity and values. 
In this way, as the Cold War drew to an end, debate about the U.S. - Japan 
relationship remained riven with tension and doubt on either side. While the 
35 Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (London: Harvard University Press, 
1979). 
36 The l- percent -of -GNP ceiling was formally introduced in 1976, by which time, Japanese military 
spending in real money terms already ranked seventh in the world. Numerous critics have argued that 
the guideline was, and is deceptive, because depending on what calculations are used, real Japanese 
military spending has generally exceeded one percent of its GNP. Even were this not the case, one 
also needs to heed Dower's observation that "1 percent of a huge and [until recently] constantly 
expending economy is by definition itself huge and constantly expanding." Dower, "Peace and 
Democracy in Two Systems," 30. 
37 Masao Miyoshi, Off Center: Power and Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 120. 
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military/security relationship forged against the now defunct Soviet Union continued 
to function, Japan was increasingly represented as a "threat" in U.S, media, academic 
and foreign policymaking circles, often via a vocabulary of danger, irrationality, and 
contrasts between (American) `individualism' and (foreign) `groupism' that were 
drawn directly from anti -Soviet rhetoric during the Cold War 39 Even when the tone 
was more moderate and optimistic, an unmistakable unease regarding the future of 
Japan's international role persisted, an unease that would eventually erupt again into 
bitter disagreement - this time however, in a post -Cold War context, via the events 
of the early 1990s. 
The Gulf War: Re- Igniting the Burden Sharing Debate 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the response from the major industrial 
powers was, as Noam Chomsky has pointed out, twofold: 
The first [response] was an array of economic sanctions of unprecedented severity. 
The second was the threat of war. Both responses were initiated at once, even before 
Iraq's annexation of the invaded country. The first response had broad support. The 
second is pretty much limited to the U.S. and Britain, apart from the family 
dictatorships that had been placed in charge of the Gulf oil producing states. As 
leader of the two -member coalition, the U.S. moved quickly to ensure that sanctions 
could not be effective and to bar any diplomatic initiative.40 
Chomsky's observations about international responses to the first major post -Cold 
War conflict shed important light on how and why the Gulf War managed to 
precipitate the issue of Japan's burden -sharing from the relatively low -level status it 
had in formal U.S. -Japan relations, to a major, acrimonious controversy, framed in 
terms of `real' contributions to global peace and security. The initial Japanese 
government response to the war was to comply with the sanctions imposed by the 
ss Harumi Befu, "Internationalisation of Japan and Nihon Bunkaron," in Hiroshi Mannari and 
Harumi Befu (eds.), The Challenge of Japan's Internationalisation: Organisation and Culture (New 
York: Kodansha International, 1983), 262. 
39 Good examples of this approach include James Fallows' More Like Us: Making America Great 
Again (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), and Woronoff's Japan as Anything But Number One 
(Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991). 
4° Noam Chomsky, "The Gulf Crisis" (Sourced at The Noam Chomsky Archive on the Internet, at 
http : / /www .zmag.org /chomsky /intro.cfm), 1. 
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UN, but the pians submitted by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, to send a (largely 
symbolic) contingent of Self- Defence Force troops to the Gulf, were scotched by the 
Japanese Diet on the basis that such a move would be unconstitutional. A 
subsequent pledge of thirteen billion dollars towards Operation Desert Storm did 
nothing to mitigate criticism of this decision in Europe and the United States, where 
Japan's lack of `global responsibility' was trumpeted almost daily. Proclaimed The 
Economist: 
Stand up, Japan, the world needs you. By hiding behind a doubtful interpretation of 
its war -renouncing constitution, say Japan's critics, it is forfeiting any say in shaping 
the new world order its westem partners want to construct. After Japan's role in the 
Gulf War - a role so retiring as to be embarrassing - they want to see a more 
assertive political leadership, matching the country's diplomatic weight to its 
economic muscle. It would be a Japan that stopped saying no 4i 
The traditional association of military activity with global `responsibility,' ensured 
that Japan's paying more for global security was never going to alleviate the demand 
for `active' participation in the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. In Japan itself, as 
the Economist article suggested, this was a view supported by many members of the 
governing elite, explicitly or otherwise. As Yamaguchi Jirô later explained: 
In the Gulf War, Japan did nothing but pay money to prosecute the war. Leaders of 
the government and the LDP said that this kind of 'chequebook diplomacy' appeared 
quite selfish, and would drive Japan into total isolation .42 
The speed with which the Western powers overwhelmed Iraq ensured that Japan 
never got to play the active role demanded of it in this particular conflict. In the long 
term however, the Gulf war proved pivotal in directing debate on Japan's place in the 
post -Cold War world. In June 1992, hastening to counter accusations of 
"chequebook diplomacy," the Japanese Diet (Parliament) passed the International 
41 "Time to Wake Up." The Economist, 9 March 1991, 58 -59. 
42 Jirô Yamaguchi, "Japanese Security Policy After the End of the Cold War," in Richard Leaver and 
James L. Richardson (eds.), The Post -Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1993), 172. 
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Peace Cooperation (IPC) Legislation,43 allowing the overseas dispatch of Japanese 
military forces to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations" Almost immediately 
afterwards, a contingent of Japanese Self- Defence Troops was sent to participate in 
the United Nations Transitional Authority operation in Cambodia. Japan's first `real' 
contribution to the new world order was generally deemed a great success, 
particularly in the West, where it was hailed as demonstrating a new maturity in 
Japanese foreign policy. Such commendation, combined with the absence of SDF 
casualties45 and the ostentatiously "non- military" nature of the duties performed by 
the SDF in Cambodia," helped to mollify public anxiety and anger over the further 
erosion of Article Nine, and since then, there have been further successful dispatches 
of SDF peacekeepers (to Mozambique, Bosnia, Zaire/Rwanda and the Golan 
Heights). 
Today, it is difficult to evoke the original sense of urgency and crisis associated with 
the SDF peacekeeping issue in Japan in the early 1990s. Indeed, it has become all 
but a non -issue, particularly since 1994, when a celebrated policy reversal by Japan's 
Socialist Party effectively banished the constitutional status of the SDF itself, to the 
very periphery of political debate. 47 Now, it is less a matter of debating where the 
SDF fits into Article Nine, than how Article Nine can be fitted (`interpreted) around 
the far bolder steps that have been taken to ensure that Japan continues to modify its 
military profile and capacity in keeping with a 'real -world' superpower role. This 
43 Better known as the 'PKO [peace- keeping operation] Law.' Ibid., 175. 
44 Eventually, Japanese minesweepers were also dispatched to the Gulf region, to participate in 
cleanup operations under the auspices of the United Nations. Ibid., 178. 
45 During the course of the operation, two Japanese civilian policeman were killed, in an apparent 
Khmer Rouge ambush. A private volunteer worker, Nakata, was also shot and killed in a separate 
incident. 
4á SDF activities were mostly confined to "non- military" tasks such as road -building: initial public 
sensitivity towards the PKO Law saw them barred even from tasks such as mine clearing. Ibid. 
47 This reversal was part of a famous compromise, via which the SPJ (now known as the Socialist 
Democratic Party) formed a coalition government with its long -standing enemy the Liberal 
Democratic Party (headed by Tomíichi Murayama). Gavan McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese 
Affluence (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Ltd., 1996), 212 -13. At the time of completing this thesis, 
the national convention of the Japan Communist Party (which, of all the major political parties in 
Japan, had always taken the most uncompromising stance on Japan's remilitarisation) was widely 
expected to approve a proposal to revise its charter in order to tolerate the mobilisation of the SDF in 
"a military emergency." Despite this, the JCP still maintains that the SDF is fundamentally 
unconstitutional. Minoru Tada, "Communists to 'Tolerate' SDF," The Japan Times Online at 
http '/wwwpantimes.p /opinion htm. 
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sense of Japan bowing to the inevitable, the rational, is reflected in the perspective of 
former Prime Minister Ryfitarô Hashimoto, who argued in 1993, prior to assuming 
his leadership, that: 
At present, when we consider Japan's role in global security, Japan faces three 
choices. It can continue as a "merchant state" [shôjin kokka], or it can become a 
country that carries the bare minimum of necessary armaments, separating itself 
from those dangers which threaten people in other countries. Or, it can choose to 
carry arms commensurate with the spirit of the United Nations, becoming a "normal 
country" [futsû no kuni]. Those of us in the LOP at least, do not see "merchant 
statehood" as an option for Japan .48 
For Hashimoto, as for countless other Japanese commentators, national pride, as 
much as global responsibility, is at stake in Japan's 21st century foreign policy 
choices. In this sense, the traditional connection between real power and politico - 
military practice is re- affirmed in the connection of the SDF /Constitution/Defence 
Agreement debate, to an increasing sense of grievance associated with Japan's share 
of global decisionmaking power. Contemporary Japanese discussions of Japan's 
post -Cold War global role rarely omit the claim that Europe and the United States 
continue to deny Japan the indices of global power that successive Japanese 
governments have been asking for since the early 1990s. Commonly cited examples 
include Japan's (to date, unsuccessful) attempts to obtain a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council, and increased voting rights and decisionmaking 
power within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. There is also the 
Japanese government's parallel interest in increasing its input into organisations and 
events associated with global cultural power: UNESCO, the Olympic Federation, and 
even the World Cup football tournament 49 
48 Ryûtarô Hashimoto, Vision of Japan: Waga Kyôchô ni Seisaku Arite (Vision of Japan: Policies in 
Alignment; Tokyo: K. K Besutoserâzu, 1993), 106. 
49 For example, while Japan today pays approximately 20 percent of total UN dues, there are only 
about 115 Japanese nationals employed by the UN; approximately half of the percentage that would 
reflect Japan's financial input to the organisation. The most senior of these employees is Koichiro 
Matsuura, who became UNESCO Secretary- General in November 1999. Matsuura has spoken 
publicly about the need for Japanese people employed within international organisations "to have the 
guts to assert themselves aggressively." Kiroku Hanai, "English is Not the Answer," The Japan 
Times, June 26, 2000. Sourced from the Japan Times Online Archive, at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/search.htm. 
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The more immediate point however, is that Hashimoto's vision for Japan in the 
future (and it is a widely shared one), draws upon a highly conventional sense of IR 
rationality and logic concerning the possibilities for world order and security - 
despite the vastly changed circumstances in which Japan finds itself. Against this, it 
is hardly surprising that government responses to the global role challenge since the 
1990s, have included ever bolder steps towards ensuring that Japan increase its 
military contribution towards regional order and stability, while affirming its 
traditional position within the framework of security thinking and geopolitical 
practice of the United States. Of particular importance, in this context, are the series 
of joint declarations by Japan and the U.S. on security issues since the mid- 1990s, 
culminating in the 1997 Review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence 
Cooperation.5° The Review is based, as a preceding declaration explains, on the 
understanding that: 
(S)ince the end of the Cold War the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. 
The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among 
countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is 
more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the 
emergence of an Asia- Pacific community. The Asia -Pacific region has become the 
most dynamic area of the globe. 
At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue 
on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, 
including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional 
conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery all constitute sources of instability 51 
Against this framework of post -Cold War `change,' which remains, nonetheless, 
underwritten by the age -old certainties of power politics, the Review stipulates that 
existing U.S. -Japan security arrangements are to be supplemented by greater 
so "Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S. -Japan Defence Cooperation," sourced 
online at the U.S. Department of Defence Web Site at 
htt.: www.state.ov'www re ionsleap/iapan /rpt- us)pn1 
defense9 /0923.html. 
51 "U.S. 
- Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," 1. Sourced online at 
the U.S. Department of Defence Web Site at 
http: / /www. state. gov /www/ regions leap /japan /jointsec.html. 
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Japanese activity, both in its own defence and, more controversially, in "situations in 
areas surrounding Japan" that are deemed to have "an important influence on Japan's 
peace and security. "52 Such activities remain, of course, firmly under the direction 
and control of the United States military forces and, to date, confined to "non- 
combatant support:" for example, the evacuation of refugees, the provision of rear 
area material support (excluding weapons and ammunition), transportation duties, 
repair and maintenance services to U.S. machinery, and so on. Yet the document 
also makes it clear that this is by no means a finished project, stating that Japan and 
the U.S. "will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner, when 
changes in situations relevant to the U.S. -Japan security relationship occur and if 
deemed necessary... "53 
In short then, Japan's `new' international role in the 21'` century is, once again, that 
designed for it in 1945, albeit in a context of far greater tensions between Japan and 
its erstwhile postwar mentor. At a moment when change is acknowledged at all 
kinds of levels, the role of Japan in the world remains essentially constant as do 
its concerns for "normal statehood," which are, I suggest, a testament to the 
influences upon its decision making elite, foremost among which remains the claim 
for `realism;' still anchored, as Gaddis lamented, in Cold War perspectives and 
premises. 
In this respect, Japan's dilemma is not particularly unique, given the continuing 
dominance of Cold War frameworks for international theory and practice. 
Commenting on this dominance, Ken Booth has argued that, while the Cold War 
may have come to an end as a particular historical period, its cognitive influence is 
much harder to shake off, with the "experience lessons, remembrances and 
forgettings" of the four and a half decades after 1945 remaining pivotal in 
international theory and practice, while the very memory of the Cold War is itself "a 
52 
"Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S. -Japan Defence Cooperation," 2. 
53 Ibid., 12. 
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prize to struggle over. "54 Thus, Booth writes, "the apparently `academic' debate over 
what the Cold War was is part of the politics of deciding what the post -Cold War 
is. "55 More importantly, he suggests, the particular mindset that helped generate and 
justify the `historical' train of events that we understand as the Cold War, represents 
a much older phenomenon - a 700 -year -old international political culture of 
conflict. Booth describes this phenomenon as the "cold war of the mind" which 
manifests itself: 
when a confrontation between nations or states ceases to be simply a matter of a 
political clash of interests and instead takes on the character - the depth, the 
persuasiveness, the semi -permanence, the identity and the commitment - of an 
eschatological political culture 56 
In the course of this thesis, and especially in Chapter Three, I will show how Japan 
became locked into this "cold war of the mind," in a way which profoundly 
influenced its postwar development, and which continues to resonate in the decisions 
being taken today by the Japanese policymaking elite in regard to Japan's 
international role. This, of course, has long been recognised by many within the 
Japanese Studies community. In particular, `critical historians' such as John Dower 
(1986, 1993, 1999),57 Laura E. Hein (1990, 1993),58 Bruce Cumings (1989, 1999)54 
and Andrew Gordon (1993),60 have illustrated the effects of the cold war mindset in 
Japan, rightly attributing to it developments such as the reversal of early postwar 
democratic reform; the establishment of a conservative oligarchy which discouraged 
public reflection upon wartime aggression; the development of the myth of 
homogenous, "mass middle class" Japanese society; and the pursuit of a growth -at- 
54 Ken Booth, "Cold Wars of the Mind," in Ken Booth (ed.), Statecraft and Security: The Cold War 
and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 29. 
55 Ibid. 
56Ibid., 31 -32. 
57 John Dower, War Without Mercy (op. cit., 1986); Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New 
York: The New Press, 1993); and Embracing Defeat (1999; op. cit.). 
58 Laura E. Hein, Fuelling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), and "Growth versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy 
in Historical Perspective" (op. cit., 1993). 
s4 Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System" (op. cit., 1993), and Parallax Visions: Making 
Sense of American -East Asian Relations at the End of the Century (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1999). 
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all -costs economic policy, whose full environmental and social implications are still 
being accounted for. 
In this regard too, there are many Japan observers for whom the question of Japan's 
future requires something other than simple assumptions about the all- powerful 
nature of market relations and /or state- centric anarchy, not to mention the stable, 
progressive and homogenous nature of postwar Japanese society. Their work is 
important to this thesis, which will use it to illustrate other `Japans' that have hitherto 
escaped the notice of those primarily concerned with Japan as an international actor. 
Yet my point here, to reiterate it, is not just that the accepted truths of Japan's 
postwar progress, and its future needs, can be rendered problematic through other 
narratives and other perspectives. Rather, it is that these perspectives are unlikely to 
be acknowledged as valuable, or even relevant, while Japan's international identity 
remains locked within the sort of politico -intellectual framework that creates and 
sustains "cold wars of the mind" - the framework that has dominated IR theory and 
practice. 
My broader point, and one that defines the critical ambition of this thesis, is that 
neither the alternatives that exist for Japan as a post -Cold War international actor, nor 
the need for them, can be understood without reflecting upon what 'IR' means in this 
context, and how its dominant tradition of theory and practice has impacted upon the 
way `Japan' has been conceived of and written about, as an IR subject. This brings 
me more directly to the question of Realism, or more recently, neo- Realism, 
undoubtedly, the dominant perspective(s) on global reality within IR intellectual and 
policy circles since WW2, and the primary conduit of the `Japan' which is the 
subject of scholarly and policy reference in the 1990s.61 In the attempt to construct 
some kind of dialogical bridge between IR and Japanese Studies as the thesis 
6o Andrew Gordon, Introduction to Postwar Japan as History (op. cit., 1993). 
61 On the dominance of Realism /neo- Realism, see Steve Smith, "New Approaches to International 
Theory," in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction 
to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 168 -69. 
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progresses, I need to confront this Realism issue, and explain how and why it has 
been largely responsible for the lack of dialogue thus far. In so doing, another 
question needs to be confronted, one that is even less commonly engaged in the 
debate over IR and Japan. 
This is the question of positivism which, I suggest, operates at the ontological core of 
Realism and is, therefore, the mainspring of its knowledge of global reality. In 
chapter Two, I will seek to explain in more detail the nature and significance of 
positivism in this context. In chapter Three, my aim is to show a positivist based 
Realism in practice, as it were, particularly on the issue of Japan as a global actor. 
The aim of chapter Four is to show how neo- Realist perspectives continue to shape 
and direct the IR and Japan debate while chapters Five, Six, and Seven are concerned 
more directly with opening the critical bridge between IR scholars and Japanese 
Studies scholars, in order to address `Japan' beyond the parameters of positivist 
Realism. In these chapters, in particular, my concern is to show what is 
systematically left out of the orthodox debates over Japan, and why a more inclusive 
engagement with Japanese society and peoples is necessary in any adequate analysis 
of its nature and role in the new millennium. For now however, and to conclude this 
introductory chapter, my aim is to further introduce some of the complex 
`theoretical' themes touched on above in brief, but in a manner which hopefully 
provides a further sense of their importance to the thesis. 
3. IR Realism, Japanese Studies and Positivism: Some Introductory Remarks. 
There are at least four fundamental assumptions underpinning the Realist approach to 
IR. The first is that individual, sovereign states are the most important actors in the 
international arena, and therefore the primary unit of realistic IR analysis, even in the 
age of global (economic) interdependence. The second, that the international arena is 
the site of endemic anarchy, the location for the struggle for (military and market) 
power which remains the essential characteristic of the global system. The third is 
that this anarchy has within it an inherent rationality, expressed in starkly utilitarian 
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terms (either as self -interested pursuit of maximum interest, or of regime 
maintenance) Finally, that, for all the cooperative posturing of recent times, there is 
a general absence of cooperative behaviour among states and other actors, except in 
cases where self- interest makes it worthwhile. These assumptions have remained 
intrinsic to Realism since its seminal U.S. scholar, Hans Morgenthau (1948), insisted 
that they correspond to the "objective laws" that govern political life at the 
international level 62 
These are, I suggest, also the assumptions that continue to inform current IR debate 
about Japan's options in the world, despite the generally broader IPE and neo- liberal 
agenda that has characterised global commentary since the early 1980s. 
Underpinning these assumptions about what is real in the current era, is a particular 
approach to knowledge and reality per se known as positivism. While the term 
`positivism' has been much misused in IR, often muddling together different, if 
interrelated methodologies and philosophical premises, I use the term here to refer to 
a specific approach to `knowing' the world, derived from a unified view of science, 
which seeks to explain reality in terms of a dichotomy between cognition and `fact.' 
Or, as Ernest Gellner has pointed out, it represents a commitment, in contemporary 
Anglo- American social thought in particular, to the distinction between an 
independent world of fact, and a realm of theorised knowledge derived either 
deductively or inductively from it 63 For Gellner, as for many others, the endurance 
of the fact /theory dichotomy has little to do with its logical merit, which has been 
questioned, in varying ways, by scholars from Gallileo to Kant. For all this, it has 
remained at the core of Anglo- American social science, particularly during the post - 
WWII period, with enormous implications for IR . 
62 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5`h edition; New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973). More will be said on this work in Chapter Two. 
63 Ernest Gellner, Legitimisation of Belief (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974),175 -177. 
"The world of regular, morally neutral, magically un- manipuable fact," Gellner writes, "which some 
of us are now in danger of taking too much for granted and which is presupposed by science, is in fact 
not at all self -evident." Ibid., 180. 
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As indicated, I will touch on these implications more thoroughly in Chapter Two. 
For now, I will merely reiterate the importance of these issues for IR in both theory 
and practice. Quite simply, and as one scholar puts it: 
if one takes the view that knowledge is derived from activities "out there" in the real 
world (e.g., knowable via testing procedures designed to separate out the facts from 
mere interpretation), then there is little point in further reflection upon the process by 
which these activities are understood. One simply responds to them in ways which 
best serve, for example, the national interest.64 
In terms more specifically connected to this thesis, this can mean, for example, that 
there is little `practical' value in reflecting critically upon the choice made by Japan 
to re -arm in the post WW2 period. From the above perspective Japan -as -state is 
simply acting realistically in responding to an `external' phenomenon - an 
anarchical world of states (and other actors), all engaged in the competition for 
power and hierarchical status.65 In this context also, there is no need to contemplate 
the specific historical and political circumstances under which some Japanese 
citizens (namely, the people of Japan's southernmost prefecture, Okinawa), have 
borne a grossly unfair share of the burden involved in defending Japanese `national 
interests' (nor, indeed, the nature of such `interest'). One simply assigns them the 
status of necessary, if unfortunate victims of a greater public good 66 
This is not to suggest of course, that there are any easy answers to the issues posed 
above, or the others that will be examined in this thesis in regard to Japan as a global 
actor. Rather, my point is that before we, as citizens of the world, can begin to re- 
address the questions of what matters to us concerning Japan and its peoples, we 
need to readdress the question of `what matters' in IR per se. And, before we can 
64 George, Discourses of Global Politics, 21. 
65 This is certainly the view, for example, taken by Geoffrey Hawthome, who explains that Japan's 
current foreign policy "is now more consistent than it has been with beliefs beyond East Asia about 
what national interests are and what matters for international security [emphasis added]." 
Hawthorne also warns against supposing that "the end of the Cold War has marked the end of the 
defensive and incipiently aggressive competition between nation states. No East Asian state, 
certainly, is rash enough to suppose that it has been" Geoffrey Hawthorne, "A New Japan? A New 
Security ?," in Ken Booth (ed.), Statecraft and Security (op. cit., 1998), 219. 
66 Okinawa and its role in Japanese national security will be explored further in Chapter Seven. 
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begin to do this in any profound way, we need to know something of the way in 
which `what matters' in IR has been made to matter. It goes without saying that this 
is a long and complex process, yet it is increasingly being taken up by those in the IR 
community for whom the various crises of contemporary global life require some 
other response than acquiescence to traditional truths about the way the world `just 
is.' 
This thesis, as indicated, seeks to make a contribution to this process, by considering 
the impact of positivism upon IR scholarship and Japanese Studies. It does so in a 
context in which such influences have been very powerful, but almost never 
explicitly addressed. On the odd occasion when `theoretical' issues have been 
traversed, the power of positivism and Realism have been evident enough. This was 
so in the very important work of Edwin Reischauer, whose detailed observations of 
Japanese society were made from an anti -Soviet Realist perspective that set the 
broader political tone for `what mattered' about Japanese political economy and 
society until well into the 1970s. Above all, Reischauer was to play a pivotal role in 
the intellectual push to explain Japan's spectacular postwar progress in terms of 
Modernisation Theory during the 1960s and, in doing so, bring knowledge of Japan 
into line with the positivist -based behaviouralism that had come to dominate social 
science thinking and research in the U.S. From the perspective of this thesis, 
consequently, Reischauer's work remains very important as an important conduit of 
Japan -related knowledge within the general context of Anglo- American `scientific' 
theory and the broader Realist agenda in IR, and I will return to his contribution, and 
others like it, in Chapter Three. 
The (ostensible) demise of Modernisation Theory will receive more attention in 
Chapter Four, as will the challenges to Realism during the early 1970s, a period 
which saw U.S. analysts in particular beginning to re -think some of their dominant 
assumptions and techniques in the aftermath of events that were no longer explicable 
in traditional terms. This was particularly evident for IR analysts struggling to come 
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to terms with, among other things, the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, the decline 
of U.S. economic hegemony, the crises in the Third World and, importantly, the 
relentless rise of Japan as a major economic competitor. As I will show however, the 
mainstream response to these events was to reformulate, rather than abandon, its 
conventional Realist assumptions, albeit with greater emphasis on international 
economic relations and the systemic forces that determine the behaviour of major 
global actors. Here, the structuralist arguments of IR scholars such as Kenneth Waltz 
played a key role in the Realist reconfiguration, which saw an amalgam of 
conservative structuralism, neo- classical economics and a Popperian variation on 
positivist themes re- presented as neo- Realism. 
It was via this `new' systemic approach that mainstream scholars (in the U.S. in 
particular) would, in the 1980s, be able to return to the issues that had occupied them 
in the post WW2 era, having satisfied themselves that they had resolved the difficult 
questions of theory and policy practice asked of Realism during the immediate post - 
Vietnam period. One of these issues was, of course, Japan, and the question of Japan 
was prominent in the neo- Realist literature both in mainstream IR and in Japanese 
Studies, where it profoundly influenced the post- Vietnam `reassessment' era. In this 
latter context, major new Japan `texts,' notably Chalmers Johnson's MITI and the 
Japanese Miracle, would be credited with establishing new theoretical parameters for 
understanding Japan. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter Four, Johnson 
rejected what he termed the "projection" of dominant Western politico- economic 
theories onto Japan's 'miracle,' seeking instead to locate this miracle in the context 
of the specific historical events and forces which had shaped Japan's emergence as a 
modern state, from a perspective that came to be known as `revisionism' in Japanese 
Studies circles. Assessments of this perspective, whether positive or negative, have 
rarely been located in the broader context of IR, but from the point of view of this 
thesis there is an important chronological and thematic connection between the 
establishment of neo- Realism as the dominant paradigm of mainstream IR, and the 
emergence of a perspective which, while claiming to significantly 'revise' dominant 
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Western perceptions of Japan, remained very much located in the basic world view 
of structural anarchy and competition that had been re- established via the neo- Realist 
makeover. 
This connection was subsequently confirmed, as I will demonstrate, by the adoption 
of many of Johnson's key themes in the late 1980s by the `generalist' IPE and IR 
scholarship of figures such as Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, and Robert Keohane, 
who utilised them to produce Japan- specific variations on what had, by then, become 
the overarching concern of mainstream analysis, e.g. the need for maintenance of the 
global status quo via U.S. economic and political hegemony, against the threat of 
politico- economic anarchy. While Japan's perceived role in this threat scenario 
ranged from benign (as in the `burden sharing' debates) to openly threatening (as 
represented in the more extreme variants of Japan bashing), the fundamental nature 
of the world in which Japan exists was never really in doubt. It remained, as Realists 
from Morgenthau to Waltz have asserted, a never -ending struggle for power in an 
inherent state of anarchy. 
Contemporary Diversions: A Word on the "neo -neo" Debate 
This thesis takes the perspective that options for Japan's contemporary international 
role continue to be framed in predominantly neo- Realist terms. I am aware that this 
stance potentially ignores one of the more enduring debates within IR circles, 
concerning what has come to be known as neo- liberalism, or neo- liberal 
institutionalism. As is well known, the perceived stand -off between neo- Realism and 
neo- liberalism concerns, primarily, the degree to which cooperation among states 
mitigates the Realist /neo- Realist depiction of international life as a never- ending 
struggle for maximum advantage in the absence of a central authority (anarchy), with 
the neo- Realists arguing for the continued predominance of conflict, while neo- 
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liberals tend to emphasise the role of cooperation 67 The end of the Cold War, 
coupled with the greatly increased globalisation of economic activity has seen 
something of a renaissance of this debate, as analysts try to map out the nature and 
circumstances of conflict and interdependence. 
There are, of course, differences in emphasis and style within the neo- liberal /neo- 
Realist debate, and some important differences in specifics (i.e. on the role of 
regimes, and the extent to which domestic politics influence international relations)." 
My own position however, concurs with that of scholars such as Steve Smith and Ole 
Waever, who have argued, convincingly, that the `differences' between neo- 
Liberalism and neo- Realism are less important than their convergences.69 Robert 
Keohane has also concurred with this view from the `inside' of the "neo -neo" circle, 
arguing that neo- liberalism "borrows as much from realism as from liberalism: it 
cannot be encapsulated as simply a `liberal' theory opposed at all points to 
realism. "70 Smith's point however, goes beyond the shared assumptions of neo- 
liberalism and neo- Realism; rather, it is that both neo- Realist and neo- liberal 
perspectives have, over the years "shared a specific view of how to create knowledge 
(emphasis added)... look[ing] at the same issue from different sides."-Ti In other 
words, the "neo -neo" debate is actually two sides of the same coin, with both 
perspectives sharing the same (positivist) image of global reality 72 
My thesis does pay attention to the influence of the neo -neo debate in Japanese 
Studies, which has been evident, I suggest, in both the updated Modernisation themes 
that service the lingering `Asian values' identity debate; and, more recently, in 
several prominent Japanese contributions to the developing literature on 
67 David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics," in David A. Baldwin (ed.), 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 6 -8. 
68 Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War" in Baldwin (ed.), 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (op. cit., 1993), 272. 
69 Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," 170. 
7° Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge," 274. 
71 Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory," 170. 
72 /bid., 172. 
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globalisation. These issues and the texts that speak about them will be debated more 
fully in Chapter Seven. My point for now is that the 'neo -neo' world view does not 
provide the thinking space that is needed if we are to understand the tensions and 
possibilities of a major global actor such as Japan, in something other than the crude 
clichés associated with our understanding of the former Soviet Union. The location 
of such space is the focus of the second half of the thesis. 
4. Critical Convergences: International Relations and `Other' Japans. 
As I illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, Japan, for many, can still be seen as 
one of the global `winners' (in Kennedy's terms) of the post -Cold War world order. 
Economic crises notwithstanding, it remains one of the world's most affluent and 
(seemingly) stable societies, difficult to associate with widespread poverty, violence 
or extreme social fragmentation. Yet as I also pointed out, there is growing evidence 
that for many, Japan's modern experience is under profound strain. At stake here, in 
addition to the specific examples of social, political and environmental disruption 
cited earlier, is a more general sense of crisis and foreboding that, paradoxically, 
seems to he motivated in part by Japan's very success in the world. One of the most 
eloquent articulations of this sense of malaise comes from the Australian scholar, 
Gavan McCormack who, in 1996, laid bare some of the ironies attendant upon late 
twentieth century membership of the `miracle' economy. 
In Japan the approach of the end of the century is experienced with particular pain 
and unease, because the long quest for the holy grail of modernisation and equality 
of status with the West is over, but, having "made it," people are bombarded with 
messages urging them to redouble their efforts, to work harder (because of the fierce 
rivalry stirred by the success of their efforts so far), to import more (to help other 
countries pay for their Japanese goods), and to consume more, so that the trajectory 
of growth may be resumed. The object of the long quest of the modem age is 
chimerical, a bird glimpsed momentarily through the foliage that flew away so 
quickly that perhaps it was never there in the first place. In no country is social life 
so structured around the imperatives of economic life, or are people subjected to 
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more pressure to consume. Nowhere is the emptiness of affluence more deeply 
felt.73 
McCormack wrote this in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin Earthquake, which 
devastated the western Japanese port city of Kôbe in early January 1995. To him, the 
earthquake and the Japanese response to it, were tragic metaphors for much that has 
gone wrong in Japanese society during its postwar quest for modern achievement. 
The human and environmental costs of Japan's "total economism," he argued, were 
evident everywhere in the stories that emerged from the rubble of Kôbe. There was, 
for example, the bureaucratic insistence on `proper procedure' that had impeded 
national and overseas offers of assistance which could perhaps have prevented more 
deaths in the aftermath of the earthquake." More disturbingly, McCormack also 
cited the post -quake revelation of geological research dating back nearly twenty 
years, identifying the Kôbe region as a high -risk area for the type of quake it suffered 
- research which was suppressed by successive municipal and central governments 
in the interests of development projects.75 In the course of reconstructing Kôbe's 
devastated infrastructure, it was found that in many instances, even nominal 
standards for construction based on worst -case disaster scenarios had been ignored, 
compounding the damage suffered by Kobe's infrastructure. Perhaps worst of all 
however, was the virtual absence of any self- reflective analysis among Japan's 
governing elite in the wake of the clean -up. Instead, according to McCormack, the 
response has been characterised, for the most part, by the same "techno- hubris" that 
had contributed to the disaster in the first place, with those in charge proffering 
higher standards, more materials, massive reinforcement of the nation's 
infrastructure (in order to quake -proof everything), plus a National Emergency Law 
to allow centralised authority to suspend the law and mobilise the military (Self - 
Defence Forces). While many thousands of its citizens were still subsisting in 
refugee camps, Kôbe City was preparing to use the rubble from the disaster as 
"filling" for the construction of phase two of Port Island and for the base of the 
73 McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence, 289. 
74 /bid., Jo. 
75Ibid., 11. 
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planned Kôbe Airport, while pitching its plans for recovery around the hosting of a 
Kôbe Leisure World 2000 to mark the end of the century. "76 
Documenting these and other incidents, McCormack came to the conclusion that a 
fundamental re -think of human and social needs in relation to conventional economic 
logic will be crucial to Japan's future - both as a stable, liveable society, and as a 
regional and global leader. In this latter context, he argued, the legacy of the Kôbe 
fiasco reaches well beyond its immediate location, to other societies where the 
slavish emulation of `Japanese -style' rapid economic growth has generated similar 
ecological, social and political dislocations.77 There is, as McCormack points out, a 
"sad, historical irony" at work here, given that the regions pressing hardest to 
emulate Japan's model of growth -at -all -costs are precisely those which bore the brunt 
of Japanese colonial expansionism in the early decades of the previous century. In 
these countries, he argues, "Japan's corporate skills in mobilising and accumulating 
are revered almost as much as its former single- minded pursuit of military hegemony 
was (and is) hated, without the inner connection between the two being grasped. "78 
McCormack's observations are not isolated ones. They form part of a growing body 
of literature, in which scholars both within and outside Japan have worked to shed 
light on issues and voices which were effectively marginalised in Japan's postwar 
rush to prosperity, and demonstrate their importance in confronting the problems and 
choices faced by Japanese people at the end of the century. This is true not only of 
the 1990s, moreover, but also of those decades prior to the time when critical 
approaches to knowledge and social theory began to acquire status and credibility 
within the broader Japanese Studies community. Even during the years when 
intellectual and political certainty associated with Japan's `miracle' was at its peak, 
there were observers for whom this miracle inspired concern, rather than 
complacency. Saburô Ienaga's fight to have Japanese wartime atrocities 
7 /bid.,17. 
77 Ibid., 290. 
78 Ibid., 292. 
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acknowledged in school textbooks for example, dates back to the 1960s, as does 
Norie Huddle's exposure of the domestic environmental disasters precipitated by 
fast -track industrialisation 79 Later, in a work whose influences are evident in 
McCormack's study, Rokurô Hidaka drew upon his own wartime experiences, and 
his postwar career as an educator of young Japanese people, to question what he saw 
as a narrow and dangerous interpretation of Japan's `miracle' economy that had 
become prevalent among most Japanese people, effectively blinding them to the 
costs at which it had been achieved 80 Like Ienaga, Hidaka was especially perturbed 
at what he saw as a progressive desensitising of young Japanese people towards 
Japan's wartime aggression in Asia - most obviously, through the direct censorship 
of educational texts, but also through the postwar growth of an inward -looking, 
consumer -oriented mass popular culture, in which education was now valued 
primarily as a means toward obtaining greater material comfort. 
Of course, these particular examples are not necessarily representative of the entire 
breadth of `critical' Japanese Studies literature, which brings me to another important 
point, concerning how one defines such literature at all. McCormack, Huddle, 
Ienaga and Hidaka for example, might all be classed, on one level, as scholars more 
or less directly critical of Japan. More precisely, they are critical of the governing 
elite of Japan - those who wield most power not only over how Japanese economic, 
political, and social Iife is conducted on a day -to -day basis, and how it impacts upon 
the rest of the world, but over how that life is represented, to the world and to 
Japanese people themselves (e.g., in the teaching of history, which is Ienaga's main 
concern). 
The issue of representation - and it is a crucial one for this thesis - brings up 
another area of concern for critical Japanese Studies literature: namely, the study of 
79 None Huddle and Michael Reich, Island of Dreams: Environmental Crisis in Japan (Vermont: 
Schenkman Books, Inc., 1975). 
80 Hidaka Rokurô, The Price of Affluence: Dilemmas of Contemporary Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha 
International, 1984), 4 -15, and 85 -100. 
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those Japanese people who have sought to define alternative sites of being and doing 
for themselves, often in ways which confront the state and its definitions of order, 
identity, community, and so on. On this basis, a definition of critical Japanese 
Studies literature needs also to include the work of scholars such as Norma Field 
(1989),81 Sang -jung Kang (1995, 1996a, 1996b),B2 and a whole range of scholarship 
on feminist issues in Japan (see Chapter Six). Following on from this, one comes to 
work which has confronted the even broader question of how we even come to 
conceptualise something like `Japan' at all. It is here, I suggest, that the choice 
becomes even more confusing, for it conceivably encompasses a truly vast range of 
methodology, styles and concerns: from the rigorously empirical studies of Ross 
Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto aimed at debunking the `group model' (1986), to the 
work of Nagao Nishikawa (1992), Naoki Sakai (1996) and Tessa Morris -Suzuki 
(1998), on deconstructing concepts of national identity, to Stefan Tanaka's 
Foucauldian- inspired genealogy of the Japanese discipline of `East Asian History' 
(Tôyôshi) and its role in framing Japan's relations with Asia and the West (1993). 
I am aware that this list is nowhere near exhaustive, and while many of the works 
cited above are examined in this thesis (along with other examples not mentioned 
here), at least as many other good and relevant examples of critical Japanese Studies 
are not. My explanation for this is that this thesis is first and foremost about defining 
and explaining International Relation's understanding of Japan, and how it frames 
the contemporary debate on Japan's international relations. Such a project, I argue, 
necessarily involves a primary focus on IR literature, as well as the portrayal of Japan 
through a more `mainstream' Japanese Studies literature which, while it may have 
sought to fill in the details of Japan as a global actor, remains content with the 
81 Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End. New York: Random 
House, 1990. 
82 Sang -jung Kang, Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon: Ajia Kara Tou Sengo 50 -Nen (Two Postwar Japans: 
A View from Asia Fifty Years On; Tokyo: Sainichi Shobô, 1995); "Datsu Orientarizumu no shikô" 
(Thoughts for Deconstructing Orientalism), in Naoki Sakai (ed.), Nashonariti no Datsukôchiku 
(Deconstructing Nationality; Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobô, 1996); Orientarizumu no Kanata e: Kindai 
Bunka no Hihan (To the Orientalists: A Critique of Modern Culture; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996). 
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broader IR community's definition of what is and is not important in analysing the 
`global' or the `international.' 
On this basis too, I suggest, the definition of what constitutes a `critical' Japanese 
studies becomes more flexible; for it can, I argue, encompass a variety of works 
which look for different interpretations of Japanese life and society. These 
interpretations have always been available to those willing to look beyond the rather 
narrow borders of Japanese Studies in International Relations, where, as argued 
above, the issue of Japan as global actor is effectively reduced to the basic thematic 
of the neo -neo agenda, and in particular, the concern with macroeconomics and the 
intricacies of global corporate management.83 My broader point, and it is one which 
sustains the core argument of this thesis, is that these critical perspectives are 
becoming more and more important, as the traditional parameters of IR thought and 
practice come under sustained pressure. At a time when the categorisation of human 
activities according to their spatial location `inside' or `outside' the nation state (to 
borrow R. B. J. Walker's famous phrase)84 has become perplexing, if not impossible, 
it is less easy to dismiss these studies and their concerns as `domestic' or `internal.' 
They are important and relevant, not only in their own right, but in the support and 
background they provide for an expanding critical IR agenda. 
The themes of this critical challenge are set out in Chapter Five, where I look at some 
of the major textual examples of the "third debate" in International Relations. Here, I 
will not be attempting to venture very deeply into the highly complex philosophical 
debates that accompany the `critical' IR agenda. Rather, I will concentrate, in broad 
terms, on the major ways in which critical scholarship has opened up Realist /neo- 
Realist IR and its policy framework, to themes drawn from philosophy of science 
83 A good description of these preoccupations within the Japanese /Asian Studies mainstream is given 
by David Wright -Neville in his description of the Western "Asia Industry" - "a crude 
commodification of presumed differences slickly packaged to sell the secrets of East Asia success to 
eager Western bureaucrats and business people." David Wright -Neville, "The Politics of Pan - 
Asianism: Culture, Capitalism and Diplomacy in East Asia" (Pacifica Review 7;1, 1995: 1 -26), on 4- 
5. 
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sources and from European philosophy and social theory. As I will demonstrate, 
these perspectives challenge the very foundation of the dominant IR- Japanese 
Studies world view, in challenging the ontological /political basis by which the world 
is reduced to a fundamentally constant set of actors, forces and interactions, 
ultimately attributable to the anarchical nature of the international system. 
Not surprisingly, the resulting "third debate," particularly in the Euro- American IR 
community, has been a contentious, and often bitter one. As David Campbell points 
out, the very language of critical IR approaches, often expressed via terms such as 
"discourse," "textuality," and "genealogy," tends to induce: 
anxiety if not apoplexy among those convinced that there exists an unproblematic 
domain ( "the real world ") impervious to interpretation. To such true believers, any 
analytic mode that implicitly or explicitly questions the facticity of the external 
world is at best misleading and at worst dangerous ß5 
As Richard Bernstein has explained, this fear of rejecting the positivist world view is 
itself derived from a deeply positivist assumption; namely, that there is either certain, 
objective knowledge of the world, or no real knowledge at a1186 For many critical IR 
scholars, however, challenging the notion of a single, irreducible world of fact `out 
there,' far from being a descent into relativism or nihilism, represents a powerful 
opportunity. It is the opportunity to reassume analytical and political responsibility 
(and power), in a world where to be `realistic' involves accepting, and working 
through, the myriad of normative and political contexts in which human life takes 
place. From this perspective, one can continue to provide answers to complex 
questions and seek to solve difficult global problems - not via externalised realms of 
certainty, and their non -negotiable options, but via a continual, self- reflective 
ß4 Walker, Inside /Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). This work is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
66 David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War 
(Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993), 8 -9. 
86 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical -Political Horizons of 
.lfodernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 17. 
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engagement with the world and its complex network of cultural, linguistic and social 
practices. 
Moreover, and in light of the concerns about contemporary Japanese society touched 
on above, this perspective removes the opportunity to relegate concerns about the 
`internal' aspects of state -bounded societies, to the margins of IR theory and practice. 
In a more general context, this theme of recdnsidering `what matters' in IR has been 
taken up by a number of scholars, notably Rob Walker, whose contributions are 
examined in detail in Chapter Five. Here however, I will invoke Walker's 1989 
work, One World, Many Worlds to briefly illustrate my current point. In it, Walker 
analyses how people around the world have worked to reclaim decisionmaking 
power in their own lives - often in circumstances of great difficulty and danger. 
The point being, from Walker's perspective, that when people confront the 
institutions and structures which restrict them and damage their lives, they also 
confront the conceptual boundaries which give meaning to these institutions and 
legitimise the power relations they sustain. In this way, argues Walker, people can 
begin to re- construct the parameters of the possible - both immediately, in their 
own lives, and in the broader structural relations between peoples globally. Thus, 
Critical social movements are necessarily involved in the attempt to undermine 
dominant universals. They are also, and more significant, necessarily involved in 
trying to reconstruct our relationship between universal and particular, between the 
recognition of our planetary vulnerability and identity, on the one hand, and the 
proliferation of histories, experiences and identities, on the other. This is not a 
matter of complex or abstract philosophy. It is something that has to be explored and 
achieved through ongoing human practices everywhere 87 
Walker's point then, is that all critical social movements, however `local,' are part of 
a global struggle against "dominant universals" in One (interdependent) World - 
but they are also representative of the politics of Many Worlds, in which "both 
present structures and future aspirations are encountered and articulated on the basis 
87 Walker, One World, Many Worlds, 136. 
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of many different experiences, many different histories. "58 Recognising this, Walker 
recognises also that, contrary to dominant assumptions about power and significant 
agency in IR, the disparate, localised, and often fragmented nature of critical social 
movements is an integral aspect of their potential. Thus: 
The significance of critical social movements is not to be assessed only by their overt 
power to bring about change by themselves or by the credibility of their specific 
policy recommendations. It lies in their capacity to recognise, interpret, and 
symbolise patterns of contemporary transformation and to find new ways of being 
and acting that enhance the capacity of people to exercise control over the processes 
that affect their lives. It lies in their ability to articulate ways of being together that 
enhance the possibilities of justice and undermine the need for violence. It lies in 
their ability to act in specific circumstances while becoming more and more aware 
that to act in specific circumstances is to engage with processes that affect people 
everywhere 89 
It is at this juncture, I suggest - between the specific and the global, between One 
World and Many Worlds, that it becomes possible to think about the issues of a 
changing Japanese society raised above, and at the beginning of this thesis, in a way 
that is entirely connected to the question of Japan as an international actor. Chapter 
Six takes up this challenge, via the contributions of a now rapidly expanding critical 
Japanese studies literature. As I will demonstrate, the diverse intellectual and 
political perspectives of this literature are nonetheless connected by a shared 
commitment: the commitment to seeing Japan in changing, complex terms, rather 
then the static, "black box "50 it has represented to the mainstream academic and 
policymaking elite for so long. In this sense, albeit in different ways, and to different 
degrees, they all contribute to the project of acknowledging "One Japan, Many 
Japans ;" whether via issues of gender, environment, or racial /ethnic identity, to name 
the categories that will be specifically examined. 
The final chapter of the thesis is an exploration of the globalisation themes that have 
emerged to dominate both Japanese Studies and IR discussions in recent years. I am 
58 Ibid. 
89lbìd.,144. 
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interested in particular here, in exploring the extent to which ` globalisation' might 
(or might not) become a space for facilitating the theme of interdisciplinary 
connection /conversation between International Relations and Japanese Studies that is 
so central to my argument. As many would acknowledge, ideas about how to define 
and respond to globalisation have worked something of a catalyst in both Japanese 
Studies and International Relations of late. In particular, they have brought issues of 
identity to the forefront of debate - and with them, a whole lexicon of terms that, 
until recently, had little or no currency within conventional IR circles: culture, 
ethnicity, race and civilisation, for example. 
To some, this shift in emphasis represents a major reworking of the accepted 
paradigms of IR. Foremost among them of course, is Samuel Huntington, whose 
stark pessimistic image of the future has, of course, come under strenuous attack 
from IR scholars and area studies specialists alike, with many objecting to the notion 
that the future holds nothing but a stand -off between "the West and the Rest." 
Despite this, as Charles William Maynes confirmed in 1995, the `cultural' agenda 
outlined in The Clash of Civilizations has "shaped [U.S.] foreign policy debate for 
the last few years. "9' Its influence in Japanese and Asian Studies however, has been 
less acknowledged. One of the reasons for this, as David Wright -Neville has 
observed, is that Asian (including Japanese) Studies specialists have long tended to 
distance themselves from IR specialists such as Huntington, in the belief that IR 
continues to fail the test of incorporating the nuances of cultural /civilisation 
difference into its theoretical assumptions. 92 Wright- NevilIe's point is particularly 
important with regard to the contemporary globalisation debate in Japan, which has 
seen a wide range of writers - Takashi Inoguchi, Ogura Kazuo and Japan's own 
`Mr. Yen,' Sakakibara Eisuke, for example - re -cast the question of Japanese 
identity as crucial to Japan's future international role. While the results have been 
90 This phrase is coined by Bruce Cumings in "Japan's Position in the World System," 34. 
91 Charles William Maynes, "The New Pessimism," Foreign Policy 100 (Fall 1995): 33 -49, on pp. 
38 -39. 
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both interesting and significant, there remains, I argue, a conservative aspect to this 
debate: one which invokes the same basic categories of understanding as Huntington 
in fleshing out otherwise more tolerant perspectives (on "globalisation," "multi - 
civilisational globalisation" and "multiple capitalisms "), than he has ever been 
willing to countenance 93 
From my perspective, and as I will argue in Chapter Seven, the still developing 
debate on identity /globalisation issues in Japan is, for all its problems, potentially 
important in achieving the kind of dialogue that I have argued to be necessary 
between International Relations and Japanese Studies, if we are to move beyond both 
Japan as "black box" and the `culturally sensitive' variant of the neo -neo debate in 
Japanese /Asian Studies that is posited as its main alternative. In this envisaged 
dialogue, the capacity for meaningful thought and action is not confined to the 
parameters set out by dominant understandings of global or `Japanese' existence, and 
the following chapters comprise my attempt to contribute toward such a dialogue, 
albeit from a perspective acutely aware of the problems of such a task, and of my still 
developing understanding of the complex critical literatures in IR and Japanese 
Studies. This process begins, in the following chapter, at its most fundamental level, 
via an explanation of how an IR orthodoxy, based on positivist first principles, has 
served to disconnect global `reality' from the everyday realities of Japanese society 
for so long. 
92 Wright- Neville, "The Politics of Pan -Asianism," 4, and 15 -16. 
93 These terms are all invoked in the Japanese globalisation texts mentioned here, which are discussed 
in full in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
KNOWING JAPAN/KNOWING THE WORLD: EXPLORING THE 
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN POSITIVISM, REALISM, AND 
JAPANESE STUDIES 
Questions about how we know the world tend not to arise in conventional 
discussions of Japan's international role. By the time one arrives at `Japan,' 
especially within a discipline as established as International Relations (IR), the world 
of which it is part is just assumed to be there; its dominant institutions and actors 
accepted as given features of international reality against which statements about 
Japan as an international actor are accorded meaning. The most powerful, if largely 
unspoken, justification for this pre -assumption of stable foundations in this regard, is 
the proposition that one has to start somewhere. After all, if everybody began by 
pondering the most foundational, philosophical questions of meaning and 
knowledge, then surely there would be neither time nor space to get down to 
understanding Japan at all... 
Accordingly, typical discussions of Japan's post -Cold War international role tend to 
depart, not from `theoretical' issues of truth or reality, nor even from a discussion of 
the significance of Realism or neo- Realism, but from a more immediate and prosaic 
context - usually in the form of a general description of the post -Cold War 
international system, and where Japan fits in. Even developments and changes 
within the system itself (including the emergence of Japan as a `new type of 
superpower ") tend to be discussed in terms which remain committed to a stable set of 
assumptions about how the world really works - its major actors, power, security, 
regimes and so on. For the majority of scholars, these assumptions are so 
commonsensical that they hardly need be mentioned at all, let alone questioned or 
doubted. Their role is as crucial as it is silent, cutting the `theoretical' corners for 
those who want to get on with discussing the more specific issues at hand, for 
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example, the necessity of a continued U.S.. military presence in Japan, the inherent 
`threat' posed by `unstable' states such as North Korea and China, or the feasibility 
of a continued, Japan -led expansion of the Asia -Pacific economy. 
This chapter goes against this established practice by seeking to resurrect these 
theoretical corners, and, in doing so, explain how and why discussion of Japan in IR 
tends to assume particular patterns of reality and relevance. In the process, I seek to 
open up some intellectual themes rarely invoked when speaking of Japan's 
international role, but nonetheless central to the way in which Japan is commonly 
thought of and spoken about in an IR context. As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, the key issue here is the process by which `Japan' has been given its global 
identity within a Realist cum neo- Realist tradition, dominant in IR circles since 1945. 
As I also suggested earlier, this is a process with deeper historical and philosophical 
foundations - in positivism. 
In this chapter, consequently, I seek to illustrate the significance of these positivist 
foundations, not only for variants of IR Realism, but for Japanese Studies also. In 
the process, I will begin to explain why the existing conduits of information between 
IR and Japanese Studies have been so resistant to more comprehensive critical 
insights on Japanese society and Japan's place in the world, and to indicate how 
these critical insights might become integral to future understandings of Japan and 
indeed IR per se.' Accordingly, my discussion begins with a brief (and admittedly 
rather superficial) history of the development of contemporary positivism, as a means 
of explaining its significance in the present context. 
1. Positivism: A Brief History of Some Basic Themes and Assumptions. 
There are, of course, a number of works that have undertaken this project in other contexts; notably 
David Ricci's The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1984); George's Discourses of International Politics (op. cit., 1994), Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski's International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) and, in a slightly more complex manner, R. B. J. Walker's 
InsidelOutside: Political Theory as International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). All of these texts have been influential in the compilation of this chapter, and a more in -depth 
discussion of Inside /Outside will be taken up in Chapter Six. 
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To say that the dominant Realist tradition of IR is built upon, and largely directed by, 
positivist principles and premises begs, of course, an obvious question - the 
question of what positivism means. While volumes of work have been written on 
this topic alone, a (very) simple answer might sound something like this: positivism 
is a particular way of understanding the world and its objects, via specific intellectual 
and methodological processes derived from modem scientific perspectives. More 
profoundly, positivism is an approach to `knowing' which represents itself as 
corresponding to real knowledge per se. It does this via a central tenet - its `unity 
of science' assumption - which holds that knowledge in and of the social and 
natural worlds are comprehensible through scientifically established logics and 
modes of reasoning which can provide irreducible knowledge of reality as it 'is.'2 
This `unity -of- science' assumption has, in varying degrees of rigidity, been intrinsic 
to positivism's dominance in the development of the social sciences over the past 
century or so. As a number of scholars have demonstrated however, its broader 
historical origins are much older, emerging out of the great discoveries of `new 
physics' scholars such as Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton who, in the modern 
era, precipitated the search for scientific knowledge derived from direct empirical 
observation. They worked within the intellectual framework established by 
philosophers such as Descartes, who had announced that modern rational -man had 
access to the mysteries of existence, via the interaction between the human mind, and 
a detached realm of (empirical) fact. 3 On the basis of these fixed, indubitable 
foundations, for example, Isaac Newton would trace out "a series of truths bound 
each to the next," as the foundation of a set of universally applicable laws about 
matter and motion.4 
2 Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in Smith et. al. (eds.), Positivism and Beyond (op. cit., 
1996), 16. 
3 Timothy J. Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Icatha: Cornell University Press, 1982), 40. 
4 Roger Scruton, A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein (London: 
Ark Books, 1984), 85. 
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Inevitably, beyond the ambition to establish a true model of the world "such as it is 
in fact," came the ambition to explain and restructure modern human society in 
correspondence with a body of independent factual reality. Thus, as Bacon explained 
when speaking of the breadth and applicability of this new approach to the world: "It 
may also be asked whether I speak of natural philosophy only, or whether I mean that 
the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, should be carried on by this method. 
Now I certainly mean what I have said to be understood of them all. "5 This 
authorisation of Western scientism as the model and exemplar of all "discourses of 
truth" set the grounds for, among other things, Hobbes' application of Newtonian 
principles to moral and political theory. More profoundly, it confirmed the nature 
and purpose of the modern - rational self - as a being capable of observing the 
material and social worlds in detached, objective terms, and gaining certain 
knowledge of it .6 
This objectivist theme underwrites the second major assumption of contemporary 
positivism, namely the dichotomy it proposes between a realm of `fact' and a realm 
of `theorised' knowledge derived (either inductively or deductively) from it. The 
terms for this dichotomy were initially set out in the 18th century by the great 
Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, who sought to dispel the lingering tensions 
between an increasingly powerful inductivism, and the kind of rationalism that 
championed `innate,' mind -centred ideas in themselves. He did so via an 
epistemological distinction between "ideas" and "impressions," which restricts 
knowledge of the world as it really is to the latter; that is, immediate sensory data. 
All other cognitive activity Hume argued, is `theoretical;' in that it takes place after 
the experienced 'fact' and therefore, it does not correspond to reality per se. On this 
basis, general statements about the world that are not referable to independent, 
observable atomised objects (including those based on `normative' judgements such 
5 From The works of Francis Bacon, quoted in Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism, 198 -199, and 233. 
6 Richard Tamas, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our 
World View (New York: Harmony Books, 1991), 345 -48. 
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as cultural or moral values), are not afforded real knowledge status - i.e., they do 
not constitute 'facts.' 
Thus, in Hume's organisation of knowledge, `theorising' about known facts takes 
place separately from experiencing them (practice), and as part of an always 
retrospective attempt to organise and categorise them. Theory in short, is separate 
from practice.' On this basis, Hume sought to establish the basis of a truly secular, 
scientific philosophy of knowledge - one that confirmed and promoted the unity -of- 
science assumption that all knowledge, including social and political analysis, is 
amenable to a single scientific method? As Hume put it: 
2. Contemporary Positivism and the Fact/Theory Dichotomy. 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the fact /theory dichotomy for any 
discussion of positivism, especially in an International Relations context - where, as 
I will demonstrate in this chapter, it operates at the discursive core of Realist 
detachment from the `facts' of global life. In Japanese Studies, I suggest, it is even 
more powerful, because of the way in which knowledge of Japan continues to be 
`area studied' within a still predominantly Anglo- (North) American International 
Relations discipline. To put it another way, Japan's geocultural `otherness' to the 
West tends to induce a certain preoccupation, if not anxiety, about 'getting Japan 
right' - about understanding it as it really is - with all the weighty qualifications 
of linguistic and cultural literacy that this implies.1° 
For the reasons described at the beginning of this chapter however, one rarely finds 
any direct acknowledgement of this preoccupation in Japanese Studies - far less any 
exploration of the tensions in the process by which early positivism, with its `unity of 
science' premise and its dichotomies of fact /theory was transferred to the 
7lbid., 347. 
8 George, Discourses of International Politics, 52. 
9 Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, 349. 
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contemporary era. Hume's own work is characterised by these tensions, particularly 
on the question of whether the most scientific of logics could, ultimately, provide the 
certain knowledge propounded for it. This tension he worked out via the problems of 
inductivism, concluding that we never actually experience anything `directly,' 
because all our impressions of things are mediated through the mind. Consequently, 
all we can establish are causal explanations of sensations that are intrinsic to the 
process by which the mind gives meaning to the impressions it receives of the `real' 
things it observes.tt Or, in slightly simpler terms, the notion of a `knowable' reality 
external to the human mind can never be conclusively established, even via the most 
rigorous scientific procedures. The world's intelligibility, such as it is, reflects only 
"habits of the mind," not the nature of external, objective reality per se. Thus, from 
one of the modern fathers of positivism came the conclusion that there is no logical 
basis, even in positivism's own terms, for the proposition that `real' knowledge is 
derived from a realm of external reality. 
It is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external 
objects resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience, 
surely, as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience, is and must be 
entirely silent. The mind never has anything present to it but the perceptions, and 
cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The 
supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.12 
While Hume's scepticism about the basis for positivism has often been ignored or 
explained away in mainstream Anglo- American scholarship, it was re- affirmed by 
another of the acknowledged 'greats' of modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant. 
Seeking a resolution of Hume's dilemma (i.e., how it can be possible to have certain 
knowledge of the world when our knowledge is ultimately dependent on impressions 
to See Norma Field, for example, on how non- Japanese scholars of Japan, particularly when making 
critical observations, are often dismissed as `not understanding' Japan properly. Field, In the Realm 
of a Dying Emperor (op. cit., 1990), 275 -78. 
Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, 351 -53. 
12 David Hume, Inquiry into Human Understanding, cited in Richard Schacht, Classical Modern 
Philosophers: Descartes to Kant (London & New York: Routledge, 1984), 197. Ultimately however, 
Hume advocated his original, empiricist approach to knowledge and society, in an exemplary instance 
of Bernstein's "Cartesian anxiety" (see Chapter One, 38). There must, Hume reasoned, be pursuit of 
"assurance and conviction," or we would find ourselves "trapped within the sphere of [our] own 
experience without even the assurance of a self to whom that experience belongs." Ibid., 200. 
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that cannot be externally verified) Kant came up with a solution that acknowledged 
the inevitably `theory -impregnated' nature of our knowledge. Neither empiricism 
nor rationalism, he argued, can logically prove the existence of independent sources 
of knowledge, because our knowledge of reality is always drawn from the meaning 
we give to objects, not directly derived from the objects in-themselves." Kant was 
not suggesting here that we cannot have a modern, `scientific' philosophy per se; 
indeed he championed such an enterprise. His point was, rather, that this scientific 
knowledge could never be meaningfully detached from the human interpretivist 
engagement of the `philosopher' - that the dichotomy between subject and object 
was `humanly' impossible. 
The greatest contemporary challenge to positivism and its objectivity theme 
however, came, not from the scepticism of Hume, nor the interpretivist Iogic of Kant, 
but from the heart of the `natural' sciences after the 1920s, when theoretical 
physicists such as Einstein, Heisenberg and Bohr began to cast more profound doubt 
upon any notion of scientific objectivity via external `real -world' reference points. 
Here, it was the engagement with a new science centred on sub -atomic particles that 
undermined any claims to `objective' knowledge in the most sophisticated of modern 
scientific circles ?4 The point being, of course, that sub -atomic particles cannot be 
observed `objectively' - nor, therefore, can the factual foundations of knowledge 
about the real world `out there' be derived from such observations. Instead, such 
knowledge is intrinsically and unavoidably part of a process in which the observing 
subject /scientist `theorises' and interprets the location, nature and significance of the 
`facts out there.' Equally disturbing in this regard was Einstein's work which, as 
David Ricci points out, projected an image of the `real world' that had profoundly 
"retrogressive" implications for modern scientific philosophy. The trouble, Ricci 
points out, 
13 Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, 350. 
14 David Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, 89. 
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lay in [Einstein's] notion of relativity - of all thing being relative to all others rather 
than having absolute character in time and in space. Relativity in this sense seemed 
to destroy forever the rationale for saying that there is a natural, fixed order of 
things, within which men have a certain and equal status 15 
By the time Einstein published his arguments, however, social scientists, especially 
in Britain and North America, had already embarked on the task of conforming their 
knowledge to the ideals of scientific method, influenced by German applications of 
the "scientific method" in humanities scholarship which promoted an accumulative, 
progressivist approach to knowledge epitomised in scientific discovery.16 The 
philosophical arguments of Comte played a significant role in this regard - as did 
those of the Vienna school of logical positivism, which explicitly sought to eliminate 
from `real' knowledge status any statement that could not be scientifically 
established.17 The aim of scholars such as these was to remove the fledgling science 
of human society from any `premodern' metaphysical doubt, via an increasingly 
strict emphasis upon scientific methods of verification. And, by the 1950s, . the 
logical positivist quest for a knowledge of human society based on verifiable fact 
was more or less embedded at the core of social science thinking and research, 
especially in the U.S 
Post WWII: Behaviouralism, and the Influence of Karl Popper. 
At the intersection of these various quests for scientific certainty was the behavioural 
`revolution' which swept through U.S. intellectual and political circles in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Behaviouralism adopted, 
positivism - its `unity of science' 
fact /theory. Also present, however, 
distinguish between the modem "good' 
15 Ibid., 91 -92. 
16 Ibid., 41 -50. 
17 Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 14. 
18 Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, 51. 
as its central tenets, the basic features of 
theme, and the associated dichotomy of 
was an explicitly Cold War concern to 
' society (i.e., U.S. pluralist society), and its 
50 
"bad" alternative (i.e., Soviet/Nazi totalitarian society).'9 The key to this distinction 
lay in the open, scientifically verifiable (and therefore, inherently rational) nature of 
Western pluralism, as opposed to the closed ideology of (irrational) Soviet 
Marxism 20 In this way, behaviouralisrn embodied the desire to establish `science' 
and an objective, open methodology as the basis of a progressive (liberal -capitalist) 
modernity. This was a (largely unspoken) issue in the debate over `is' and `ought' 
which re- emerged with a vengeance in Anglo- American circles during the first flush 
of post WWII behaviouralism, expressed now in terms of a scientific approach 
which, "deals with what is, and nonscience which might be theology, ethical theory, 
ideology, or something else [which] takes as its province those things that ought to 
be "21 (emphasis added). 
Not surprisingly, the behaviouralist `revolution' was a major influence in the 
development of post -WWII International Relations, as (primarily) U.S. scholars 
sought to establish the intellectual ground rules for the conflict with the Soviet 
Union. In so doing, they drew upon behaviouralism in the social sciences, and also 
upon the Newtonian model of scientific certainty in their quest for a knowledge of 
global reality which actually corresponded with the `is' rather than the `ought.' And, 
this is where one scholar in particular, Karl Popper, becomes a major influence in the 
story of the Realist/Positivist nexus; albeit, one rarely acknowledged in IR circles. 
Seeking to resolve once and for all the question of what is `scientific' (and therefore 
`real' or `reliable') knowledge and what is not, Popper advocated four basic criteria 
for debate (i) testability (the extent to which it is possible to associate scientific 
statements with unambiguous evidence); (ii) falsification (the process by which a 
scientific claim can be tested - for its falsifiability); (iii) tentativity (the notion that 
scientific certainty is always open to rules of contingency); and (iv) the privileging of 
method over results; in other words, while scientific reality might itself change, it is 
14 Ian Jarvie, "Popper's Ideal Types: Open and Closed, Abstract and Concrete Societies," in Ian 
Jarvie and Sandra Pralang (eds,), Popper's `Open Society' After Fifty Years (London & New York; 
Routledge, 1999), 76 -77. 
20 Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, 50. 
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always obtainable via the application of the correct methodology. For Popper, these 
criteria characterise the scientific enterprise, and help overcome any "sociological" 
(i.e. normative influences) on scholarly communities .22 
It was regarding this latter issue, and via his second and third criteria in particular, 
that Popper also claimed to have moved beyond the "hard- core" (logical) positivist 
obsession with fixed, external certainty and its crude inductivist premises. Whether 
scientists study the physical world or society, he argued, they make 
recommendations for the improvement of the human condition which have to be 
offered in a spirit of rational experimentation and only contingent `fact.' 
Accordingly, and as Popper declared in his seminal Cold War text, The Open Society 
and its Enemies, this committed behaviouralist science (and the free West) to the 
ideal of an "open society," in which democratic institutions operate as the political 
agency of (social scientific) inquiry?' It was in this way that behaviouralism, centred 
on positivist first principles (and a selective memory regarding those principles) 
gained contemporary credence as a non -ideological mode of reasoning in a world 
threatened by its opposite - ideological regimes and thought processes associated 
with the quest for totalitarianism and irrationality (e.g., in the USSR).Z4 
There is more to the Popperian contribution than this, of course, and in particular, 
there is a great debate of sorts concerning Popper's actual status in regard to 
positivism, given his explicit rejection of the term and its connotations 25 I cannot 
engage this debate here, except to say that I follow the lead of a number of other 
scholars, who consider Popper to be very much part of the positivist tradition 
outlined above - albeit as its most sophisticated exponent. This sophistication is 
particularly evident in regard to the falsificationist clause in his thinking, and 
'71 Ibid., 136 -137. 2 Ibid. 
23 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, 
and the Aftermath (4'h edition; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1962), 13. 
24 Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, 119. 
25 See in particular Popper's response to the Frankfurt School. in "Reason or Revolution ?" in 
Theodor Adorno et. al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (translated by Glyn Adey & 
David Frisby; London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1976), 288 -300. 
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certainly Popper was one of the few early postwar social theorists to confront 
seriously the limitations of Cartesian rationalism and the extreme inductivism of 
much of the logical- positivist school 26 Likewise, there is a certain anti -dogmatism in 
Popper's re- worked Critical Rationalism, which seems to distance it from the often 
highly dogmatic stance of much IR Realism. As I will also show at the end of this 
chapter, this anti -dogmatism has helped to popularise Popper's critical rationalist 
approach among to some Japan (and other `area') specialists, with interesting results. 
For all this, however, a whole range of scholars have remained unpersuaded by this 
distancing, concluding instead, as I do, that Popper's contribution is integral to the 
positivism and IR Realism of the present context 27 One of the more succinct of these 
criticisms, as mentioned in Chapter One, comes from Ernst Gellner, who argues that 
while Popper might have rejected logical positivism and its rigid inductivism, his 
Critical Rationalism retained its connection to a major positivist principle - namely, 
the `unity of science' - and to its associated (Newtonian) connotations regarding 
independent factual worlds `out there' 28 In Popper's work, this commitment is 
evident enough in his emphasis upon the importance of method - the method of the 
natural sciences, which consists "of offering deductive causal explanations, and in 
testing them (by way of predictions)29 As Ricci, another critic of behaviouralism, 
has pointed out, this effectively locked post -war political analysis into a "scientific 
community," whose work: 
was modelled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences. In this 
sense, political scientists were seen as potential novitiates for a larger vocation, if 
only they would adopt appropriate habits.... if political scientists would only adopt 
the principles and procedures of science, patiently checking each other's 
26 Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation (op. cit., 1991), 61. 
27 While there is no space here to discuss their dialogue in detail, one of the most strenuous early 
attacks on Popper came from Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962). On the debate between Popper and Kuhn, see Bernstein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers 
Limited, 1983), 4, and in The New Constellation, 61 -63. On Popper's dispute with the Frankfurt 
School (which is discussed further in Chapter Five), see Adorno et. al., The Positivist Dispute in 
German Sociology (op. cit., 1976). 
28 Ernest Gellner, Legitimation of Belief (op. cit., 1974), 175 -80. 
29 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 130. 
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propositions, the discipline could come to constitute a scientific community, with 
reliable results, in the Popperian style 3° 
The implications of Popper's Critical Rationalism for IR have been raised more 
recently in some of the critically inclined literature which acknowledges its 
significance. Steve Smith, for example, has discussed this issue as central to a post - 
positivist `illusion' he perceives within contemporary IR 3t For Smith, the illusion 
resides in the way that IR scholars seek to distance themselves from any negative 
connotations associated with positivism, by following Popper's strategy of simply 
reducing positivism to inductive logic and `hard core' (logical -positivist) 
perspectives. It is in this context that Smith recalls: 
many discussions with leading specialists in my own research area at the time 
(foreign policy analysis) who denied outright that they were positivists, associating it 
with a crude form of behaviouralism which had failed `to produce the goods.' This 
was very evident in the mid 1970s when the comparative foreign policy movement 
lost its impetus... The response [however] was not to abandon positivism... but rather 
to reject the excessive reliance on quantitative data characteristic of behaviouralism, 
and also to question the belief in an inductive route to general theory. But, of course, 
neither of these moves involved a rejection of positivism, only one component of it, 
and a rather extreme one at that.32 (emphasis added) 
The reason that Smith's erstwhile colleagues were so reticent about their positivist 
connections, of course, was the disrepute that scientific modelling and game - 
theorised approaches fell into in IR circles in the 1970s, particularly after the 
Vietnam War, when the `scientific' Realism of U.S. analysts was shown to be 
somewhat less that adequate in its predictive and strategic capacities. But as so often 
in the past, proof of inadequacy did not prevent the development of further attempts 
to apply positivist principles to the IR arena. The most obvious example of this, and 
one that utilised precisely the same Popperian strategy as Smith's colleagues in the 
foreign policy community, was the development of neo- Realism in the late 1970s 
3o Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science, 140. 
31 Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 32. 
32 Ibid., 33. 
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and 1980s, particularly via Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979), 
which has continued to be a major influence on IR and Japanese Studies ever since. 
I will return to Waltz's revamped Popperian positivism shortly. The point I seek to 
make at the moment is that Popper's adjustments to positivism served to further 
cement the status of behaviouralist social theory and IR Realism within an academic 
and policymaking community already immersed in the struggle between Cold War 
"open" and "closed" societies. In the following chapter, I will develop this theme in 
a Japanese Studies context by showing how the privileging of the former on 
"scientific" grounds would prove irresistible logic to thinkers such as Edwin 
Reìschauer and his Modernisation Theory- inspired colleagues in the 1960s, Prior to 
this however, I wish to add more detail to the connection point between positivism 
and IR, by saying something about the historical and intellectual process by which 
that connection took place. . 
4. International Relations and Positivist -Based Realism. 
The main conduit in this connective process, as indicated above, has been a Realist 
tradition which, after WW2, became synonymous with IR per se for the great 
majority of the international scholarly and policy community. As IR scholars began 
to make their claims for knowledge that corresponded with reality as it `is,' they did 
so via a historical narrative that objectified the past in exemplary positivist terms, 
and which accorded a selected group of thinkers in the past, an essentialised 
knowledge of the present. Important figures in this regard are Thucydides, 
Augustine, Hobbes and above all Nicolò Machiavelli, whose vision of "good 
political order" is based on the widely held tenet that: 
the manner in which men live is so different from the way in which they ought to 
live, that he who leaves the common course for that which he ought to follow will 
find that it leads him to ruin rather than to safety... A Prince therefore who desires to 
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maintain himself must team to be not always good, but to be so or not as necessity 
may require 33 
The eternal wisdom to be gained here was that which was to underpin and define 
Realism thereafter - i.e., that the is /ought dichotomy is intrinsic to understanding 
the international arena per se (an arena which, as Hobbes insisted, was the site of 
endemic and unyielding anarchy). This was a theme already evident in the first of 
the modern great texts of Realism, E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis (1939) 
which, as the title suggests, sought to explain the real nature of international affairs in 
the inter -war years (between WW1 and WW2). 
E. H. Carr: Establishing a Genuine "Science of International Politics" 
As others have argued, Carr was a sophisticated and incisive thinker, and a great deal 
more subtle than many of those who articulated his Realism in later years.34 On the 
other hand, there are many passages in Twenty Years Crisis (when read without 
noting the associated caveats) which lend themselves to the kind of crude, positivist - 
based Realism that has characterised much IR analysis in the post WW2 era. 
Emphasising the failure of Wilsonian liberalism to provide peace and stability in the 
inter -war years, for example, Carr emphasised also the need for a "science of 
international politics," as the basis of a Realist alternative 35 In so doing, he 
represented this scientific approach to reality in terms of a series of dichotomies 
which illustrated its superiority over its liberal counterpart which, by definition, was 
`idealist' in comparison. In particular, Carr maintained, there was a "fundamental 
antithesis" between a liberal utopianism characterised by "an inclination to ignore 
what was and what is in contemplation of what should be," and a Realism 
33 Niccolò Machiavelli, excerpt from The Prince, reproduced in John Vasquez, ed., Classics of 
International Relations (2nd edition; New Jersey: Prentice -Hall Inc., 1990), 22. 
34 Ken Booth, "75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past - Reinventing its Future," in Steve Smith 
et. al. (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 329. A good discussion of this issue is also found in the first chapter of Charles Jones' E. H. 
Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
especially pages 6 -12, where Jones criticises the conflation of Carr with post -war North American 
Realism. 
35 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919 -1939 (2nd edition; Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, Ltd, 1946), 
1 -3. 
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characterised by "an inclination to deduce what should be from what was and what 
1S. "36 
Having thus rekindled the is /ought dichotomy as the basis of this new, scientific 
Realism in IR, Carr utilised the `unity of science' premise to strengthen his Realist 
case, arguing that the template for any genuine Realism in IR must be the procedures 
and attitudes of the natural sciences, where conclusions "can be nothing more than a 
true report on facts. "37 This was so, Carr argued, because in the natural sciences facts 
exist "independently of what anyone thinks about them. "38 Admittedly, he conceded, 
the intrinsic concern of the political sciences with "human behaviour" meant that the 
facts themselves were more liable to change and mutation, meaning that political 
science would always be, to some extent, the `science of what ought to be. "39 
Despite this, Carr argued, the concentration on "the initial stage of wishing," in the 
political sciences had to be succeeded by "a stage of hard and ruthless analysis," if 
one wished to achieve serious and critical thought about international problems. In 
other words, the successful analyst of international politics understands, 
that no political utopia will achieve even the most limited success unless it grows out 
of political reality. Having made the discovery, he will embark on that hard ruthless 
analysis of reality which is the hallmark of science... he will have reached a stage 
when purpose by itself is seen to be barren, and when analysis of reality has forced 
itself upon him as an essential ingredient of his study ß° 
In this atmosphere, the Realist quest to slough off the distraction of transforming 
"ought" into "is" was defined by Carr in terms of a positivist privileging of "the 
observation and collection of facts" over the metaphysical meanderings of 
philosophy - thereby, he argued, achieving what International Relations had failed 
to do in its earlier, "idealist" (utopian) stage; namely, an objective, factual analysis of 
the international realm as it is. In short, as Carr proclaimed in one of his best -known 
36 Mid., 11. 
37Ibid., 3. 
3' ibid. 
39 Mid., 4-5. 
44 Ibid., 10. 
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dictums, International Relations in its new, `mature' (Realist) manifestation 
understood what the inter -war idealists had not: that `the function of thinking is to 
study a sequence of events which it is powerless to influence or alter. "41 
In this way, Carr established major positivist dichotomies (is /ought, theory/reality, 
unity of science) as integral features of how we know the reality of IR. His legacy 
has endured in IR theory and practice to this day, where Realists of all hues continue 
to objectify the `given' or `irresistible' characteristics (e.g. anarchy) of an 
international realm of detached reality, and privilege the voices of those (i.e. 
Realists) who most successfully detach themselves from that reality. In short, as 
Bradley Klein has put it, IR particularly in its post -war manifestation: 
is predicated upon an analysis of a world that stands on its own, as an externality 
upon which the researcher gazes. The task of rigorous academic investigation is to 
devise terms of analysis and understanding that come as close as humanly possible to 
the logic and reality of that realm.._ In this sense, International Relations has been 
shaped decisively by the injunction to be dispassionate, realistic, and above all, 
practical 42 (emphasis added) 
As indicated above, it was in the early years of the Cold War that the implications of 
this positivist based Realism would become most evident and, understandably 
perhaps, its greatest impact was not in Carr's Britain, but in the U.S., where a new 
generation of IR scholars and policymakers sought some kind of foundational 
understanding of their new (Cold War) world order. Here, importantly, it was not 
just explicit behaviouralism that accorded such understanding, but perspectives in IR 
which explicitly opposed behaviouralism. And, in this regard, the contribution of 
Hans Morgenthau was vital in developing further the positivist/Realist tradition in 
IR. 
Hans J. Morgenthau: Power Politics as IR Reality 
41 /bid., l0. 
42 Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 16. 
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In his great work (and still the most influential book in IR history) Politics Among 
Nations (1948), Morgenthau followed Carr's lead in distinguishing between two 
major schools of thought relevant to IR; a liberal /idealism, and a Realism, which 
"believes that politics, Iike society in general, is governed by objective laws that have 
their roots in human nature. "43 These `objective laws,' insisted Morgenthau, are 
"impervious to our preferences," and the most important of them is the anarchical 
nature of the international system. "It is sufficient to state," he wrote, thus, "that the 
struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of 
experience. It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, 
economic, and political conditions, states have met each other in contests for 
power. "44 In this way, then, a positivist determinism is employed to declare a 
culturally and historically specific aspect of human society (i.e., the European post - 
Renaissance era) to be "universal in time and space," allowing Morgenthau to claim, 
in turn that "international politics is of necessity power politics. "45 More 
importantly, in this way, the major metaphor of modern Realism in Morgenthau's 
account, namely, the `balance -of- power' strategy, becomes represented, in the Cold 
War era, as "the essential stabilising factor in a society of sovereign nations;" that is, 
the only realistic means to tame an anarchical world order 46 
In regard to a methodology for analysing modern anarchy, Morgenthau again utilised 
exemplary positivist themes, proposing that the task of the Realist scholar is to 
discover the ways in which the "objective laws' of politics and IR operate in the Cold 
War era, thus both predicting and assisting the behaviour of states and diplomatic 
elite's in their quest for order. In this context, above all, the competent Realist must 
distinguish: 
between truth and opinion - between what is true objectively and rationally, 
supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective 
as Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5" edition; New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4. 
44 Ibid., 34. 
45 Ibid., 33. 
46 Ibid., 167. 
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judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and 
wishful thinking» (emphasis added) 
Here again then, the positivist dichotomies of `is' and `ought', and `fact' and theory' 
are invoked as the keystone of understanding reality in the world - a reality which 
is represented as independent of the theorist -cum- policymaker, who can only engage 
the factual evidence from a (positivist) distance. 
Having said all this, there is, in Morgenthau, something more than crude positivism. 
As with Carr (and Popper in the broader context), there were elements of 
Morgenthau's work which clearly indicated an intent to go beyond objectivism and 
`unity of science' prescriptions. In particular, as Rob Walker and others have pointed 
out, Morgenthau was influenced greatly by Max Weber, and there is, in Politics 
Among Nations much of the tension of Weber concerning the complexities of social - 
scientific thinking and the place of the human interpretative subject 48 In 
Morgenthau's case this tension is expressed best perhaps in the passages which deal 
with the role of the statesman in international affairs. In this context, as Jim George 
has argued, Morgenthau's work has dimensions beyond an obvious positivism, in 
which an adequate Realism must, on this basis (i.e., privileging the "position of the 
statesman "), 
seek to understand and explain the norms, rules, ideologies and competing interests 
of diplomatic statecraft. Realist analysts must [according to Morgenthau] attempt to 
get "inside" the world of the diplomat, the foreign policy maker, the strategist and 
the power broker. Realism is validated, in this sense, when it has meaning for the 
diplomat statesman, the human agent of power defined as interest. Realist 
scholarship, following these broad hermeneutic principles, must do more than simply 
reaffirm the anarchy of the system or make rigorous and systematic the evidence of 
an endemic struggle for power and influence.49 (emphasis added) 
It is on the basis of passages such as this that Morgenthau, like Carr, has usually been 
categorised as a Classical or Traditional Realist rather than a more `scientifically' 
47Ibid., 4. 
48 R. B. J. Walker, Inside /Outside, 55 -56. 
49 George, Discourse of Global Politics, 92. 
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inclined Realist. My view, however, as intimated above, is that fundamentally he 
followed positivist first principles, and was integral to the transference of those 
principles to IR in the 1960s and 1970s. This is a view supported by Stanley 
Hoffman who, in 1977, proposed that the Realism of scholars such as Morgenthau 
was indeed integral to the transference of more systemic approaches to the discipline 
during the 1960s and 1970sá° And, as John Vasquez has illustrated in detail, the 
behaviouralists who moved into the IR spaces created by Carr and Morgenthau and 
other Classical Realists, did not for a moment seek to challenge their fundamental 
assumptions about the world, but rather, sought to impose Popperìan adjustments 
(e.g. falsificationist procedures) upon those fundamental assumptions 51 In this regard 
too it is not as surprising as it might seem to find a major neo- Realist of the 1990s, 
John Mearsheimer, invoking Morgenthau as a primary source of his thinking rather 
than the more obvious `scientific' Realists52 The most obvious influence upon neo- 
Realists such as Mearsheimer, of course, is Kenneth Waltz, and I want to finish this 
present chapter by saying something briefly about Waltzian neo- Realism, and its 
contribution to the IR and positivism connection in the 1980s and 1990s. 
5. Neo- Realism: Re- Organising Realist `Fundamentals.' 
It is generally conceded that what we know refer to as neo- Realism emerged in the 
aftermath of a period of profound crisis in (Realist) U. S. foreign policy practice. 
The fluctuating strength of U.S. economic status, the failure of Modernisation Theory 
in the Third World, and above all, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, generated a range of 
criticisms within the IR community about the theoretical and `real- world' 
inadequacies of Realism 53 
50 Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," in James Der Derian 
(ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. by James Der Derian (London: MacMillan 
Press Ltd., 1995), 221 -224. 
51 John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1983), 25. 
52 John Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison & Gregory Treverton (eds.), 
Rethinking America's Security (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992). 
53 George, Discourses of International Politics, 111 -112. 
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George (1994) has suggested that the challenge to Realism emanating from the 
critical literature on the Vietnam war brought forward three key themes. First, there 
was the inadequacy of Realist- derived images of the state system (the keystone of its 
eternal wisdom concerning global anarchy); the problem being, that its essentialised, 
universalistic image of reality told us nothing terribly useful about the actual nature 
of the Vietnamese state nor about the history, culture, and sociopolitical structure of 
Vietnam, its peoples, or its struggles 54 Secondly, the behaviouralist methodology of 
Realist analysis, with its claims for precision and strategic predictability (based on 
game- theorised accounts of rational -actor behaviour) was manifestly unable to 
predict or explain the `irrational' behaviour of the North Vietnamese in the face of 
the catastrophic losses and damage inflicted by U.S. escalation strategy Finally, the 
crude Realist/Modernisation conception of power (i.e., in terms of advanced 
military /technological capacity) was seriously undermined by the defeat of the most 
powerful state in human history at the hands of a `traditional' (i.e., `primitive) 
society >5 
These problems, I suggest, are integral to the larger problems of understanding and 
limitation associated with the whole `Japan' question in IR and I will touch on 
similar themes in the chapters to follow, in more direct terms. For now, my concern 
is to explain, briefly, how a new form of positivist- Realism emerged from the ashes 
of the old in the wake of Vietnam and directed mainstream IR thinking into the 
1990s. The seminal figure in this metamorphosis was Kenneth Waltz, via his Theory 
of International Politics (1979), which sought to repair the damage done to Realism 
(and U.S. foreign policy) by addressing the problems Waltz perceived in Classical 
Realism and its behaviouralist counterpart. 
Waltz: Addressing the Structural Inadequacies of Classical Realism 
54Ibid., 112. 
ss Ibid. More will be said in the following chapter on this third theme, as it is particularly important 
to the development of Asian area studies in the post- Vietnam period. 
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Waltz's repair kit was borrowed from Popper, and, to some degree, from Adam 
Smith. He began however, by conceding (like the behaviouralists before him), that 
the most fundamental assumptions of the Realist world view are correct; that is to 
say, the world is, essentially, an anarchical realm characterised by an ongoing 
security dilemma; the nation state is still the primary actor in the anarchical system 
(albeit now in competition with a range of other `economic' actors); and the lust for 
power and hierarchical status remain the basis of state interest and behaviour. On 
this basis, the balance of power remains the only realistic strategy for maintaining 
order.56 
Having said this, Waltz also argued that Realist theories (prior to his) had made one 
major error in gauging the real nature of global reality. They had utilised an 
inductivist methodology and a `unit- Ievel' mode of analysis 57 Consequently, 
following the Popperian template, Waltz sought to re -define his position in terms 
which retained a rigid positivist framework but which appeared original and 
invulnerable to anti -Realist critique. He did so, initially, by doing what Popper did 
(and what Steve Smith found so widespread among his IR colleagues; see above), by 
defining positivism, in a mainstream Realist context, as logical positivism: that is, as 
little more than fact -grubbing inductivism which claims to `extract' reality from 
observable facts. And, like Popper, Waltz then sought to distance his neo- Realist 
approach from this perspective by arguing for a deductivist approach to knowledge, 
based on the structuralist laws of IR, rather than theories about them. 
If we follow the inductivist route, we can deal only with pieces of problems. The 
belief that the pieces can be added up, that they can be treated as independent 
variables whose summed effects will account for a certain portion of a dependent 
variable's movement, rests on nothing more than faith.._ ltlhe hope apparently rests 
on the conviction that knowledge begins with certainties and that induction can 
uncover them. But we can never say with assurance that a state of affairs inductively 
arrived at corresponds to something objectively real 58 
56 Timothy Dunne, "Realism," in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 116. 
57 /bid., 118. 
58 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw -Hill, Inc., 1979), 4 -5. 
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It was on this basis (and, incidentally, precisely after the manner of Classical Realists 
such as Carr and Morgenthau) that Waltz ended up drawing a firm distinction 
between `laws' and `theories.' Laws, he explained, are derived from observation and 
testing - as per the natural scientific model - whereas theories "cannot be 
constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be invented not 
discovered. "59 In other words, `theories' are mind -centred and therefore susceptible 
to normative distortion, while `laws' are `out there,' waiting to be discovered as 
things -in- themselves, susceptible only to falsificationist logic. 
In Waltz's neo- Realist structuralism then, the most important task of the ER analyst is 
the discovery of such laws; an engagement which sees the vital separation between 
"what is unchanging and foundational in the international system" and that which is 
merely "ephemeral and susceptible to change. "60 And, as Theory of International 
Politics goes on, it becomes clear enough that `what is unchanging and 
foundational," and therefore invulnerable to (non -scientific) theoretical critique, is 
the state of anarchy between states following self- interest. 
In an unorganised realm each unit's (state's) incentive is to put itself in a position to 
take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so. The international 
imperative is "take care of yourself!" Some leaders of nations may understand that 
the well -being of all of them would increase through their participation in a fuller 
division of labour. But to act on the idea would be to act on a domestic imperative, 
an imperative that does not run internationally. What one might do in the absence of 
structural constraints is different from what one I encouraged to do in their presence. 
States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. to a 
self -help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political 
interest 61 (emphasis added) 
The assumption of anarchy as a fundamental law of the international system is 
integral of course, to all preceding Realist perspectives on the world. The really 
extraordinary thing about Waltz's updated version of Realist folk -lore, however, is 
that which his pure structuralist approach leaves out of the equation - which, as I 
59Ibid., 5. 
60 Ibid., 69. 
61Ibid., 107. 
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will show in Chapter Four, has had major implications for what has consistently been 
left out of discussions of Japan in the postwar /post -Cold War era. In Waltz's case, 
this omission is achieved through his insistence that certain questions and issues are 
no longer worth asking of IR, in the search for a 'scientific' approach beyond the 
concern with state -units per se. Thus, he argues, we must leave aside "questions 
about the kind of political leaders, social and economic institutions and ideological 
commitments states may have. "62 Going further, he insists that we must also no 
longer be concerned with certain issues regarding relations between states. Thus too, 
we must also "leave aside questions about the cultural, economic, political and 
military interaction of states. "63 The reason for this, Waltz maintains, is because the 
relationship and nature of states "is not a property of the units [states]... but a 
property of the system [of states] . "64 In other words having put aside questions about 
the political leadership, sociology, ideology, culture, economic and politico- military 
interaction of states we are left with "a purely positional picture of society" - that is, 
a structure. The advantage of this, Waltz concludes, is that "structures endure, while 
personality, behaviour and interaction vary widely. "65 Accordingly, "[structuralist] 
theories developed for one realm may with some modification be applicable to other 
realms as well 66 
On this basis, Waltz redefined Realism in structuralist terms - attempting, in the 
process, to immunise it from criticism, and re- establish anarchy as the `structure that 
endures' even in a world of economics and globalisation. Ironically, however, when 
faced with the question of how this structure has `endured' historically (if it isn't to 
do with the ideology, leadership and political ambition of states) Waltz resorted to an 
`economic' explanation derived from neo- classical economics and the logic of the 
market. In short, what he argued is that the structure of the state system is just like 
the structure of the market, because "international political systems, like economic 
62 Ibid., 80. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
655Ibid., 81. 
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markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated and unintended" 67 
(emphasis added). In other words, the state system `just happens,' and the structure 
of the state system at any historical moment is just the way it is - "spontaneously 
generated and unintended." 
Now, not even Waltz's supporters were satisfied by this proposition, with scholars 
such as Keohane complaining that his balance -of -power theory was "so general that 
it hardly meets the difficult tests that [Waltz] himself establishes for theory ; "68 and 
John Ruggie (1982) taking Waltz to task for the ahistorical implications of his 
work 69 More critically inclined scholars meanwhile, were scathing about Theory of 
International Politics' paradoxical reductionism and the problems of its appeal to its 
(Popperian) positivist rigour. As Richard Ashley put it: 
Despite neorealism's much ballyhooed emphasis on the role of hard falsifying tests 
as the measure of theoretical progress, neorealism immunises its statist commitments 
from any form of falsification. Excluded, for instance, is the historically testable 
hypothesis that the state -as -actor construct might be not a first -order given of 
international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which 
dominant coalitions legitimise and secure consent for their precarious conditions of 
rule 70 
As so many times in the past, however, the enormous problems of a perspective such 
as this have been ignored or reformulated in order to maintain the (positivist) bottom 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 91. 
68 Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert O. 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 172. 
69 John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist 
Synthesis," in Neorealism and its Critics (op. cit., 1986). Ruggie notes, for example, that Waltz's 
structuralism provides "no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important 
contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the 
modem international system." Ibid 141. 
70 Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (op. 
cit., 1986), 270. The inadequacy of a structuralist theory that cannot explain where contemporary 
state structure came from, let alone individual states, has also laid Waltz open to criticism concerning 
the possibility of change within the international system. In order to explain the fact that change does 
occur in the international system, Waltz was ultimately forced to undermine his own argument by 
conceding that, "under certain conditions," units can resist systemic constraints. Even those more 
generally supportive of Waltz's anarchy principle have acknowledged that this represents a major 
contradiction, in an argument which insists upon the historical immutability of the system, and its 
constraining power upon the values, ethics and moral aspirations of individual states. Justin 
Rosenberg argues for example, that, in conceding that state behaviour varies according to 
determinations outside those encompassed within a Realist theory, Waltz thereby reduces his theory 
to the "not very profound" suggestion that "inter -state behaviour can be understood as a recurring 
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line. Thus, Robert Keohane insisted in 1986 that, for all the differences between the 
moderate, historically sensitive structuralists like himself, and Waltz, the basic 
assumptions of Waltz's structuralism (including, of course, the anarchy assumption) 
were correct, and as such, provided "a good starting -point for explaining the 
outcomes of conflicts... by directing attention to fundamental questions of interest 
and power within a logically coherent and parsimonious theoretical framework"" 
(emphasis added). More recently, with regard to the 'neo -neo' debate mentioned in 
Chapter One, Stephen Krasner has made it clear that, in regard to the history of the 
Westphalian system, both neo- realists and neo- liberals agree that there is, as Waltz 
insisted a "striking sameness in the quality of international life through the 
millennia;'"2 - a structural basis that endures `out there,' continuing to underwrite 
global life even in the age of globalisation. Foremost among the aspects of this basis, 
for Krasner, is the fact that states (and other actors, depending on whether one 
subscribes to the neo- liberal viewpoint), are inherently rational, seeking to maximise 
their interests in a world of finite resources (and anarchical structure) 73 Moreover, 
he argues, the important issue, from an analytical perspective, is not the continuing 
differences of interpretation between neo- liberalism and neo- realism within [PE, so 
much as the fact that both "have been generated by an epistemology [i.e., positivist 
empiricism ] that conforms with the Western Rationalistic Tradition." 
If liberal and realist analyses... have not provided definitive answers, they have 
offered systematic frameworks within which issues can be addressed. They have 
made statements about causal variables (power, security, group interests, ideas, 
values) and they have suggested the kind of evidence that would be relevant for 
testing these alternative arguments.74 
In short, what Krasner is saying is that the only type of theory with anything useful to 
offer the human situation is one whose claims can be contested against empirical 
Prisoners Dilemma" Justin Rosenberg, "What's the Matter with Realism ?" (Review of International 
Studies 16:4,1990,285- 303),293 -94. 
71 Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 191 -92. 
72 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 66. 
73 Stephen D. Krasner, "The Accomplishments of International Political Economy," in Scott Burchill 
and Andrew Linklater (eds.), Theories of International Relations (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 
1996), 110-15. 
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evidence - against a realm of fact which (presumably) just exists, independently of 
what anyone thinks about it. In this way, the positivist detachment central to Realist 
understanding from Carr onwards, is once more invoked at the core of neo- Realist 
(and neo- Iiberal) dogma in the 1990s. 
I will return to both Realism and neo- Realism in Chapters Three and Four 
respectively, where I will trace their influence in the development of postwar 
understandings of Japan as an international actor. Prior to this however, I wish to 
explain, somewhat more directly, the implications of positivism in Japanese Studies; 
firstly, in terms of the theoretical choices (or non -choices) being made by some 
mainstream discussants of Japanese foreign policy in the 1990s, but also, more 
broadly, via the contemporary debate about the changing status of `area studies,' and 
the increasingly confident claims of some Japan specialists concerning the 
`independent' theoretical status of their knowledge. 
6. IR Realism and Japan. 
As [ argued at the beginning of this chapter, the philosophical foundations of IR have 
not generally been a major concern within Japanese Studies, where the necessity of 
getting down to specifics, without first having to wade through a whole lot of 
complex (and, for many, needlessly distracting) theory, is generally seen as a 
priority. Indeed, this is more or less what the traditional division of labour between 
'area studies' (such as Japanese Studies) and `disciplines' (such as International 
Relations) has been all about - as Keohane expressed it, `ve must understand the 
context of action before we can understand the action itself. "75 Conversely, on this 
basis, by the time one arrives at "action" concerning Japan, it is assumed that one 
knows the context in which "Japan" acts. 
The problem with this however, is that it effectively abrogates those approach Japan 
in this way, from any critical contemplation of their broader theoretical choices. 
74lbid., 124. 
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And, in the case of some Japanese Studies texts, the results are not just predictable, 
but for anyone remotely aware of broader debate, even in the more `conservative' 
circles of contemporary International Relations, almost embarrassing. They are 
shown up especially, I suggest, in the surge of (predominantly) North American 
commentary on Japan's international role during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as 
the Cold War drew to an end - i.e., a time when, as I pointed out in the previous 
chapter, even conservative scholars such as Gaddis were already emphasising the 
need to re -think the fundamentals of Realist analysis, especially the power -politics 
metaphor. While it is not unreasonable to expect that some of these `theoretical' 
musings might have filtered through to the mainstream Japanese Studies community, 
a quick look at some of the more prominent (English language) literature of this time 
indicates very little change in the fundamental assumptions of Japan specialists 
charged with discussing Japan's post -Cold War future. 
Three years after the Cold war ended, for example, John Creighton Campbell was 
still invoking the "game" metaphor of Cold War power politics to describe relations 
between Japan and the United States. Under the sub -heading "The Diplomatic 
Game," for example, Campbell informed the reader that, 
Diplomacy refers to the grand affairs of world politics, the fundamentals of foreign 
policy, and the relationships of friendship or enmity among nations. For postwar 
Japan, the most crucial element of foreign policy has been to maintain its 
relationship with the United States. Tokyo keeps that in mind in conducting all its 
other relationships; it nearly always follows a simple set of behavioural mles 
resulting from a tacit understanding with Washington that evolved in the first half of 
the 1950s 76 
Japan's 1990s foreign policy agenda is thus represented by Campbell, in language 
and imagery directly reminiscent of Realist orthodoxy at the height of the Cold War. 
Realism's assumption about the nation state as primary actor in "the grand affairs of 
world politics," for example, is the unspoken justification for Campbell's 
Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," 193. 
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anthropomorphic posturing of "Tokyo" and "Washington." Similarly, the following 
of `behavioural rules" is entirely in accordance with a broader concept of universal, 
transhistorical "games" played among nations for a rational, pre -determined end - 
i.e., the maximisation of state power in a shifting, uncertain international arena. 
These "rules" are reiterated elsewhere in Campbell's essay, in terms of different 
variations of the "game ;" for example, "the military game," where he describes the 
"ritualised conflict" between the U.S. and 'Japan on Japan's defence role?' Even 
when he concedes the specific interests at stake on this particular issue, Campbell 
still represents these interests in exemplary Realist /neo- Realist terms; i.e., of 
calculable, rational choice. 
The defence game illustrates how conflict can be functional for maintenance of a 
stable relationship. Each govemment is able to respond to discontent within its own 
country by opposing the other. Congressional and public opinion in the United 
States resents Japan's "free ride," so Washington presses for a greater effort; the 
Japanese public and opposition parties worry about remilitarization, so Tokyo stands 
up to these pressures 78 
A similar approach is found in Martin Weinstein's essay on Japan's future foreign 
policy options, where he produces three possible scenarios for the post -Cold War 
world order, on the basis of the late 1980s economic and military "power balance" 
between Japan, the U.S. and Europe. Weinstein's first scenario is of continued 
Japan -U.S. economic and security cooperation; his second, of discontinued U.S. - 
Japan economic /security cooperation, and his third is of discontinued U.S. -Japan 
cooperation with a new twist via the return of the "Soviet Threat " - which, in 
Weinstein's account, takes the form of a "nationalistic, militaristic, authoritarian 
backlash in Russia [which] has thousands of advanced nuclear weapons.... and is 
76 John Creighton Campbell, "Japan and the United States: Games That Work," in Gerald L. Curtis 
(ed.), Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
1993), 44. 
77Ibid., 46. 
78Ibid., 47. 
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determined to prevent encroachments on its territory by a unified Germany, China or 
Japan. "79 
The point here of course is not which, if any of Weinstein's scenarios have 
subsequently proved most accurate as the `new' global paradigm. It is that for 
Weinstein, (or Campbell), there is no other way of imagining international reality - 
one can only speak of Japan's international role in (Realist) terms of power balances, 
alliance structures, and advantage- maximising "games.'80 My broader point however, 
is that the confidence of scholars such as Campbell and Weinstein about Japan's 
options is derived from the positivist closure integral to Realist knowledge, where 
reality is understood as coherent, complete and above all detached from the observer 
- making it accessible to universalised, essentialised and totalised understandings of 
it. From this perspective, relevant capable analysis of Japan as an international actor 
does not need sophisticated imagery of Japanese life and society; all it needs is an 
understanding of the ritualised behaviour patterns of states in the international 
system. 
This is not to suggest that the sort of issues raised in a traditional, military security 
context are not important to the question of Japan's international role; nor is it to 
insist that all discussions on Japan as an international actor begin at the finer points 
of positivism (or even ReaIism). It is to suggest however, that thinking about 
traditional aspects of Japan's international role - including its role in military 
security - demands a more updated context than that assumed into existence above 
via the theoretical `corner cutting' techniques employed by Campbell, Weinstein, and 
others of their ilk. To put it another way, classifying oneself as a `Japan specialist' 
79 Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan's Foreign Policy Options," in Curtis (ed.),Japan's Foreign Policy 
After the Cold War (op. cit., 1993), 232 -233. 
8Ó Besides Curtis's volume (in which the Campbell and Weinstein essays appear, and which is 
described on its cover as " `must' reading for anyone interested in Japan's evolving world role" by the 
Dean of the Edwin O. Reischauer Centre for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University), other 
literature defines Japan's options as an international actor in these terms, even beyond the end of the 
Cold War. Other examples include the strategic studies analyses of the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, Sheldon Simon's East Asian Security in the Post -Cold War Era (New York: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1993), and the updated edition of Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto's The Political 
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does not, I argue, remove analytical /philosophical responsibility for the assumptions 
which make it possible to think about something called `Japan' in the first place; 
even if it is not always possible to confront those assumptions at great length. 
This is a particularly important issue I suggest, in light of the rapidly changing nature 
of contemporary `area studies' in Western communities. Today, in many 
universities, Japanese Studies has achieved almost disciplinary status in its own right. 
One result of this, as I argued in Chapter One, is that increasingly, many Japan /Asia 
specialists regard their knowledge as linguistically, culturally and even analytically 
separate from a more traditional Western disciplinary core. For such scholars, the 
issue at stake is not so much theoretical `corner cutting,' as the relevance of Western 
social scientific theory and methodology to non -western contexts. Following the 
work of its own Ieading scholars,ßl Japanese Studies is no longer just about the 
interpretation of Japan by and for a Western audience, but about the building of 
whole new bodies of knowledge about traditional 'disciplinary' topics - such as 
economics, political theory and, of course, International Relations. 
No -one could argue that the expansion and diversification of Japanese Studies has 
been other than stimulating and useful. Nonetheless, and as stated previously, I have 
some concerns about the seeming lack of communication between a `theory building' 
Japanese Studies, and International Relations - a situation which David Wright - 
Neville has blamed for the growing sense among many IR (Asian) area studies 
specialists, that "their discipline is unique and capable of existing without any 
significant intrusions from theoretical developments elsewhere "82 From my 
perspective, and as I argued at the beginning of this chapter, this sense of self - 
sufficiency is derived from the disinclination among many area specialists to 
Economy of Japan: The Changing International Context (2nd edition; Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1991). The Inoguchi /Okimoto volume is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
81 E.g., Reischauer, whose work is covered in the next chapter; but more recently, the works of 
scholars such as Lucien Pye, who was one of the first Asian Studies specialists to apply the `Pan 
Asianist' perspective to an IR/political theory context, in Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural 
Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 1985). 
This work, and the perspective it embodies, is discussed at the beginning of Chapter Six. 
82 David Wright -Neville, "The Politics of Pan Asianism" (op. cit., 1995), 2. 
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confront the `how' questions raised in this chapter about our dominant ways of 
knowing reality, and how they influence our `theory building.' 
This concern is borne out, I suggest, by the fact that on the few occasions when 
Japanese Studies texts have explicitly confronted these issues, they have done so 
from a positivist perspective - albeit one which utilises (Popperian) critical 
rationalist themes to argue for the greater inclusion of `non -western' values and ideas 
in the building and refining of social. theory. The particular example I have in mind, 
and some of the most interesting writing to come out of Western literature on Japan 
in recent years, is the work of David Williams. Williams is one of the few scholars 
ever to have confronted the positivism issue in a Japan- specific context, and he does 
so from a political economy perspective that is particularly useful to this discussion, 
using overtly Popperian themes to justify a `post- positivist' approach to 
understanding Japan's significance in the global system. As explained above, this has 
also been a crucial theoretical device for International Relations scholars, via the 
work of Waltz in particular. And, like Waltz, Williams work is significant because it 
fails to acknowledge what Popper's critics have pointed out - namely, the lingering 
positivist closure in his scholarship. 
David Williams and the Japan- shaped hole:' Conquering the Eurocentric bias in 
Japanese Studies. 
Williams' admiration for, and emulation of Popper's approach to knowledge is 
declared quite openly in the title of his 1996 work, Japan and the Enemies of Open 
Political Science, in which he argues that (logical) positivism has retarded 
acknowledgement of the challenge that postwar Japan poses to an established `canon' 
of Western politico -economic thought. Williams' definition of positivism is, of 
course, indebted to Popper, whom, as explained above, based his claim to a 
postpositivist critical rationalism on the rejection of scientific foundationalism in the 
humanities, via the insistence that knowledge must always be subjected to 
falsificationist scepticism. In making this assertion, Popper argued that his approach 
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went beyond "positivist epistemology... the aping of the natural sciences by the 
social sciences. "83 The key move here, as acknowledged by admirers and critics 
alike, is that which equates positivism with logical positivism - i.e. crude, "fact - 
grubbing" inductivism, with a rigid emphasis on the fact /value distinction. 
Translated to a Japanese Studies context, this inductivist approach is associated with 
an old- fashioned (and ethnocentric) approach to the non -West, in which Western 
grand theory was, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, applied to Japanese 
circumstances, without taking any particular note of historical and /or cultural 
contexts. And this, according to Williams, remains the dominant approach to Japan, 
especially when evaluating the postwar Japanese political economy, As first 
explained in his 1994 work, Japan: Beyond the End of History (1994), there has been 
no notable integration of Japanese economic and political thought, and its results, 
into "the Western canon" of political philosophy and economic theory, despite the 
fact that postwar Japan represents "one of the great political experiments of history, 
fully compared to Plato's Athens, Machiavelli's Florence, or James Madison's 
America." This "marginalisation [of Japan] in global consciousness,"" Williams 
argued, persists because Western theorists are unable to concede that 
the post -war Japanese miracle offers a significant intellectual challenge to some of 
the more rooted assumptions of the Western mind. To neglect Japanese political and 
economic success is to create a Japan- shaped hole' in the discourse of modern 
Western social science and political analysis. Though the point may be lost on 
Europeans and Americans ensconced in the heartland of Western civilisation, this 
incipient `hole' is the object of bitter feelings in Japan and the Third World 65 
More specifically, and as Williams subsequently argued in detail in Japan and the 
Enemies of Open Political Science, the `Japan shaped hole' persists because Western 
social science, particularly economics, remains dominated by a hard -core (logical) 
positivism, which is inimical to the natural concerns of the area specialist - 
83 Popper, "Reason or Revolution ?" in Adorno et. al. (eds.), The Positivist Dispute in German 
Sociology (op. cit., 1976), 299. 
84 David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History (Routledge: London & New York, 1994), 190- 
91. 
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linguistic, historical and cultural context. The result, Williams claims, is that 
Western scholars persist in trying to squash Japan into universal grand theories 
located within the Western canon, rather than admit that Japan's postwar experience 
has a genuine contribution to make. On the basis of the available literature about 
Japan, he writes, 
...the mainstream Western scholar may safely conclude that Japan has nothing 
special to say to him. Japan comfortably conforms to the Euro- American paradigm 
in which John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek divide the public policy world 
between them. This represents a victory for the ghetto mentality that pervades Japan 
studies on both sides of the Atlantic... where once the mind of Europe celebrated the 
singular feats of the Venetian Republic and the miraculous surge of English power 
after the Glorious revolution, today we greet Japan's record of political achievement 
with the fog of empirical denial 86 
While there is no space here to develop the fine details of Williams' thesis, basically, 
his solution to the Japan -shaped hole is the same falsificationist logic employed by 
Popper - expressed, in Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science, as an 
expanded "dialogue" between Japan specialists and the disciplines 87 Such a 
dialogue, he argues, would take into account the other "great tradition"" of Asian 
studies; namely, the tradition of Orientalism. Here, "Orientalism" is interpreted by 
Williams in a predominantly positive sense which (correctly) pays tribute to the great 
early descriptive and philological studies of Japan in nineteenth and early twentieth 
century scholarship by writers such as Lafcadio Hearn (1850 -1904)89 and George 
Samson (1883 - 1965)9° - in other words, Williams argues, scholarship based, on 
"micro- observation," grounded in "a commitment to cultural geography as an 
ordering motif in human learning. "9' This approach, he observes, has been largely 
8s /bid., 191. 
86 Williams, . Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science (Routledge: London & New York, 
1996), 137. 
87Ibid., 249. 
88 The first being (behaviouralist) social science; in particular, Modernisation Theory, on which more 
is said in the following chapter. Ibid., 269. 
89 Lafcadio Hearn, collected essays on Japanese language, culture and religion, in Louis Allen and 
Jean Wilson (eds.), Lafcadio Hearn: Japan's Great Interpreter. A New Anthology of his Writings: 
1894 -1904. Folkstone: Japan Library Ltd., 1992 
99 George Bailey Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History (Revised edition; New York: Appleton - 
Century , 1943). 
91 Ibid. 
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swept aside in the postwar rush to conform to "the conceit, so powerfully alive in 
much American political science, that the term `methods' must, where rigorous, 
apply to certain quantitative tools alone. "92 If Japan's "canonic" status in the lexicon 
of politico- economic knowledge is ever to be acknowledged, Williams suggests, it is 
vital that the "micro- observation" techniques of this type of scholarship be allowed to 
re -enter the domain of genuine knowledge, thereby eradicating 
the massive wall that has been erected during the twentieth century between the 
humanities and the social sciences. For the area student, philosophy and literature 
matter more than physics or higher mathematics, although it is the latter that have 
served, for far too long, as the dominant epistemological model for so- called 
rigorous social science. Orientalist precedent should encourage the regional 
specialist to say `goodbye' to someone that he never knew very well, but whose 
legacy has been allowed to exert a baleful influence on the human sciences: Sir Isaac 
Newton 93 
In actual fact, Williams' ideas are not, in themselves, startlingly new; echoing, as 
they do, long- standing concerns about the ethnocentric bias of conventional 
(Western) social theory shared by a wide range of scholars, and particularly evident 
among Japan /Asia specialists. By the mid 1970s for example, scholars such as James 
White and Lucien Pye were already willing to concede that the traditional division of 
labour between area specialists and disciplinary theory -builders was no longer 
viable 94 Later, Chalmers Johnson (whose work is examined in detail in Chapter 
Four) would go even further, producing a compelling argument for Japan's `miracle' 
to be examined as a major challenge to Western politico -economic theories.95 Where 
Williams differs to these scholars however, is in the directness with which he 
confronts the philosophical foundations of Western scholarship. In this respect, and 
also in his deliberately cross -disciplinary approach, and encouragement of an 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 270. 
94 James White, "Tradition and Politics in Studies of Contemporary Japan," (Journal of World 
Politics 3,1974: 400 -427), in which he argued against the "ethnocentric" Western social scientific 
definition of concepts such as `tradition' and `modernity' which equated them, dichotomously, with 
'undeveloped' and `developed' (Ibid., 403 -05). See also Lucien Pye's early comments on this matter, 
in "The confrontation between discipline and area studies," in Lucien W. Pye (ed.), Political Science 
and Area Studies: Rivals or Partners? (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press), 1975,24- 
26. 
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enhanced `dialogue' between usually separated sectors of knowledge, Williams has 
been inspirational to my own project, explained in the previous chapter, of 
`connecting' the concerns and themes shared by contemporary International 
Relations and Japanese Studies. 
On the other hand, I have deep reservations about Williams' overtly Popperian 
position on the positivism issue - a position which leads to the same, problematic 
result; namely, that which saw Popper (at least, from the perspective of his critics) 
replicate in his work, the very positivist closure he claimed to have moved beyond. 
In Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science, this is most obvious when 
Williams, in arguing that "some knowledge of Japan is indispensable to a sound 
grasp of the contemporary world, "96 spells out his certainty that Japan is `out there' to 
be known. In other words, it is possible, through various levels of micro and macro 
analysis, based on empirical observation, to understand the true nature of Japanese 
reality from a detached, unbiased perspective. Accordingly, even as he denigrates 
the "monoist orthodoxy" in a behaviouralist Japanese Studies, which denies the 
relevance of linguistic knowledge and cultural frames of reference (for example, in 
the rational choice theory used to explain Japanese voting patterns),97 Williams 
remains fundamentally committed to the objectivist stance of `true' science as a 
whole a commitment that is never more evident than when he berates scholars 
such as Edward Said for their inability "to square up, honestly and clearly, to an 
obvious truth: it is possible for a White man or woman to study Asia in an objective 
and disinterested manner. A rigorous science of the Orient is not only conceivable, 
it has been achieved. "95 
95 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925 -1975 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1982). 
96 Williams, Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science, 140. 
97lbid., 129. 
98 Ibid., 152 -53. A further irony pervades Williams' defence of science on page 263 of Enemies, 
where he conflates the scientific achievements of "Newtonian or Einsteinian physics." This 
underlines the (Popperian- derived) narrowness of William's grasp on positivism, given the profound 
challenge that Einstein's achievements represent to the Newtonian world view, as indicated above. 
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Now, in terms of the primary assumptions of positivism noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, this represents positivism - at the heart of one of the most explicitly 
"anti- positivist" statements that has ever been made in a Japanese Studies context. 
The result is that Williams' concerns about squashing Japan's modern experience 
into grand theorised, Western generalisations of "how the world works" are, 
ironically, expressed in terms which re- confirm the most basic assumption of 
Western grand theory - namely, the scientific accessibility of the world `out there.' 
In this respect, his work ultimately connects to those who are far less self conscious 
about invoking "generalised" structures of thought - such as Weinstein or 
Campbell, whose prognoses for post -Cold War Japan are unapologetically located in 
Cold War Realism. Even more importantly, it connects to the problems identified by 
Wright -Neville, concerning the efforts of Japan /Asia specialists to create and impose 
`canonic' statements about Japanese/East Asian reality, that are grounded in a single, 
essentialised reading of that reality. As Wright -Neville concludes, while the attempt 
to transcend Western reason to recognise that "there are other ways of thinking than 
those enshrined in the reified categories of Western epistemology" is perhaps 
worthwhile: 
the task is immediately problematised by the fact that the apparent object of 
liberation from the tyranny of Western hegemonic categories, the non- Western 
individual, is doubly ensnared by [those] who, despite their heady rhetoric on 
defending cultural integrity, are themselves dependent upon the continuation of 
categories of difference initially imagined and imposed by Europeans 99 
In subsequent chapters, I will return to the problem of negotiating the division 
between Japanese Studies and the "disciplines" (in this case, International Relations). 
For now however, I will return to the Realist /positivist influence in Japanese Studies, 
focussing on the postwar period, and the construction of Japan's international role in 
the shadow of the Cold War. 
99 Wright -Neville, "The Politics of Pan Asianism," 25 -26. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POSTWAR JAPAN (I): 
REALISM AND THE CREATION OF THE `BLACK BOX.' 
The issue of Realism and postwar Japan is best encompassed, perhaps, in two 
observations concerning Cold War mind sets and their continuing influences in IR. 
The first, by Ken Booth, compliments the position taken in the previous chapter on 
the question of positivism and the restricted images it allows of global reality. For 
Booth, these restrictions were never more evident than in relation to the approach of 
Western (and Soviet) strategists during the Cold War. The problem here, he argues, 
is that those who planned Cold War strategy and invoked their images of the `is' of 
the world, did not understand that "there is no clear dividing line between images [of 
the world] and reality. [That] the reality of our strategic world is inextricably 
interconnected with our manner of conceiving it. "1 Developing this point further 
Booth explains that, in Cold War terms, this process of `conceiving' global reality: 
is premised on a clear conception of the nation -state (billiard ball) model of 
international relations: governments are seen as the chief actors: defence is 
conceived to be the primary duty of the authorities: national stereotypes are seen at 
their clearest: So- called realism is the prevailing philosophy [and] conflict and war 
are seen to be necessary and normal because of the struggles for power which 
determines the major clash of [inter- state] interests? 
The problem with this perspective, for Booth, is precisely that which Gaddis and 
others have pointed to in the 1990s; i.e., that while it might make for the kind of 
parsimonious theory beloved by policy makers, in practice, it tells us nothing much 
about the peoples and cultures and differences of global society beyond reductionist, 
stereotypical images of them. As I indicated in the previous chapter, this was to have 
particularly disastrous consequences in Vietnam. More recently, and as a whole 
range of scholars have pointed out, it resulted in a general failure to predict, or even 
Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 9. 
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acknowledge, the possibility of the Soviet implosion - despite trillions spent on 
surveillance and intelligence analysis. 
The value of Booth's comment in the present context has a slightly different 
connotation, however, because as well as reiterating the power and influence of a 
Realist image of the world at the core of Cold War thinking, it adds an important yet 
rarely discussed dimension to the issue of Realism and IR, with significance for 
Japan and this thesis - namely, its ethnocentrism. This dimension of Realism has 
seen an almost exclusively Western (or more precisely western European) image of 
the world, derived from the historical and intellectual experiences of the post - 
Renaissance period, universalised into global reality per se. The result, as Booth's 
observations indicate, is a `real -world' of IR invested with the structural and 
philosophical characteristics of a particular (social, cultural and historical) image of 
reality, in which other peoples, cultures, histories and experiences are reduced to a 
`billiard ball' scenario or, at best a series of "national stereotypes." 
The most important political and analytical implication of this restricted perspective, 
as earlier intimated, is that in this essentialised context there is no real need to 
understand the complex, `inside' of state- actors if, as the Realist perspective insists, 
all states act in fundamentally the same ways for fundamentally the same purposes in 
a world which follows the same fundamental patterns.' For Booth, however, writing 
at about the same time that Waltz was arguing precisely this in updated positivist 
terms, this was indeed a major problem, that needed to be re- addressed in theory and 
acted upon in practice. In particular, he suggested, the study of global strategy 
divorced from area studies is little more than "thinking in a void "4 
The second observation I want to highlight on this issue also comes to this 
conclusion, and it also points to the rampant ethnocentrism at the core of Realist 
2 Ibid., 22. 
3 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics (op. cit., 1994), 33. 
4 Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, 157. 
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Cold War thinking about Japan. It comes from Bruce Cumings who, in the early 
1990s, took up some of the themes introduced by Booth to try, in retrospect, to work 
out the nature of past U.S. -Japan relations, and provide a sense of what future 
relations might look like. In the present context, it is a basic question asked by 
Cumings that is of most interest. The question is this: "What does Japan look Iike 
when it is viewed from without, as if it were a black box, as if little that happened in 
Japan was of great moment ? "5 For Cumings, this is an entirely appropriate way to 
begin any inquiry into postwar U.S. -Japan relations because, he argues, Japan has 
been little more than a `black box' for Western analysts for the past sixty -odd years; 
particularly in the United States during the Cold War, of course, when those charged 
with Japan -related policymaking "did not study Japan, nor did they know it; [instead] 
they wished to situate Japan structurally in a world system shaped by the United 
States so that Japan would do what it should without having to be told "6 
What Cumings points to here is vital in understanding the very profound impact that 
a Realist dominated IR perspective has had on Japan, because what he points to is the 
process by which `Japan' was given a particular Cold war identity and a particular 
structural location in U.S. geo- political strategy. Via this strategy, I suggest, Japan 
became little more than a `black box' for Realist analysts. Even when this approach 
was altered slightly in the 1960s to re- locate Japan as primarily a geo- economic asset 
and, among some Japanese Studies specialists, the jewel in the Modernisation Theory 
crown, Japan remained very much an essentialised, universalised entity in Western 
Cold War planning.' Moreover, much of the negativity associated with U.S. 
perceptions of Japan in the 1970s, which developed into the `Japan bashing' era of 
the 1980s and the uneasy relationships of the current era can be traced, I believe, to 
this initial (positivist induced) objectification of Japan in the 1940s and 1950s as a 
passive Western (i.e. U.S.) ally in Asia which, as Cumings puts it, `would do what it 
5 Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System" (op. cit., 1993), 34. 
6 Ibid. 
81 
should without having to he told. "8 In this respect, Cumings is correct, I think, to 
point to the tensions of the 1990s as derived initially from U.S. perceptions of 
Japan's designated location in post -WWII U.S. global strategy, via which the U.S. 
policy community imposed "distinct outer limits on Japan's behaviour." According 
to Cumings, these limits persist to the present day, in the (Cold War) mind -set of 
many within the U.S. foreign policy elite, to whom any shift from a passive to an 
active Japan (even in a burden sharing context) "sends a chill up the American 
spine. "8 
This chapter will explore this issue, or at least some elements of it, as part of a 
discussion which seeks to connect the political and intellectual process by which 
`Japan' was represented in IR in the Cold War era, to the larger 'theoretical' issues 
thus far developed in this thesis. In this context, as the chapter progresses, I want to 
connect the issue of a caricatured Cold War Japan more precisely to the issue of 
ethnocentrism at the core of Realism and positivism. In particular, I want to explore 
the period which saw Japan become not only a Cold War geo- strategic bulwark 
against Communism in the 1940s and 1950s, but the (Asian) exemplar of Western 
modernity for the (first phase) Modernisation Theorists of the 1960s. This, I suggest, 
is also an important point of connection for my developing discussion on Japanese 
Studies, and my claims about its continued dependence on themes drawn from the 
influences of IR Realism and positivism, and the kinds of perspectives associated 
with Modernisation Theory in the 1960s. In the chapter to follow, I will develop this 
discussion further in terms of the neo- Realism of the 1970s and 1980s, and the 
second phase of Modernisation Theory at the heart of the neo- liberalism of the 
1990s. 
1. Re- Modelling Japan: The Geo- strategic /Geo- economic Asset. 
7 This is a particularly important point with regard to the early Japanese Studies texts of scholars such 
as Edwin O. Reischauer, on whom more will he said in this chapter. 
8 Bruce Comings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 34. 
9 Ibid. 
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The post -war history of Japan is an object lesson in what international politics are 
really about. 
Peter Calvocoressi, 1985.10 
In Chapter One, in particular, I touched on issues concerning the early years of post - 
WWII Occupation policy, and specifically, the desire to demilitarise and democratise 
a Japan which had paid the ultimate (nuclear) price for its brutal activities in the 
1930s and 1940s. The major objectives of this restoration of Japan under U.S. 
tutelage were articulated and, to varying degrees, implemented, primarily between 
1945 and 1948 - a period when the vast majority of Japanese people were 
struggling desperately to survive the material and psychological aftermath of war and 
defeat. In this context, as John Dower has written, the reforms implemented by the 
Occupation represented nothing less than a "revolution from above... an 
extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid moment; never seen before in history and, as 
it turned out, never to be repeated. "" In its initial stages too, it was a revolution with 
enormous popular support. There is little doubt, Dower argues, that the reforms 
implemented under MacArthur were a great source of inspiration for millions of 
Japanese, helping them to transcend the economic chaos and social hardship of these 
years, to begin rebuilding their lives'2 
The keystone of the democratic makeover of course, was the 1947 Constitution, 
which metamorphosed Japan into a new Western style constitutional monarchy in 
which power was situated within the elected Diet rather than in the hands of the 
powerful zaibatsu combines and the Emperor.13 While this was never a process that 
in practice entirely coincided with its stated aims,14 the new Constitution was a 
1° Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (7° edition; London & New York: Longman, 1996), 
77. 
Il John Dower, Embracing Defeat (op. cit., 1999), 84. 
12/hid., 119 -20. 
13 J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy (2 °d edition; London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1982), 198 -200. 
14 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 405 -410. For example, in its preservation and protection of Emperor 
Hirohito, which, as Dower argues, effectively erased the issue of war responsibility. Later too, it 
became increasingly obvious that "democratization" had never been intended to flourish to the extent 
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genuinely revolutionary document, drafted by a working committee who set out to 
interpret the guidelines set down by MacArthur "towards the most liberal 
interpretation possible. "15 The result was a document that not only overturned many 
of the traditional ( "feudal ") aspects of Japanese society, but which, in some instances 
went beyond even the institutions of its creators in stipulating the conditions of 
democratic life. The section enumerating the "rights and duties of the people," for 
example, "was, and remains, one of the most liberal guarantees of human rights in 
the world... it even affirmed "the essential equality of the sexes" - a guarantee not 
explicitly found in the U.S. Constitution. "16 
Initial Cold War Concerns and Acheson's "Great Crescent." 
Less than a year after the Constitution's promulgation however, such aims had 
already become secondary ones. By now, it was clear that the post -war identity of 
Japan was ceasing to be an issue primarily of U.S. policy in East Asia, becoming, 
instead, an issue of U.S. and Western global policy in the Cold War. Two issues in 
particular accelerated this shift in strategic thinking. The first centred on the ever - 
worsening relationship between the Western powers and the Soviet Union in central 
Europe. The second concerned the increasing vulnerability of the Nationalist 
Chinese under Chiang Kai -shek and the increasing likelihood of a major Communist 
victory in Asia. This latter possibility was a significant blow to the post -WWII 
planners in the U.S., in particular, who, initially at least, had looked upon China 
under the Kuomintang Nationalists as a key strategic and economic ally in any long- 
term confrontation with the USSR ?' By mid -1948 however, the Northern regions of 
China were under Communist control and, even more disconcerting for Western 
that it might override the democratisers themselves; freedom of speech, for example, was strictly 
curtailed under Occupation authorities, who were assiduous in suppressing critical and /or satirical 
comment on their efforts. Ibid., 406. 
15Ibid., 369. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 36. 
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strategists invoking images of a `monolithic communism' spreading outwards from 
Moscow, a People's Republic was now proclaimed in North Korea?' 
The response of the Western powers was the containment policy of the Truman 
administration which, in its formal articulation, in November 1948, was concerned to 
"reduce the power and influence of the USSR to Iimits which no longer constitute a 
threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of 
nations. "19 In this context, and with the U.S. increasingly committed to its role as 
`world policeman' and generator of a political and economic strategy designed to 
contain the perceived expansionism of Soviet Communism, each member of the 
(free) `world family of nations" was designated a role in this strategy under U.S. 
leadership and guidance.20 Japan's role was a clear and important one in this context, 
situated as it now was at the centre of the `great crescent' of strategic threat defined 
by U.S. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1947, which took in the 
immediate danger areas of China and Korea and a range of potential 'domino' states 
stretching from Japan down through Southeast Asia and around India to the oil -rich 
regions of the Persian Gulf?, 
Within this `great crescent' perspective, Japan had a dual importance for the U.S. 
The first concerned U.S. strategic interests in Asia and, as a prominent State 
Department expert on Japan explained it in late 1948, the problem here was that 
victory for the Chinese Communists and for Communism in Korea would increase 
the difficulties of "holding Japan within the U.S. sphere," and eventually "destroy 
U.S. security in the Pacific. "22 On this basis, it was vital that Japan be confirmed as a 
major strategic ally of the Western powers in the `great crescent;' the major bulwark 
in the defence of U.S. security interests in the Pacific region. This new strategic role 
18 Tessa Morris -Suzuki, Shôwa: An Inside History of Hirohito's Japan (Sydney: Methuen. Australia, 
1984), 130. 
19 National Security Council Document 20/4: "U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR to Counter 
Threats to United States Security," quoted in Colin S. Gray, The Gen -Politics of Super Power 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 117. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 39. 
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was to be supplemented however, by the role Japan was also to play as the 
keystone of a regional economic policy designed "to develop in non -Soviet Northeast 
Asia a group of independent people...who, on an economically viable basis, are 
capable of successfully resisting communist expansion. "23 
In this regard, Japan was now taking on the role that West Germany had been 
designated in Europe - erstwhile enemies nbw `remade' in the image of the United 
States, to become passive symbols of the free -world and the struggle against 
ideology and oppression. As such, these newly sanitised states were to be given all 
of the benefits of both the U.S. strategic arsenal (or at least guaranteed protection 
under the U.S. nuclear umbrella), and the surging U.S. economy. Moreover, this was 
an attitude that penetrated even those with reservations about the speed of the 
rehabilitation process who, for the most part, conceded that "they had nothing to fear 
from Japan and Germany, as long as they were kept on capital, technological, 
defence and resource dependencies "24 
If anything, Japan was by now already more important to the U.S. than was 
Germany; to the extent that, while the (West) Germans were pivotal to the success of 
the Marshall Plan and 'economic' containment in Europe, Germany was still a 
divided society and as such, not totally amenable to U.S. influences. Japan, on the 
other hand, was not only a complete entity, but its people had been regarded from the 
outset, as more malleable to instruction - being, as MacArthur famously described 
them, "Oriental peoples [who] suffer from an inferiority complex which leads them 
to `childish brutality' when they conquer in war and to slavish dependence when they 
lose.'2S While not all would have expressed it thus, Japan was certainly widely 
regarded as being, effectively, a clean slate for U.S. Cold War theory and practice, 
just as it had been, three years previously, a clean slate for American democratic 
22Ibid., 42. 
23 Ibid. 
24Ibid., 38. 
25 MacArthur to Truman, October 1945; quoted in Dower, Embracing Defeat, 223. 
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ideals. This was very much the way, for example, that the arch Realist George 
Kennan saw Japan - and it was Kennan who was to have a major voice in the way 
that Japan was restructured, socially and conceptually, as a Cold War asset of the 
Western alliance. 
2. The Kennan Factor: Taking Cold War Realism to Japan. 
The significance of Kennan is particularly worth noting here, because his influence 
as a Realist theorist of the Cold War goes far beyond his importance in the makeover 
of Japan. In fact, as Charles Nathanson and others have argued, Kennan's Realism 
and his positivist history is intrinsic to the way in which U.S. Cold War policymakers 
came to know the Soviet Union and respond to its natural expansionist ambitions 
after 1945.26 In this sense, Kennan is perhaps the major architect of the Cold War 
mind -set which gripped U.S. policy and analytical circles in the wake of WWII, and 
which was to have such a profound effect on policy towards Japan. 
The point here, as Nathanson explains it, is that in 1945 the Soviet threat thesis per se 
did not exist in U.S. policy thinking. Rather, at this time, a range of interpretations 
of the Soviet Union and its post -Cold War intentions permeated the U.S. decision 
making community, with the anti -Communist propensities of the Truman 
administration generally balanced by U.S. intelligence reports which argued that the 
Soviets were neither capable of, nor interested in, any further expansion 27 The key 
actor in shifting this ambiguity into concrete reality was Kennan, via his secret `X' 
telegram in February 1946. In this telegram, Kennan insisted that U.S. policy should 
not be based on negotiation and traditional diplomacy but on force, because force, 
argued Kennan was the only thing the Soviets understood.28 Moreover, he claimed, 
the Soviet Union had a "neurotic view of world affairs" provoked in the main by its 
contact with "the more competent, more powerful... and economically advanced" 
26 Charles E. Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of 
Representation." Alternatives. XIII (1988: 443 -483), 443. 
27/bid., 444. 
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states of the West 29 This underpinned a foreign policy "fanatically committed to 
the belief that the U.S. way of life [must] be destroyed [and] the international 
authority of [the U.S.] be broken. "3° 
Expanding his point, Kennan explained that the Soviets would seek to pursue their 
agenda at two major levels: `internally' by infiltrating "labour unions, youth leagues, 
women's organisations, racial societies, social organisations, cultural groups, liberal 
magazines etc" and by setting the "poor against rich, black against white, young 
against old. "31 In the international arena, their tactics were to `weaken the power and 
influence of the Western powers" by gaining power and influence among "colonial 
backward, or dependent peoples. "32 Moreover, there was, Kennan warned, no point 
in trying to find compromise with the Soviets on any of these problems, because they 
were "impervious to the logic of reason... and seemingly inaccessible to 
considerations of reality. "33 The only realistic solution, he advised, was the 
traditional balance of power logic, in which the free -world acted in alliance to 
contain an enemy which could only be deterred if its "adversary has sufficient force 
and makes clear his readiness to use it. "34 
Importantly, as Daniel Yergin indicates, Kennan's telegram strengthened the position 
of the anti -Communist cold warriors around Truman, and was the catalyst for the 
global containment strategy and for the NATO alliance." But, crucially, it was not a 
response to any change in the character of Soviet behaviour. Rather, suggests 
Yergin, Kennan's perspective on the Soviet Union actually had very little to do with 
Soviet behaviour in 1945 -1946, but emanated instead from an objectivised view of 
Russian history, coloured by a deterministic view of communism as a fundamentally 
28 /bid. 
29 Kennan's "Long Telegram," quoted in Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet 
Threat," 455. 
30 Ibid., 456. 
31 
32 ibid . 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 457. 
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evil force in world affairs 36 Thus, Kennan understood the Soviet aim as an 
extension of Russian imperialist aims which, from the revolution of 1917 on, was 
interpreted as `world -wide revolution... [and] the destruction of all governments as 
now constituted. "37 Nothing, on this basis, could change this interpretative-cum - 
objective 'fact,' apart from a global U.S. led alliance against the spread of 
communism. This provided an interpretative framework for aggressive, expansionist 
Soviet behaviour even when its behaviour appeared not to be motivated by 
aggressive or expansionist intent. 
The more immediate importance of all this, for the present discussion, is that this 
objectivist interpretation- cum -factual reality in IR was now transformed into U.S. 
policy after 1946 - including, of course, its policy for Japan. Consequently, in the 
letter which White House special council CIark Clifford wrote for President Truman 
which drew on Kennan's analysis and which acted as a draft for the `Truman 
Doctrine,' some intrinsic Realist themes began to shape the U.S. perspective on its 
role and that of its allies. The notion, for example, that `The language of military 
power is the only language which disciples of power politics [i.e. the Soviets] 
understand. "36 That, "compromise and concessions are considered by the Soviets to 
be evidence of weakness. "39 That, "the main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United 
States, or on areas of the world which are vital to our security, will be the military 
power of [the U.S.A.]" (emphasis added). That, "the United States should support 
and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by 
the USSR." That, in this context, "providing military support in case of attack is a 
last resort: [but] a more effective barrier to communism is strong economic 
support...[Thus] Our efforts to...bring economic unification to countries now 
divided by occupation armies are also directed towards the re- establishment of 
35 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National- Security State 
(London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1978), 170. 
36 ibid., 171. 
37 Kennan, cited in Yergin, Shattered Peace, 169. 
38 Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat," 459. 
39 ibid., 460. 
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vigorous and healthy non -communist economies"4° Finally, and most pertinently, 
perhaps, came the conclusion that, "our [anti- Soviet] policies must be global in 
scope. "41 The significance of this being that while "by time honoured custom we 
have regarded `European policy,' `Near East' policy,' Indian' policy and `Chinese' 
policy' as separate problems to be handled by experts in each field" (emphasis 
added), this was to change, because all the areas involved `border on the Soviet 
Union [meaning that] our actions with respect to each must be considered in the light 
of overall Soviet objectives" 42 (emphasis added). 
Kennan's "Most Significant Contribution:" Setting the `Reverse Course' in Japan 
It is in this context, and against this background, that Kennan was dispatched to 
Japan in 1947 to oversee the `reverse course' program, aimed at redefining Japan in 
terms of newly designated U. S. interests in the Asia- Pacific region. As indicated 
above, this required, on the one hand that Japan be transformed into a "regional 
power of the second rank, hamstrung by the hegemonic power but free to dominate 
its historic territory. "43 Above all, Kennan wanted Japanese power restored in order 
"to butt up against the Soviets, to establish a balance of power like that at the turn of 
the century" in Europe 44 Accordingly, his draft provisions for the reverse course 
included, for example, the "moral right" of U.S. intervention in Japanese affairs, 
should "stooge groups" such as the Japanese Communist Party seek to gain 
influence. Kennan also recommended the swift restoration to power and 
respectability of various war criminals and business leaders, on the basis that they are 
both "the most stable elements" in society and that "they have the strongest natural 
ties with the U.S." 45 In short, he explained, Americans responsible for Japan had to 
4 °Ibid., 461. 
41 Ibid. 
42lhid 
43 Kennan, cited in Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 40. 
44 Ibid., 39. 
45 Ibid., 40. 
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abandon the "aspiration to be liked," dispensing with concerns about "human 
rights" or `living standards," and instead, "deal in straight power concepts. "46 
In this way, the `reverse course' program was constructed and implemented with 
U.S. power politics concerns at its core, and as it moved into effect, the conservative 
architects of Japan's prewar empire and the business groups that had supported them 
began to filter back into public life - among them, many who had previously been 
purged "for all time," for having actively abetted militarism and ultranationalism 47 
Complementing this trend, some of the more radical reforms that had blossomed 
under "democratisation and demilitarisation" were scaled back and, in some cases, 
revoked altogether. Notable among these was MacArthur's 1948 reversal of 
Occupation labour policy, by withdrawing the right to strike from public employees. 
Within organised labour generally, the Occupation worked hard to ensure that 
"democratisation" be increasingly linked to a virulent anti -communism, aided and 
abetted by conservative politicians, government bureaucrats and corporate 
management. The result was the infamous "Red Purges." Between the end of 1949 
and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, some 11,000 activist union 
members in the public sector had been dismissed - a figure that was subsequently 
doubled when the purgers turned their attention to the private sector 4g 
The "reverse course" did not stifle the public ideals of democratisation and 
demilitarisation in postwar Japan. If anything, it helped to strengthen their appeal 
among ordinary Japanese people, in a legacy that, as I will later demonstrate, persists 
to this day. It did, however, drastically re -order Occupation priorities after the 
(Realist) manner recommended by Kennan. Concerns for the liberation of the 
Japanese people and economic equality for all (including the fair economic 
46 Kennan, "Review of Current Trends: U.S. Foreign Policy." PPS 23, February 24, 1948; quoted in 
Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 123. 
47 Dower, Embracing Defeat," 271 -73. 
48 Ibid., 273. 
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recompense of Japan's wartime victims in Asia)49 had now been replaced with the 
harder -headed objective of shaping Japan for its `external' role, as a politico - 
economic bulwark to communist influence in the region. 
And, in regard to this `external' role, decisionmakers such as Kennan were 
unimpressed by any need for a pacifist Constitution. Kennan himself argued openly 
for Japan to be allowed to re- engage militarily in its region, and his reasoning, as in 
everything else regarding the restructuring of Japan as (primarily) a Cold War geo- 
strategic asset, was Realist to the core. `The day will come, and possibly sooner than 
we think," he cautioned, "when realism will call upon us not to oppose the re -entry 
of Japanese influence into Korea and Manchuria. This, in fact, is the only realistic 
prospect for countering and moderating Soviet influence in that area. "50 All this, of 
course, was only a few years after the devastating events of the Japanese rampage 
through the region and its own devastation by nuclear bombs - a fact that would 
have cut no ice with Kennan or his supporters, given that their logic on this issue was 
not derived from immediate events or behaviour, but, as Cumings points out, on a 
forty year old power politics image of Japan, originally invoked by Theodore 
Roosevelt, which posited Japan against Russia, "so that each may have a moderative 
effect on the other. "51 In the same pronouncement, Kennan also reiterated Tyler 
Dennett's judgement that "Japanese ascendancy in the peninsula" would be 
preferable to at "Korean misgovernment, Chinese interference, or Russian 
bureaucracy. "52 
In pondering the dangers of Kennan's perspective on this issue, Cumings 
compliments the arguments thus far presented in this chapter with his insight that, for 
Kennan, the prospect of conflict with the Koreans or the Chinese over the re- 
49 On this issue, Kennan was joined by MacArthur, who supported his recommendations for the 
scrapping of the 1946 Pauley reparations program. Reparations to former occupied territories had 
virtually ceased by 1948. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the 
Occupation (op, cit., 1997), 12 -14, 
50 Kennan, cited in Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 40. 
51 This is Roosevelt's reasoning on the Japan issue in 1905, cited in Cumings, "Japan's Position in the 
World System," 41. 
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imposition of Japanese power "was of little moment" because, for Kennan, "Korea 
and China were `black boxes' too. "53 And, while Kennan would eventually fail to 
wholly get his way on this dimension of Realist `wisdom,' as the above discussion 
has sought to illustrate, his legacy was a powerful and long standing one in the re- 
making of Japan as a Western geo- strategic asset. Kennan himself would later 
evaluate his work in Japan, next to the Marshall Plan, as "the most significant 
contribution I was ever able to make in government. "54 Certainly, he was the major 
force in preparing Japan for the other aspect of its bulwark role, namely, its geo- 
economic status within a political economy focused at maximising "free Asia." 
Japan as the "Workshop of Asia:" Geo- Economic Concerns, and the Intensification 
of the Cold War 
The basics of Japan's strategic economic restructuring were set out in the 1947 
Martin Plan, which called attention to the rapidly changing nature of the world 
economy and warned that an impending "dollar gap" crisis in Asia could only be 
averted by the swift development of Japan's capacity to export capital goods to Asian 
markets 55 Two months later, Dean Acheson reiterated this perspective in a now - 
famous speech, in which he visualised Japan as the `workshop of Asia:" the base 
upon which Asian capitalism would fortify the Great Crescent S6 To this end, the 
reparations program would be abandoned, and U.S. capital and technology would be 
directed at rebuilding and updating Japan's industrial core - a strategy regarded as 
effectively killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, Japan would regain 
the international trade it needed to survive and prosper in its post -imperial age while, 
on the other, technological and financial dependence and U.S. power over naval and 
52 ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Kerman, cited in Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 120. 
55 Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," in Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected 
Essays (New York: The New Press, 1993),173. 
5e Meribeth Cameron et. al., China, Japan and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 
1952), 631. 
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maritime movement would keep Japan from ever breaking out of its position of 
"subordinate independence" within the U.S. Japan relationship 57 
Woven into the picture of subordinate independence, as Dower has pointed out, was 
a fundamentally pessimistic view of the nature and limits of future Japanese 
economic growth. In 1947, when Joseph Dodge was appointed chief engineer for 
stabilising Japan's economy, the most optimistic view of the future was of achieving 
a watered -down version of the old Japanese economy, specialising in cheap exports 
such as glass, toys and ceramics, "Oriental" specialities such as tea and silk, and a 
limited number of labour -intensive (but second -rate) products such as textiles, paper, 
and simple electrical goods.58 Even as late as 1954, when the economic boom 
created by the Korean war had long carried the Japanese economy out of the Dodge - 
inspired doldrums, Dulles was still privately advising Japanese leaders to find other 
markets than the U.S. for its products, because "the Japanese don't make the things 
we want. "S9 
By the end of the 1940s, there was also a growing sense of pessimism, in U.S. 
circles, about the possibility of containing the Communist threat in Northeast Asia. 
As a consequence, Japan was perceived as an even more important, albeit vulnerable, 
asset in U.S. planning. As NSC -48/1 observed, "if Japan, the principal component of 
a Far Eastern warmaking complex, were added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet Asian 
base could become a source of strength capable of shifting the balance of world 
power to the disadvantage of the United States. "60 And, in the wake of Mao's victory 
in October 1949, the prospect of Chinese support was added to the spectre of a `giant 
Soviet co- prosperity sphere." As the journalist Stewart Alsop put it, "China and 
Southeast Asia.., comprise Japan's whole natural trading area, and economic pressure 
57 Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," in Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History (op. 
cit., 1993), 12. 
58 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 536. 
59 William K. Tabb, The Post-war Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 15. 
fi° NSC -48/1, reproduced in Thomas H. Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containment: Documents 
on American Policy and Strategy 1945 -1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 255. 
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alone could be enough to ultimately to bring Japan into the Soviet sphere. "61 With 
these fears in mind, the task was now increasingly to create a regional balance of 
power in this sphere of potential Soviet influence, centred on Kennan's image of 
Japan as a modern military- industrial empire 62 But unlike those who favoured an 
explicit military role for Japan in the regional containment strategy (e.g., Kennan, 
Army Under -Secretary Draper, and Chief of Defence Louis Johnson)63 others with 
exemplary Realist credentials, such as Acheson, MacArthur and John Foster Dulles, 
now argued that an over -militarised posture for Japan might create even more 
instability in the region. 
For all this the dispute about the relative emphasis of Japan's geo- strategic or geo - 
economic role as U.S. asset was only ever one about means rather than ends. The 
strategic `ends' - a U.S. `counteroffensive' against communist influence in Asia 
was never in dispute, given the now dominant image of the world `out there' as the 
site of struggle between the free -world, order and progress and the forces of 
aggression and global anarchy centred on the USSR. On the eve of the Korean War, 
in 1950, the `means' were also agreed upon, at least in official circles, with Kennan's 
basic program underlying the efforts of the U.S. State Department and Dulles, in 
particular, to prevent Japan becoming encircled within "the communised parts of 
Asia. "64 by installing a "dynamic program" aimed at destabilising Communist 
controlled China and North Korea via Japanese economic power 6s 
In short, by 1950 Japan's geo- economic future had become inextricable from the 
pursuit of a `hard' Cold War policy in Asia66 The pivotal theoretical articulation of 
this policy was set out in April 1950 by Paul Nitze, who had succeeded Kennan as 
head of the State Department's Policy Planning Section. But the statement, when it 
61 Alsop, quoted in Schalter, The American Occupation of Japan, 180. 62Ibid., 179 -182. 
63 ibid., 183. 
64 Ibid., 270. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," 177 -181. 
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came, was pure Kerman. Thus, in the top- secret document NSC -68, delivered to 
President Truman in April, 1950, Nitze confirmed the central message of the "Long 
Telegram; " namely, that: 
The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international 
communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the 
Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control... The United States, 
as the principal centre of power in the non -Soviet world and the bulwark of 
opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality 
must he subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve 
its fundamental design 67 
Warming to his topic, Nitze warned the President that Kremlin policy towards the 
United States was animated "by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear, "68 and 
that U.S. military capacity was becoming "dangerously inadequate" at the very time 
that the USSR was "developing the military capacity to support its design for world 
domination. "69 The point, he explained, was not about the strength per se of the U.S. 
Armed Forces, but rather, the fact that "coupled with the [numerical] inferiority of 
forces in being, the United States also lacks tenable positions from which to employ 
its forces in event of war. 70 
This fatter point, of course, had particular implications for Japan - that is, in a U.S. 
context where the notion of `monolithic communism' held sway, and where the 
Chinese and the North Koreans, and indeed any left -of- centre political organisation 
was perceived as part of a single, global conspiracy orchestrated from the Soviet 
Union (a theme on which Nitze again drew inspiration from Kennan, in his 
description of world communism as "a new fanatic faith antithetical to our own')." 
Indeed, if anything, NSC -68 actually goes beyond Kennan in terms of the scope of its 
perceived military-based solutions to the `Soviet' problem. Whereas Kennan had 
67 "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security" (NSC -68), reproduced in Etzold & 
Gaddis, Containment (op. cit., 1978), 386. 
68 Ibid., 394. 
69Ibid., 398 
70 Ibid., 411. 
71 Ibid., 385. 
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advised a military- industrial build up in selected areas (e.g. Japan), the new 
Realism of Nitze and his colleagues insisted on the need for a major build of U.S. 
forces around the world to `contain' the USSR in all areas "along the Soviet 
perimeter. "72 If this were not done, NSC -68 warned Truman, the U.S. would be faced 
with a nuclear -armed USSR by the mid -1950s capable of "devastating' the USA. "'" 
Again echoing the "Long telegram," the Nitze document also pointed out that there 
was no value in negotiation with the Soviets; rather, the important thing was to 
recognise that the Cold War was `in fact a real war in which the survival of the free - 
world was at stake. "74 Once this was acknowledged, the Document concluded, the 
U.S. could engage "in a bold and massive program of rebuilding the West's 
defensive potential to surpass that of the Soviet World." Under such a program, the 
U.S. must abandon any distinction it might previously have utilised between 
"national" and "global" security 75 
NSC -68 stands thus, as the exemplary statement of early Cold War Realism, centred 
as it is on a whole range of objectivised (positivist) assumptions about a world `out 
there' full of `black -box' actors engaged in traditional anarchical behaviour - albeit 
in a newly `theorised' context in which one actor (the USSR) following its `natural' 
and pre -determined historical course, seeks to destroy the order and progress of the 
state -system for ideological reasons. In this regard, as Woods and Jones suggest, 
NSC-68 projected a view of the world that was "both questionable and highly 
dangerous" particularly in its potential for global conflict as self -fulfilling 
prophecy 76 More pertinently, in the present context, the danger of this classical 
Realist perspective was that in refusing to try and negotiate with the Soviets until 
"they were converted from their way of life," the U.S. set out ground rules in which 
only total victory would suffice. In this way, conclude Woods and Jones, the U.S. 
77 Ibid., 411. 
73Ibid., 412. 
74Ibid., 441. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, The Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for 
Order (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 253. 
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perspective and global strategy "helped lay the groundwork for Korea and 
Vietnam "77 
3. The Korean War. 
There is of course, a huge literature on the causes of the Korean War, and this is not 
an issue I can engage in any detail here. Most would agree, nevertheless, that the 
decision of the North Koreans to attack the South in June 1950 had a good deal to do 
with the strategic and economic programs put into place by the U.S. in Japan as part 
of its `great crescent' containment plan. More specifically, the explicit support in 
U.S. circles for Japan to become the regional `balancer' against communist influence 
revived complex historical and cultural enmities among Korean people, as those in 
the North now linked together American and Japanese imperialism as an immediate 
threat to Korean independence.78 
The decision by the U.S. (and UN) to confront the North Koreans was also 
influenced by this geo- strategic matrix, albeit without the historical and cultural 
nuances. The New York Times in May, 1950 summed up the situation by re- working 
the old theme of Korea as a `dagger' pointed at the heart of Japan. Thus: "An abrupt 
American withdrawal from Korea] ...would mean the collapse of the free Korean 
state and the passage of the dagger once more into Russian hands. "79 The solution to 
this problem, it was argued, was for the U.S. to make even more secure its Japanese 
asset via the logic "that if Japan is to be defended all of Japan has to be a base, 
militarily and economically.'° This stance was supported by many within the right - 
wing South Korean elite, who, much like Kennan, saw the re- establishment of a 
Japanese `presence' in Asia as the key to Korea's survival 81 
77Ibid., 254. 
78 Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 49 
79 Ibid. 
80Ibid., 50. 
81 Ibid. 
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The war itself, the only `hot' confrontation between major powers (i.e., China and 
the U.S.) during the Cold War, was of course a tragic affair. In addition to the 
casualties among the anticommunist forces, over 3 million Koreans died, and many 
thousands more were rendered homeless. In the end, for all the death and 
destruction, and the increased tension between nuclear armed enemies, there was 
stalemate, and the edgy status -quo which continues to this day at the 38th parallel in 
Pjonmunjan. Both sides, of course, claimed victory, and the U.S., in particular 
solidified its geo- strategic position in Northeast Asia in relation to both Korea and 
China (via upgraded U.S. support for Taiwan). On the other hand, the U.S. 
containment policy was now being increasingly stretched by other events in Asia, 
and almost as soon as it had completed its task in Korea, the focus was already 
shifting to Vietnam 82 
As far as Japan was concerned, the major effect of the Korean War was a re- 
affirmation and consolidation of the role already mapped out for it. The tension over 
a peace treaty was resolved by September 1950, with both the Defence and State 
Department policymakers agreeing that the best way to gamer Japanese allegiance 
was the swift conclusion of a treaty, restoring Japanese independence on the 
condition of a continued U.S. military presence. Six weeks after the outbreak of the 
war, SCAP supervised the beginning of Japan's re- armament, in the form of a 75,000 
man "National Police Reserve."" Far more importantly, it lifted Japan out of 
postwar depression via a "special procurements" bonanza that injected approximately 
$3.5 billion into the economy between 1951 and 195784 This last aspect has been 
82 Historians and policy analysts have long noted the ambiguities and seeming contradictions in U.S. 
policy towards Korea in the build -up to the war's outbreak in June 1950. As Gaddis suggests, 
however, the shifts and changes reflected both an increasing realisation of the financial burden of 
world policemanship, and the shift in emphasis of Far East policy as a whole - particularly as it 
became clear that Japan, not Korea, was a more suitable and self- contained arena for showcasing the 
superiority of democracy to the rest of Asia, and projecting U.S. strategic power in the name of 
containment. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (op. cit., 1997), 217. When the 
North attacked however, Korea became the site on which the rationale of NSC -68 had to be 
implemented, on the basis of Nitze's dictum that "in the context of the present polarisation of power a 
defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." Nitze, cited in Woods and Jones, The 
Dawning of the Cold War, 256. 
" Morris- Suzuki, Shôwa, 207. 
84 Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System, 14 -15. 
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emphasised by many Japan historians as the main reason why the Korean War was 
received with comparative equanimity in Japan (if not the rapturous reception 
suggested by Yoshida's description of it as "a gift of the gods ") - in stark contrast 
to the massive political unrest caused by Japan's subsequent and equally vital 
military- industrial role in Vietnam 85 
Above all however, the war consolidated, for the meantime, Japan's strategic value 
within the regional sphere of U.S. influence, as the centrepiece of a coordinated 
approach to Asia. In 1951, just prior to the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, 
the CIA summarised Japan's central place in American strategic planning as "a 
decisive factor in the balance of power in the Far East. "86 As the NSC Report had 
done before it, the CIA Report emphasised the importance of Japan's "strategic 
denial" to the Soviet Union as an industrial base, and the advantage of a Japan 
"rearmed and aligned with the West" represented as both "a potential military base in 
Northeast Asia" and as an encouraging example to "other non -Communist 
countries... in their fight against the spread of communism. "87 And, although the 
CIA's recommendation of a Japanese army of up to half a million men and a war - 
centred "industrial plant" was never to be realised, the assumption that Japan would 
"do what it should" with regard to rearmament was clear and confident. It was 
reiterated in the final terms of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty incorporated into the 
peace settlement which, as Dower has noted, ensured that "Japan's status... was less 
equitable than the status of any other nation that entered into a postwar security 
agreement with the United States."88 
Overall then, the Korean War pulled together all the Realpolitik perceptions of Japan, 
articulated between 1945 and 1950, and set the direction for Japan's long -term 
diplomatic and economic orientation. It also, unwittingly, set up long -term problems 
85 Morris -Suzuki, Shôwa, 147. 
86 Schaller, Altered States, 24. 
87 Central Intelligence Agency, "Feasibility of Japanese Re- Armament in Association with the United 
States," cited in Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," 187 -88. 
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for U.S. -Japan relations which, although they would not surface fully until the late 
1960s, were to twist the San Francisco System - predicated as it was on the status 
quo of Japanese inferiority and U.S. superiority - increasingly out of shape. In 
particular, as the economic and social dislocations associated with maintaining the 
`great crescent' began to tell upon the U.S. (e.g. in Vietnam) Japan would be 
establishing itself as a major global power in a way that few Americans would have 
predicted (or wanted). This was a tendency that was already becoming apparent in 
the years following the end of the Korean war, when the image of Japan as `black 
box' asset was already becoming problematic for Realist Cold war planners in the 
U.S. 
4. Post -Korea: Early Problems with the `Black Box" Perspective. 
The Korean War accelerated many trends, yet the outline of American policy toward 
Japan, China, Korea and Vietnam for the next twenty years was set even before the 
fighting began 89 
Michael Schaller. 
Schaller's insight above is, I suggest, particularly relevant to the growing conviction 
within American policy circles that Japan's economic development held the key to 
the military security of the United States in Asia. This was evident enough, as 
indicated above, in the pre- Korean War years, when Occupation policies centred on 
recreating Japan as a Cold War satellite were at their peak. It was central to the 
thinking of Joseph Dodge who, in 1948, imposed a series of harsh measures on the 
Japanese economy (subsequently known as the "Dodge Line ") aimed at curbing 
deflation and accelerating an "independent and stable" Japanese economy. The 
immediate result of Dodge's policies was further hardship to a Japanese people still 
88 Ibid., 190. 
89 Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 298. 
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recovering from the wholesale destruction of their society 90 This, however, was of 
little import to Dodge and the rest of the U.S. administration; what mattered, from 
the "black box" perspective, was that the Japanese economy and society be re -made 
in terms of the U.S. model. In this respect, as William Tabb has pointed out, 
Dodge's austerity measures complemented the broader goals of the "reverse course" 
policy, for, "as jobs became scarce, enterprise unions gained strength over workers 
...great wage differentials between large and small companies became 
institutionalised and the structure of postwar industrial relations was established.91 
For all this, Tabb argues, Dodge's reforms set the framework for an industrial 
structure that would help Japan make the most of the Korean War `boom' which 
arrived a little over a year later (and eventually, in a major twist of irony, would be 
one of the subjects of U.S. complaints about `unfair' Japanese business practices). 
Thus, when orders for war -related goods and services began to flow in under the 
Korean War procurements arrangement, massive technological and capital 
investment assisted Japanese production, as recommended by Dodge. Moreover, the 
expansion of demand for Japanese goods was strongest in industries such as textiles, 
steel products, and automotive equipment - the sectors that would lead Japan's 
export drive in the 1950s and 1960s.92 Overall, during 1953 -55, production levels in 
Japanese heavy industry regained the peak achieved during theWW2, and thereafter 
the speed of economic development accelerated 93 
In this respect, while the Korean War and its immediate economic advantages were 
short- lived, the trends they established for Japan's development were to be crucial to 
its long -term growth. Ironically, the continuing post -Korea perception of Japanese 
economy and industry as weak and inferior to that of the U.S. (see Dulles' comments 
9° For example, at a time when most people were barely surviving on rations, about 700, 000 workers 
lost their jobs under the `efficiency' provisions of the Dodge Line. Tabb, The Postwar Japanese 
System, 79, 
91 ibid., 80. 
92Ibid., 91 -92. 
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above) also helped, given the U.S. desire to enhance its military strategic 
containment strategy via support for its junior ally and its major regional `asset.' 
Above all, as a 1953 NSC document reiterated, Japanese trade with the U.S. was vital 
to prevent the economic deterioration that "creates fertile ground for communist 
subversion. "94 Accordingly, America's Cold War leaders encouraged and facilitated 
Japanese access to its markets, with major Cold Warriors such as Dulles pushing 
through international trade agreements that favoured Japan, and ensuring U.S. 
patronage for Japan in the GAT°T95 
Moreover, in return for Japanese acquiescence in the containment of China, Japan 
received privileged access to U.S. patents and technical expertise, and U.S. backing 
in the conclusion of favourable reparations agreements with its former colonies (with 
the exception of Korea and Vietnam, Japan's reparations bills had all been settled by 
1957, to the tune of about 1.5 billion U.S.$).96 Meanwhile, Eisenhower urged U.S. 
industrialists to buy Japanese products "even if they did not meet U.S. quality 
standards, "97 his encouragement backed up by an undervalued yen which benefited 
Japanese exports98 Such measures were crucial to the long -term success of Japan's 
economy, for they enhanced, albeit artificially, Japan's competitiveness in the world 
market and allowed its postwar economic architects to pursue the large -scale 
renovation and updating of the heavy industries (steel, chemicals and oil refining) 
that would become the backbone of Japanese high growth and monopoly capital until 
the 1970s.99 
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In this period then, reaction to Japan's rapid economic growth among U.S. 
policymakers was positive, and reports on its progress often generous and 
enthusiastic. Thus, in 1956, it was recorded that: 
the Japanese economy is one of the richly productive economies of the world, and 
one of great promise for the Japanese people and for the world at large. Output per 
capita has more than kept pace with the rapid population growth of the postwar 
years.... [while] the continued pace of scientific and technological advance assures a 
continuation of advancing output per capita.'°° 
Throughout this period Japan's deficit with the U.S. remained large, but inside the 
`black box,' things were changing considerably for the better, as Japanese society 
began to reap the benefits of the "economic escalator. '101 And with this change in 
conditions inside Japan, small cracks were beginning to appear in its `external' image 
as exemplary junior partner of U.S. order in `free Asia.' At this time, U.S. order in 
the region was increasingly under strain as other Western allies (e.g. France) 
struggled to stave off the challenge from the Vietminh. From the perspective of U.S. 
Realists this was, predictably enough, perceived as part of a larger Soviet inspired 
process of undermining U.S. power in the world. Consequently, for Dulles, the 
conflict in Vietnam was a Soviet plot designed to "get" Japan through Indochina, 
thus gaining access to "the rice bowl of Asia" in the process.102 Harold Stassen 
reinforced this perception by proclaiming that a French defeat in Indochina would 
"lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia. "103 
A major consequence of this preoccupation with a domino -like collapse, was the 
U.S. fortification of its economic containment of China. In 1951, the Truman 
administration had concluded that the Soviet Union planned to gain control of East 
and Southeast Asia, as well as Japan, "primarily through.., exploitation of the 
too Report on the Economic and Technological Feasibility of the Proposed Kobe- Nagoya Expressway, 
cited in Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Postwar Economy, 215. 
m Morris- Suzuki, Shôwa, 220, 
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resources of Communist China. "104 To prevent this, it was argued, the U.S. needed 
to apply "countervailing military, political, economic and psychological power to 
depose the Chinese government or force a change in its policies. "105 To this end, 
Japan, in addition to joining COCOM, was pressured into signing a separate, secret 
bilateral agreement that imposed even more draconian limits on economic contact 
with China. By 1952, Japanese trade with China had shrunk to 0.04% of its exports, 
and 0.7% of imports - creating enormous resentment within Japan. Various efforts 
to offset this were made by U.S. planners, including opening up markets within 
Southeast Asia on a raw -materials- for -goods exchange basis. Dodge also 
recommended that Japan's military be redeveloped, both in order to further stimulate 
economic demand, and so that United States forces could be deployed elsewhere.106 
Thus, whatever else it represented, the U.S. embargo on trade with China served to 
highlight the precise nature of the U.S. -Japan relationship, and this was a lesson 
learnt well by many within the Japanese elite, now restricted in their other economic 
and political relationships by the commitments of the San Francisco Treaty 107 
Tensions were now also emerging on the question of re- armament, and the role that 
Japan should play as a military actor in the region. Throughout the Korean War, 
Prime Minister Yoshida had steadily refused to yield on the 230,000 man Japanese 
army demanded by Dulles (although Japanese minesweepers did secretly take part in 
the war).t08 Yet U.S. demands for swift Japanese re- armament never ceased entirely, 
and while they complemented the stance of the conservative political hegemony 
established in Japan after 1955,109 the LDP suggestion that Japanese forces might 
04 NSC 48/5, cited in Schaller, Altered States, 52. 
105 Ibid., 54. 
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eventually replace U.S. forces stationed in Japan was not quite what the U.S. had in 
mind.110 Meanwhile, the majority of the Japanese people remained steadfastly 
opposed to any major military role for Japan in Asia. Sporadic protests against the 
expropriation of more land for U.S. missile launch sites and extended military 
runways continued throughout the 195Os, and in 1960, massive public 
demonstrations erupted over the scheduled renewal and revision of the Security 
Treaty 11' This was, in many ways, a precursor to the kind of activities which would 
reappear on a much more substantial scale during the Vietnam War.112 It was also an 
important factor in the development of a Japanese Studies literature on the nature 
and role of modern Japan which sought in the 1960s, in particular, to open up the 
`black box.' 
I will say something more directly about this Japanese Studies issue shortly. For 
now, and in summary, the point of the preceding discussion has been to illustrate 
how and why the influences of Cold War Realism became integral to the `Japan' at 
the centre of IR understanding of it in the 1940s and 1950s. I then sought to indicate 
how the imposition of Realist theory and practice in relation to Japan began to have 
some dysfunctional consequences for the U.S., in particular, following the Korean 
War when the policies designed to enhance Japan's role as geo- strategic and geo- 
economic `asset,' simultaneously became the basis of the tensions between the 
`senior' and junior' partners in the alliance, as Japan's most favoured status gave it 
an opportunity for major power status, at least in economic terms. 
In this context, while Japan continued to play its designated role within the 
containment strategy, the strategy itself was exacerbating the strains within the U.S. - 
Japan relationship that had existed ever since the postwar settlement. Ultimately, 
therefore, and ironically, the attempt to achieve a balance -of -power in Asia along 
110 Marc S. Gallicchio, "The Best Defence is a Good Offence: The Evolution of American Strategy in 
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Realist guidelines and in line with U.S. hegemonic ambitions (i.e. a balance in 
`our' favour) created the conditions that would significantly undermine U.S. 
hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The economic containment of China, for example, forced the United States to 
prolong the expensive military procurements arrangement with Japan as it sought to 
assure Japanese economic access td a still -underdeveloped Southeast Asian 
market.113 For Japan, this arrangement consolidated the capitalist boom set off by the 
Korean War and allowed the intensive upgrading and expansion of those industries 
that would underwrite Japan's most intense period of growth between 1960 and 
1973, as it gained increasing access to the lucrative markets of the West. But for the 
United States, it meant a commitment to assuring the security and prosperity of 
Southeast Asía that eventually resulted in the tragic morass that was Vietnam, and a 
profound (if temporary) loss of confidence in the means, if not the ends of the 
containment project. In the wake of Vietnam, it would prompt increasingly 
rancorous accusations of Japanese "free riderism," leading to the outright hostility of 
the `Japan bashing' 1980s, and the continuing tensions of the 1990s. This too is an 
issue for further discussion in the chapter to follow, which puts the whole debate in 
the context of the rise of neo- Realism and the resurgence of U.S. hegemonic 
perspectives. 
My more immediate concern however, is to add a dimension to the discussion thus 
far, by reintroducing the issue of ethnocentrism, which is a core characteristic of IR 
Realism, of the positivism which underpins it, and of the U.S. social science 
perspectives which after WW2 complimented the more overt containment strategies 
with Modernisation Theory. In this context too, I suggest, Japan was represented in 
`black box' terms (as indeed alI other non- Western states were) - but here also, the 
112 Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 21. 
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original purpose of Realist Cold War theory was shown to be something other than 
`realistic' in practice. 
5. Modernisation Theory: Some Basic Themes. 
The basic thrust of Modernisation (Development) Theory in its early, most optimistic 
manifestation, is nicely summed up in the title of Robert Packenham's influential 
1973 study, Liberal America and the Third World. Looking back on the first two 
decades of U.S. foreign aid to the developing world," Packenham observes the 
continuity with which U.S. scholars and policymakers conceptualised "the kinds of 
political systems they considered to be desirable and fc isible; "114 where both 
`desirability' and `feasibility' he argues, were derived from certain premises 
embedded generally in American culture and political thought which could be 
"collectively designated... as the American liberal tradition. "115 
It was the influence of this tradition and it assumptions, Packenham argues, that saw 
political development, in both its `theoretical' and `policymaking' 
conceptualisations, consistently defined between 1947 and 1968 in terms of 
"democracy, stability, anti -Communism, peace, world community, and `pro - 
Americanism. "116 In this respect, he suggests, for both scholars and policymakers the 
goal of political development (expressed as `political modernisation and 
democracy ") was regarded as both self -evident, and the major achievement of 
Western= societies (particularly following the fall of fascism). The central issue was 
how this goal might be facilitated by the West in the `traditional' societies of the 
Third World, in a Cold War containment context. And, inevitably, the answer was 
primarily one of applying an objective model of (Western, European) growth to non - 
Western societies. In this regard, the model proposed that: 
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economic and technical assistance [to the Third World] contributed to economic 
development; and economic development in turn was seen as contributing to political 
development. Economic development was defined in terms of growth of per capita 
product (sic) and other conventional measures; political development was defined in 
terms of stability, democracy, anti -communism, "world community," peace, pro - 
Americanism 117 
Integral to Modernisation Theory thus, was the kind of universalised, ahistorical 
image of modern reality which had served IR Realism so well - particularly in its 
behaviouralist, `scientific' phase in the 1960s. For scholars of 1960s development, 
the scientific goals were similar, as was reliance on a few `great men' and the 
wisdom of selected great texts. Indeed, as Gabriel Almond made it clear, the path to 
universal development was derived from "the classic formulations of Max Weber, 
Ferdinand Tonnies and Talcott Parsons. "118 At the core of these `classic formations' 
was the dichotomy between "traditional and modern forms of society and polity. "119 
And, it was on the basis of this dichotomy that modernisation theorists were able to 
discern the essence of social modernity, and articulate that essence via developmental 
models. 
For most scholars, the essential prerequisite of the modern good society was the 
attribute of `choice.' This, as David Apter pointed out, was most apparent in the 
economic context of modern civil society, as men find, `ways to assess preferences, 
controlling them within a context of a rapidly changing technology. "120 More 
generally, he argued, modernisation as a process originates when "a culture embodies 
an attitude of inquiry and questioning about how men make choices - moral (or 
normative), social (or structural), and personal (or behavioural). "121 In short, as Apter 
put it, "to be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences and choices... 
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[and] self -conscious choice implies rationality. "122 In keeping with the dictates of a 
positivist, post -Kantian approach to social theory however, the `moral' or 
`normative' dimensions of rational choice could still be represented as essentialist 
and universal, in that "we generally accept some well- entrenched values as 
universals...because they are sufficiently widespread to seem rooted in common 
sense "123 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the central task of modernisation, Apter 
noted, particularly in the Third World, was simply a matter of improving "the 
conditions of choice and the selection of the most satisfactory mechanisms of 
choice. "124 
In this way, Modernisation Theory could correlate its quest to find the most 
"desirable and feasible" modern society with a `common sense' support for 
capitalism and the Western way (as the obvious historical and cultural site of 
`choice'). Its role, in short, was to provide the developmentalist dimension of Realist 
Cold War IR, via its image of a universal, rational -utilitarian human behaviour model 
that, as indicated in the previous chapter, has always been a `natural' factor in the 
story of the rise of the international state system,125 
The Huntington `Corrective' 
This was a theme most immediately obvious within Modernisation Theory classics 
such as W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth: ,4 non -Communist 
Manifesto. It was taken up in even more significant fashion, however, in a work that 
represented itself as a corrective to much of the `liberalism' that Packenham 
perceives as integral to Modernisation Theory. Samuel Huntington's Political Order 
in Changing Societies (1968) took Modernisation Theory scholars and the U.S. 
policy community to task for forgetting the fundamental task which faced the `free 
world' under U.S. leadership. This, argued Huntington, was not liberalism or 
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125 Higgot, Political Development Theory, 21 -22. 
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economic development per se, but the maintenance of a particular kind of global 
order in which liberalism and development could take place. 
In this regard, Huntington reminded his peers in the 1960s that the keystone of U.S. 
global interests was order under U.S. hegemony - and that this must also be the 
goal of Modernisation Theorists, if `development' was to take place without creating 
disorder and anarchy. The problem with a `liberal- orientation' in this (Cold War) 
context, he warned, was that it blinded its advocates to a fundamental reality 
concerning political change, which is that, "the primary problem is not liberty but the 
creation of a legitimate public order. "125 Expanding this point, he explained thus: 
Authority has to exist before it can be limited [but] it is authority which is in scarce 
supply in modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated 
intellectuals, rambunctious colonels and rioting students. [And] It is precisely this 
scarcity that communists and communist -type movements are often able to 
overcome 127 
The problem, Huntington continued, was that Modernisation Theorists in the West 
- and the U.S. in particular - had missed the point about the reality of the process 
by which social change takes place, either progressive or otherwise. This process, he 
insisted, was centred on strong central power and political authority, not on market 
freedom or rational choice. And, while "communist type" groups already understood 
this, Huntington cautioned, American liberals did not. Accordingly: 
While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists offer 
modernizing countries a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. 
Amidst the social conflict and violence that plague modernizing countries, they 
provide some assurance of political order.128 
A number of things might be said about this contribution of Huntington's, and about 
his 1990's reiteration of these themes in his `Clash of Civilisations' proposition, 
which is, in its own way, another warning about the dangers of too much liberalism 
128 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 7. 
127 Ibid., 8. 
128 Ibid. 
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at the international level.L29 In the present context however, the most immediate 
value of Huntíngton's work is that it makes clear the always integral relationship 
between the IR Realism at the core of U.S. Cold War thinking and the linear 
(positivist) progressivism at the centre of Modernisation Theory. In this sense, 
Huntington is the most candid of the Cold Warriors associated with the `liberalism' 
of the 1960s and their attempt to develop the world in the image of the U.S. He was 
also one of the most influential, of course, with his particular brand of Modernisation 
Theory acknowledged by the Johnson Administration as integral to the attempt to 
`liberalise' Vietnam in the mid- 1960s'3° 
Even for Huntington, however, Japan was by now an exemplar of what could be 
achieved when order and authority underpinned development and modernisation 
programmes on the U.S. model. For him, and for many other scholars of this time, 
Japan, in this sense, was not just a geo- strategic and geo- economic exemplar, but, in 
many ways, the jewel in the Modernisation Theory crown. 
6. Modernisation Theory and Postwar Japan: the Realism /Japanese Studies 
Nexus> 
John Dower has best expressed the sense of Japan as the jewel in the Modernisation 
Theory crown with his insight, complimenting those above, which suggests that: 
Postwar American objectives internationally have rested on the twin pillars of 
counterrevolution and support of a capitalist mode of development, and in that 
scheme Japan plays a key role both materially and as an alleged Asian model of the 
advantages of gradual, nonrevolutionary development along capitalist lines.131 
In this context, one can see some of the key Modernisation Theory themes - 
progress and linear development, "desirable and feasible" forms of polity and 
economy - utilised to represent Japan as an exemplary Cold War asset, particularly 
129 1 will return to this theme in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
13° Stephen Chan, "Too Neat and Under -Thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilisations," in 
Millennium Journal of International Studies 26:1 (1997: 137 -142), 138. 
131 Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the uses of history," 33. 
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during the Occupation period and in the "reverse course" era of the 1940s and 
1950s. Not so obvious, I suggest, but just as evident, were attitudes intrinsic to 
Modernisation Theory concerning a `natural' global hierarchy and a process of linear 
historical and cultural development. 
This dimension was evident for example, in the representation of Japanese people as 
subjects of Occupation policy. Here, as Dower has pointed out, a representation 
originating in wartime stereotypes of the "Jap enemy" was swiftly modified to a 
more benign image of orientalised, `Asian' identity.132 Emphasised, in particular, 
were notions of Japanese `backwardness' and `naiveté,' articulated most commonly 
in terms of a pupil and master theme which was to be reiterated throughout the 
Occupation years. Such a theme was utilised most powerfully by MacArthur 
himself, who presented his understanding of the Japanese in predictably linear terms, 
and in comparison to civilised European and U.S. experience. Thus, for all their 
(Asian) `history,' the Japanese: 
Measured by the standards of modem civilisation, would be like a boy of twelve as 
compared with our development of forty -five years. Whatever the German did in 
dereliction of the standards of modem morality ...he did deliberately. But the 
Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity." 133 
This type of ethnocentric rhetoric (which presents German Fascism as, at least, 
mature!), as Dower has pointed out, was very much a personal trademark of 
MacArthur's 134 Yet the fundamental `black box' image it conjured up, of Japan as 
(immature) geocultural other to the West, had a broader appeal, and would remain 
132 John Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," in Dower, Japan in War and Peace 
(op. cit., 1993), 259. Here, Dower notes, in particular, the differing attitudes in the U.S. towards 
Anglo -Saxon and "Oriental" foes during the war. Whereas a distinction was usually made between 
"Nazis" and "Germans," he points out, the Japanese were invariably inflated to a supra- Japanese foe 
- "not just the Japanese militarists, not just all the Japanese people, not just ethnic Japanese 
everywhere, but the Japanese as Orientals" (emphasis added). Ibid., 260. This wholesale rendering 
of an ethnic `other,' Dower writes, has a long and enduring legacy within the political ontology of 
white supremacism, applied, variously, against "Amerindians in the genocidal Indian wars, against 
Negroes ever since the slave trade, against Chinese since the opening of regular contact in the mid 
nineteenth century, [andl against Filipinos in the American conquest of the Philippines at the turn of 
the century." Ibid., 261, 
133 U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 
quoted in Tetsuya Kataoka, The Price of a Constitution (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1991), 31. 
134 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 223. 
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essential in legitimating the nature and extent of U.S. influence in Japan, both 
through the Occupation and beyond. As NSC 48/1 explained it to the Truman 
government in 1948, despite the "notable steps" taken towards its postwar 
rehabilitation, Japan remained, when all was said and clone, an "Asiatic society," and 
as such, full of people who are "traditionally submissive to power" and "habituated 
to authoritarian government and the suppression of the individual. "135 Such people 
were, by definition, vulnerable to the influences of Communism, and therefore 
potentially unreliable allies of the Western powers in holding off a cunning and 
ruthless communist enemy in the vital Northeast Asia region ?36 
The task of the Occupation under MacArthur (and of the Reverse Course Policy 
under Kennan) was, in this `modernisation' context, to overcome the natural 
dichotomies which separated Asian societies from the modern (Western) civilisations 
and democratic progress. In this way Asian political naiveté was to be transformed 
into Western political maturity, Asian groupism into Western individualism, and 
Asian backwardness and traditionalism into Western techno- rationality. With this 
transformation, it was argued, the situation inside Japan might supplement its new 
external status as regional bulwark against communism, and its future might finally 
coincide with the mainstream of IR history - at least as Western Realists tell the 
story.137 
For the most part then, by the 1960s, U.S. Realists and their Modernisation Theory 
counterparts were comfortable with the `black box' that was `Japan' in IR. On the 
other hand, and largely parallel to this IR perspective, a more complex picture of 
Japan was emerging in a developing Japanese Studies literature which, while it 
generally followed the Realist and Modernisation Theory lead (albeit implicitly) was 
beginning to lift the lid a little on the IR `black box.' 
3s NSC 48/1, cited in Etzold & Gaddis, Containment, 254. 
136 Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," 174. 
137 /bid. 
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At the forefront of this `new' agenda was Edwin Reischauer, who in many ways 
was as important to early Japanese Studies as was George Kennan in the larger IR 
context. In many circles, Reischauer continues to be celebrated as the most 
distinguished of Western specialists on Japan. His major books continue to be 
designated classic texts in either language, particularly his writings on early postwar 
Japanese society.138 Reischauer has also been dismissed, by more critically oriented 
scholars, as an outdated figure whose writings exemplify the ethnocentrism and rabid 
anti -communism of Cold War U.S. foreign policy, and as a major contributor to the 
indigenous status -quo reading of Japan's past, which continues to be criticised for its 
historical amnesia, insularity and jingoism.139 
My own view is that Reischauer is a pivotal figure in the formation of postwar 
Japanese Studies which saw a classical Realist reading of IR and the Cold War 
transposed upon Japan in a way that continues to resonate in contemporary times. He 
is, therefore, too relevant to dismiss as an anachronism and remains an important 
figure in the present context. Recognising this, John Dower has proposed that 
Reischauer's work highlights, even to this day, the inherently conservative political 
implications, of much `area studies' analysis and of postwar Anglo- American social 
science in general.'4° In the following discussion I want to briefly illustrate how this 
is so by looking at the way in which a figure such as Reischauer was able to open up 
the Japan debate to questions of cultural and historical diversity while constraining it 
within the confines of a Cold War Realist perspective and a positivist approach to 
`knowing' the real -world. 
138 Another important indicator of Reischauer's status of course, is the fact that, like many other 
`great,' contributors to a particular field of study, his name is the title of a prestigious academic 
position; namely, the "Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics" at Harvard. 
139 In particular, Reischauer was one of the earliest defenders- cum -apologists for Emperor Hirohito's 
role in the war, and a staunch advocate of the retention of the Emperor system in postwar Japan along 
with Douglas MacArthur. Among many Japan historians, the view is that it was the retention of the 
Emperor system which is largely responsible for the continuing inability of contemporary Japanese 
governments (and society) to confront the issue of Japanese responsibility for the war. H. D. 
Harootunian, "America's Japan /Japan's Japan," in Masao Míyoshi and H. D. Harootunian (eds.), 
Japan in the World (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1993), 212. 
149 Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History" in Dower (ed.), Origins of the Modern 
Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman (New York: Random House, 1975), 47. 
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7. Making Japanese Studies: Reischauer, Realism and Modernisation Theory. 
Reischauer's best -known work on Japan, Japan, Past and Present, was first 
published in 1946, going into two subsequent revised editions before being re- 
published in 1970 as Japan, the Story of a Nation.141 During this period, particularly 
following Mao's rise to power in China, Reischauer's anti -Marxist stance became 
central to his work as a whole - but it was a stance that differed significantly from 
that of his MacCarthyite policymaking contemporaries. As he explained in a 1955 
book -length policy recommendation entitled Wanted: an Asian Policy, Reischauer 
saw the Western "defeat" in China and Korea as the direct result of intellectual 
failure, referring to it as a case of "ignorance leading to catastrophe. "142 Analysts and 
policymakers, he argued, had simply failed to grasp the "naturally perplexing" nature 
of Asía. 
Whatever the differences between ourselves and the peoples of western Europe and 
Russia, the historical and cultural gap between us and the peoples of Asía is far 
greater. None of the civilisations of Asia is closely related to ours, even though they 
have felt the influence of the West in recent years. While in Russia we see an 
abhorrent system built on a substructure of Western civilisation, in Asia we often 
find familiar Western superstructures resting on what are to us strange if not 
altogether unknown foundations.143 
Reischauer's Realist credentials are on display throughout Wanted, which represents 
knowledge of Asia in explicitly utilitarian terms to its policymaking audience, as an 
essential component of the means to U.S. power and control. Reischauer thus speaks 
at length on the failure of American policy to beat the communists in `winning 
minds," (and therefore "arms and bodies ") in Asia, and outlines a proposed strategy 
in which an "arsenal of ideas" needs to be employed in this quest aimed at educating 
Asians to the developmental and political `rightness' of the Western way, If this were 
done, he argues: 
141 The latest edition of Japan, the Story of a Nation was published in 1991 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf). 
142 Edwin O. Reischauer, Wanted: An Asian Policy (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1955), 14. 
143 Ibid.., 8 -9. 
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We could then more easily avoid self- defeating blunders and perhaps achieve 
much more with no greater over -all effort than we are expending today. Asian 
students who come to the West to study would not be forced to apply, within the 
limits of their own ability and understanding, the evolutionary experience of the 
West to the intricate and pressing problems of Asia, but would find guidance in this 
key problem from capable men who have devoted their lives to its study. Americans 
working in Asia would not go to their tasks innocently ignorant of the problems they 
face or the true significance of what they are doing. Most important of all, Asian 
leaders would find at hand specific information and penetrating interpretations of its 
meaning that might save them from many dangerous pitfalls and enable them to go 
farther and more safely in their own thinking than they could without these aids 1' 
(emphasis added) 
In Reischauer's prescriptions for meeting the `real problems' of the West in Asia, it 
is easy to see how the bound -to -lead mentality of U.S. theorising remains dependent 
upon the early postwar contrast between Western superiority and Asian `naiveté.' 
The central project of Wanted, of ensuring the Western way in postwar Asia, is thus 
expressed in elite- centred terms - to be achieved through "Asian leaders" and 
(Western- educated) Asian intellectuals. Underpinning this perspective one can 
discern the original NSC 48/5 dictate that Asian peoples lack the political maturity to 
rationally make the choice of democracy unassisted; something that becomes even 
clearer when Reischauer turns to the "theoretical addiction" to Marxism among 
Asian. This, he explains, is an entirely natural stage of development among people 
not yet technologically sophisticated enough to acknowledge the inherent superiority 
of the Western Cold War cause. In this sense, for Reischauer, the problem is not just 
one of historical development but of an "underlying [irrational, unmodern] anti - 
Western bias in the whole Asian response" to Westernism and modernity 145 
The point I make here is not the obvious one about Reischauer's ethnocentrism, nor 
his stereotyped and essentialised images of `Asians.' It concerns, rather, the 
affirmation in Reischauer's work of a universalised and essentialised image of the 
international system in which all state actors are reduced to a common `cultural' need 
(Western democracy and modernity) and a common `rationality' of purpose. This is 
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all the more important, given that it was, after all, Reischauer who later became a 
major force in developing Japanese Studies, and that his perception of his own work 
was that it represented a push to make Western knowledge of the non -West less 
ethnocentric and patronising. 
This, for example was the central theme of "Our Asian Frontiers of Knowledge" 
(1958) in which Reischauer explicitly condemned the practice of regarding "Asian 
experience as merely a source for supplementary materials that can be used to 
confirm or possibly even amplify the solid truths about mankind already derived 
from the experience of the Occident. "146 In this context, Reischauer appeals for a 
knowledge of Asia that goes beyond even that of Wanted, urging the sensitive 
Western scholar to take Asia's own history "seriously," and even conceding that Asia 
might have something to offer the West. The idea that cultural and historical 
understanding and respect of different peoples are not only relevant, but 
indispensable to the pursuit of interstate relations, has of course been a fundamental 
assumption of Japanese Studies for many years - and it is certainly worth noting 
Reischauer's connection, in this context, to much of the more incisive scholarship 
that, pursuing this assumption, has since appeared. 
Unfortunately, however, in Reischauer's case, this sensitivity was always 
undermined by his commitment to positivist theorising of the kind integral to his 
broader Realist commitments. Even in Frontiers for example, it is obvious enough, 
particularly when Reischauer speaks of the issue of historical development, and how 
it is to be understood as the key to Asian progress. Having previously rejected 
Marxist historical analysis on the grounds that it generalises history as "an inevitable, 
unilinear progression, from the slave state... to the Socialist Utopia," Reischauer 
144 Ibid., 202. 
145 Ibid., 204. 
146 Reischauer, "Our Asian Frontiers of Knowledge," Reicker Memorial Lecture No. 4 (University of 
Arizona Press, 1958), 10. 
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unselfconsciously posits his own brand of universalism and linear essentialism, by 
explaining that: 
Asians realise that they are going through a period of cataclysmic change, and the 
more thoughtful of them - that is, the potential leadership groups - keep groping for 
the meaning of this painful process. They want a theory of history that will explain 
and justify their present travail and will help to clarify the way ahead of them. In 
fact, it is the historical theories in men's mind, more than any other factor under 
human control, that gives direction to the tremendous transformation of Asia now 
under way. This situation actually may not be unique to Asia. In this age in which 
even the philosophers have retreated into narrow specialisations in logic and 
semantics, the historian seems to have inherited the job of being the synthesiser of 
knowledge about mankind, and it is the theories of the universal historian that are 
sometimes the closest approach to what might be called guiding philosophies for 
modem man 147 (emphasis added) 
To sum up, Reischauer is, on the one hand, arguing for an interpretivist view of Asia 
that is not subject to Western (Marxist) universalist paradigms. On the other, he 
claims that the purpose of such an approach is a "universal theory of history" 
grounded in historical fact, that is to be provided to Asian people by the more 
experienced Western scholar, (as is more openly admitted in Wanted). The only way 
that Reischauer can do this of course, is through the representation of "history" in 
positivist, ahistorical terms; i.e., as a neutral set of concrete realities in the past, to be 
correctly interpreted by the detached Western analyst. The pivotal role of the 
Western scholar in helping Asians understand their own history is taken for granted 
because, as explained previously in Wanted, the West is in a more advanced stage of 
modernity than Asia. 
This was a perspective that Reischauer held firm to when he was subsequently called 
upon by the Kennedy Administration to become Ambassador to Japan in 1961.148 
Indeed, as several scholars have noted, Reischauer personally defined his mission as 
a continuation of the tasks outlined in Wanted and Frontiers; namely, the defeat of 
147 Reischauer, "Our Asian Frontiers of Knowledge," 11. 
148 Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 54. 
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Marxism ( "our true foe in Japan "),'49 by assisting the Japanese in "taking on a new 
view of history." °° For Reischauer, this process required the rejection of 'leftist' 
historical interpretations (in particular, those of Reischauer's most eminent 
predecessor, E. H. Norman), concerning the `feudal' stage of Japan's class 
development, to concentrate on the actual facts of contemporary history. Central 
among these facts was Japan's historical status as a "late moderniser" in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. For Reischauer, and his followers, this fact was 
pivotal, because it undermined leftist views of Japan's aggressive past and anti- 
democratic tendencies, and transformed that `past' into a linear path to modernity 
which distinguished Japan and Japanese society as `unique' within Asia. As Dower 
puts it, it was a reading of Japan that emphasised: 
the potentially merchandisable aspects of prewar Japanese development - such as 
gradualism, "community- centred" entrepreneurship, diplomatic "realism" and 
integration with international capitalism (prior to 1931), creation of "multiple 
elites," and bourgeois parliamentary democracy - and a concomitantly benign 
approach to related misfortunes such as exploitation, autocracy, economic and social 
imbalance, and engagement in overseas military adventures and war in every single 
decade of its modem existence with the exception of the 1880s.151 
In this revised context, Japan's descent into fascism in the 1930s was represented as 
"a sudden reversal of the dominant trends of the preceding decade" by the militarists, 
rather than the inevitable result of the social and economic structures of the late 19th 
century ?52 Even more importantly, in this context, the events of the post 1945 period 
(particularly Japan's by now evident economic potential) were a phenomenon in line 
with a Japanese `history' susceptible to Western guidance. 
The implications of this invocation of historical `fact' in Reischauer's work was 
beneficial both to the developing Japanese Studies discipline and to the developing 
political hierarchy within Japan. In the former context it allowed a re- working, in 
149 Reischauer, cited in H. D. Harootunian, "America's Japan /Japan's Japan," 207. 
15° Ibid. 
151 Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 41. 
152 Reischauer, Japan, Past and Present, 82. 
120 
positive terms, of the Asian feudalism vs. Western modernity theme which had 
been central to the work of (leftist) historians Iike Norman, as well as to eminent 
Japanese intellectuals such as Gorô Hani and Hyôe Ôuchi.153 But it also benefited the 
emerging conservative political elite within Japan, consolidated by the election of the 
LDP to government in 1955. Backed up by the prevailing Cold War atmosphere, and 
utilising the new positive `history' of Japan, they could now re- engender some of the 
milder symbols of the past, and speak more openly of the values of prewar imperial 
life.'54 The formation of the Japan Cultural Forum in 1957 reflected the breadth of 
appeal of Reischauer's `history' in the coming together of "liberal" conservatives and 
nationalist ideologues, now united by the concern to preserve a `unique' cultural 
heritage, and Japan's successful economic modemisation.'ss 
This emerging Japanese perspective (at least in conservative circles) is well summed 
by Carol Gluck, who proposes that: 
To the question "progress of and toward what ?" the answer since Meiji had been, 
tautologically, "the modem." This belief in directed (or misdirected, but still 
purposeful) change since the nineteenth century led Japanese to think of the postwar 
task as the redirection of a longer evolutionary historical process... The alleged 
break in 1945 in fact posited a continuity not between prewar fascism and postwar 
democracy but between modernisation in its first phase and the chance the second 
time to get it right.L56 (emphasis added) 
The re- narrativising of the past as part of a larger modernising /Cold War project, as 
indicated here, would reach its zenith during the 1960s, with the basic intellectual 
and political ground having been mapped out by Reischauer during his 
ambassadorship. In this period, scholars, both Western and Japanese, turned their 
attention specifically towards Modernisation Theory as the most effective conduit of 
153 Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 52. 
154 E.g., the flying of the Rising Sun flag and the singing of the imperial national anthem in schools, 
and government support for the Yasukuni Shrine. Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present," in Gordon 
(ed.), Postwar Japan as History (op. cit., 1993), 70 -71. 
15' J. Victor Koschmann, "Intellectuals and Politics," in Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History (op. 
cit., 1993), 407. 
156 Gluck, "The Past in the Present," 79. 
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anti -Marxist thought within Japan, and of connecting Japanese Studies more 
closely to mainstream concepts and methodologies in Western social science.157 
Reischauer's work was, of course, integral to this project, primarily through his 
influential book, A New View of Japan's Modernity (Nihon Kindai no Atarashii 
Mikata, 1965), which was read widely in Japan, (although never translated into 
English).158 Here, Reischauer explicitly appropriated Rostow's The Stages of 
Economic Growth as his analytical model, using its linear, progressivist tenor to 
explain how Japan had successfully avoided revolutionary excesses in its passage to 
a modern order. In doing so, he again appealed to the positivist value -neutrality 
theme to emphasise the difference between his support for the Western way and other 
'ideological' and idealist perspectives.159 This stance had been revealed in an earlier 
address, where, echoing E. H. Carr's dichotomy between `is' and `ought,' Reischauer 
explained that: "the most common sort of misunderstanding [about 
modernisation]... arises from the use by some people of the term `modernisation' to 
mean what should happen, whereas I use the term to denote what is happening, good 
or bad, without making any value judgements. '160 In other words modernisation, in 
theory and in practice, is exempt from the value judgements of the critics/Marxists 
because, as a naturally occurring process, it represents part of a historical and 
cultural reality which goes beyond interpretation of its `rights' and `wrongs.' It was 
not Reischauer though, but his pupil, Marius Jansen, who would eventually make the 
ultimate statement about the value- freeness of the modernisation project (and hence, 
the Western way), in a 1961 paper presented at the International Christian University. 
In the modern world, Jansen proclaimed, 
the important thing is that people read, not what they read, that they participate in the 
generalised functions of a mass society, not whether they do so as free individuals, 
157 Dower, "E. H. Norman, Japan and the lises of History," 55. 
158 Reischauer, Nihon Kindai no Atarashii Mikata (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1965). 
159Ibid., 30. 
16° Reischauer, "Towards a Definition of Modernisation," speech delivered to the Japan Cultural 
Forum, September 26, 1964, and subsequently published in Jyû magazine, September 1965. Dower, 
"E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 56 (fn.). 
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that machines operate, and not for whose benefit, and that things are produced, not 
what is produced. It is quite as "modern" to make guns as automobiles, and to 
organise concentration camps as to organise schools which teach freedom.'61 
Jansen, not surprisingly, had been a central figure at the 1960 Hakone Conference on 
Modern Japan some months earlier, which was convened specifically `to conduct a 
debate concerning the problem of Japan and the idea of modernisation. "162 The 
Hakone meeting produced a series of similar gatherings (including the ICU 
conference), whose results were eventually gathered together and edited by Jansen in 
the 1965 volume, Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernisation .163 In its 
introduction, John W. Hall explained how, as its "starting point," the Hakone 
Conference had adopted some "self- evident" categories, including a "nine point 
description of the essential features of modern society "164 - seven of which were 
lifted directly from the linear distinction between modern and traditional societies 
outlined by Almond and Coleman in that "near perfect and objective taxonomy of 
modernisation," The Politics of Developing Areas .165 
Adopted too was a (highly simplified) reading of Max Weber's view on rationality in 
modern societies, which complemented and sustained the `value -free' claims of the 
discussion in hand, by effectively reducing rationality to a dehistoricised means -ends 
relationship. In this relationship, it was argued, capitalism merged with political 
development in an ahistorical, neutral "process... [that] has tended to pick up 
momentum as human society has gained the means to purposely achieve rational 
control of its physical and social environment. "166 From the point of view of the 
161 Marius B. Jansen, 1965 speech to the International Christian University, quoted in Dower, "E. H. 
Norman, Japan and the Uses of History," 55. 
162 Harootunian, "America's Japan /Japan's Japan," 205. 
163 Marius B. Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965). 
164 John W. Hall, "Changing Conceptions of the Modernisation of Japan," in Jansen (ed.), Changing 
Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation (op. cit., 1965), 18. 
165 According to Hall, these seven characteristics were: urbanisation, a "high degree of use of 
inanimate energy," "extensive spatial interaction of members of a society," literacy, the presence of a 
mass communications network, the existence of "large scale social institutions" (i.e., government, 
business, industry), and "increased unification of large bodies of population under one control 
(nations) and the growing interaction of such units (international relations)." Ibid., 19. 
166 Ibid., 33. 
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Western delegates in particular, the rationality explanation was most attractive in 
helping direct the debate towards "simplification" rather than "diversification" - 
given, as Hall enthused, that "most other attempts at devising unitary explanations of 
the modernisation process, in fact, seemed merely to be special cases of this 
principle, in other words, they could be explained as manifestations of rationality 
operating in specific contexts. '167 
In this context too however, another Weberian' theme emerged that was also of 
value: namely, that concerning the role of cultural values and specific historical 
circumstances in shaping economic, political and social structures conducive to 
modern achievement (as opposed to the `Marxist' focus on substructural factors such 
as class and economic forces). Here, certain `Japanese' socio- psychological 
characteristics were perceived as having been peculiarly conducive to the 19ts century 
modernising process - resulting, as Jansen remarked, in "a reasonable, almost a 
remarkable coherence about Japanese attitudes towards modernisation, toward the 
Japanese tradition, and toward Asia.'168 While this theme would be taken up most 
famously by Robert Bellah some years later,169 for now, it allowed a satisfying 
distinction between the universal nature of modernisation, and the study of cultural 
differences between Japan and the West. Beyond its `theoretical' value to the 
Japanese Studies community, however, this perspective allowed another Cold War 
point to be made - concerning the comparison between a `stagnant' Chinese 
society, and a Japan that, while historically indebted to Chinese culture and 
civilisation, had been able to move forward. In this respect, scholars such as Robert 
Scalapino argued that even `premodern' (i.e., pre -Meiji) Japan was more modern 
than China.17° Another Western participant, Herbert Passin, went further, arguing 
that the conditions for the emergence of a "modern intellectual class" which "is one 
167 Ibid., 24. 
168 Jansen, "Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation," 65. 
169 I.e., in Bellah's Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan (New York: Free Press, 
1985), which sought to demonstrate an analogy between Tokugawa religious discourse, and the 
Protestant work ethic. 
17° Robert Scalapino, cited in Harootunian, "America's Japan /Japan's Japan," 207. 
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of the constitutive, defining elements of modern society," had been more vibrant 
in pre -Meiji Japan than in any other non -Western "traditional" society 171 
The Modernisation project, of course, was never entirely monolithic. Differences 
would emerge out of the Hakone Conference, and its subsequent sessions, over the 
nature and meaning of modernisation itself, and also over methodology. Here, for 
example, Japanese scholars such as Masao Maruyama and Toyama Shigeki were 
quite ready to question Western scholars confidence in their "value- free" empiricist 
perspective, arguing, correctly, that it left no room for "historically mediated 
concepts, differing temporalities, and local experience. "172 As Harootunian has 
recently pointed out, this was not quite the critical breakthrough it appears to be at 
first glance, given that Maruyama and his `dissenters' remained locked into the same 
basic (Cold war) mind -set, and its positivist assumptions. In this respect, he points 
out, 
none of the participants on either side ever questioned the problematic status of 
privileging as a standard criterion, the relationship between means and ends and its 
authorisation of a protean binarism that generated a whole catalogue of distinctions 
that automatically aligned societies according to their proximity to the universal or 
particular, and the instrumentality of a culturally specific conception of rationality 
masquerading as a universal value ?73 
Harootunian's observation backs up my own broad perspective on the Conference on 
Modern Japan - and my concluding point for this chapter - which is that the 
Conference represented, above all, the institutionalisation of a particular postwar 
Japanese Studies perspective that would continue to dominate images of Japan from 
the `inside' for much of the Cold War. Originally and most powerfully invoked by 
U.S. Cold Warriors such as MacArthur, Kennan and Dulles, it was confirmed, and 
171 Herbert Passin, "Modernisation and the Japanese Intellectual: Some Comparative Observations," 
in Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation (op. cit., 1965), 450 -52. As 
Passin went on to explain, this did not imply that Japan had somehow been modem before its `actual' 
modernisation in the late 1880s, but rather, that, for "the great non -Western civilisations, such as 
Japan, China, India, the Islamic word, and Southeast Asia, the starting point for modernisation is 
entirely different." Ibid., 462. 
172 Masao Maruyama, "Patterns of individuation and the Case of Japan: a Conceptual Scheme," in 
Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernisation (op. cit., 1965), 492. 
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given further credence by the postwar generation of Japan experts - including 
Reischauer, the `Morgenthau' of Japanese Studies - who uncritically appropriated 
its Realist framework, refining it with more detailed information, that was 
nonetheless gathered and analysed via the same positivist principles. 
Since the 1970s however, this perspective has been under challenge, as the theory 
and practice of IR Realism has also come under challenge, and as scholars in 
Western and Japanese settings have begun to seriously reassess the positivist first 
principles by which 'modern' peoples in general have come to know themselves and 
the real -worlds in which they live. The chapter to follow begins to explore this shift, 
which saw the U.S. reassess, and then reassert, its hegemonic status in the wake of 
the Vietnam War - and which saw Japan, the great `asset' of global Westernism and 
modernism, become something of a problem -child for its U.S. mentor. The result in 
`theoretical' terms was a reformulated neo- Realism in IR, and the development of a 
range of alternative perspectives in IR and Japanese Studies; while in `practice,' 
increased tension between the U.S. and its global allies would usher in an new, less 
predictable era in everyday global life per se. 
173 Harootunian, America's Japan /Japan's Japan," 204. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POSTWAR JAPAN (II): 
NEO- REALISM, IR AND JAPANESE STUDIES: 
FROM PRIZED `ASSET' TO `PROBLEM CHILD' 
This chapter continues the task begun in the previous one, of illustrating the 
connections between a dominant IR perspective (Realism) and its Cold War making 
of `Japan,' and the development of post -WW2 Japanese Studies perspectives 
underpinned and directed by the (primarily) U.S. centred IR exemplar. The context 
of this chapter is somewhat different, however, in that its major themes are not those 
of emergence, development and consolidation, as in the previous discussion, but of 
challenge, reassessment and reassertion, and increasing tension between Japan, the 
once prized `asset' and its U.S. mentor. More specifically, the historical context of 
this chapter is the period between the early 1970s and the present. The political and 
economic context is that which sees U.S. foreign policy in crisis in Vietnam and in 
attempts to regain its hegemonic credibility, and which sees Japan becoming a global 
economic power and a growing problem for the U.S. Finally, the intellectual context 
is that which sees the transition from Realism to neo- Realism within (mainly) U.S. 
analytical and policy circles - a neo- Realism which, in the Reagan era, in particular, 
made clear its increasing dissatisfaction and frustration with a Japan, even as it 
sought to lock Japan ever more securely into a "global partnership." 
In order to cover these issues in a coherent manner, the chapter initially presents a 
broad historical and intellectual framework in which neo- Realism and its attitudes 
towards Japan might be best understood. Having established this framework, I will 
then concentrate more directly on the influences of the new IR orthodoxy on Japan, 
and within a developing Japanese Studies. 
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1. The Post -Vietnam Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy. 
As I indicated in Chapter Two, the challenge to Realism and to the U.S. image of the 
world associated with it, emanated primarily from the disaster that was the Vietnam 
War. In broad `theoretical' terms at least, three fundamental problems became 
starkly evident during that war and in its aftermath. The first concerned, above all, 
the inadequacies of the Realist `black box' approach to the world `out there.' More 
precisely, the war in Vietnam illustrated that Realism had no theory of the state 
which allowed it an understanding of the `inside' of states other than those it 
imagined via its Cold War model of 'black box' anarchy. There was, in other words, 
a general absence of U.S. foreign policy insight into "the history, culture, and 
sociopolitical structure of Vietnam, its peoples, or its struggle. "1 Secondly, for all its 
claims concerning universality and strategic predictability, the game -theorised 
methodology underlying the `escalation strategy' model of war fighting in Vietnam 
was manifestly unable to predict or explain the `irrational' behaviour of the North 
Vietnamese in not surrendering to overwhelming power (i.e., in the face of the 
catastrophic losses and damage inflicted by the Americans). Finally, and relatedly, 
the crude Realist conception of power, based on the superior capacity of modem 
military /technology, was seriously undermined by the defeat of a modern Western 
state at the hands of a `traditional' (i.e., `primitive') society .2 
The debate which was provoked by the Vietnam War centred, initially at least, on 
some of the more obvious inadequacies of this Realist perspective (if not the 
positivist first -principles which underlay it). And, initially at least, it saw some 
interesting dimensions added to the IR analytical agenda, which began to 
acknowledge some of the blind spots and silences that had characterised the U.S. 
Cold War perspective. In particular, figures such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
introduced notions of `complex interdependence' as a more accurate and more 
Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics (op. cit., 1994), 112. 
2 /bid. 
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incisive way of understanding the everyday workings of the global system in the 
1970s3 In this context, interdependence theory sought to add dimensions to state - 
centric Realism via a more complex reading of "transnational interactions,"4 that 
acknowledged the role of nonstate actors and institutionalised regimes (e.g., trading 
and /or politically cooperative regimes) in a changing global order. As Keohane and 
Nye explained it in 1972, "world politics" could no longer be conceptualised in 
purely state -centric terms; rather, it had to include: 
all political interactions between significant actors in a world system in which a 
significant actor is any somewhat autonomous individual or organisation that 
controls substantial resources and participates in political relationships with other 
actors across state lines. Such an actor need not be a state .5 
In this context too, the notion of the `black box' state was placed under scrutiny, 
given that, from an interdependence perspective, the state could not simply be 
viewed as "totally unitary," or "exclusively concerned with the militarist /diplomatic 
state of the realists. "6 Rather, and as another observer later argued, both the state and 
its diplomatic agenda were: 
penetrated by the need to satisfy broadly based social interests. The increased 
interdependence of domestic economies linked through the global economy and the 
similarity of their positions, obliges states to pursue policies through diplomacies 
aimed among other things at domestic stability. These forces in a changing 
international system account for the emergence of international regimes whose 
purpose it is to ensure this stability.' 
In this vein too, John Ruggie sought to problematise the crude power theme in 
traditional Realist thinking, by arguing for an understanding of institutional /regime 
behaviour which connects international behaviour to the concepts of social 
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1972). 
4 ibid., xv. 
s Ibid., xxv. 
6 ibid., xxvi. 
7 Anthony Jarvis, "Societies, States and Geopolitics: Challenges from Historical Sociology," Review 
of International Studies 15 (1989: 281 -293), 282. This is the interdependence position associated 
with Keohane and Nye in the first Transnational Relations and World Politics, and, to a lesser extent, 
its later edition, published in 1977. 
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legitimacy underpinning all political authority. International regimes, Ruggie 
suggested (unlike `black box' states), are not to be known "simply by some 
descriptive inventory of their concrete elements, but by their generative grammar, the 
underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation 
and transformation.'" 
Broadly then, interdependence theory was about bringing a more complex matrix of 
power relations and politico- economic connections to bear on contemporary IR and 
power politics themes - albeit, within the framework of basic assumptions (endemic 
anarchy, the competition for survival, etc.) intrinsic to those themes. This 
interpretivist and more sophisticated approach to political interaction has had a 
number of variations in IR since the 1970s, and I will explore its implications for 
both IR and Japanese Studies, here and in following chapters. At this time too, I will 
readdress the institutionalist themes which have found their way into the neo- 
liberalism of the 1990s, with its faith in liberal institutions as the basis of global 
order in the globalisation era of the 21st century. 
The more immediate point for now is that this critical space, which initially opened 
up in the early 1970s, was quickly closed down again with the advent of neo- 
Realism, which, in the early 1980s, emerged as part of a broad conservative backlash 
in the U.S. that saw U. S. foreign policy resurrected in the `new Cold War' terms of 
the Reagan Administration.' To understand why these historical and intellectual 
themes developed in the way they did, and to explore some of their implications for 
Japan, is to appreciate that it was not just Vietnam that precipitated the sense of crisis 
B John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order," in International Organization 36 (1982: 379 -415), 196. Ruggie 
argues that the dominant, Realist understanding of international behaviour (i.e., in terms of power 
capability and utilitarianism), while not "fundamentally wrong," does not help to understand 
regimes, because it does not recognise political authority as "a fusion of power with legitimate social 
purpose" (emphasis added). Ibid., 197. His notion of "embedded liberalism" is derived from 
Polyani's 1944 concept of normal, or "embedded" economic orders, in which "the economic order is 
merely a function of the social order in which it is contained. Ruggie uses this to explain the way in 
which the postwar economic order reflected "the shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives to 
which the industrial world had moved, unevenly but `as a single entity. - Ibid., 214. The theme of 
social legitimacy is also important, albeit in a slightly different context, in the work of Robert Cox, as 
I will show in Chapters Five and Seven. 
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within the U.S. at the start of the 1970s. Nor was it merely the politico -strategic 
status of the U. S. that was under challenge during this period. There were a range of 
other challenges too, many of which were aimed at the status of the U.S. as the 
global economic hegemon - and it is in relation to these challenges that much of the 
neo- Realist response was formulated. 
As the European Union developed into a stronger and more efficient regional regime 
in the 1960s and 1970s for example, there were signs that some of the European 
states, such as Germany and France, were less willing to toe the American line on 
political and economic matters in the way that the U.S. had become accustomed to in 
the early World War years. Kennedy's earlier refusal to countenance European 
military (i.e., nuclear) parity with the U.S. had generated huge tension within Europe 
over the role of NATO, and in 1966, France, under de Gaulle, withdrew from all of 
NATO's military organs, expelling them from French territory.t0 While NATO 
continued to play the lead role in the Cold War defence of Western Europe, there was 
widespread suspicion among the European ruling elite that the U.S. was trying to 
extract a disproportionate price (in both manpower and financial resources) for this 
defence, and that it was doing so in a elaborate attempt to undermine the cohesion of 
the EC as an international actor.11 The events of the early 1970s (see below) would 
do nothing to calm these suspicions - and in this context, while the economic 
shock -waves created by the oil crisis were hugely damaging to Europe, they also 
helped renew and strengthen the mindset of integration.12 
Other challenges came from the Third World. As Calvocoressi points out, Third 
World solidarity originated in the rejection, by many new or emerging states in the 
early postwar period, of the either /or choice of alliances proffered by the 
9 Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (Thetford: The Thetford Press, 1984), 13. 
10 Peter Stirk,A History of European Integration Since 1914 (London: Pinter, 1996), 175. 
11 Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945 (London 
& New York: Longman, 1995), 160. 
12 This opened the way for the reconfirmation of the Franco -German entente within the Community, 
under the leadership, during the mi- 1970s, of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt. Ibid., 
163. 
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superpowers, and their accompanying insistence "that, in the one case in democratic 
capitalism and in the other in communism, they had discovered a way of life which 
others need do no more than follow. "13 Moreover, as anti -colonial and non -aligned 
sentiments within these countries continued to gain impetus during the 1960s, many 
states began to openly criticise the assumptions of Modernisation Theory, and the 
major economic institutions behind it: namely, the Bretton Woods system and its 
accompanying organisations, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank. At the forefront 
of this dissatisfaction with the economic status quo were the OPEC countries of 
major oil producers, primarily in the Middle East, who now confronted the Western 
industrialised nations with the implications of their own systemic Iogic. More 
precisely, the OPEC Cartel shocked the industrialised world by threatening to 
withhold oil supplies, thus repositioning themselves in the international political 
economy (IPE) as price -fixers, rather than recipients of Western pricing procedures.'4 
And, the results, for the Bretton Woods system were dramatic, to say the least, as the 
drastic rise in petrol prices, together with the suspension of the dollar's convertibility 
into gold (see below), nearly overwhelmed both the IMF and the World Bank, thus 
making it clear that: 
[o]stensibly worldwide in its purposes, the Fund - like the Bank - had operated as 
an adjunct of an economic system created by and largely for the developed capitalist 
world, but from the 1970s, it was impelled to take a wider view as the developing 
(and now independent) Third World clamoured to be treated as part of the world's 
economic problems and the richer countries began to realise the extent of their 
economic involvement with the poorer.ts 
The oil shocks also posed a particular kind of problem for the U.S. as global 
hegemon, even though it was a never a major importer of oil from the Middle East 
itself. Rather, the problem it faced was that those industrialised states who were 
major oil importers from the region - particularly Japan - now became openly 
critical of the U.S. and its seeming inability to act as hegemon in time of global 
13 Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (op. cit., 1996.), 171. 
4 Urwin, The Community of Europe, 160. 
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crisis.16 In itself, this represented an important moment in the post WW2 relationship 
between the U.S. and Japan, but in the present context it is also an important theme 
in any explanation of later neo- Realist attitudes, and the tensions within U.S. foreign 
policy concerning Japan in particular. 
Japan and the United States: Emerging Tensions 
Most immediately, the friction over the OPEC issue brought to the surface a tension 
that had been building for some time, which I touched on in general terms in the 
previous chapter, but which I would like to develop a little further here, concerning 
Japan's rapid economic growth in the era after the Korean War. By the early 1970s, 
this rise to power was an obvious and worrying reality for the U.S., and one that it 
found difficult to treat with equanimity. The sense of unease was only heightened by 
the fact that Japan's rise seemed to correspond to a decline in American fortune, as 
the country which, for a century, had run a trade surplus with the rest of the world, 
now began to run a trade deficit, largely because of its massive involvement in the 
Vietnam War. 
Japan, on the other hand, was by now moving from strength to strength. The high - 
technology, high -value -added export strategy brought in under the Ikeda cabinet in 
1960 had continued the trajectory begun in the mid 19505.17 Between 1960 and 
1965, when its economy moved into surplus for the first time since the war, Japan's 
real GNP grew by an average of 10% every year - double that of the U.S.1ö 1965 
was also the year that the U.S. -Japan trade balance first switched to Japan's favour; 
albeit by a comparatively paltry $334 million (a far cry from the $50 billion it would 
eventually tally in the mid 1980s).19 However, the psychological impact of this 
historical moment in the U.S. - Japan relationship, added to the challenges from the 
15 Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945, 188. 
16 ibid., 190. 
17 Gary Allinson, "The Structure and Transformation of Conservative Rule," in Andrew Gordon 
(ed.), Postwar Japan as History (op. cit., 1993), 135. 
18 Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (op. cit., 
1997), 181. 
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Third World, and the increased competition from the European community, only 
added to the pressures on the U.S. at a time of even greater and more immediate 
problems vis -à -vis the war in Vietnam, which, by now (the early 1970s), was 
crippling the domestic U.S. economy, further undermining its status as the global 
hegemon. 
The Nixon Doctrines 
The initial U.S. response to this pressure, not surprisingly, was an abrogation (albeit 
a brief one) of the roles (world banker and world policeman) which had precipitated 
these problems. Lyndon Johnson had actually begun this process in 1968, by 
capping escalation of the Vietnam war,20 but it was his successor, Richard Nixon, 
who would oversee the most radical redefinition of U.S. hegemony - and of the 
U.S. -Japan relationship - since the war. At the policy level, this saw, for example, 
the abrogation of important Bretton -Woods provisions; in particular, the de- coupling 
of the U.S. dollar from the gold standard, effectively ending the fixed -exchange rate 
system which had been at the heart of the post -WWII restructuring agency .21 At the 
same time, Nixon adopted an openly antagonistic economic policy towards Japan, 
the details of which will be discussed below. 
On the political front, there was an unprecedented shift in policy towards the Soviet 
Union, which reflected deeper changes in the Cold War. By the early 1970s, the 
Soviet Union was estimated to have achieved (or be about to achieve) rough nuclear 
parity with the U.S.. Rather than compromise the U.S. economy even further 
however, by a costly (and probably futile) attempt to restore U.S. superiority, Nixon, 
under Kissinger's guidance, implemented a range of political and economic 
incentives designed to moderate Soviet behaviour, that came to be known as 
19 lbid. 
2° Ibid., 210. 
21 Including, of course, the favourable yen -dollar exchange rate, which had been a major factor in 
postwar Japanese economic recovery and growth. Ibid., 231. 
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détente 22 Meanwhile, overtures were also made towards China, on the logic that 
"triangular diplomacy" with Moscow and Beijing would not only hasten the end of 
the Vietnam War, but, in the long term, serve Washington's interest in restoring 
global equilibrium. 
Nixon's period in power was, as Cumings points out, a truly pivotal one for U.S. - 
Japan relations 23 While on the one hand, Nixon's foreign policy agenda retained all 
the key assumptions about the nature of the Cold War and the need for U.S. 
vigilance, it was also a time of strategic shifts in method - including, as Nixon 
himself put it, "sticking it" to U.S. allies (such as Japan and Korea) who would not 
cooperate with the new burden -sharing philosophy 24 However, while the 
reverberations from the "Nixon shocks" would continue to be felt, particularly within 
the U.S.-Japan relationship, for decades to come, Nixon himself would soon be gone. 
In 1974, the legacy of Vietnam caught up with him on the Watergate affair, and he 
was forced to resign, succeeded by Gerald Ford (August 1974 -January 1977), and 
then by the Democrat Jimmy Carter (1977- 1980), who came to power as a 'liberal' 
alternative to the corruption and power politics chicanery of the Republicans. 
Carter: the Beginning of the End of Détente 
When Carter assumed the Presidency, he did so among a widespread hope, both 
within the U.S. and abroad, that détente policy would be expanded into genuinely 
peaceful relations with the Soviets and other U.S. 'enemies.' However, from the 
moment Carter came to power, a series of events around the world saw many in the 
U.S. begin to denounce the whole détente experiment as a failure and as an 
opportunity for America's enemies to take advantage of its weaknesses. The period 
between 1978 and 1979 saw Soviet involvement (or that of its Cuban proxy) in 
22Ibid., 225. 
23 Bruce Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System" (op. cit., 1993), 55. 
24 Schalter,Altered States, 211. In addition to the economic attacks on Japan, which are discussed in 
more detail further below, Nixon also imposed "burden sharing" policy on South Korea, withdrawing 
a division of American troops, and pressing the South Korean government hard in textile negotiations. 
Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 55. 
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conflicts in Central America, Poland, Sub -Saharan Africa, Iran and Afghanistan. 
These conflicts, combined with allegations that Moscow was reneging on arms 
controls agreements, were seized upon by anti -détente groups in the U.S., and by late 
1978, Carter was under enormous pressure from both Republican and Democract 
critics insisting on a return to a more assertive and aggressive U.S. foreign policy 
world wide. These fears were only compounded by the seizure of the American 
Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, which convinced many in the policymaking 
elite that the U.S. was no longer feared and respected as global hegemon. The 
spectre of a power vacuum rapidly being filled by Soviet influence (even as the 
Islamic regime in Iran rapidly made clear its contempt for both of the superpowers 
and their ideologies) was subsequently lent further credence by the events over 
Christmas 1979 which, hard upon the embassy seizure in Iran, saw the Soviet Army 
move into Afghanistan. This was the final confirmation for many in the U.S. that 
détente was just an opportunity for the Soviet Union to gain global advantage over 
the U.S., and behave in ways it never would have had when the U.S. was the 
undoubted hegemon. It was also a useful underlining of the Committee on Present 
Danger's assessment that "the two superpowers have utterly opposing conceptions of 
world order. "Ü 
At the centre of the anti -détente push in the U.S. was a right -wing group supporting 
Ronald Reagan, then the governor of California, who began to rekindle the language 
and Iogic of the early Cold War, invoking in particular Kennan's early logic that the 
only way to `deal' with the Soviet Union was by superior force of arms and a power 
politics rationale. In the face of this challenge, Carter hastily re- invented himself as a 
born-again hawk, increasing the defence budget, instituting a grain embargo on the 
Soviet Union, and enunciating the "Carter Doctrine," under which he pledged to 
defend U.S. oil interests in the Persian Gulf region against "outside powers. "26 In the 
Committee on Present Danger, cited by Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The 
Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 96. 
26 Schaller, Altered States, 225. 
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last months of his presidency, he instigated a massive military buildup, "designed to 
re- establish strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, reassert control over the 
Western alliance, re- impose authority in the Middle East, and consolidate strength in 
the Pacific through strategic cooperation with both China and Japan. "27 The result 
was that as détente collapsed completely around the beginning of 1980, it did so 
amid a welter of recrimination and antagonistic rhetoric reminiscent of the early Cold 
War years, with the two superpowers reverting (rhetorically at least) to their original 
Cold War positions. And, in this atmosphere, Reagan swept to power in the U.S. in 
1981. 
Reagan: The New Cold War 
From his first days in office, Reagan set about accelerating the fundamental shift in 
the tone and direction of U.S. foreign policy that Carter had begun. Détente and 
post- Vietnam angst were rapidly discarded in favour of a reformulated notion of 
American hegemony, centred on the notion that the world required strong, central 
leadership if order was to be restored, and that leadership must come from the United 
States. Accordingly, in the wake of Afghanistan and Iran, the Reagan administration 
vowed to correct the failures of the détente strategy, and the weaknesses of U.S. 
military and diplomatic power which had seen it humiliated by small regional non- 
Western powers. The most immediate target of the détente backlash of course, was 
the Carter Administration, and (in shades of the emergence of Realism vs. idealism 
in the 1920s and 1930s) `liberalism' in general, which was now blamed for 
undermining Western global strength and rendering the West `vulnerable' to superior 
Soviet nuclear forces 28 
27Ibid., 253. 
28 In this context, it is worth noting Norman Podhoretz's claim that Reagan was not actually opposed 
to détente per se, so much as Carter's "soft headed" handling of it. "Even the tough policies of the 
Reagan administration," Podhoretz argues, were "entirely consistent with the theory of détente as 
spelled out by the post -presidential Richard Nixon, and in some of the writings of Henry Kissinger, 
because their conception of détente did indeed involve a component of power. Détente had to be 
policed, and the only policeman available was the United States." Norman Podhoretz, "The Rise and 
Fall of Containment," in Terry Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containing the Soviet Union: A 
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At the broader, strategic level, the new Reagan doctrine had three major themes, 
which, in the early 1980s, were articulated as part of a resurgent American voice in 
the world (with broader support from the conservative governments now elected in 
both Western Europe and Japan) 29 First, the U.S. had to re -build its military strength 
and close the so- called `window of vulnerability" opened up during the détente 
years. Second, there was a policy of "neo- containment," which represented, 
essentially, an updated version of the containment policies of the early Cold War 
years, now re- invoked to counter what was seen as a new phase of Soviet 
expansionism during détente. This policy was structured around a diffuse network of 
`alliances' with Third World nations,30 and the broadly- conceived `Reagan doctrine," 
under which the U.S. reserved the right to intervene to destroy regimes it considered 
hostile. With regard to the costs of this renewed `world's policeman" role, the 
rhetoric of burden sharing was also revived. Finally, Reagan promulgated the values 
of a world -wide free trade policy based on market principles and Western `liberal' 
institutions as the basis of future order and prosperity (i.e., the IMF, the World Bank 
and GATT)." 
All of these themes, as I will explain below, had particular implications for Japan, 
which was to re- emerge in the 1980s as the centrepiece of American strategic 
thinking - and, somewhat paradoxically, as the focus of U.S. ire and resentment. 
Indeed, in many ways, it was the U.S. -Japan relationship that would prove the most 
profound influence on the debate whose intellectual framework was defined by the 
events above. This framework of course, was neo- Realism. 
Critique of U.S. Policy (Washington: Pergamon -Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987), 
227. 
29 Schaller, Altered States, 253. 
30 Informal, that is, in terms of the absence of formal treaties, with the ties being underpinned by 
(often clandestine) arms transfers, military aid, and economic aid. Terry Deibel, "Alliances for 
Containment," in Deibel and Gaddis (eds.), Containing the Soviet Union (op. cit.), 114. 
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2. Neo -Realism: Reformulating Global Order in the Post -Vietnam Era. 
Neo- Realism, as its name suggests, claims to carry on the central intellectual heritage 
of `traditional' or `classic' Realism, while at the same time seeking to remedy the 
defects that rendered Realism vulnerable to critical challenges of the type described 
above. On the one hand consequently, neo- Realist scholars in IR uphold the basic 
assumptions of Realism as inviolable: i.e. the fundamentally anarchical nature of the 
international realm, the primacy of the nation state as actor in this realm, and the 
pursuit of power and self -interest as the primary motivation of all actors, even when 
cooperative or integrative behaviour is evident (as in trading, political regimes such 
as the EC)." On the other hand, neo- Realism has acknowledged two major 
weaknesses in the traditional orthodoxy which it now sought to overcome. The first 
was its tendency toward reductionism; `reductionism,' in this context, signifying the 
Realist tendency to concentrate on the behaviour of individual states per se. The 
second perceived weakness was Realism's failure to recognise that economic factors 
were crucial in the contemporary era. Hence the neo- Realist concern with the global 
International Political Economy (IPE) rather than International Relations (IR) in the 
traditional sense 33 
I touched on the first of these issues in Chapter Two, in explaining the way in which 
the most influential neo- Realist, Kenneth Waltz, reinstated some old positivist 
principles to 'overcome' the problem of reductionism in Realism. In his Theory of 
International Politics (1979), Waltz had confronted this problem by arguing that 
Realists should not be looking at the way states behave, but appreciating why they 
behave in the way they do. The reason why, he insisted, was that the behaviour of 
states and all other actors in the international system is determined by the structure of 
31 Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War, 164. 
32 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Rout ledge, 1998), 9, 
33 Scott Burchill, "Realism and neo- Realism," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), 
Theories of International Relations (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 83. 
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that system, which is anarchical, and which imposes its security dilemma Iogic upon 
all actors, regardless of their intention or will 34 
As indicated previously, this structuralist perspective, which was presented as an 
unchanging, irreducible `law' of international life (and therefore beyond change, and 
critical reassessment) was not accepted, even in its heyday, by the more incisive of 
IPE analysts, primarily because it could not explain the relationship between the 
parts (the states and other actors) and the whole (the anarchical system) 35 By the 
early 1980s, an even more profound challenge was under way, as some within the IR 
and IPE fields began to question the positivist underpinnings of perspectives such as 
Waltz's with its propositions concerning structural `laws,' and systemic hierarchies 
which are just `spontaneously' generated, like markets.36 Indeed, it was in response 
to this crude reassertion of positivism within neo- Realism that a new phase of IR 
analysis emerged in the 1980s and 1990s - and in the chapters to follow, I will 
concentrate more directly on aspects of this new Critical Social Theory literature, 
particularly as it has been associated with new thinking in Japanese Studies. 
The point for now though, is that in the early 1980s, with Reagan in the White House 
and U.S. foreign policy once more assertive around the world, many within the 
analytical community in the U.S., in particular, were beginning to reformulate the 
post -Vietnam world order in terms derived from the neo- Realism of figures such as 
Waltz. Some of those who followed Waltz's lead, as indicated, articulated their 
reservations about some elements of his position (e.g., Ruggie). And some, like 
Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane and Robert Gilpin, continued to emphasise 
more complex themes concerning the role of regimes and liberal institutions and the 
significance of `economic' power in the 1980s - albeit, while remaining more or 
less committed to the notion, as Krasner put it in 1983, that "outcomes related to 
34 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (op. cit., 1979), 10. 
35 See my comments in Chapter Two (69 -70) regarding the reaction to Waltz's claims by Ruggie and 
Ashley, in particular. 
36 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 90. 
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either regimes or behaviour ultimately remain a function of the distribution of power 
among states ." 
It was from this second phase of neo- Realism, I suggest, that much of the tension 
developed between Japan and the U.S. in the 1980s. To explain why this is so, it is 
necessary to touch briefly on one particularly important element of neo- Realism - 
its commitment to Hegemonic Stability Theory. This is a perspective which 
encompasses both the wider U.S. foreign policy attitude to the world during the 
Reagan and Bush Presidencies, and the more precise direction taken by neo- Realists 
in their attempts to fuse basic Realism principles with elements of neo- classical 
economics. 
Hegemonic Stability Theory 
In its broader context, Hegemonic Stability Theory emerged from the Reagan 
Doctrine's view of why there had been global disorder in the period of the 1970s and 
1980s; the answer being that there had been a loss of faith in the `American Way' 
after Vietnam, and in the basic value system which had prevailed in the years 
following WW2 38 In the neo- Realist community, the answer was similar, but more 
specific. It argued that there had been a loss of faith in U.S. strategic leadership and, 
just as importantly, in the Bretton Woods System constructed to provide economic 
stability and leadership after WW2 39 In this way, neo- Realist Iiterature added a 
further dimension to the argument that, if order was to be restored at the global level, 
so must U.S. hegemony be. It was an economic dimension, whose key source was 
the U.S. economist Charles Kindleberger, and his ideas about modern economic 
history as the struggle for hegemonic power. 
37 Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," in 
Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1983), 357. 
38 Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War, 215. 
39 Robert O. Keohane,After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 213. 
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In 1973, Kindleberger had written a book called The World in Depression,40 in which 
he argued that the major cause of the global Depression of the early 1930s was that 
the global market had no one state capable of maintaining order in conditions of 
fiscal anarchy. Britain, Kindleberger suggested, had been "unable," and the United 
States (more reprehensibly) "unwilling," to assume responsibility for the major tasks 
of world economic stabilisation 41 From this, Kindleberger drew two conclusions. 
The first stated that all markets, at all levels, require a single orderer - a hegemonic 
presence capable of enforcing and maintaining stability.42 Secondly, that if one 
understands the world in market terms, and if one reads history as the struggle for 
market hegemony, it is clear that when there has been a hegemon in the market there 
has been systemic order and market efficiency - and when that hegemonic presence 
has declined or disappeared there has been disorder and anarchy.43 
This rather simplistic reading of complex events proved a major inspiration for the 
emerging neo- Realist literature; which, after all, as Keohane would later make clear, 
preferred its theoretical frameworks "elegant" and "parsimonious. "44 Kindleberger's 
conclusions thus became a catalyst for Hegemonic Stability Theory, which in turn, I 
argue, became a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy during the 1980s and 1990s. In 
this context, the theoretical logic was simple enough. In the period between WW2 
and the early 1970s, there was an acknowledged and powerful hegemonic force in 
the market: the United States, and in this period, the market worked efficiently (at 
least for those capable of competing in it). Since the 1970s, however, for a range of 
reasons, the hegemon has been in decline, and the world has entered a period of 
increased disorder, which could lead to a more obvious anarchy if legitimate order is 
not restored. 
40 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929 -1933 (London: Allen Lane The Penguin 
Press, 1973). 
41 Ibid., 292. 
42 Ibid., 307, 
43 Ibid., 308. 
44 Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" (op. cit., 1986), 191. 
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Thus scholars such as Robert Gilpin (1981), began, on this basis, to invoke a rather 
nostalgic vision of the international order associated with British preponderance in 
the 19`h century, and American dominance in the immediate postwar period (on 
which more will be said presently). For Gilpin, both Pax Britannica and Pax 
Americana had "ensured an international system of relative peace and security," 
because "Great Britain and the United States created and enforced the rules of a 
liberal international economic order "45 (emphasis added). A few years later, 
Keohane added a dimension of sorts to this perspective, by arguing that while there 
was scant empirical evidence to support `crude' (i.e., military power -based) 
hegemonic stability theory, a more `refined' version of this theory (taking into 
account economic regimes and the internal dynamics of powerful states) "makes 
some contribution to understanding recent changes in the international politics of oil, 
money and trade. "46 
As mentioned above, it was with respect to Japan in particular that Hegemonie 
Stability Theory (or one aspect of it at least), would have greatest resonance for U.S. 
academics and policymakers. This was the notion (popularised by Reagan) that a 
major cause of hegemonic decline is a decrease in respect for hegemonic power - 
not merely by enemies of the hegemon, but by "free riders," or actors in the global 
market who benefit from stable world order, without contributing to it. This, it is 
argued, increases the burden on the hegemonic power, who has to underwrite the 
free rider. More specifically, from this perspective, there has been one major free 
rider in the post -WWII global marketplace - Japan. As a result, and after all the 
years in which Japan had been proudly (and paternalistically) presented to the world 
as the U.S.'s best Cold War asset, the U.S. and its analytical sector now began to re- 
define Japan as, at best, a problem -child. And, it is from this perspective that I wish 
to move into the second task of this chapter, adding some detail and precise analysis 
45 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
144. 
46 Keohane, After Hegemony, 214. 
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to the sketch thus far presented on complex themes and issues. I will start by 
analysing the way in which Japan gradually came to be re- presented as a major 
reason for U.S. hegemonic decline. From here, I will consider the impact of the 
'Japan problem' on both International Relations, and a (by now) rapidly developing 
Japanese Studies literature. 
3. NeoRealism, U.S. Foreign Policy and Japan as `Problem- Child.' 
Thus the paradox: the success of the U.S.-Japanese alliance has been its undoing. 
The near total achievement of great ambitions conspires with the waning of great 
fears to leave the two nations today without a clear conception of what each needs or 
wants from the other. 
Graham T. Allison, 1972.47 
Allison's statement, I suggest, accurately captures the suspicion and confusion that 
had already begun to penetrate U.S. images of Japan in the 1970s, as it became clear 
that Japan was destined to transcend the role planned for it in Cold War Containment 
strategy. As many scholars have acknowledged however, the fault lines which now 
began to appear on the surface of the "rickety old San Francisco system "48 had, in 
truth, been integral to the postwar U.S. -Japan relationship since its inception. The 
broader world view upon which the relationship depended (i.e., that of the U.S. as the 
undisputed hegemon of the `free world') and which relegated Japan to the status of a 
militarily subordinate satellite, ultimately abetted Japan's recovery, as the U.S. 
continued to promote and protect Japan's economic interest both at home and abroad 
in the name of Kennan's `great crescent.'49 On the Japanese side, savvy economic 
policies, including the introduction of long -term fiscal and economic planning, and 
the `income doubling" scheme introduced by the Ikeda administration (1960 -64) to 
47 Graham T. Allison, "American Foreign Policy and Japan," in Henry Rosovsky (ed.), Discord in 
the Pacific: Challenges to the Japanese- American Alliance (Washington: Columbia Books, Inc., 
1972), 9. 
48 John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems" (op. cit., 1993), 20. 
49Ibid., 12. 
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boost domestic consumption, made the most of these concessions5° Between 1960 
and 1970, average Japanese incomes outdid even Ikeda's expectations by not just 
doubling, but trebling - creating a mass consumer market that encouraged high- 
speed growth, and completed the recovery of Japanese industry from its wartime 
devastations' 
By the end of the decade however, Japan was well beyond its recovery phase. Its 
GNP had overtaken that of Germany, it had a 3.2 billion dollar trade surplus with the 
U.S., and Japanese capital was now being poured into the newly industrialising 
economies of Southeast Asia.52 In contrast, as already noted above, the U.S. economy 
was heading for recession, undermined by the costly entanglement in Vietnam and an 
increasingly competitive world economy53 By the end of 1971, the ballooning 
balance -of- payments deficit was approaching $29 billion, and for the first time in 
nearly a century the U.S. experienced an overall merchandise trade deficit of around 
$2.27 billion. Add to this situation a trade deficit with Japan of $3.2 billion, and it 
was easy to see why Japan, in the minds of many within the U.S., was rapidly 
becoming, as Kinhide Mushakôji put it, "something of a prodigal son. "54 
Japan and the "Nixon Shocks" 
This was certainly one of the things on Richard Nixon's mind as he sought to 
extricate the U.S. from Vietnam55 By 1970, Nixon had become increasingly bitter 
towards Japan, primarily over the Satô government's failure to cooperate fully with 
America over Japanese textiles exports, after the U.S. had formally undertaken to 
withdraw nuclear weapons from Okinawa and return it to Japanese sovereignty by 
5° Laura E. Hein, "Growth Versus Success" (op. cit., 1993), 114. 
51 Schaller,AlteredStates, 161. 
52 Takurô Seiyama, "A Radical Interpretation of Postwar Economic Policies" (op. cit., 1989), 50. 
53 William K. Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation 
(op. cit., 1995), 95. 
54 Kinhide Mushakôji, "The American -Japanese Image Gap," in Rosovsky (ed.), Discord in the 
Pacific (op, cit., 1972), 230. 
55 Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 55. 
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1972 56 His mood had not been improved by Japanese press reports hailing the 
textiles impasse as a victory for "independent foreign policy. "57 In this context, the 
1971 move to normalise relations with China (thereby enhancing Sino- Soviet 
tensions) as part of the détente strategy without consulting Japan, was a calculated 
insult; not, as some suggested at the time, a mere misjudgement or oversight58 
More importantly, Nixon's visit was a powerful, if crude reminder, of the 
fundamental structural inequities built into the U.S. -Japan relationship from its 
beginnings - inequities which Nixon (egged on by early Japan bashers such as 
Treasury Secretary John Connally), was now prepared to remind the Japanese of in 
any number of ways 59 This was certainly the motivation underlying his New 
Economic Policy (announced fittingly enough, on VJ Day 1971), which revoked easy 
Japanese access to the U.S. market (by slapping a 10% surcharge on imports), 
imposed "voluntary" quotas on Japanese textile exports, and unilaterally devalued 
the dollar reserves that Japan had built up as financial support to the Vietnam War 
campaign (a move which also, of course, pushed up the cost of Japanese imports in 
the U.S.) 60 The following year, Nixon pushed through an agreement with Japan 
which included `voluntary' export restrictions on textiles and which, in a forerunner 
of the interweaving of economic and security issues in the 1980s, threatened to tie 
Okinawa's restoration to Japanese sovereignty to economic cooperation with the 
U.S 61 
On the strategic front too, there were signs that the U.S. was changing some of its 
attitudes and policies where Japan was concerned. This was implicit in Nixon's 1969 
Guam Doctrine, which, while it did not revoke U.S. responsibilities concerning 
56 Schaller, Altered States, 217 -20. 
57 ibid., 222. 
58 Donald Hellmann, Japan and East Asia: The New International Order (New York: Praeger, 1972), 
135. 
59 Jun Eto, "Japan's Shifting Image," in Rosovsky (ed.), Discord in the Pacific (op, cit., 1972), 223. 
so Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System, 95. 
61 Saburô Okita, "Dynamics of the Economic Relationship," in Paul Gordon Lauren and Raymond P. 
Wylie (eds.), Destinies Shared: U.S.- Japanese Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 85. 
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Japanese security, indicated the need for a `burden sharing' role on the part of the 
Asia `asset.' As Nixon explained it: 
as far as the problem of military defence [is concerned] except for the threat of a 
major power involving nuclear weapons... the United States is going to encourage 
and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the 
responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.62 
"Responsibility," in this context meant, among other things, Japanese responsíbílity 
to "shoulder the concerns of Realpolitik in Asia," under the continued guidance of 
the U.S. -Japan military alliance fi3 Accordingly, while the Guam Doctrine seemed to 
coincide with Japanese establishment desires for a more independent and 
autonomous Japanese position in the region, the U.S. perspective was somewhat 
different; centred as it was on the notion that Japan was to accept a higher cost for its 
`subordinate dependence' within the U.S. global strategic plan after Vietnam. This 
became clear under Nixon's New Economic Doctrine, which saw a free -floating 
dollar pushing up the price of domestic weapons production in Japan, effectively 
ending the surge towards productive autonomy that had been pursued since the late 
1960s by the Self- Defence Agency 64 
Hard upon the "Nixon shocks" of course, came the OPEC crisis and oil shock of 
1973, which caused Japan's `miracle' growth to grind temporarily to a halt. This 
eventually proved a decisive factor in Japan's consolidation of its economic great 
power status, as Japanese industry shifted its focus from heavy industries to the high - 
tech, service- oriented products for which it would become famous in the 1980s.65 
Nevertheless, at the time, the oil shock, as indicated earlier, exposed deep tensions in 
62 Nixon press release, July 25, 1969, cited in W. W. Rostow, The United States and the Regional 
Organisation of Asia and the Pacific: 1965 -1985 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 58. 
63 Hellmann, Japan and East Asia, 139. 
64 Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defence Production, Alliance Politics, and the Search for 
Postwar Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 59 -60. 
65 Tabb, The Postwar Japanese System, 96. 
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the U.S. -Japan relationship" - tensions that would only increase when the crisis 
was over, and a revamped Japanese economy really began to make a mockery of 
Dulles' 1954 surmise that "the Japanese don't make the things we want" by 
threatening U.S. market shares in products such as steel, television sets, automobiles 
and electronics 67 By the end of the 1970s, a deep sense of unease was more or less 
entrenched in some sectors of U.S.-Japan relations, as U.S. manufacturers, in 
particular, grew increasingly bitter at what they saw as "unfair" Japanese strategies 
regarding market protection. 
Japan in the 1980s: "Burden Sharing" and Bashing in the Lead -up to the Gulf War 
The development of coherent neo- Realist perspectives on the world in the harsher 
atmosphere of the Reagan era saw a further and sometimes ironic dimension added to 
the U.S. -Japan relationship, as the U.S. began to re -assert its `world policeman" role. 
In the context of a renewed Cold War, and especially with regard to Reagan's fears 
about Soviet naval capacity and strategic intent in the Pacific, Japan once again 
became a geo- strategic `asset,' as neo- Realist observers urged a return to the 
strategies and perspectives of the Kennan years. Asia - especially Northeast Asia 
- once more became a strategic focal point, with analysts like Martin Weinstein, for 
example, propounding the need for a renewed U.S. commitment. `The security 
affairs of Northeast Asia," Weinstein warned in 1983, 
have been especially neglected since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. One of 
the effects of the American failure in Vietnam has been a tendency to disengage 
psychologically from the whole region that carries the taint of Vietnam.., the sense 
that Americans have a vital stake in Northeast Asia and that American actions and 
omissions have a major impact on this region is far weaker now than it was after the 
Pacific War or the Korean War68 
66 Many Japanese for example, believed that the quadrupling of oil prices during the 1970s was 
abetted by Nixon and Kissinger in order to help restore the balance of trade to favour the United 
States. Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 56. 
67 Okita, "Dynamics of the Economic Relationship," 83. 
68 Martin E. Weinstein (ed.), Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1983), vii -viii. 
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From the perspective now prevalent, the obvious solution to this neglect was the 
restoration of U.S. hegemony in Northeast Asia, and the restoration, therefore, of the 
order that prevailed in that region after 1945. Akira Iriye was another arguing this 
case, and while he went beyond the rather simple hegemonic stability assumptions of 
Weinstein, he too emphasised the future need for a powerful "regime coordinator" in 
the post- Vietnam period 69 Continuing this theme, Daniel Okimoto added another 
twist to it, in reminding the U.S. that if it did not take on its traditional 
responsibilities in the region, the resulting anxiety might tempt the Japanese to "go 
nuclear." Utilising a kind of reverse psychology on the U.S. in the neo- Realist era, 
Okimoto warned that: 
the loss of U.S. strategic superiority, expansion of Soviet capabilities, the Vietnam 
debacle and withdrawal and the uncertainty of domestic support for U.S. 
commitments overseas... have all had a corrosive effect on Japanese perceptions... 
[Consequently] the seeds of doubt have been planted and with deterioration in the 
global or regional balance, these doubts could very well grow 70 
None of this was quite what it appeared in the 1980s, however. For all the talk of a 
renewed U.S. `world policeman' role emanating from Washington and variations on 
the Hegemonie Stability Theory theme from elsewhere, the emphasis was always on 
a `burden sharing' strategy also. Moreover, by the 1980s, `burden sharing' for neo- 
Realists had come to mean more than simply shouldering the costs of a global 
military buildup, with equal, if not greater emphasis being placed on the 
responsibility of U.S. allies playing their part in the orderly maintenance of Reagan's 
global trading regime. 
This, for example, was what Leonard Sullivan, an ex- Pentagon official and national 
security consultant, had in mind when he spoke of the issues facing the U.S. in the 
mid -1980s version of Acheson's `great crescent' which, for Sullivan, took in South 
America, the Middle East, Europe and North and Southeast Asia. In this context 
69 Iriye, "Security and Stability in Northeast Asia: a Historical Overview," in Weinstein (ed.), 
Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam (op. cit., 1983), 25. 
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Sullivan also had `free -riders' on his mind when he outlined a major problem facing 
the U.S. hegemon in its newly defined role in the Reagan Doctrine. Criticising, in 
particular, "America's relentless underwriting of West European and Japanese 
security," Sullivan warned that in the new Cold War of the 1980s: 
it is becoming ever more urgent that all who wish to reap the benefits of the current 
prosperity show the same willingness to contribute... these contributions are 
substantial and must be shared. When they are not, perceptions of freeloading can 
undermine any voluntary cooperative venture. In short, partnership may be 
voluntary, but it is not free. Participation begets costs.71 
At the time that Sullivan was advocating his burden -sharing prescriptions, Japan was 
already well established in the U.S. policymaking (and public) imagination as one of 
the worst examples of states which were "reaping the benefits" without 
"contributing." Since the early 1980s, Japan's growing trade surplus had been seen 
as a threat to the stability of the (U.S. led) international system. Economic tensions 
between the two countries now encompassed not just markets for goods, but capital 
markets, distributions systems, and financial services 72 More than any other nation in 
the world, it was argued, Japan depended on a liberal trading system (and 
accordingly, in the Cold War logic of the 1980s, a secure world order) to feed, clothe 
and satisfy its people. Yet Japan, its critics argued, continued to do less than any 
other nation to maintain this order. As the business economist James Abegglen put 
it, "all of Japan's interactions with the rest of the world in trade, investment, aid and 
defence, can be interpreted as those of a country acting purely in self- interest, with 
regard only to consequences for itself. "73 To make matters worse, by the mid 1980s, 
the trade deficit between Japan and the U.S. had blown out to over $50 million,74 
70 Daniel T. Okimoto, "Japan and the United States: Security Options," in Weinstein (ed.),Northeast 
Asian Security After Vietnam (op. cit., 1983), 64. 
71 Leonard Sullivan, "A New Approach to Burden Sharing," in Foreign Policy 60 (Fall 1985: 91- 
110),93. 
72 Okita, "Dynamics of the Economic Relationship," 87. 
73 James Abegglen, "Narrow Self- Interest: Japan's Ultimate Vulnerability," in Diane Tasca (ed.), US- 
Japanese Economic Relations: Cooperation, Competition and Confrontation (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1980),27. 
74 $55 billion as of 1986, according to M. O'Donnell. "Japan, the United States and Economic 
Development in the Asia Pacific Region," in Lauren and Wylie (eds.), Destinies Shared: US- 
Japanese Relations (op. cit., 1989), 115. 
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with Japanese trade profits increasingly being ploughed back into U.S. financial 
assets such as banks, securities, and real estate:, By the end of the decade, the U.S. 
had become the world's largest debtor country, while Japan had become its great 
creditor, making it not merely an economic, but a financial superpower.76 
Meanwhile, Japan was coming under increased criticism on military and security 
issues, with the Reagan administration, in particular, expressing frustration at the 
extent and speed of Japanese military spending and a perceived lack of Japanese 
support for the strategic agenda of neo-Containment.77 The idea, during the 1980s, 
had been to gradually cajole Japan into assuming a regional military role more 
commensurate with its economic influence while keeping it technologically 
dependent upon the U.S.; a policy which, from the perspective of the Reagan 
Doctrine, made both economic and strategic sense 78 Maintaining Japanese 
dependence upon costly military technology, it was argued, would not only lock 
Japan more securely into the neo- Containment strategy, but would also contribute 
towards bringing the economic relationship back to a more even keel79 These 
expectations however, were soon dashed; even with the steady growth of Japan's 
military capability under the Nakasone Administration (1982 -87), Japanese defence 
spending failed to satisfy U.S. expectations. Similarly, while Nakasone's "new 
internationalist" agenda seemed, initially at least, to correspond to both general 
burden- sharing expectations and the neo- conservative strategic agenda of the Reagan 
administration, its emphasis remained firmly nationalist 80 Its main aims were to 
75 Thus contributing to U.S. budgetary deficits. Peter Moody, Tradition and Modernisation in China 
and Japan (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1995), 326. 
76 Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," 29. 
77 Raymond F. Wylie, "The U.S. Japanese Security Relationship," in Destinies Shared (op. cit., 
1989), 63. 
78 Green, Arming Japan, 95 -96. 
79 Cumings, "Japan's Position in the World System," 56. 
8° Nakasone's hawkishness in military affairs for example, was congruent with the anti- détente 
backlash; in 1983, he famously referred to Japan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier, putting up a 
tremendous bulwark of defence." Under Nakasone, Japan undertook the defence of its own sea lanes, 
breached the symbolic `one percent' of GNP on defence spending established under the Yoshida 
Doctrine, and participated in the Strategic Defence Initiative. Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the 
Powers: 1890 -1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994),184 -86. 
151 
consolidate Japan's position in the global economy, and to reassert a strong Japanese 
national identity in the world8t 
This was hardly the stuff of dutiful, subordinate Japanese partnership envisaged in 
U.S. circles, and in this context, it is not surprising that some of the most bitter trans - 
Pacific diplomatic wrangles broke out under Nakasone's leadership, culminating in 
the revelation, in 1987, that for some years the Tôshiba Corporation had violated 
COCOM rules by selling computer software and machine tools to the Soviet Union 
that could be used in submarine construction 82 Congress responded by imposing 
sanctions on selected Japanese electrical imports, and, more memorably, several 
Congress members hanged an effigy of Toshiba Corporation on the steps of the 
Capitol, and bludgeoned a Toshiba portable radio with a sledgehammer." 
Admittedly a more literal example of "Japan bashing" than most, such actions 
reflected an increasingly prevalent atmosphere of distrust and dislike; a feeling, as 
the journalist James Fallows put it in 1989, that there was "a basic conflict between 
Japanese and American interests." For Fallows, as for many others, this conflict 
arose from: 
Japan's inability or unwillingness to restrain the one -sided and destructive expansion 
of its economic power. The expansion is one -sided because Japanese business does 
to other countries what Japan will not permit to be done to itself. It is destructive 
because it will lead to exactly the international ostracism that Japan most fears, 
because it will wreck the postwar system of free trade that has made Japan and many 
other nations prosperous, and because it will ultimately make the U.S.-Japan 
partnership impossible to sustain.m 
In this way, and throughout the decade, Japan came to be seen in the U.S. in 
increasingly schizophrenic terms. On the one hand, it remained a more or less 
undisputed `free world' ally at a time when the global dichotomy between free /non- 
free world was back in vogue. On the other hand, Japan itself was perceived as an 
st Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington: AEI 
Press, 1992), 100 -103. 
82 Schaller, Altered States, 254. 
83Ibid. 
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increasing threat to `free -world' interests, at least when the term was used as a 
synonym for U.S. interests, as it often was by the Reagan Administration (and by 
Hegemonic Stability Theorists and neo- Realists generally in the analytical 
community)." 
To read the above is, I suggest, to assume that nothing very much had changed at the 
policymaking and intellectual centre. of the IR community with regard to Japan at the 
end of the 1980s. In some ways however, it had. While the `black box' attitude 
continued to prevail among many (particularly, of course, when it came to Japan - 
bashing rhetoric which, by its very nature, required nothing more complex than a 
black box), there was also a thriving Japanese Studies community in the West, which 
offered a far more complex and variegated picture of Japanese life and society. 
Much of this community and its output, as I will demonstrate in later chapters, 
remained very much on the outskirts of the discussion of Japan's international role. 
Yet some of it was profoundly influential, intersecting with the more complex picture 
of the world that by now, had been conceded by International Relations and its neo- 
Realist mainstream in particular. It is to this literature, and to one figure in 
particular, Chalmers Johnson, that I now turn. 
4. Neo- Realism, Revisionism and Japanese Studies: Explaining Japan. 
Johnson remains one of the best -known Japanese specialists outside Japanese 
Studies, primarily because of his status as the pioneer of a perspective now known as 
Japan revisionism. In the broader IR context of course, revisionism generally refers 
to a body of work which in the 1960s and 1970s began to revise the official and 
orthodox accounts of the Cold War "6 In Japanese Studies, it has a more specific 
connotation, one that is associated with the efforts of Western intellectuals, 
politicians and journalists to understand the significance of the Japanese political 
84 James Fallows, "Containing Japan," inAtlantic Monthly (May 1989: 40 -48), 41. 
85 Masao Míyoshi, Off Center (op. cit., 1991), 63 -65. 
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economy, beginning around the late 1970s.87 And, as Japanese growth began to 
challenge the U.S. perception of postwar order and stability through the 1980s, Japan 
revisionism became almost synonymous with the `Japan bashing' perspective 
touched on above 88 
I would argue however, that, at its best, the revisionist perspective, particularly in its 
earliest stages, represents something more than this. Indeed, that it represented one 
of the more substantial early attempts to deal with the implications of Japanese 
economic power by confronting, to some extent, the `givenness' of mainstream IPE 
perspectives and the limitations imposed on thinking about Japan installed after 1945 
in IR. On the other hand there is little doubt that the revisionist genre in Japanese 
studies was also a major conduit of neo- Realist influence, or, in the 1980s, that this 
influence underlay the tendency in revisionist literature to see Japanese `difference' 
as `threat.' Both of these aspects are integral to understanding the importance of 
Johnson's contribution to contemporary images of Japan, and they are never more 
evident than in his most famous work (and one of the most influential books on 
Japan ever written), MITI and the Japanese Miracle 89 
Johnson: Theorising the Economic Miracle 
MITI is the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and in Johnson's 
study its role in the direction and nature of post WW2 Japanese economic 
development was used to illustrate how Japan had evolved a style of industrial policy 
that fitted into neither the dominant Anglo American form of free -market capitalism, 
nor its major Cold War alternative of centrally planned socialism. Through MITI, 
86 Lynn Eden, "The End of U.S. Cold War History? A Review Essay," in International Security 18:1 
(1993: 174-207), 119. 
87 
`Revisionism' as a description of this effort however, was not actually taken up until the late 1980s. 
According to David Williams, the term `revisionism' as it pertains to anti -Japanese commentary was 
coined by the editors of Business Week in 1989. Williams, Japan and the Enemies of Open Political 
Science, 232. 
88 E.g., in the work of Masao Miyoshi, who refers to Chalmers Johnson (see below) as "the 
`Godfather' of revisionists and bashers." Miyoshi, Off Center, 68, 
89 Chalmers Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925 -1975 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
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Johnson argued, Japan "has invented and put together the institutions of capitalism in 
new ways, ways that neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx would recognise or 
understand?'" It is this distinction, and the (albeit modest) questioning of 
conventional economic theory it involves that has been the basis of Miti and the 
Japanese Miracle's "pathbreaking" theoretical status among general political 
economists and Japan specialists alike. In .particular, for those trying to articulate 
and explain the increasing sense of disjunction between Japanese and U.S. interests, 
in a world where Cold War divisions still offered only two categories of belonging in 
the international system, Johnson's work went beyond just another description of 
Japanese economic development. Rather, as one admirer later noted, it introduced 
new concepts for understanding Japan that were "later embraced and debated 
seriously by the discipline of political science as a whole. "91 In this respect, Miti and 
the Japanese Miracle: 
ushered in a era of research by American Japan specialists that addressed the 
political economy and that began to reassess the transwar institutional communities... 
As in earlier periods, the Japan scholars mostly followed, rather than led, the 
intellectual developments in the [political science] discipline. But for the first time 
ever, they had in the Johnson volume a beacon that illuminated equally theory and 
Japan 92 (emphasis added) 
For Johnson, the central `theoretical' issue at stake in understanding Japan's position 
in the 1980s global political economy was the need to break away from the 
intellectual and analytical traditions of what he called the "projectionists... writers 
who project onto the Japanese case Western - chiefly Anglo American - concepts, 
problems and norms of economic behaviour, "93 Johnson identified four main 
"theoretical approaches" utilised by Western analysts in explaining Japanese 
economic growth. The first, he termed the "anthropological" approaches (e.g. Vogel 
and Pye) which postulated cultural essentialisms as factors in Japanese success (e.g. 
vo /bid., 8. 
91 Richard J. Samuels, "Japanese Political Studies and the Myth of the Independent Intellectual," in 
Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner (eds.), The Political Culture of Foreign Area and 
International Studies: Essays in Honour of Lucien W. Pye (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), 31. 
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Confucian work ethic and Japanese groupism) 94 The second approach he termed the 
"pure" economics perspective (e.g. in the work of Hugh T. Patrick) which explains 
Japanese growth in terms of the natural outcome of global market forces. The third 
category encompasses those approaches which concentrate on the "unique" structural 
influence of unusual Japanese institutions (such as the lifetime employment system 
or enterprise unionism), and the fourth represents the (then) major U.S Government 
and neo- Realist perspective, based on "free rider" themes 95 
While rejecting none of these approaches out of hand, Johnson argued for a broader 
socio- historical context which took into account not only Japan's location within the 
IPE over the past century or so, but also the complex matrix of relationships in 
Japanese society concerning the government, the bureaucracy and the public. It was 
this unique combination of internal /external circumstances, or `situational 
imperatives,' Johnson argued, that had forced the Japanese governing elite to adopt a 
"developmental state policy" over the hundred years or so of Japan's modernisation. 
The foremost characteristic of the developmental policy, he explained, was the 
tendency of the ruling elite to set substantive social and economic goals. In contrast, 
the "regulatory state" (of which the U.S. is an example), was more "market rational... 
concern[ing] itself with the forms and procedures - the rules, if you will - of 
economic competition, but not... with substantive matters. "96 Both systems Johnson 
argued, rely on and promote distinct types of economic and political decisionmaking, 
but they lead to very different structural relationships between government, industry 
and the bureaucracy. Accordingly, the history of MITI and its role could be seen as a 
microcosm of the history of Japan as a developmental state in the world political 
economy. 
92lbid., 32. 
93 Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle, 6 -7. 
94 Johnson interprets the much -cited Japanese preference for "consensus" for example, as a result of 
the social and economic misery of the 1940s, which "made all Japanese equally poor," and provided 
the incentive for mass economic mobilisation. In other words, it was based on "changes in historical 
circumstances and political consciousness and not [as many Modernisation /Nihonjinron theorists 
argued] on unique social values." Ibid., 239. 
95 Ibid., 8-15. 
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Just as important as the distinction between developmental and regulatory states in 
Johnson's argument, however, was his explanation of why Japan had not been 
recognised as a developmental state within mainstream Western political and 
economic theory. As he pointed out, the idea of the developmental state was, after 
all, not particularly foreign to Western economic thought, being located within the 
Handelspolitik ("neomercantilism" or "economic nationalism') school of thought 
developed by German thinkers such as Weber and Dahrendorf.97 The problem, 
however, argued Johnson, was that in this context it becomes a theme dominated by 
"the prevalent and peculiarly Western preference for binary modes of thought in the 
field of political economy" (emphasis added). Thus: 
In modem times Weber began the practice with his distinction between a "market 
economy" (Verkehrwirtschaft) and a "planned economy" (Planwirtschaft). Some 
recent analogues are Dahrendorf's distinction between "market rationality" and 
"plan rationality," Dore's distinction between "market- oriented systems" and 
"organisation- oriented systems," and Kelly's distinction between a "rule- governed 
state" (necromantic) and a "purpose -governed state." 98 
This, for Johnson, now gave a hint of the more immediate problem concerning the 
way in which Western scholars and policymakers understood (or misunderstood) 
Japan, and why its behaviour had come to be perceived as threatening by so many in 
the U.S. The point, he argued, was that Western `binary modes of thought" in the 
post WW2 period had became dominated by Cold War ideology to the extent that 
"the existence of the developmental state in any form other than the communist state 
has largely been forgotten or ignored as a result of the years of disputation with 
Marxist - Leninists. "99 Consequently, because Japan does not `fit' into either of the 
categories within this dichotomised perspective it was always being represented (in 
96lbid., 18-19. 
97Ibid., ls. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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the English -speaking West, at least) as "a variant of something other than what it 
is."100 
It is on this issue, I suggest, that the critical contribution of Miti and the Japanese 
Miracle deserves recognition, not just within Japanese Studies, but as Samuels 
suggests, "within the discipline of political science as a whole. "t01 On this issue, 
Johnson's acknowledgement of the intellectual straitjackets imposed by Cold War 
Realist dichotomy, which forced `Japan' and its economy either into a category like 
the U.S., or like the USSR, also enabled him to recognise, albeit implicitly and to a 
limited extent, beyond the `black box' of the state -as -actor in the international 
system. Thus, in terms which were to become more obviously part of the Critical 
Social Theory perspectives in IR and Japanese Studies in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Johnson's revisionist approach began to explore, not just the factors imposed upon 
Japan in order to define it (e.g. as Western asset), but also the complex internal 
factors - the particular social, political and economic power relationships between 
the Japanese bureaucracy, the Japanese government, Japanese business elite and (to a 
lesser extent), the Japanese people, that have also come to define Japan as a modern 
state, and determine its position in the world. 
On these issues, Johnson's approach was undoubtedly more thoughtful than the 
(hitherto dominant) Modernisation Theory approach in Japanese Studies, which 
merely sought to show how Japan had successfully evolved from a feudal order, to 
become "a superior and even more efficient expression of liberal democracy ."1°2 For 
Johnson, Japanese development, particularly in the post -WW2 period, had been a far 
more complex, tension -filled process of bureaucratic trial and error, in which the 
social and political action motivated by public fears and angers (over issues such as 
pollution, industrial relations and bureaucratic control) had played a major role. In 
this context, Johnson was (rightly) scornful of how easily "admirers of the 
too ¡bid., 17. 
tut Samuels, "Japanese Political Studies and the Myth of the Independent Intellectual," 31. 
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tranquillity of Japanese society during the 1970s [e.g., Reischauer and Jansen] forgot 
the strikes, riots, demonstrations and sabotage that marked the period 1949- 1961. "103 
The broader notion that Japan needed to be looked at on its own terms had, of course, 
been around for somewhat longer than the more specific political economy 
perspective Johnson brought to it in the Miti study. In this sense, Miti and the 
Japanese Miracle reflected the legacy of the more `liberal' scholarship mentioned 
above, that developed out of reactions to the Vietnam War - reactions that, in some 
cases, had been quite evident in Japanese Studies from the early 1970s. In 1972 for 
example, when the Japanese -American Assembly met to discuss the new tensions in 
the San Francisco System, it was obvious that a number of participants, not all of 
them Japanese, related these tensions to a dominant and perhaps inappropriate 
'Western' (U.S.) understanding of global life. It was in this context that Graham 
Allison spoke at length on the necessary challenges to the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment, and its "prevailing set of basic assumptions and simplifications about 
what was happening in international politics. "loo Assumptions, which for Allison, had 
effectively broken down in the aftermath of Vietnam, along with the "moral 
authority" of the U.S. and the `widespread domestic public consensus" associated 
with earlier U.S. foreign policy perspectives 105 Developing this theme, another 
delegate, George Packard, blamed a "Eurocentric bias" in U.S. teaching methods for 
the "abysmal national ignorance" within the U.S. about non -Western countries, and 
the tendency of its foreign policymaking elite to arrogantly dismiss the need for area 
specialists106 The dangers of this state of affairs, Packard argued, had been clearly 
demonstrated in Vietnam, where available experts who might have been able to offer 
more nuanced interpretations of the Vietnamese struggle and its people were often 
102 Harootunian, "America's Japan /Japan's Japan" (op. cit., 1993), 203. 
103 Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle, 197. 
104 Allison, "American Foreign Policy and Japan," 19. 
105 Ibid., 20 -23. 
106 George R. Packard, "A Crisis in Understanding," in Rosovsky (ed.), Discord in the Pacific (op. 
cit., 1972), 133 -134. 
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deliberately excluded in favour of those who were willing to project the simplistic 
(`black box') orthodoxy advocated by the intellectual and political elite 10' 
Similarly, there was evidence that the `binary modes of thought" later criticised by 
Johnson, were already making inroads at this time, particularly among Japanese 
scholars impatient with the seeming inability of the U.S. to countenance Japan as an 
international equal. Addressing the issue of increasing trade -related tensions 
between Japan and the U.S. in this regard, Yonosuke Nagai had criticised the 
tendency in U.S. foreign policy to "see [all] rivals in monolithic terms," along the 
lines of a Soviet Threat or China Threat.106 Speaking directly to the issue of strategic 
ethnocentricity, Masao Kunihiro suggested, further, that linguistic and cultural 
differences could no longer be ignored in state interactions. Japan, he argued, 
literally did not `speak' the language of international relations in the way that the 
U.S. did. Thus, "the first step in improving U.S.. - Japanese communication," 
Kunihiro stated, "should be for Americans to discard the idea that this Western logic 
is the universal thought structure for all the 3.6 billion inhabitants of this globe. "'o9 
I would argue that what Johnson achieved, via Miti and the Japanese Miracle, was, 
effectively, to pull many of these various, emerging discontents together, by 
providing one of the first empirically rigorous studies of why "Western logic" could 
not be unthinkingly applied to the Japanese postwar experience. As such, his work 
was vital in creating the space for subsequent explorations of Japan which have also 
gone beyond both the `black box' theme, and the Modernisation narrative of Japan as 
the super- achiever of the Western liberal democratic model. Works as diverse as 
Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto's studies of Japanese social diversity (1986),110 
109Ibid., 140 -142. 
toe Yonosuke Nagai, "Some Observations on the Perception Gap," in Rosovsky (ed.), Discord in the 
Pacific (op. cit., 1972), 201. 
tog Masao Kunihiro, "U.S: Japan Communications," in Rosovsky (ed.), Discord in the Pacific (op. 
cit., 1972), 163. 
110 Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Social 
Construction of Reality (London: KPI Limited, 1986). 
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Gavan McCormack's questioning of democratic institutions in Japan (1986, 1996),111 
and the `new wave' of economic histories which, like Miti and the Japanese Miracle, 
probe the tensions and contradictions of Japan's postwar growth, (Tessa Morris - 
Suzuki and Takurô Seiyama, 1989; Laura Hein, 1990 & 1993, and William K. Tabb, 
1995),112 have all been created in this space. 
Johnson's Debt to Realismlneo-Realism: The ` Bashing' Connection 
The specific contributions of these and other `post -revisionist' scholarship will be 
explored in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. For now however, I wish to return to the 
claim made above, regarding the intersection of the revisionist perspective, and of 
Johnson's work in particular, to the themes discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
More specifically, I argue that the revisionist perspective harbours lingering 
overtones of the dominant (Realist /neo- Realist) IR and IPE perspectives discussed 
above - overtones which ultimately limited many of Johnson's insights in Miti and 
the Japanese Miracle, and which have remained especially influential within the 
sector of Japanese Studies charged with discussing Japan's international relations. 
These limitations are evident in Johnson's perspective, I suggest, as soon as one 
starts to probe Miti and the Japanese Miracle for some of the broader, more basic 
assumptions he makes about the world in which Japan exists as a `modern state.'113 
For, despite Johnson's interest in adding an `internal' dimension to his analysis of 
Japan, he was /is not particularly concerned with challenging the basic, dominant 
perception of what states are and how they behave in the international system. This 
becomes quite clear at the end of Miti and the Japanese Miracle, where Johnson 
Ill Gavan McCormack & Yoshio Sugimoto, Democracy in Contemporary Japan: A Reader (Armonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), and Gavan McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence (op. 
cit., 1996). 
112 Tessa Morris- Suzuki and Takurô Seiyama, Japanese Capitalism Since 1945 (op. cit., 1989). Laura 
E. Hein, "Growth versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective" (op. cit., 
1993), and Fuelling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). William K. Tabb, The Postwar Japanese 
System (op. cit., 1995). 
113 Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle, 300. 
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concludes that the diversity of modern states can best be understood in terms of their 
priorities. Thus: 
Today there are welfare states, religious states, equality states, defence states, 
revolutionary states, and so forth. All this is a way of saying that the innumerable 
things a state does can be arranged in rough rank order according to its priorities, and 
that a state's first priority will define its essence.114 
On this basis, the clue to understanding Japanese success in the international system 
is, ultimately, the particular priorities the Japanese state has been forced to adopt - 
its `situational imperatives' which determine every state's development. This, as we 
have seen, is where Johnson regards Western projectionism as having failed, because 
the particular "situational imperatives" that have faced Japan during its period of 
development (and which account for the unique characteristics of domestic 
institutions such as MITI) fall outside rigidly defined postwar Western 
categorisations. 
The point is however, that `situational imperatives' of any kind exist for Johnson as 
the result of a more fundamental ordering system in the world of states. And, it is 
when he attempts to explain how this system works that Johnson seems to abandon 
his reservations about Western projectionism, and, ironically, starts to sound very 
much like the neo- Realists that dominated IR /IPE thinking in the West when he 
wrote Miti - responding, as Kenneth Waltz would, by pointing to the structural 
conditions for rational action on the part of market actors. Thus: 
The priorities of the Japanese state derive first and foremost from an assessment of 
Japan's situational imperatives, and are in this sense a product not of culture or social 
organisation or insularity but of [systemic] rationality... During the 1920s and 1930s 
Japan tried to solve the economic problems it faced by handing over to the state the 
responsibility for economic development. It goes without saying that what the state 
did during the 1930s made the situation worse, not better, but the fact that there may 
have been preferable altematives to the ones adopted does not detract from the 
rationality of its [systemic] priorities. 115 
1147bid., 303. l'Slbíd., 307. 
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In other words, whatever `priorities' cultural and historical difference might bestow 
on a society like Japan, it and all other states must ultimately conform to a broader 
standard of "rationality" derived from the structural "situational imperatives" 
imposed upon the state system out there in the real world. From this perspective, 
Johnson's argument is less about understanding the diversity of states per se, than it 
is about understanding the diverse priorities that all states pursue for a core set of 
uniform reasons - reasons drawn from a reductionist understanding of the state as 
rational utilitarian actor which has directed mainstream (i.e., Realist and neo- Realist) 
IR and IPE analysis over the past six decades or so. This is the other (positivist 
directed) side to Johnson's revisionist contribution which insisted that it was possible 
to understand Japan not as any `variant" of a Western economic model, but "as it 
really is. "116 
It is in this context, I argue, that Miti and the Japanese Miracle connects to the more 
hardline stance towards Japan that, by the time of its publication, was starting to 
solidify among Reagan -era neo- Realists and Hegemonie Stability Theorists. During 
this time, a number of otherwise `generalist' scholars began to turn their attention to 
the Japan problem, as a particularly salient example of the new complexities facing 
the U.S. in the changed circumstances of the post -Vietnam era. One of the more 
prominent figures in this grouping was Robert Gilpin who in contributions to The 
Political Economy of Japan (1987)117 and other works, outlined many of the themes 
which became the new IPE and IR orthodoxy inn the 1980s regarding Japan as 
`problem -child.' 
Gilpin, of course, is a major IPE scholar who over a number of years has brought 
some classical Realist assumptions to his works on the reality of the international 
system. Like other scholars of his ilk though, Gilpin would acknowledge the 
116 Ibid.,17. 
117 The Political Economy of Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987 -1992), was a 
mammoth research project coordinated by Yasusuke Murakami and Hugh T. Patrick, and designed to 
be the definitive Japanese Studies text for the 1980s /early 1990s_ Volume II, The Changing 
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changed circumstances of the post -Vietnam period and integrate his perspectives into 
the fully fledged neo- Realism of the 1980s. Nevertheless, in 1975, he maintained 
that the traditional principles of power politics still applied, even in an 
interdependent global economy.118 Moreover, claimed Gilpin, while a liberal 
economic order characterised by "relatively free trade, currency convertibility, and 
freedom of capital movement "119 was dependent on a certain level of cooperation 
among otherwise conflicting state actors, "the historical record suggests that... the 
existence of mutual economic benefits is not always enough to induce nations to pay 
the costs of a market system or to forgo opportunities of advancing their own 
interests at the expense of others. "120 Accordingly, and in line with Kindleberger's 
understanding of the structural necessities of the international system -as- market, 
Gilpin proposed the need for a hegemonic orderer, given that the system does not 
work via "the operation of an invisible hand and in the absence of the exercise of 
power. "121 
It was this same perspective that Gilpin brought to his analysis of Japan ten years 
Iater, in the context of what he saw as a "new protectionism" in the global system, 
engendered specifically by the Japanese and detrimental to the U.S. sponsored 
strategies of `free- trade.' Japan, he indicated, was not playing fairly (i.e. by 
hegemonic rules) but had "changed the rules of the [international trading] game" by 
inspiring other industrialising states to adopt similar patterns of economic policy; in 
particular, a "state interventionist" approaches.'22 This, argued Gilpin, was placing 
even more strain on the global trading system and of the ability of the hegemon to 
control it. And while "all major industrial economies," Gilpin argued, were being 
International Context (1987) was edited by Daniel Okimoto and Takashi Inoguchi (whose own 
contribution to IR /Japanese Studies is covered at some length in Chapter Seven). 
118 Gilpin, "The Nature of Political Economy," from Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and Multinational 
Corporation: the Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975); 
reproduced in Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political 
Economy and Decision -Making (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1985), 287. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 288. 
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encouraged by the U.S. to go along with "the regime of liberalised trade," the 
Japanese example was undermining the efforts of the U.S. systemic orderer.123 
Indeed, for Gilpin, the deterioration of the liberal trade regime (and the decline of the 
U.S. hegemon) stemmed largely from the fact that by the mid- 1980s, "almost every 
advanced industrial country had begun to emulate Japan's industrial policies. "124 
In keeping with the general attitude of fear and mistrust in the U.S. concerning Japan 
and in line with neo- Realist perspectives on the world, Gilpin warned also about the 
problem of "alternative hegemons" when it came to ordering the global IPE. The 
problem, he argued, was primarily one of 'Iegitimacy,' based on the historical record 
of aspiring hegemons: 
Unless this legitimacy issue can be resolved or somehow transcended, economic 
nationalism and regionalism will make deeper inroads into the postwar regime of 
liberalised trade. What this intensifying problem demonstrates is that a liberal 
economic order must rest on a firm political and ideological base. The United States 
and its conception of a liberal order dominated the postwar era. With the relative 
decline of U.S. power and the rise of powers with different conceptions of legitimacy 
the future of the liberal world economy has become severely threatened.125 
(emphasis added) 
For Gilpin, of course, Japan was the actor in question whose "conceptions of 
legitimacy" were not congruent with the liberal postwar order, and which now 
threatened the ability of the only `legitimate' hegemon to maintain that order. This 
was a theme he later spelt out in his major work, The Political Economy of 
International Relations (1987) where he insisted again that it was Japan and the 
Japanese system, more than any other factor, that was undermining the efficient and 
legitimate order of the 1980s IPE. This, he concluded, was because: 
Whereas Western economies are based on belief in the superior efficiency of the free 
market and individualism, the market and the individual in Japan are not relatively 
122 Gilpin, "The Changing Trade Regime," in Inoguchi and Okimoto (eds.), The Political Economy of 
Japan, Volume II: The Changing International Context (op. cit., 1988), 140 -41. 
123 Ibid., 147. 
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125 Mid., 168. 
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autonomous, but are deeply embedded in a powerful nonliberal culture and social 
system.126 (emphasis added) 
From Gilpin's neo- Realist perspective then, Japan had become, at best, a `problem - 
child' in global terms, because it no longer did what the legitimate economic 
hegemon wanted it to and even more disturbingly, it no longer seemed to be 
following the social, cultural and political rules laid down by the U.S. after 1945. 
Japan, in short, was no longer controllable by the U.S. and from a neo- Realist 
perspective, of course, where there is dissent and difference there is disorder - and 
where there is disorder, there is anarchy close by. For Gilpin thus, this disorder came 
with the protectionist example set by Japan, an example which underlay the 
hegemonic decline of the global orderer and had anarchical implications for the free- 
market system. 
For all this, Gilpin is not a `Japan Basher' per se in the way the term came to be used 
in the late 1980s. Nor, as indicated above, is Johnson. My point, however, is that the 
development of both revisionism and its `Japan Bashing' variant was intrinsically 
connected to the attitudes and perspectives of the Reagan Administration and U.S. 
foreign policy in the 1980s - and the development of those attitudes and 
perspectives in much neo- Realist inspired literature, particularly that centred on 
` hegemonic' themes. If one looks at the major themes of Japan bashing: (i) Japan as 
fundamentally `different' to the West, (ii) the difficulty if not impossibility of Japan 
ever becoming truly `Western,' (i.e., `normal') and (iii) the problem /threat that 
Japanese difference poses to the West, all of these themes rely on the broader 
assumptions of anarchy /competition among nation states. Moreover, and as 
indicated above, these themes were always intrinsic to Miti and the Japanese 
Miracle, and the subsequent revisionist literature it inspired. 
126 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 
1987), 391-2. 
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This remains the case in some of Johnson's own contributions, post -Miti, and post - 
Cold War. Indeed, if anything, in the years after Miti's publication, I suggest, as 
Johnson became less interested in probing the `internal' factors which might 
enlighten contemporary observers of Japan, much of his work has increasingly 
complemented the neo- Realist mainstream which, in one form or another, continues 
to insist that all states (and other actors) must comply with structural or `situational 
imperatives.' This shift in emphasis has been accompanied by a corresponding shift 
in tone, reflecting the unpopularity of any sort of `moderation' towards Japan in the 
U.S., in the years following Miti's first appearance. In the wake of the establishment 
of Japan as the world's largest creditor nation, the blowout of the U.S. /Japan trade 
deficit by billions of dollars, and the confirmation (through the Gulf War) of Japan's 
`selfish' free -riderism on security issues, there is a harder line apparent; one which 
emphasises the need for the U.S. to invoke what power it possesses, in containing the 
Asian /Japanese onslaught. 
Thus in 1992, and again in 1995, Johnson borrowed the rhetoric of Michael 
Friedman and Meredith LeBard to emphasise the inevitability of conflict between the 
U.S. and Japan, should things remain the same between them, for structuralist 
reasons associated with the (Realist) security dilemma, in that, "both are responsible 
nations living in a dangerous world. "127 Unlike LeBard and Friedman however, 
Johnson does not believe that the U.S. and Japan are headed for armed conflict. His 
predictions have a more contemporary (neo- Realist) ring to them, concerning global 
conflicts over "technonationalism" and an IPE strategy, and above all, a deliberately 
free -riding Japan that has attempted to strengthen its position vis -à -vis the U.S. by 
prolonging the Cold War economic /security relationship, "built on a badly outdated 
127 George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1991), cited in Johnson, "Japan in Search of a Normal Role," in Daedalus 121:4 (1992:1 -33), 
16. Johnson later returned to the Friedman/LeBard argument in Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of 
the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 322. 
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division of labour. "128 In this context, Johnson has remained critical of the U.S. elite, 
and its failure to recognise how the U.S. has been duped into an outmoded and 
unsustainable role. 
A more imaginative administration might have re- evaluated America's strategic 
interests in Japan in light of long -term changes in strategic and economic trends. It 
might have concluded that a regional balance of power among China, Japan and 
ASEAN, maintained in part by the United States in return for greater American 
participation in the Asian economy, was needed for the next century. Instead, as the 
United States attempts to reassure the region with its continuing defence 
commitment, the economic factors creating a more independent Asía are exposing 
the frailty of the U.S. position.129 
Accordingly, and echoing Gilpin, Johnson warns that the U.S. needs to seriously re- 
think Japan's continued "protectorate status" in the post -Cold War world, forcing it 
instead to evolve into a more normal power, "a country with a balanced portfolio of 
economic, technological, military and other forms of power used in concert with its 
allies, and under firm control of the nation's political leaders. "130 In addition, he 
argues, the U.S. must adopt a far tougher economic stance towards Asia, principally 
by refusing to continue to serve as "the absorber of other nations gross surpluses of 
production. "131 It is, in short, the modulated vision of U.S. hegemony explained in 
Chapter One, that has been popular among many IR theorists and Japan specialists 
since the late 1980s - global leadership propped up by a renewed emphasis on 
military burden -sharing, and a greatly increased willingness to invoke economic 
levers in the pursuit of U.S. interests. 
My point in discussing Johnson in this way, in regard to both his Miti book of the 
1980s and his later work, is to try and personify the revisionist Iiterature that 
emerged in response to the neo- Realism in IR and the reasserted hegemonic 
ambitions of the U.S. during the Reagan era. My point also was to indicate the 
128 Johnson, "Ending Japan's Protectorate Status," in Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz 
(eds.), Asia After the "Miracle:" Redefining U.S. Economic and Security Priorities (Washington: The 
Economic Strategy Institute, 1998), 110. 
1291bid.,115. 
13° Ibid., 116. 
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connections between these themes, and to illustrate how the theory and practice of 
the Cold War years still resonates very powerfully through the literature on, and 
attitudes towards, `Japan' in the current era. There was however, an additional task 
here, and one which could only be achieved by also emphasising the positive, 
incisive contribution in Johnson's Mitt book. It was to indicate that for all the 
influences of positivism, Realism /neo- Realism and the Cold War, there have been, 
and are, other ways of thinking about IR and IPE and Japan which have other kinds 
of implications in practice. 
In the chapters to come, I intend to bring these perspectives into the debate, and in 
doing so, re- capture Johnson's best contribution; namely, his effort towards opening 
the 'black box' of Japan. First however, I want to set up the broader framework for 
this process, by saying something about the critical responses to the fudamental 
assumptions behind Realism /neo- Realism. This is the task of my next chapter. 
131 Ibid.,118. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY: EXPLORATIONS BEYOND 
`INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:' IMPLICATIONS FOR THE `JAPAN' 
QUESTION. 
This chapter begins the second section of this thesis, in which, having illustrated the 
connections between orthodox perspectives on IR and some dominant perceptions of 
Japan in Japanese Studies, I examine some important alternative perspectives on 
both. More specifically, in this chapter, and the ones to follow, my concern is to 
engage some of the ways in which both IR and Japanese Studies have, in recent 
years, begun to connect to the insights and attitudes of a new kind of scholarship 
broadly defined as Critical Social Theory (CST)? 
Critical Social Theory is not a single approach per se. Rather, as George and 
Campbell have explained, it is an umbrella term for a range of critical approaches to 
International Relations, some of them very different, which emerged in the 1980s.2 It 
is simply not possible for me to examine all of these approaches in great detail within 
the confines of this thesis, but nor, I argue, is it necessary, given the nature of the 
particular `connection' project outlined in Chapter One. My main concern, 
consequently, is to explain how certain arguments and texts become positioned under 
the CST umbrella and to connect their themes to a Japanese Studies context. My 
discussion begins with an outline of the broader historical and intellectual 
circumstances in which critical approaches began to penetrate IR debates in the 
1980s. I will then briefly engage some of the most important themes associated with 
the critiques of mainstream IR via these approaches. Finally, I will set up the 
framework for the chapter that follows, by saying something, briefly, about the broad 
Jim George and David Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical 
Social Theory and International Relations." International Studies Quarterly: Journal of the 
International Studies Association 34:3 (1990): 269 -293, on p. 269. 
2 lbid 282. 
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contemporary context in which CST themes have become important for Japanese 
Studies. 
1. The `Third Debate;' Re- Opening IR to Critical Debate in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
These (CST) debates point to no necessary conclusion. They mandate no single 
position. Instead, they suggest the opening up of "thinking space," a space of 
thought that is exploited by a variety of dissident voices who would speak in reply to 
the dangers and opportunities of political life in the late twentieth century. 
Jim George and David Campbell, 19903 
As the above passage suggests, the diversity of CST approaches to International 
Relations is itself a commanding feature of their `criticality.' This diversity however, 
does not prevent the identification of prominent themes within the CST challenge to 
IR; most notably (for this thesis), its shared antipathy to Realism and, by extension, 
to the scientism that Realism in its (largely) U.S. articulation, represents. In this 
context, while the emergence of CST in the 1980s was very much part of the 
renewed liberal response to the social, economic and political impact of Reaganism, 
both domestically and abroad, it was also different from previous critical encounters 
within the IR field. 
As Yosef Lapid explains, the so- called `third great debate' that CST generated within 
IR circles did not simply focus on Realism /neo- Realism and the disciplinary and 
policy orthodoxies of the IR community, but on the historical, political and 
intellectual processes by which such orthodoxies had come to prominence in the IR 
field in the first place? In this respect, the `third debate' marks the moment when 
International Relations was confronted by a range of critical challenges which had 
been part of the analytical agenda in many others sectors of the humanities for years 
- for example, in philosophy, history, the philosophy of science, anthropology and 
3lbid., 269. 
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sociology.' Until relatively recently, IR had kept this critical incursion at a distance 
via the dichotomy which distinguished `domestic' theory and practice from the 
purportedly discrete realm of inter -state relations.' 
The emergence of a CST dimension to IR theorising however, has seen this 
dichotomy, and indeed, the processes of dichotomous thought per se, problematised 
and critically assessed. This has been the case most obviously in regard to the 
critical debate surrounding neo- Realist orthodoxy in IR, and its claims for an 
enhanced `scientific' understanding of contemporary global life, which, as I 
mentioned in Chapter Two, and more expansively in Chapter Four, is underwritten 
by neo- Realism's reliance on positivism. More specifically, it is underwritten by the 
(positivist) assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between `fact' and 
`value ;' the former being theory -neutral. As discussed previously, this has allowed 
both Realism and neo- Realism to claim objective knowledge of an (anarchical) world 
of states 'out there' -a mode of thought which remained intrinsic to the 'black box' 
thematic of IR (and its Japanese Studies sub -branch) for most of the postwar period. 
From the outset, the CST challenge was founded upon a profound scepticism about 
this claim to objectivism, and a deeper and more comprehensive approach to 
knowledge and political society than had previously been the case in IR. 
Consequently, its effect was to open up the major premises and assertions of 
orthodox IR perspectives, for so long the taken -for -granted basis of (Cold War) 
policy prescription, to questions of ontology and epistemology. Or, in other words, 
to the questions about `how we know the world.' As I argued in Chapter Two, these 
questions have rarely, if ever, been at the forefront of mainstream IR theorising, or its 
4 Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate. On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post -Positivist 
Era." International Studies Quarterly 33:3 (1989): 235 -253, on p. 236. 
5 Mark Hoffman, "Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 17:1 (1988): 91 -95, on p. 91. As a number of scholars (e.g., George, op. cit., 
1994; Devetak, op. cit., 1996; Smith, op. cit., 1996) have pointed out, both the first and second "great 
debates" (realism vs. idealism in the inter -war period; behaviouralism vs. classical theory in the 
postwar period) were not concerned with questions of epistemology, but instead accepted, implicitly, 
"a rather simple and, crucially, an uncontested set of positivist assumptions which have 
fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we might explain it." Steve 
Smith, "Positivism and Beyond" (op. cit., 1996), 11. 
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Japanese Studies dimension. in recent years however, their inclusion in critical 
debates has seen IR opened up to a wide range of `unconventional' approaches, 
including some previously `alien' perspectives based on European `sociology of 
knowledge' premises (e.g. German hermeneutics via Gadamer and Mannheim); 
unconventional philosophy of science approaches (e.g. via Kuhn and Feyeraband); 
issues concerning the relationship between social language and reality (e.g. via 
Wittgenstein and Sassure);7 and the role of orthodox IR thinking in the larger 
rationalist framing of the modern world .8 
In short, as R. E. J. Walker explained it in 1980, the point has been to force Realist 
and neo- Realist thought to confront a shift under way in the wider social theory 
debate, which has seen scholars from a wide variety of backgrounds attempting "to 
make a decisive break from the comfortable, deeply ingrained and indeed addictive 
Western habit of making a separation between subject and object, between the 
knower and the world to be known.'' In this regard, CST scholarship, in an IR 
context, is not just about the post- Enlightenment surge towards positivism as the 
exemplary modern knowledge form, e.g., as in neo- Realism. Rather, it is concerned 
with the whole (historical and philosophical) process by which modern (primarily 
Western) forms of knowledge as power have served to disenfranchise and exclude 
other ways of thinking and being, particularly at the global level)" 
The nature of this challenge is perhaps best exemplified by two particular branches of 
CST thought: Critical Theory, which has brought the concerns of two generations of 
Frankfurt School scholarship to bear on IR (in particular, via the work of Habermas), 
and Postmodernism/Poststructuralism, which utilises the works and influences of 
(primarily) French scholarship, notably Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. While 
these do not, by any means, exhaust the possibilities for thinking about IR from new 
6lbid., 239. 
George and Campbell, "Patterns of Dissent," 272 -73. 
8 Jim George, "International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third 
Debate," International Studies Quarterly 33:1 (1989): 269 -279, on p. 272. 
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and critical perspectives, I have chosen them as most representative of the broad 
critical themes which I wish to consider in the context of the `Japan question' in the 
chapters which follow. Accordingly, I turn now to a brief discussion of these two 
perspectives, in their IR context. 
2. Critical Theory. 
Critical Theory's philosophical background has been described elsewhere in the 
depth and detail it demands ?1 But it is Critical Theory's acknowledgement of the 
knowledge -power nexus that has generated its major appeal amongst IR specialists, 
particularly those unconvinced by the detached scientism of (in particular) neo- 
Realism. And, it is this nexus, represented in Critical Theory terms, which led some 
CST scholars in the early 1980s to focus on the positive aspects of Traditional 
Realism, arguing that the historical sensitivity and critical openness discernible in the 
work of scholars such as E. H. Carr, could and should be distinguished from the 
reductionism and closure associated with neo- Realist positivism. 
Richard Ashley: Recovering a `Critical Theory' of International Relations 
One of the most explicit (and influential) arguments of this kind came from Richard 
Ashley who, in 1981 sought to illustrate how, increasingly in the postwar period, 
Realism had become systematically reduced to a single knowledge form - scientific 
rationalism - in the interests of producing a unified, "technical" knowledge and a 
theory of control suited to the circumstances of the Cold War.12 Rejecting this 
perspective, Ashley proposed the need to explore the "deeper relations between 
realist concepts, knowledge claims, and modes of inquiry and grounding, on the one 
9 R.B. J. Walker, Political Theory and the Transformation of World Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Centre of International Studies, 1980), 4. 
10 George, Discourses of Global Politics (op. cit., 1994), 22. 
it E.g., in Richard Bemstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (op. cit., 1983), chapters 1 -3. 
Specific influences include Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, 
Erich Fromm and Leo Lowenthal, as well as Jurgen Habermas, who is perhaps the single most 
important conduit of Frankfurt School thought in an IR context. Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory," 
in Burchill and Linklater (eds.), Theories of International Relations (op. cit., 1996), 146. 
12 Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," International Studies Quarterly 25:2 
(1981): 204 -236. 
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hand, and the world of social action, on the other." His aim was not simply to 
condemn or dismiss Realism per se, but, in Habermasian terms, to expose some of 
the "critical tensions that make realism, at least potentially a vital, open ended 
tradition.'" 
With this in mind, Ashley sought to distinguish between the "technical" or "modern" 
(neo)realism of scholars such as Waltz, whidh denies the intersubjective relationship 
between the theorist and the social circumstances under which theory is produced, 
and a more interpretivist route traversed, however rudimentarily and sporadically, by 
"practical" Realists such as E. H. Carr, John Herz and Hans Morgenthau. This 
"practical" strain of Realism, Ashley argued, had critical potential because it sought a 
knowledge of IR, not in order to more effectively control an objectified environment 
(a là Waltz),14 but in order to understand how, in the contemporary world of states, it 
is possible: 
to be and behave as a worthy member of one's traditional community with its 
intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms, rights, meanings, purposes and 
limitations on what the individual participant can be and might become.15 
For Ashley, this was not about countering Realism with `idealism.' Rather, as he 
went on to explain in some detail, it represented a genuinely emancipatory approach 
to a hitherto closed discipline, by opening up a conceptual space in which notions of 
power and national interest can be perceived as derivative of historical, political and 
cultural interpretation, rather than as the pre- theoretical "givens" of a technical - 
rationalist image of reality.16 It was an approach, he argued, which offered a more 
progressive understanding of reality, centred as it was on the historical and political 
interests of human actors, rather than the mechanical operation of systems or 
13 Ibid., 206 -7. 
14 Waltz himself, as Ashley pointed out, is quite straightforward on this point, acknowledging that 
"the urge to explain is not born of idle curiosity alone. It is produced also by the desire to control, or 
at least to know if control is possible." Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (op. cit., 
1979), quoted in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 217. 
15 Ibid., 212. 
15Ibid., 214. 
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structures. In short, Ashley wrote, a Critical Theory approach represents (in 
Habermasian terms) the potential for thinking and acting: 
freed from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and Ethel 
conditions of distorted communication that deny humans the capacity to make their 
future through free will and consciousness.., in short.., exercising reflective reason 
to dissolve limits on the self -conscious development of life and thereby restore to 
men and women a true awareness of their place in history and their capacities to 
make the future. 17 
These themes were also at the forefront of Ashley's most powerful contribution to the 
CST agenda in IR: "The Poverty of Neorealism" (1984).18 While I have already cited 
this essay in Chapter Two, for its specific criticisms of the positivist underpinnings 
of Waltz's "technical realism," it warrants a further (if brief) mention here. In this 
1984 work, Ashley's critical sights were focused on the way in which neo- Realism, 
in the name of scientific scholarship, had effectively betrayed the critical potential of 
Traditionalist Realism i9 Consequently, Ashley proposed, neo- Realists such as Waltz, 
Gilpin, Tucker, Keohane and Krasner, had effectively reduced Realist thought to a: 
positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the natural order, limits rather 
than expands political discourse, negates or trivializes the significance of variety 
across time and place [and] subordinates all practice to an interest in control 2° 
Ashley represented this neo- Realist approach as "an orrery of errors," set upon a 
"self -enclosed, self -affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist 
commitments," held together at its core by a positivist /empiricist epistemology. 21 
Accordingly, Ashley wrote, neo- Realism is a theory "by and for positivists," which 
"excludes all standpoints that would expose the limits of the given order of things."22 
This it did, at one level, by refusing to problematise its state -as -actor model, thereby 
17 This is Ashley's reading of the realism of John Herz (although not one that Herz himself 
necessarily agreed with, as his response to Ashley's article in the same volume indicates). Ibid., 227. 
18 Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization 38:2 (1984): 225 -286. 
Reprinted in Neorealism And Its Critics edited by R. Keohane (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986). All subsequent page references are from the version published in Neorealism And Its 
Critics. 
19 Ibid., 228. 
20 ibid. 
21 Ibid., 248. 
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treating as given, the "existence, boundaries, identifying structures, constituencies, 
legitimations, interests, and capacities to make decisions" of modern states 23 As 
such, and for all its "scientific" posturing, neo- Realism excluded the state -as -actor 
from the very falsificationist process it claimed as essential to establishing 
worthwhile knowledge. Consequently, Ashley concluded, the state -as -actor 
approach, ironically, represented for neo- Realism precisely what neo- Realists 
claimed it did for Traditionalism: a "metaphysical commitment prior to science and 
exempted from scientific criticism. "24 
As I indicated earlier, Ashley focused in particular on what he saw as the theoretical 
"poverty" of Kenneth Waltz's structuralism, stressing its tendency, on the one hand, 
to grant the anarchical structure of IR "a life of its own independent of the parts, the 
states -as- actors," while, on the other, seeking to establish "the independence of the 
structured whole from the idealized point of view of the lone, isolated state -as- 
actor.' In this way, Ashley argued, neo- Realism had ended up with the worst of 
both theoretical worlds, encompassing, as it did, "atomism's superficiality combined 
with structuralism's closure.' Moreover, these limitations were not just relevant to 
Waltz, he argued, but also to many of those who have ostensibly sought to detach 
themselves from Waltz's "conventional" structuralist approach - in particular, the 
so- called "modified structuralists" such as Krasner and Keohane, and political 
economists such as Gilpin (see Chapter Four). Accordingly, in 1984, Ashley was 
ready to acknowledge these and others (Kindleberger, Tucker, etc.), as participants in 
the `collective movement or project" of neo-Realism.27 
Since its publication almost twenty years ago, 'The Poverty of NeoreaIism," has 
been widely criticised, not only by those whose scholarship it attacked, but also by 
those broadly sympathetic to Ashley's position, and the philosophical issues he 
22Ibid., 237. 
23Ibid., 238. 
24 Ibid., 240. 
23Ibid., 255. 
261bid., 256. 
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raised 28 Moreover, Ashley himself has since shifted radically away from the 
emancipatory Critical Theory themes that pervaded his earlier work, towards the 
postmodernist perspectives that will be discussed below. For all this, "Poverty" 
remains one of the most important contributions to the CST debate in IR. Its status 
as a major catalyst for the critical agenda of the 1980s and 1990s has been widely 
acknowledged, and others (notably Andrew Linklater) have continued to develop the 
Habermasian themes Ashley introduced in the 1980s, in a complex and ongoing 
debate. 
The remainder of this section however, continues the Critical Theory contribution to 
IR via a slightly different route to that taken by either Ashley or Linklater, primarily 
through the work of Robert Cox, whose particular emancipatory perspective draws 
not only on the Habermasian themes mentioned above, but others derived from 
Gramsci and (antistructuralist) Marxism in general. Cox is of interest to this thesis 
on two counts: first, and most obviously, because his work represents a major 
contribution to the Critical Theory literature under discussion in this chapter. But as 
I will show subsequently, Cox has also influenced the transference of Critical Theory 
perspectives within Japanese Studies, through his specific comments on Japan's 
search for a global role. In Chapter Seven, I will return to these comments and the 
insights they hold for the globalisation debate in particular. For now, I will 
concentrate on Cox's more general significance within IR's `third debate.' 
Robert Cox: Hegemony, Historicism, and the Challenge to `Problem- Solving' Theory 
Like Ashley, Cox, in the early to mid 1980s, was concerned with resuscitating the 
critical potential of IR, a potential which he too regarded as having been usurped in 
the Cold War period by a "technical" or "problem solving" neo- Realism. In this 
respect, Cox was also influenced by Frankfurt School perspectives, most obviously 
in his pivotal 1982 essay entitled "Social Forces, States and World Order," where he 
27 ibid., 249. 
28 For a summary of this debate, see George, Discourses of Global Politics, 174 -76. 
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warned of the dangers of positivist thinking at the core of Cold War policy making 
processes. More generally, Cox sought to undermine the generally ahistorical 
analysis of positivist- dominated approaches to the world - a tendency, he argued, 
which had been integral in particular to post- Vietnam neo- Realism, as it continued to 
frame its image of global reality in terms of an anarchical state system centred on 
traditional power politics impulses and hierarchical structures 2° 
The problem with such a view, Cox proposed, was that it blinded its adherents to 
significant systemic change, and to more specific changes in relations within and 
between states. As a result, he suggested, the mainstream IR analytical and 
policymaking community continued to frame their questions and answers around a 
fundamental and unchanging substrata of assumptions detached from any historical 
frame of reference, thus dictating that "with respect to fundamentals [e.g., the nature 
of man, the nature of states, and the nature of the state system], the future will always 
be like the past."3° In short, Cox argued, in a now- famous passage, Realism and neo- 
Realism remained embedded within a "problem- solving" paradigm of thought, which 
simply accepted the (perceived) status quo as the `is' of the world and sought, in this 
context, only to make the existing system work more efficiently. This "problem 
solving theory," he argued: 
takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and political power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given 
framework for action. The general aim of problem -solving is to make these 
relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular 
sources of trouble. Since the general pattern of institutions and relationships is not 
called into question, particular problems can be considered in relation to the 
specialised areas of activity in which they arise 31 
In contrast, Cox argued, a Critical Theory approach is concerned with questions of 
how any `is' is historically, politically and intellectually produced. Or, more 
29 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," Millennium; Journal of International- 
Studies 10:2 (1981): 126 -155. Subsequently re- published in Keohane's edited volume, Neorealism 
And Its Critics (op. cit., 1986). All subsequent page references are from the version published in 
Neorealism And Its Critics. 
30 Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders," 212. 
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specifically, it seeks to expose the process by which taken -for -granted perspectives 
and responses to IR are historically, politically and intellectually produced - in 
order that this process might be questioned, reassessed and changed. This historicist 
approach, he explained, could be traced back to the eighteenth century scholar 
Giambattista Vico,32 for whom the nature of man and of human institutions 
(including states and the state system) "should not be thought of in terms of 
unchanging substances, but rather as a continuing creation of new forms. "33 To think 
this way, is to understand that: 
human institutions are made by people -not by the individual gestures of "actors" 
but by collective responses to a collectively perceived problematic that produces 
certain practices. Institutions and practices are therefore to be understood through 
the changing mental processes of their makers. There is, in this perspective, an 
identity of subject and object. The objective realities that this approach encompasses 
- the state, social classes, the conflict groups... and their practices - are 
constituted by intersubjective ideas 3a 
This was a vital enterprise for Cox because it made possible that which positivism 
deemed impossible, in that it brought the externalised, essentialised world of IR and 
IPE `out there' back to earth, back to its social, political and ideological roots. At the 
`theoretical' level, this allowed Cox to revive one of Habermas' (and Ashley's) major 
concerns about the way in which a technical -rational knowledge form (e.g. 
positivism) had been imposed inappropriately upon social and political practice, 
thereby limiting and distorting such practice. 
In Cox's later work, and in particular, his 1987 book Production, Power and World 
Order,35 this was a concern aimed specifically at the way in which `economics' and a 
value -free market logic have become the basis upon which neo- Realists frame the 
world. For Cox, this neo- Realist perspective represents a "misleading 
31 Ibid., 208. 
32 And, in a more direct IR context, to E. H. Carr. Ibid., 208. 
33 Mid., 213. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
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oversimplification," in that it tends to regard all interstate systems as "essentially the 
same insofar as they all lack a supreme world authority. "36 In fact, he argued: 
There have been important qualitative and structural differences between successive 
world orders in the modem era... The qualitative differences between world orders 
touch the nature and incidence of wars, the manner of resolving disputes, and the 
creation and distribution of wealth and poverty. These differences between one 
structure of world order and its successor are shaped by the forms of state and 
production, and stabilised structures of woild order in turn provide a framework 
conducive to certain forms of state and production 37 
Cox's point here was that when one looks at world order from this `historicist' 
perspective, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualise such orders in 
terms of neo- Realist `problem solving' theory, in which the most powerful state 
assumes the role of orderer, and in which any potential change to the prevailing order 
is viewed negatively 38 This is not to suggest that Cox's work is about denying the 
impact of great powers, or of hegemony in general. Rather, his conceptualisation of 
the world order question understands hegemony, not in neo- Realist terms, but in 
broader (Gramscian) terms, as the `fit between power, ideas and institutions."" 
Hegemony, in this sense, is not just about the dominance of a single world power, 
but rather, "dominance of a particular kind, where the dominant state creates and 
order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to 
general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or 
states and leading social classes. "40 In Production, Power and World Order, this 
perspective allowed Cox to pursue a series of detailed critical investigations into the 
practices of Western hegemonie control (via global capitalism and the major 
economic and political institutions of the state system such as the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the G7). Just as importantly, it has allowed him (and those influenced by 
his scholarship) to explore space for counter -hegemonic perspectives and action in 
36 ibid., 7. 
37 Ibid . 
38 For example, as I argued in Chapter Four, the metamorphosis of Japan in American perspectives 
from "successful junior partner" to "threat" in the 1980s. 
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those areas of the world either taken for granted in the hegemonic system (e.g. 
Japan) or effectively ignored by it (e.g. the Third World).41 
Integrated with themes drawn from Gramsci and other aspects of European social 
theory, Cox's work has been the catalyst for a range of critical incursions into IR and 
IPE right up to the present day. Of particular significance to the following chapters 
is the way in which many of these Coxian approaches have emphasised the need for a 
broader, more comprehensive analysis of world order - one which takes account of 
supposedly `domestic' issues (e.g. issues of class, culture, race and ethnicity) in the 
attempt to better understand and help transform IR on behalf of those effectively 
ignored or marginalised by neo- Realist power politics. It is in this respect, in 
particular, that Critical Theory approaches to IR are vital to the `connection' project 
of this thesis because, as the following chapter will illustrate, while the examination 
of `domestic' tensions and identities is already a well- established source of debate in 
Japanese Studies, such themes have had almost no impact upon discussions of 
Japan's international relations. 
To understand the reasons for this, one needs to do more than simply stress the 
relevance of the domestic to the international, and vice versa. Rather, it becomes 
necessary to engage the structures and assumptions that underwrite these very 
categories, and which continue to make it difficult to connect Japanese Studies with 
International Relations. This is where another dimension of the CST agenda - 
postmodernism - becomes an important analytical tool in the process of opening up 
the `black box' that is Japan in International Relations. 
3. Postmodernism and International Relations 
39 Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order," 224. 
40 Cox, Production, Power and World Order, 7. 
41 Notably, Stephen Gill; e.g., in "Gramsci and Global Politics: Towards a Post -Hegemonie Research 
Agenda," in Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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It is not my intention in this chapter to explore very deeply the ongoing and complex 
philosophical debate that has developed over postmodemism42 This debate has been 
extensively canvassed by others far more qualified than I43 Suffice it to say that my 
own position is essentially a positive one in relation to much of the postmodernist 
critique of IR orthodoxy; but like many others, I have considerable reservations 
about its sometimes overly esoteric tendencies - some of which have been evident 
in the application of postmodern themes to Japanese Studies.44 For now, I seek only 
to explain the significance of some of the more general postmodern insights that have 
been influential in opening up a closed IR orthodoxy since the early 1980s. 
International Relations as Discourse: Postmodernist Perspectives 
Of particular significance here, is the way in which postmodernist scholarship has 
problematised the previously taken -for -granted premises of Realist /neo- Realist 
thought. To achieve this, postmodernist writers have invoked Foucault and Derrida 
(and, implicitly, Nietzsche) to re- address the story of Western dominance of the 
modern world, and of Western rational -science as the basis of modern global 
knowledge. The major result of this has been the further illustration of the many 
silences within mainstream IR theorising, on the relationship between power and 
knowledge. As I suggested in Chapter Two, the orthodox social science perspectives 
that underwrite Realism and neo- Realism, assume a certain immunity of knowledge 
from power. Consequently, from an orthodox perspective, the study of IR "requires 
the suspension of values, interests and power relations in the pursuit of balanced 
(objective) knowledge - knowledge uncontaminated by external influences and 
42 For the purposes of clarity, I will refer in this section only to 'postmodernism,' while remaining 
aware of the claims some make for "poststructuralism." 
43 E.g., George (op. cit., 1994), Devetak (op. cit., 1995), Smith (op. cit., 1996) and Linklater (op. cit., 
1996). 
44 Specifically, I have in mind some postmodern literary/cultural theory writings on Japan, and 
especially those works which seem keen on developing the idea of Japan's `special,' even `unique' 
contribution to the postmodem scene. A good summary of such literature can be found in the 
introduction to Charles Wei -Hsun Fu and Steven Heine (eds.), Japan in Traditional- and Postmodern 
Perspectives (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995), x -xii. While I am generally in 
accordance with Heine/Fu that this particular genre of postmodemist Japanese Studies is interesting 
and needs to be acknowledged much of it is simply too far removed from the central themes of my 
thesis to be usefully dealt with in this chapter. 
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based on (pure) reason." 45 This is certainly the position of Waltz, who proposes that 
`good' theory can be abstracted from reality only by leaving aside the personality of 
actors, their behavior and their interactions." 46 
This view however, has been challenged by postmodernism; most famously through 
the work of Michel Foucault, who argued that social and political realities cannot be 
studied independently of the ideology and power relations employed by the namers 
and makers of those realities. Knowledge, Foucault argued, is a hugely complex 
system of exclusion, in which some voices are accorded meaning (and /or `truth,') 
and others not 47 Knowledge, in this sense, becomes the struggle of `discursive 
practices.' In this context, the term "discourse" encompasses something more than 
just language, referring to "the broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning 
to the way that people understand themselves and their behaviour. "48 A discourse, 
thus, does not `describe' reality per se; instead, it establishes particular categories of 
meaning that explain reality in particular ways. 49 As successive defenders of this 
idea have emphasised, this is not to say that reality "doesn't exist," but that it does 
not exist independently of the meanings we ascribe to it - meanings which are 
inextricably connected to the social structures and power relations within which our 
knowledge of the world is created. Consequently, a discursive approach to 
knowledge understands that: 
The subject of knowledge is situated in, and conditioned by, a political and 
historical context, and constrained to function with particular concepts and 
categories of knowledge. Knowledge is never unconditioned. As a consequence of 
the heterogeneity of possible contexts and positions, there can be no single, 
45 Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism," in Burchill and Linklater, Theories of International Relations 
(op. cit., 1996), 181. 
46 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 80; see also my remarks in Chapters Two, 65 -70, and 
Chapter Four, 14 -15. 
47 Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" (1981); reprinted in Michael J. Shapiro (ed.), 
Language and Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1984), 110. 
4a George, Discourses of Global Politics, 29. 
49 Bradley Klein, Strategic Discourse and its Alternatives (New York: Center on Violence and Human 
Survival), 4. 
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Archimedean perspective which trumps all others. There is no `truth,' only 
competing perspectives and `regimes of truth.'S0 (emphasis added) 
It is in relation to this issue, that Donna Gregory, for example, has described the task 
of postmodern approaches to IR as one of "strange- making" - that is, distancing and 
querying the dominant processes, facts, perspectives and concepts of International 
Relations, in order to show how they are socially, textually, and linguistically 
constructed, inevitably at the expense of other possibilities of meaning 5t "Strange" 
of course, has a double significance here, given the intrinsic strangeness of 
postmodernist techniques to a discipline which, as I argued in Chapter Two, has 
generally avoided, `philosophical' questions of knowledge and meaning. Yet as a 
number of scholars have pointed out, all that is really being asked here, are the "how" 
questions, or, as Ashley puts it: 
How, by way of what practices, are structures of history produced, differentiated, 
reified and transformed? How, by way of what strategies, displacements and shifting 
emphases, are fields of practice pried open, hounded and secured? How, by way of 
what manoeuvres and in opposition to what resistances, are regions of silence 
established?52 
In asking these questions, rather than the "what" question that tends to predominate 
in conventional IR, we begin to approach the issue of "what matters" in IR in a 
fundamentally different way. From a postmodern "how" perspective, therefore, 
social and political worlds appear, not as objectively observable phenomena, but as a 
complex network of discursive practices which impose meaning and value. Or, to 
invoke another key term from the postmodernist lexicon, they appear as texts. The 
concept of textuality in postmodernist thought is derived, in particular, from the work 
of Jacques Derrida, but is integral also to the discourse analysis of Foucault, and to 
the semiotic analyses of writers as diverse as Roland Barthes, Umberto Ecco, and 
56 Devetak, "Postmodernism," 185. 
51 Donna Gregory, "Introduction," to James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), Interna - 
tionalhntertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books, 
1989), xiv. 
52 Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of 
International Politics," Alternatives 12:4 (1987): 403 -434, on p. 409. 
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Jean Baudrillard.53 Like `discourse,' this term pays special, but not exclusive, 
attention to linguistic practices, in teasing out the ways in which people "make 
facticity" via the particular representational practices they employ.54 Much of 
Derrida's analysis has been devoted to disclosing these practices, particularly in 
regard to the post -Enlightenment search for an essential, universal rationality. 
Derrida used the term logocentricism to describe this process, in which identity, 
unity and meaning are achieved by a series of exclusions and oppositions from the 
original (logo), in a continuous metanarrative of dichotomies: self /other, 
identity /difference, realism /idealism, and so on.55 A postmodern textual strategy 
seeks to radically unsettle these conceptual oppositions, by exposing the internal 
instabilities within dominant texts, discourses and institutions. Employed in an IR 
context, these methods have been utilised to probe some of the more taken -for- 
granted certainties of Realism and neo- Realism. 
Deconstructing the `Great Texts' of IR: The `Machiavelli' Issue 
One of the more obvious ways in which textual /discursive strategies have been 
employed in IR is in the problematisation of IR itself as a coherent `discipline,' 
centred around a permanent set of problems, themes, and questions, as represented by 
the eminent scholars of the day. As I explained in Chapter Two, this has been 
achieved in part through the privileging of thinkers who, via their `great texts,' are 
deemed to have captured the essence of the present in their readings of the past. In 
this way, IR can indeed be represented in terms of a coherent `tradition,' (i.e., 
Realism), traceable from Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau, through to 
the seminal twentieth century figures of Carr, Morgenthau, and Waltz 56 
From a postmodernist perspective, the representation of these voices as a coherent 
tradition depends on the possibility of differentiating Realism from other textual 
53 Gregory, InternationallIntertextual Relations, xviii. 
54 Michael J. Shapiro, "Textualizing Global Politics," in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), 
International /Intertextual Relations (op. cit., 1989), 14. 
55 ibid., 15-16. 
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traditions. This can only be done however, when internal differences among /within 
the dominant tradition are suppressed or ignored. Postmodern approaches seek to 
expose these differences, and in so doing, disrupt the certainty with which particular 
texts are ascribed their categorical status (e.g., "realist," or "idealist'), and accorded a 
place within particular traditions. It reads these texts, as it were, "'against the grain,' 
highlighting those points where the tradition must remain blind to tensions or 
differences that would otherwise put its continuity and coherence in doubt_ "57 
One of the best examples of this strategy comes from R. B. J. Walker, whose 1989 
examination of the "politics of origins" in IR thinking focused in particular on the 
contribution of Machiavelli 58 For generations of IR theorists, Machiavelli has been a 
key figure in establishing the foundational wisdom of the discipline on questions of 
human nature, structural necessity, power, the state, and national interest. More 
specifically, according to Walker, it is Machiavelli who, through his seminal text, 
The Prince, has afforded Realism a linear credibility in a representation of history set 
upon a theme of structural anarchy, in which power always reigns over ethics, ends 
always justify means, and all (relevant) human behaviour can be rationalised in terms 
of raison d'etat. 
For Walker however, this is an extremely caricatured reading of Machiavelli - in 
the sense that it deliberately marginalises those aspects of his scholarship that might 
render problematic his status as a `paradigmatic Realist. "59 Machiavelli's emphasis, 
for example, on the need to distinguish "between violence in general and the 
mínimum recourse to violence in pursuit of virtu," somewhat contradicts the more 
familiar, straightforward image of the Machiavelli who insists also on the necessity 
"for deception and dirty deeds if a price is to remain in power. "60 Moreover, Walker 
56 See Chapter Two, 9 -10. 
'7 Devetak, 'Postmodernism," 192. 
58 R. B. J. Walker, "The Prince, and `The Pauper:' Tradition, Modernity and Practice in the Theory of 
International Relations," in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), Internationalllntertextual Relations (op. 
cit., 1989), 29. NB: This essay was subsequently updated and re- published as the second chapter of 
Walker's 1993 work, Inside /Outside, which is discussed in more detail below. 
'9 Walker, "The Prince, and `The Pauper,'" 32. 
60 Ibid., 33. 
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argued, if one reads Machiavelli beyond The Prince, thus locating his `great text' in a 
broader context that includes, for example, Discourses on Livy, The History of 
Florence, and The Art of War, it becomes difficult, if not impossible to continue 
representing him (as orthodox IR accounts have tended to do), as an archetypal 
Realist whose sole concern is the timeless essence of political life. From this broader 
perspective Machiavelli appears: 
as someone trying to make sense of historically specific circumstances and 
attempting to do so in the discursive categories then available to him... while it may 
be possible to trace a "tradition" that may be called Machiavellian, it is one 
concerned less with "realism" or "power politics" than with "humanism," 
" republicanism," or " civic virtue. "61 (emphasis added) 
The point of WaIker's exercise, as he makes clear, is not to make a claim about what 
Machiavelli `really' meant, or even to dismiss the dominant (Realist) readings of 
him. Rather, it is to illustrate that these are only readings - and that as such, their 
status is not derived from any correspondence with an essentialised meaning present 
within the text, but from specific discursive practices "that have turned a historical 
problematic into an ahistorical apology for the violence of the present. "62 
Double -Reading Realism: The SovereigntyíAnarchy Problematique 
Demonstrating how the repression of internal textual tensions works to produce a 
stable effect of homogeneity and continuity is, I suggest, of special relevance to 
Japanese Studies on two counts. Most obviously, it suggests that the same textual 
strategies used by scholars such as Walker to query the textual and disciplinary 
coherence of IR, can be applied, with similar effect, to the major texts that have 
shaped dominant images of Japan, and Japanese society. More fundamentally 
however, and as indicated above, the exposure of these tensions is also important in 
exploring (and questioning) the very assumptions which make it possible to speak 
about `Japanese Studies' in the first place. Assumptions which divide our knowledge 
61 Ibid. 
62 /bid. 
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of the world between the domain of the domestic and the international, and which 
ascribe profoundly different structural conditions to either. In an IR context, this 
dichotomy has been absolutely integral to Realism, and its certainty about the 
irreducible, state -centric reality of global politics. This is never more evident than in 
regard to the concept of state sovereignty. In traditional narratives, state sovereignty 
is almost synonymous with the concept of state power and the legitimate use of state 
violence to maintain order within the boundaries of the state, and, in Hobbesiean 
terms, the rationale for state authority in an anarchical world 63 From the systemic 
perspective of neo- Realism, sovereignty is important in terms of the state as a 
rational actor, engaged in making choices in the (analogised) marketplace. Indeed, 
sovereignty is such a taken -for -granted assumption in IR that it has come, in the 
words of one scholar, "to seem quite uninteresting, the preserve of legal scholars and 
constitutional experts rather than the subject of heated exchanges among social and 
political experts. "64 
From a postmodernist perspective however, this status has been achieved at the cost 
of a profound silence about the discursive circumstances under which such an 
historically specific notion as sovereignty has been invoked as the sole way of 
understanding political life. Scholars such as Ashley, for example, have questioned 
this assumption by relocating the issue of sovereignty in its broader context; i.e., that 
of the emergence of the sovereign individual in post -Enlightenment philosophy.65 
This silenced tension, Ashley suggested in 1988, is at the core of the establishment of 
the sovereign state as the most potent form of modern man's resistance to the 
(anarchic) darkness `out there.' The point here is that to reconcile the principle and 
practices of individual sovereignty at the state level with peaceful relations at the 
interstate level requires the elimination of differences within the sovereign state, so 
that it can be represented as "a well- bounded sovereign entity possessing its own 
63 George, Discourses of Global Politics, 200 -201. 
64 Walker, Onside /Outside, 62, 
65 Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17 (1988):227 -262, and "Living on 
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`internal' hegemonic centre of decision- making capable of reconciling "internal" 
conflicts and capable, therefore, of projecting a singular presence. "66 In this way, 
Ashley argued, the sovereign state effectively becomes sovereign man, the site of 
modern reason in opposition to an externalised, anarchical world 67 
Walker has also taken up this issue, in a work whose title, InsidelOutside, directly 
invokes the sovereignty /anarchy dichotomy in Realist thought and practice, and its 
reification of: 
an historically specific spatial ontology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a 
discourse that both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of 
political life inside and outside the modem state as the only ground on which 
structural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history can 
be revealed68 
The `spatial ontology' that Walker refers to is derived from, among other things, the 
constructs of Elucidean and Newtonian geometry, and their impact upon the cultural 
forms of seventeenth century Europe. In this historically specific historical - 
intellectual context, he argued, we can see the emergence of the connection between 
ideas of inviolable, sharply delineated geographical space, and the conceptions of 
state territoriality, sovereignty and anarchy -a connection intrinsic to contemporary 
International Relations thought and practice. On this basis, International Relations 
appears, not just as an ongoing discussion about `power politics,' or `trade,' or even 
` globalisation,' but rather, "as a celebration of [cum warning of] an historically 
specific account of the nature, location and possibilities of political identity and 
community. "69 This, despite the fact that the fracturing and dispersion of political 
Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War," in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds.), 
International /Intertextual Relations (op. cit.), 1989. 
66 Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State," 245. 
57 /bid. 
68 R. B. J. Walker, InsidelOutside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), ix. 
69Ibid., 15_ 
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identity among a multiplicity of sites has been "a familiar, though selectively 
forgotten, characteristic of modern political life for several centuries.'m 
For Walker then, like Ashley, the demarcation of authentic political life and identity 
within the territorial `container' of the sovereign state represents the means by which 
a concept of anarchy can be represented as the natural condition of relations between 
states. Natural, in the sense that on the inside, justice and law, freedom and social 
progress can be pursued within clear spatial limits; while on the outside, relations 
between states can be understood as the negation of the community presumed to be 
possible inside the sovereign state - represented, variously, as politics without 
centralised authority, or as an international anarchy, or as the more or less 
mechanical `system' of the (post- Waltzian) neo-Realists.71 In this way, anarchy 
becomes integral to the discourse of the modern state, and its claims to sovereign 
identity. Indeed, read this way, the inherent anarchy of the `outside' (i.e., the violent, 
ungovernable realm of the international sphere) becomes the tacit condition that 
makes claims to a monopoly on permanent order and universality on the 'inside' 
possible. It is, accordingly, this claim to universality made within the state that 
becomes the ground against which "a tradition of international relations theory may 
be constructed through a discourse of negation." 
Against order, anarchy; against peace, war; against justice and legitimate authority, 
mere power and mles of accommodation; against progress and emancipation, mere 
contingency and eternal return. The only alternative to negation, of course, turns out 
to be an affirmation of the hope that someday, somehow, all that is presumed to be 
possible inside may be extended to the outside - a hope that is constantly deferred, 
and indeed can only be specified as a condition of its own impossibility in anything 
other than the bounded space of the sovereign state 72 
I will return to Walker's inside /outside metaphor in Chapter Seven, where it is 
particularly important, I argue, in understanding how globalisation issues are 
affecting the debate over Japan's global role. For now, my point is that these critical 
OIbid., 161. 
/bid., 169-171. 
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postmodern incursions into the conceptual framework of Realism and their 
questioning of `irreducible' conceptual and structural realities are absolutely integral 
to understanding how Japan's global role came to be framed in the dominant way 
that it has been (see Chapters Three and Four). Moreover, and as indicated above, 
they are also an important prelude to understanding how and where the concerns 
being taken up by a more critically inclined Japanese Studies literature might be 
usefully integrated into the question of Japan's `international' agency. 
Before this literature is taken up in any detail however, there is one more element of 
the postmodern CST contribution to IR which requires brief discussion - the issue 
of identity. Or, more precisely, the role of `otherness' in constituting the identity of 
the sovereign state, and its privileged status as procurer of human security and safety. 
This topic has of course, already been touched upon above in relation to the 
sovereignty /anarchy dichotomy, and its spatial demarcation of the state as the 
container of political community. In this demarcation the question of `otherness' is 
pivotal; for it is the definition of who is not included within these boundaries that 
makes it possible to define a state (e.g.'Japan') at all. 
Postmodernist approaches have sought to tease out this question of identity in IR, by 
examining the practices of representation and exclusion by which certain identities 
are privileged, and other excluded or marginalised. From this perspective, the issue 
of security, for example, becomes something more than the defence of territorial 
integrity from threats `out there' in the anarchical world system. It becomes, instead, 
an issue inherently about the danger inside states as much as that between them. The 
dangers that multiple, ambiguous and shifting sites of identity within the state 
represent to its production of domestic `order,' and its pursuit of foreign policy on 
behalf of a unified, sovereign whole. To put it another way, when one begins to 
recover and re- examine the voices of those inside the state whose difference has been 
ignored, silenced or repressed in the name of domestic order, one begins then to 
72/bid., 152. 
192 
understand the way in which the differences between states have been invoked to 
justify this control. As I will show in the following chapters, this is of particular 
relevance to a Japan context, where the image of an unusually, even `uniquely' 
homogeneous Japanese society continues to mask the processes by which this unity 
has been imposed. 
For now, however, the final section of this, chapter pursues this theme through the 
work of David Campbell, who has written extensively on the constitution of foreign 
policy and security from the perspective described above. Here, I am particularly 
interested in Campbell's recent work on the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia and 
the Western response to the subsequent violence in Bosnia -Herzegovina, as it 
appears in his 1998 book, National Deconstruction 73 While such events may seem 
far removed from the problems currently confronting Japan, Campbell's analysis of 
them is, as I will argue, of vital importance in addressing the inside/outside divide 
that currently separates Japanese Studies from International Relations. 
Identity. Violence, and `Problematising Bosnia' 
In National Deconstruction, Campbell was not, as he made clear from the outset, 
attempting to write a `true' account of the events that occurred in Bosnia - 
Herzegovina between 1993 and 1996; or even write about Bosnia per se. Rather, he 
was concerned "primarily with `metaBosnia,' the array of practices through which 
Bosnia (indeed competing `Bosnias') comes to be. "74 More specifically, he was 
concerned with how conventional, dominant understandings of sovereign identity 
relate to the inadequacy of dominant understandings of `international' violence - an 
inadequacy that, he argued, has been tragically illustrated via events in post -Cold 
War Yugoslavia. 
73 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 
74 ibid., ix -x. 
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In this context, Campbell sought to outline the very specific role that conventional 
understandings of identity and political community (i.e., those informed by the 
identity- sovereignty nexus discussed above) had played in the Western `solution' to 
the crisis. In particular, he proposed: 
the idea that the national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and 
fixed identity - were not only insufficient to enable a response to the Bosnian war, 
they were complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself. This is 
because inscribing the boundaries that make the installation of the nationalist 
imagery possible requires the expulsion from the resultant "domestic" space of all 
that comes to be regarded as alien, foreign and dangerous 75 (emphasis added) 
For Campbell, this process of inscription /expulsion was exemplified in the 
international community's recourse to `ethnicity,' and the existence of "age old" 
ethnic divisions between Serbs/Muslims /Croats, as a key explanatory factor. Over 
and over, he pointed out, the conflict was spoken of by politicians and military 
spokespeople in terms of ethnic `sides,' ancient hatreds and essentially irresolvable 
animosities 76 This perspective, Campbell argued, was a rather simplistic one. It 
ignored the fact that not all Serbs were represented by Radovan Karadzic and the 
official Serb /Yugoslav representation of the conflict (as "a `civil war' involving an 
`ethnic struggle' between groups who cannot, and do not want to, live together); "77 
nor did it acknowledge the views of hundreds of Bosnian individuals who expressed 
their bemusement and outrage with the segregationist response of the international 
peace- makers which eventually became the Vance -Owen plan 78 
More tellingly, from the postmodern "deconstructivist" perspective taken by 
Campbell, the `ancient animosities' thesis entails a teleological reading of history 
75 lbid.,13. 
76 Ibid., 49 -51. 
77 Official Serb/Yugoslav response to the ICJ, 1993, cited by Campbell in National Deconstruction, 
44. For example, Campbell writes, the Serb Civic Council, which supported the sovereignty of the 
Bosnian republic throughout the war, issued a statement to "the Serb people in Bosnia -Herzegovina," 
urging them to remember that "Bosnia- Herzegovina is an internationally recognised state, its 
legitimate authorities guarantee equal human and civil rights for all people, irrespective of their ethnic 
allegiance and religious belief." Ibid., 47. 
78 See Campbell's examples, op. cit., 93 -95. 
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that, in Derridean terms, "locks up, neutralises, and finally cancels historicity." 
Focusing on the `historical' constitution of the conflict, Campbell argued, implies 
that the hostility had an identifiable point of origin, being transmitted from 
generation to generation until it reached the present. Such representations, he 
pointed out, have very tangible political consequences because: 
if conflicts represented as "ethnic" are understood as no more than settled history or 
human nature rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the 
present to resolve the tension except repress or ignore such struggles. In this view, 
the historical animus has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in 
suspension while nature violently plays itself out 80 (emphasis added) 
Inevitably, Campbell pointed out, the problematisation of the violence in `ethnic' 
terms also carried over into the eventual solution to it proposed by the international 
community. Here, the same terms of reference that had initially paralysed 
international intervention in the carnage, saw the majority of 
intellectual /policymaking parties concerned opt for the 'ethnicisation' of Bosnia, by 
dividing it into provinces with a clear ethnic majority in each. It was a response, 
Campbell writes, which not only reflected assumptions about territory and identity 
remarkably similar to those of Karadzic, but which ultimately sanctioned more 
violence (i.e., against the new `ethnic minorities' it inevitably created in the new 
zones) 81 Yet it was seen as the only response possible, because the (Realist) frame of 
reference in which it was conceived, cannot itself conceive of any form of political 
identity that is not bound up in the sovereign state, and in turn, to the norm of 
territorial and cultural alignment in an anarchical world.82 
In the wake of Bosnia, the continuing power of these assumptions has been borne out 
most strongly by the conservative backlash (in the U.S. and Europe in particular), 
against multiculturalism, which has seen a number of commentators (most notably, 
Samuel Huntington), issuing dire warnings about the possibility of "balkanisation at 
79 Derrida, cited in Campbell, op. cit., 83 -84. 
80 Campbell, National Deconstruction, 84. 
B1 Ibid., 162. 
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home. "83 This perspective, as Campbell observed, has often acted as a post -Cold 
War replacement for traditional threat perceptions, in the sense that: 
Within the United States, this logic plays itself out in the way multiculturalism is 
perceived as a threat to the unity of America, a tearing asunder of the collective ideal 
that founds the nation...Of course, it is this very logic that provided both the basis 
for the Bosnian war, its representation, and the international community's diplomatic 
response 84 
In National Deconstruction, Campbell's point was not to produce a superior solution 
to the Bosnian crisis from the detachment of hindsight. Nor was he unaware of the 
very real constraints under which those involved in the crisis were operating. His 
point, however, was that these constraints should not prevent us from reconsidering 
the assumptions that limited positive, humane decisionmaking about what was 
`possible' in regard to Bosnian identity and community, and trying to find 
alternative, less destructive approaches. 
One possibility, according to Campbell, lay in radically deconstructing the notion of 
democracy, away from its dominant meaning as "a select, [universal] range of rules 
and governing regulations involving periodic elections, universal franchise, and 
limits on executive power, "85 to "a particular attitude or spirit, and ethos, that 
constantly has to be fostered "86 (emphasis added). A culture of democracy 
understood in these terms, Campbell argued, denaturalises and unsettles the 
dominance of particular identities and their accompanying powers. In the context of 
Bosnia, he suggested, this democratic ethos might help to open up different avenues 
for thought and practice, particularly with regard to the questions of ethnicity and 
multiculturalism. More specifically, it harbours the potential to foster an 
"emancipatory ideal" of multiculturalism, which "on the one hand affirms cultural 
diversity without situating it, while on the other hand recognises that 
82Ibid., 165, 
83 E.g., in the work of Krauthammer (1991), William Lind (1991), and of course, Samuel Huntington 
(1996). Ibid., 166 -67. 
84 Ibid., 166-67. 
85 Ibid., 194. 
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multiculturalism can itself succumb to an enclave mentality that suppresses cultural 
interdependence and plurality ." 
The use of the present tense here is important, indicating Campbell's rejection of the 
notion, popular in the aftermath of the Dayton agreement, that the scale of the 
violence in Bosnia and the hatreds it inflamed have somehow gone `too far' for 
democratic /nonethnic /multicultural ideals ever to be reclaimed. Without ignoring the 
very real effect of the violence in dividing communities along ethnic lines, Campbell 
argued that this was not the only option being pursued by Bosnian people, citing 
numerous efforts (mainly by local communities, but also by some individual units 
associated with the UNHCR and IFOR) to develop and implement proposals for 
political space that would be `legitimised by their resistance to exclusivism and 
enabled by the multiplication of sources of sovereignty. "88 
I have dwelt at length on Campbell's work here, because it speaks about some of the 
most pressing themes that haunt contemporary discussions of International Relations: 
identity, citizenship, and international responsibility. And, like the other examples 
discussed above, it speaks to these issues in a way which seeks to disrupt the 
(Realist) certainty associated with the traditional responses who would have us 
believe that there is no other way to engage with the problems of contemporary life; 
that to question the underpinnings of the options we have, would be to leave us adrift 
with no options at all. 
For postmoderníst scholars such as Ashley, Walker and Campbell, and for a Critical 
Theorist like Cox, this process of disruption is a wholly positive one. It provides us 
with the opportunity to confront IR, not as a set body of knowledge which informs us 
about the possibilities for responding to issues according to their location along the 
inside /outside divide, but as a particular set of (discursive) processes by which 
86 Ibid., 196. 
'7Ibid., 208. 
88 Ibid., 234. Campbell's examples include efforts to establish an independent press in Sarajevo, the 
Antiwar Campaign in Zagreb, the establishment of a market in the borderlands adjoining the Zone of 
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"identities are formed, meaning is given, and status and privilege are confirmed. "89 It 
resists holistic, totalising responses to the predicaments of global life, whether they 
are framed in terms of power politics inevitability, or state sovereignty, or economic 
rationalism. Above all, in allowing people to understand the processes by which 
they, and their identity, and their status are constituted, it lends support to those 
seeking to question the conditions of their lives, and participate in the decisions that 
affect them. 
All of these claims, I suggest, can he further substantiated in the context of Japan, 
and the concerns I outlined at the beginning of this thesis in regard to dominant 
discussions of Japan's global role. While this is predominantly the work of the 
following chapter, I wish to conclude the present discussion with a few brief 
comments on the general significance of the CST agenda to Japan. My initial 
concern here is to show how CST themes are potentially useful in refiguring the 
relationship between `International Relations' and `Japanese Studies.' 
4. Complicating the Japanese State: The Significance of CST Approaches 
In pinning down the most important contribution that CST approaches bring to the 
debate over Japan's global role, I want to re- engage at least three introductory 
questions that I brought up in Chapter One. First, how is it that some issues (formal 
bureaucratic procedure, foreign policymaking institutions, political leadership), are 
regarded as clearly more `important' in discussing Japan than others? Second, why 
is it so difficult and uncomfortable to move beyond the state- centric image of Japan 
as an international actor, to probe into the everyday activities and predicaments of 
Japanese people? Finally, what process or processes, do debates on Japanese society, 
identity and citizenship remain marginalised from the analysis of Japanese foreign 
policy? 
Separation under the auspices of an IFOR unit, and the UNHCR program to establish inter -entity bus 
routes in Bosnia. Ibid., 236 -37. 
99 George, Discourses of Global Politics, 216. 
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These questions, I suggest, have been at least partially answered in the discussion 
above - most particularly in Walker's metaphor of inside /outside which, as noted, 
delineates not only the possibilities of political community according to pre -given 
geospatial coordinates, but creates a particular division of labour with regard to 
knowledge: `political theory' on the inside; `international relations' on the outside. 
One result of this, Walker pointed out, is a type of vacuum within IR when it comes 
to theories of the state. Questions of civil society, economy, and politics, he argued, 
remain the prerogative of "those who are concerned with life within states, rather 
than relations between them. "9° Equally, complex historical structures (states, 
diplomacy, governance) become convenient transition points between `internal' and 
`external' activities; e.g.: "between defence and foreign policy conceived as the 
limits of domestic politics within, and the mere relations in which states are engaged 
without. "91 
As Campbell's work also demonstrates, this is an approach replete with dangers, not 
least because it continues to allow an effective abrogation of personal /international 
responsibility for the terrible things that happen to occur on the `inside' of spatially - 
demarcated sites of belonging. And, as this chapter has sought to illustrate, it is an 
approach increasingly rejected by those influenced by CST perspectives, who are no 
longer willing to side -step the ethical implications of knowledge detached from 
power, theory disconnected from practice; theory that merely seeks to `describe' and 
interpret the facts of power politics, hegemony, `ethnic strife,' and so on. The 
alternative space available to IR scholarship is one in which questions are asked: 
not only of the immediate circumstances of power politics, but of the whole process 
by which a discourse affording identity, influence, credihility, and power to some 
among the global population is represented as universally and unproblematically 
"real" for all (e.g., the national interest, the new world order, state security, common 
sense, the revolutionary manifesto) 92 
90 Walker, Inside/Outside, 125. 
91 Ibid. 
92 George, Discourses of Global Politics, 229. 
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Just as importantly, a critical approach to International Relations now turns its 
attention toward people who have traditionally been excluded from traditional IR 
analysis because they lack `power' on the scale deemed necessary to command 
serious attention. These are people who, as in Campbell's study for example, have 
chosen (often unwittingly) to resist the categories of identity being thrust upon them 
in the 'ethnicisation' of Bosnia. More generally, they are people who, for a whole 
range of reasons, and all over the world, have chosen to resist the processes and 
categories that define them and their possibilities, whether these are expressed in 
terms of race, gender, economic rationalism, or just `progress.'93 
These are people, more immediately, who are of interest to those within Japanese 
Studies who have engaged the conventional, state -centric Japanese foreign policy 
perspective in a range of critical ways. In so doing they have sought to fill out the 
`black box' of the Japanese state, and call into question the conventional assumptions 
we make about what it means to be `Japanese' per se. A critical approach to IR 
needs this type of Japanese Studies, because in confronting essentialised 
generalisations about what Japan is, it makes it more difficult to speak about Japan's 
interests, or its `international role' in unified, essentialised terms. Accordingly, in 
the following chapter, I begin to flesh out these `other Japans,' and their potential 
impact upon the way we ask the Japan Question in IR. 
93 See my comments on Walker's One World /Many Worlds (op. cit., 1989), in Chapter One, 29 -30. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
OPENING THE `BLACK BOX:' OTHER `JAPANS' AND JAPANESE 
STUDIES 
This chapter continues to engage the themes introduced in Chapter Five, where I 
Iooked at the way in which the major assumptions of International Relations theory 
and practice have been challenged by Critical Social Theory (CST) approaches. In 
this chapter, my aim is to show how this challenge intersects with questions asked 
about Japanese life, society and identity by some Japanese Studies literature. This 
connection, as I argued in the previous chapter, occurs when debates about security, 
national interest and Japan's global role framed in the predominantly state- centric 
terms of orthodox (Realist and neo- Realist) FR theory, are rendered problematic by 
opening up the `black box' image of Japan as a unified (and more or less 
homogeneous) nation state. In this context, Japan's spatial and temporal frontiers, 
often assumed to be inherently stable and fundamentally established, turn out to be as 
recent and contested as those of any other nation state. Similarly, Japanese claims to 
unique levels of social, ethnic and cultural homogeneity turn out to be much more 
tenuously grounded. 
For some, of course, the resulting picture of a complex, multifaceted Japan has 
prompted a sense of crisis that, in many cases, is linked to the uncertainty of the post - 
Cold War era, and of globalisation, and of anxieties concerning Japan's national 
presence in the world. These reactions and the debates surrounding them I will 
engage in the chapter to follow. For now, I wish to concentrate on the responses of 
those for whom the opening of the `black box' represents a more positive enterprise, 
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one which allows them to question the categories and assumptions that define them 
as `Japanese.' 
1. Critical Japanese Studies: Challenging the Homogeneity Thesis. 
To some extent, Japanese Studies has always been critical of International Relations, 
or, more precisely, that IR which represents the academic and foreign policymaking 
concerns of the postwar United States. Over the years, this criticism has been 
directed in particular at the failure of the U.S. (and the `West' more generally) to 
appreciate and understand the socio- cultural differences between Japan and the 
Western state system - the dominant framework of IR theory and practice. Indeed, 
it was in this context that Reischauer condemned the failure of his contemporaries to 
appreciate the need for a linguistically and historically informed `approach to Asia' 
to aid U.S. interests in the region (see Chapter Three). Later, in the wake of the 
Vietnam War, as part of a broader re- assessment of area studies approaches, centred 
on the behaviouralism that had dominated social scientific research in the United 
States during the 1950s and 1960s, Lucien Pye would develop this theme in an IR 
context, arguing that conventional definitions of power in Western IR theorising did 
not take into account the fundamental differences of `Asian' political culture, and its 
influences on foreign policy decisionmaking.' In the case of Japan, Pye insisted (as 
had Johnson a few years previously), the West had failed to grasp that Japan was a 
fundamentally different type of state: one in which Confucian traditions had 
intersected with Japan's `unique' structure of social relations and the modern ising 
Lucien Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 1985). 
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influences of technology, to facilitate a particularly successful experiment of modern 
developmentalism.2 
However, while Japanese Studies of this ilk went some way towards exposing the 
culture- neutral, society -neutral approach of a mainstream Realism wholly concerned 
with the systemic `outside,' it remained more preoccupied with the differences 
between Japan and the West, rather than identifying heterogeneity within Japan. In 
this context, it actually served to reinforce the homogeneous, holistic images of 
Japanese life and society that have conventionally been privileged in an IR context. 
This is perhaps best demonstrated in the post -WWII discussions of Japanese national 
identity, known collectively as nihonjinron or the `theory of Japaneseness. 
Nihonjinron draws much of its framework from early Japanese ethnographic and 
philosophical studies which sought to portray Japan as having a unified, homogenous 
`national character,' of which the best known remains Watsuji Tetsurô's 1943 
classic, Fûûdô (`Climate').3 It also owes a large debt to Western scholarship, 
including Ruth Benedict's classic anthropological study, The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword (1945), and Reischauer's own Japan: Past and Present (1947), both of 
which emphasised the importance of understanding Japan as a unified totality, whose 
fundamental difference from `Western' (read U.S.) society and culture was located in 
a distinct national character. In the 1960s and 1970s, an expanding Japanese 
sociological literature rephrased these perceptions of distinctiveness and 
homogeneity in `modern' social scientific phraseology, explaining Japanese people 
Ibid., 170 -181. 
This work was written around Watsuji's belief that human societies are profoundly shaped by their 
natural settings. Japan, he argued, had a unique climate distinguished by regular, distinct seasons, but 
also by the unpredictability of typhoons and floods. This, he asserted, accounted for the unique and 
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and society in terms of nationally uniform psychological and linguistic 
characteristics' and patterns of social organisation.' 
Since the 1970s, these and other Japanese texts `explaining' Japanese society and 
culture have been translated and read widely in the West, and their assumptions 
continue to have a profound impact upon Western scholarship; particularly that 
concerned with Japanese economic, business and diplomatic practices.' Yet for other 
scholars, the image of an homogeneous Japan, explicable in terms of a single `group 
model' was never convincing, and it was from these concerns that a more genuinely 
critical Japanese Studies began to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The problem, as Herbert Bix explained it in 1980, was not that the group model 
descriptions were wholly inaccurate, but that they had come to assume the status of 
immutable, inviolable `facts' about the nature of Japanese society, to the extent that 
alternative accounts tended to be effectively ignored.' As a result, thinking about 
Japan had become "concentrated in particular directions," for example: 
on the group rather than the individual agent, on the relationship between elites rather 
than classes, on how people act towards social organisations rather than toward 
complex sensitivity to nature in the Japanese spirit, as displayed through Japanese art, gardens, 
architecture and literature. Watsuji, cited in Morris- Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan (op. cit., 1998), 57. 
Takeo Doi, Armee no Kôzô (The Anatomy of Dependence; Tokyo: Kobundo, 1971). This work 
interprets Japanese social relations through the concept of amae, or the "tendency [of Japanese people] 
to behave self -indulgently, presuming on some special relationship which exists" between oneself and 
others (Ibid., 29). In Tozasareta Gengo: Nihongo no Sekai (Closed Language: The World of Japanese; 
Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1975), Takao Suzuki argued that the linguistic restrictions and structures of 
Japanese language determine social relationships. 
Nakane Chie, Tateshakai no Ningen Kankei (Personal Relations in a Vertical Society; Tokyo: 
Kodansha, 1967, translated 1973). Nakane argues that the structures of Japanese society (corporations, 
universities and bureaucracies) are modelled on the hierarchical structure of the Japanese family, or ie. 
For further comments on this structure, see the section on feminism, below. 
Herbert Bix, "Japan at the End of the Seventies," Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars I2:1 (1980: 
53 -60), 55. 
Ibid., 54. Bix's essay is specifically directed at Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One: Lessons for 
America (London: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
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objective situations, and on a single set of consensus values and value structures 
which appear to mediate the group and individual interactions of the Japanese.' 
Bix also argued that this emphasis on an holistic, homogeneous Japan was directly 
linked to the rise of Japan as a major economic power, and the enormous 
corresponding rise in Western interest in the `secrets' of Japanese success. This, he 
suggested, had intensified the tendency to portray Japan's `difference' to the West in 
absolute terms, ignoring or downplaying those characteristics which did not comply 
with the images of rapid economic growth.' 
This (albeit modest) questioning of the `black box' was echoed and expanded during 
the 1980s by a number of both Western and Japanese scholars. In 1986 for example, 
Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto produced one of the first book -length challenges 
to `homogeneous Japan,' in their study, Images of Japanese Society!' Like Bix, 
Mouer and Sugimoto were concerned by the extent to which knowledge of Japan 
revolved around particular, selective assumptions about the essential nature of 
Japanese society and identity: those emphasising cultural homogeneity, behavioural 
uniformity, the absence or avoidance of conflict, the sanctity of hierarchy and the 
pre -given, `structural' character ascribed to Japanese interpersonal relations (e.g., as 
represented in Nakane's `vertical society')." The result, they argued, was a 
`monolithic' conception of the Japanese individual, which marginalises and excludes 
the experiences of Japanese people (e.g., women, Ainu people, burakumin and 
Chinese/Korean minorities, among others) who do not easily fit its categorisations.° 
Ibid., 54. 
Ibid., 58. 
Ross Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society: A Study in the Social Construction 
of Reality (London: KPI Limited, 1986). 
Ibid., 54. 
Ibid., 55 
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"In a manner not too dissimilar to the way in which economic man and political man 
are conceptualised," Mouer and Sugimoto wrote, "we are given a rather uniform 
Japanese man. The probability that any two Japanese may have been produced from 
different moulds is never seriously examined." '' Once established, the authors 
argued, this image of `Japanese man' is posited against an equally monolithic 
conceptualisation of `Western man' who is assumed to be everything Japanese man 
is not (i.e., individualistic, open and egalitarian)." 
Mouer and Sugimoto's challenge to this image of Japanese people was itself 
conducted from an orthodox social science viewpoint, which utilised numerous 
statistical, linguistic, and economic studies to evaluate whether there was indeed any 
sound foundation to the group model, and the patterns of `Japanese' social behaviour 
derived from it. But it provided some interesting results. Their work showed for 
example, that, on the evidence of available social scientific literature, Japanese 
people could be represented as both group oriented and capable of supposedly 
`Western' traits such as spontaneity, autonomy and individual self -interest, according 
to the specific circumstances at hand.15 Similarly, their study threw doubt on the 
quintessentially `homogenous' nature of Japanese life and society, illustrating 
instead, strong class divisions, significant regional variation, and vibrant sites of 
social and political activism.1ó These findings Ied Mouer and Sugimoto to ponder 
another, important issue: namely, the extent to which particular images of reality 
become self -fulfilling so that, in John Vasquez's terms, "new information that 
conforms to existing images tends to be emphasised, and information that is 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 62. 
Ibid., 200. 
Ibid., 99-128. 
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dissonant with the images is often not seen, ignored, or explained away." " Their 
conclusions, in this regard, are significant in light of the themes canvassed by this 
thesis (especially Chapter Five). In particular the conclusion that the dominant 
Japanese image of `reality' had become so ingrained in orthodox thinking that it 
promoted particular patterns of behaviour within Japanese society which sought to 
compliment that 'reality.''' 
Since Mouer and Sugimoto's work was first published, the task of investigating the 
possibility of different Japanese social realities has been taken up by a number of 
Japanese Studies specialists. Today, there is an ever -expanding literature on Japan 
that continues the project of revealing the experiences and perspectives of those who 
have found little or no representation within orthodox categories. Some of this 
literature openly echoes the more 'philosophical,' themes discussed in the previous 
chapter; some of it simply concentrates on revealing and discussing what one scholar 
John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1983), 78. There is an interesting parallel to be drawn, I suggest, between Vasquez's 
1983 study of power- politics Realism and Images of Japanese Society. Both works confront a 
dominant, taken 
- for - granted representation of reality (in one case, the behaviour of Japanese people; in 
the other, the behaviour of states in the international system), and show it to be, at best, a one -sided 
and highly selective image of that reality. Moreover, both do so in the terms associated with `good' 
orthodox social scientific technique; i.e., on the evidence of available literature and its records of the 
`facts.' 
Mouer and Sugimoto were able to show, for example (via survey data) how this tendency is 
particularly apparent in the assumed correlation between Japanese group -orientation and Japanese 
economic success - with very powerful results for Japanese labour relations. "Attributing Japan's 
remarkable economic growth largely to uniquely Japanese cultural traits," they argued, '`encourages 
workers to accept other forms of discipline associated with tradition, and this acceptance in itself can 
shape the work force into something more closely resembling the ideal worker advocated by 
management." Mouer and Sugimoto, Images of Japanese Society, 169. This tactic, the authors argue, 
is also utilised by non -Japanese people; for example, by Australian businessmen who have invoked the 
stereotype of Japanese work practices in their attempts to combat trade unionism at home. Ibid., 170. 
Similarly, they write, the popular notion of Japan as "uniquely unique," (and therefore inaccessible to 
foreign understanding) has been utilised, to powerful effect, in Japan's dealings with the world: e.g., 
during the 'bashing' years of Japan's relationship with the United States, when Japanese trade 
negotiators and commentators were prone to explain criticism of Japanese economic and business 
practices as `culturally' ignorant (and therefore, racist) Ibid., 171. 
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has termed the "other Japan." 19 In either case the importance of this literature is its 
exposure of Japanese `realities' which make it difficult, if not impossible to adhere to 
a unified, homogeneous and unchanging image of the Japanese state - as, for 
example, a `black box' in the international system of states, whose behaviour is 
described and prescribed according to a given set of assumptions. To put it another 
way, if we accept that there are multiple `Japanese' realities, we accept that there can 
be multiple `Japanese' perspectives on the world and on Japan's international role. It 
is this acceptance in the work of critical Japanese Studies which connects it to the 
CST/IR agenda outlined in the previous chapter. 
Consequently, for the remainder of this chapter, I will address two particular sites at 
which critical Japanese Studies has confronted the dominant `Japan' in this broad 
CST context. And while the categories chosen here - gender and race - do not 
exhaust, by any means, the possibilities for speaking about `other Japans,' they do 
represent particularly vibrant sources of contemporary debate over (a) what it is to he 
`Japanese,' and (b) how these meanings might impact upon Japan's international 
role. In particular, the discussion of these issues within contemporary Japanese 
Studies contradicts both the `homogeneous' image of Japan, and the broader 
Realist/neo- Realist assertion that anything more than an homogeneous Japan is 
superfluous to the consideration of Japan's post -Cold War international role. 
2. Feminism, Japanese Studies and International Relations. 
When feminists in the 1960s and 1970s began to challenge and question the notion of 
specific gender roles in (Western) society, they did so via a broad principle that 
9 Joe Moore, introduction to Joe Moore (ed.), The Other Japan: Conflict, Compromise and Resistance 
Since 1945. (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), ix -x. 
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remains important in the CST approaches to International Relations outlined in the 
previous chapter - namely, that there is nothing irrevocable or unchangeable about 
social roles or human social practices per se. Consequently, even as feminist 
movements continue to grow and diversify, they have remained broadly connected to 
the insistence that gendered divisions of labour, social standing and political power 
cannot be derived from or justified by any irreducible, foundationalist `facts' 
contained within `history,' social tradition, or `human nature.' Rather, as feminists 
around the world have noted, the marginalisation and/or subordination of women in 
everyday life is absolutely integral to the `theoretical' processes by which established 
political and social practices are given their `real' meaning.20 
This point is, of course, particularly important in an International Relations context, 
where, for many feminist thinkers and writers, the process of breaking down gender 
barriers is not simply about creating more space for women to participate in the 
world of diplomacy and inter -state relations. Rather, it is about showing how the 
very definition of "what matters" in International Relations replicates the gendered 
hierarchies established in theoretical traditions that have seen "man" become "the 
exclusive interpreter and keeper of various interrelated contracts of importance to 
other "men" and their creations of nation states and theories." 21 As Sandra 
Whitworth puts it: 
Feminists who [have] sought merely to uncover the activities of women in 
international relations most surely have been disappointed and only able to lament the 
continued under -representation of women in these spheres. Feminists who seek to 
uncover the ways in which international institutions contribute to the creation and 
J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global 
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 19. 
Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1994). 82. 
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maintenance of particular gender relations, by contrast, may discover that while 
women as real living human beings are often nowhere to be found, understandings of 
their appropriate relationships and behaviour abound in the practices of international 
relations. 
It is in this context that feminist writers and thinkers have sought to disrupt some of 
the more established discursive practices of a Realism which accords no visibility to 
women as agents in the processes that define war and peace, order and security. 
Some of this work has echoed the textual strategies discussed in the previous chapter, 
by drawing attention to the gendered assumptions that permeate the work of IR's 
`great texts.' Thus, Christine Sylvester has pointed to the way in which thinkers such 
as Machiavelli, and later, Hobbes and Rousseau, assume the distinction between the 
public realm of the state, and the private sphere of the home.23 This distinction, she 
argues, has seen men and women traditionally positioned within different "civil 
spheres" of existence, to the extent that: 
"Women" were in a household -based civil sector and "men" were the nationals on 
whose behalf the state conducted international politics. Since "men" were also the 
legal heads of households, they had a foot in each possible demarcated sphere. 
"Women," by contrast, were sequestered in the texts of these philosophical 
authorities.' 
In this way, Realist "Statecraft" becomes "Mancraft," not only because the 
institutionalised forums of power and prestige remain dominated by men, but 
because the particular attributes valorised and privileged by Realism in confronting a 
violent, anarchical world `out there' remain the `male' ones of objectivity, autonomy 
Sandra Whitworth, Feminism and International Relations: Towards a Political Economy of Gender 
in Interstate and Non -Governmental Institutions (London: MacMillan, 1994), 3 -4. 
Ibid., 80. 
Ibid., 25. 
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and tough- mindedness - not `female' subjectivity, weakness and emotion!' The 
experiences of women are thus marginalised and forgotten, because they are not seen 
as relevant in the realm of international politics where, as J. Ann Tickner notes, the 
characteristics associated with a culturally dominant, "hegemonic" masculinity "are 
projected onto the behaviour of states whose success as international actors is 
measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self -help and 
autonomy." 26 
A feminist scholarship which confronts these practices then, also confronts the 
origins and legitimacy of social and political institutions. Instead of the pre- assumed 
hierarchy that Realism ascribes to structure and agency, the relationship between 
structure and agency is brought back into focus!' As a result, feminist scholars of IR 
have also been able to re -ask the question of what /who matters in an IR context, 
often by drawing upon a broad literature on and/or by women in other, related areas 
such as history, political and social theory, and development studies.!' Through these 
accounts of women's lives, work and relationships women begin to "re- appear" in 
the processes and relations of global life; often as victims, but also as participants 
and actors; especially in non -governmental, counter -hegemonic movements for 
change such as environmental groups, peace groups and human rights movements. 
In the process, as Jan Jindy Pettman has observed, feminism has split and re- grouped, 
and produced different kinds of theorising about gender, that have differing 
resonance in relation to particular topics or approaches in IR. Thus: 
Ibid. 
Tickner, Gender in International Politics, 6 -7. 
Whitworth, Feminism and International Relations, 50 -51. 
e Ibid., 56. 
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radical feminists and others working on male violence have helped document gender - 
specific violence across state and community borders, and at times joined in uneasy 
ways with liberal rights rhetoric to argue women's rights as human rights. Socialist 
and marxist feminists have raised significant questions about the nature of women's 
power and politics. In recent years some of these tendencies have metamorphosed 
through debates within feminism informed by attention to difference /s among and 
between women, between first and third world women for example. Here black, 
ethnic minority and 'third world' feminists have called on first world feminists to 
examine their /our own class, cultural and national locations, and strengthened moves 
:9 
towards internationalising the feminist account. 
For Pettman, the emergence of these different (and sometimes conflicting) feminist 
concerns is a positive development, which points to the sheer accumulation, energy 
and interest of feminist scholarship that has begun to "put pressure on the IR 
borderlands." 30 Like Sylvester, Tickner and Whitworth, she acknowledges too, that 
pressure is also being exerted from within, as CST perspectives deploy theoretical 
moves both useful and familiar to a feminist perspective, by drawing more 
generalised attention to the politics of knowledge making - "asking how we come 
to ask the questions we ask in/as IR, pointing to other voices, those not heard in their 
views of the world." 31 By asking these questions in a more open context (i.e., of all 
categories of `otherness' rather than just gendered ones), Pettman suggests, CST has 
helped to move feminist inquiry beyond its initial concern to illustrate the gendered 
nature of International Relations, and push for female inclusion in previously closed 
arenas.32 Increasingly, she argues, feminist scholars in International Relations have 
come to recognise gender as only one constitutive part of multiple and possibly 
Jan Jindy Pettman, "Gendering International Relations," Australian Journal of International Affairs 
47:1 (1993): 47 -60, on p. 48. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 49. 
Pettman, "Border Crossings /Shifting Identities," in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R, Alker (eds.), 
Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996), 275. 
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conflicting identities - leaving little room for complacency within (particularly 
Western) feminist scholarship, as women everywhere are forced to confront their 
own possible complicity in other repressive and/or displacing configurations of 
power based on class, ethnicity, nationality or even age." 
Feminism in Japanese Studies 
The themes identified above as generally important in feminist re- workings of IR are, 
I suggest, of special relevance to Japanese Studies. Despite their comparative neglect 
in mainstream social and political histories of Japan, notions of gender have 
generated wide -ranging and complex debates in Japanese society, and have been 
important, if often implicitly so, in conceptualisations of Japan's role in the world. 
The understanding of (Realist) statecraft -as- mancraft is undoubtedly important in 
understanding this role, but so are some of the more specific ways in which gendered 
divisions of subjectivity have operated in Japanese society. 
As the historian Sharon Sievers has pointed out for example, the emergence of a 
significant (if not very coherent) feminist agenda in late nineteenth/early twentieth 
century Japan was very much part of the intense public discourse on the future and 
direction of Japan's modernisation into a "European- style" nation state." When 
Japan's ruling elite embarked on the task of re- modelling the Japanese state in 
concordance with Western European conceptualisations of world order and security, 
Sievers argues, they found themselves under considerable pressure to improve the 
legal, political and educational status of Japanese women - both from `outside,' as 
Ibid., 275. 
Sharon L. Sievers, Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), 10 -11. 
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Japan encountered Western notions of modernity and civilisation,35 and from `inside,' 
as the rapid flow of foreign technology, culture and ideas into Japan saw many 
women mobilise to present their own agendas for political and social change. 
Political activists and intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
such as Kishida Toshiko and Fukuda Hideko used the burgeoning popular rights 
movement to argue for the inclusion of women in the changes sweeping Japanese 
society.36 Lecture and study groups, "freedom houses" and other cooperative 
societies aimed at expanding women's political interests and participation began to 
proliferate; and women workers, particularly in the textile industries, began to 
organise more formally in the effort to achieve better wages and working 
conditions. 7 
Inevitably, these efforts were subject to hostility and repression from the male - 
dominated Japanese state elite which, despite some initiatives relating specifically to 
women, such as compulsory education, remained reluctant to engage women in the 
changes sweeping Meiji society. At a time when the pursuit of national unity and 
stability were seen as critical to augmenting Japan's power and status in the world 
system, women's attempts to engage with the modernising process and redefine their 
roles and options were seen by many as potentially destabilising, and even dangerous. 
The result was an increasingly co- ordinated series of manoeuvres by the Meiji 
oligarchy designed to control and restrict the modernisation of Japanese women 
' According to Sievers, the deference accorded to American women, even in the 19th century, 
impressed and puzzled Japan's elite. "The way women are treated here," commented an attendant to 
the 1860 Japanese envoy to the U.S., "is like the way parents are treated in our country." Yanagawa, 
cited in Sievers, Flowers in Salt, 1. 
Some prominent male intellectuals and academics such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinori also 
argued for improvements in the treatment of women - but without necessarily advocating equality. 
Sievers, Flowers in Salt, 18 -20, and 30 -45. 
Sievers, Flowers in Salt, 83 -86. 
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ranging from official guidelines decreeing the `proper' physical appearance and mode 
of dress,?8 to more direct restrictions on political participation.39 Finally, in 1898, the 
Meiji Civil Code sought to confine the role of women to the home once and for all, 
by denying them the status of independent legal persons.40 The broad framework for 
these directives, as Chizuko Ueno and others have argued, was the popular concept 
of the Japanese family, or a structure in which personal roles and status are both 
fixed and gender dependent, emphasising vertical relationships between parents and 
children, the ultimate power of the (invariably male) household head, and the 
importance of continuing the family name.42 
In short, Japanese women's lives were crafted to fit in with concepts of statehood and 
citizenship not at all dissimilar to the Western philosophies and political theories 
which defined `statecraft' as `mancraft.' Here too, familiar dualisms were brought 
into play - between public /private, modern/traditional, and active /passive - to 
delineate the roles men and women were expected to fulfil. The result, as Tessa 
Morris -Suzuki has pointed out, was that whereas modernity and national power in 
Japan came to be emphatically associated with masculinity and the `public' domain, 
women, on the other hand, were seen as the custodians of tradition, and their domain 
- the home - the site of `feminine' continuity and stability.43 And, while women 
were portrayed in official discourse as equal participants in Japan's modernisation, 
For example, the 1872 ban on short hair for women reflected the Meiji elite's dilemma of needing 
Japan to appear `civilised' to the West, while insulating women from the effects of modern change. 
Hence, 'feudal' practices such as tooth -blackening and eyebrow -shaving were discouraged along with 
`modern' short hair. Sievers, Flowers in Salt, 14 -15. 
In 1890, women were included under Article 5 of the Police Security Regulations, effectively 
banning them from any form of political activity. Sievers, Flowers in Salt, 110. 
Ibid., 111. 
Chizuko Ueno, "Modern Patriarchy and the Formation of the Japanese National State," in Denoon et. 
al., Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic to Postmodern (op. cit., 1996), 215. 
Ibid., 217, and Sievers, Flowers in Salt, I l t. 
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with their own role to play in the strength and unity of Japan as a nation 
(predominantly as producers of sons and teachers of patriotism),°` it was a role which 
could never be confused with the male destiny of nation building - of `statecraft.' 
Morris- Suzuki adds a further, interesting dimension to this perspective, by pointing 
out that the dichotomy between the household as a (female) site of tradition, and the 
public (male) realm of technological and social change was reflected not just in Meiji 
Iegislation, but also in more subtle shifts of industrial policy: such as the gradual re- 
delegation of traditionally `female' work (e.g., silk production) to men, as production 
processes began to adapt modem (and therefore `male') technology.d5 For all this, the 
Meiji distinction between female (private) and male (public) spheres of agency, even 
when backed up by legislative and industrial practice, was largely an imaginary one: 
Women's lives, like men's, were transformed by the social and economic changes of 
the Meiji and Taishô eras. Women formed the larger part of the factory workforce 
until World War I and also played a crucial and often neglected role in managing and 
keeping the accounts of the tens of thousands of small family firms which dominated 
Japanese manufacturing and commerce throughout the early decades of the century. 
But the concept of woman as source of continuity, and man as agent of change, 
ab 
became a particularly enduring leitmotiv in evolving notions of nationhood. 
In the postwar period, gendered concepts of modernity and tradition and the social 
roles defined by them would become even more imaginary, as Japanese women 
acquired full civil rights and greatly expanded opportunities for work and education 
under the Occupation." The changed postwar status of women was interwoven with 
fundamental shifts in economic and demographic patterns, as self -employed family 
Tessa Morris -Suzuki, Re- Imagining Japan (op. cit., 1998), 112. 
Sievers, Flowers in Salt, 112. 
Morris-Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 113. 
Ibid. 
John Dower, Embracing Defeat (op. cit., 1999), 128 -30. 
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households gave way to nuclear, wage- earning households, and enormous numbers 
of Japanese people began to migrate from rural to urban areas!' The straitened 
economic conditions of the late 1940s and early 1950s also saw a dramatic increase 
in the number of women working outside the home.89 
Yet despite these profound socio- economic changes, existing images of gender in 
postwar Japan and the social relations they privilege have remained strangely 
resistant to modification, leading other scholars to contemplate their influence on the 
problems and opportunities faced by Japanese women today. In particular, critical 
attention has been focused on the way in which the concept of ie (family structure, or 
household) enshrined in prewar and wartime Japan continues to be privileged in 
contemporary Japanese economic, political and social life. Both before and during 
the war, government propaganda such as the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education 
(Kyôiku Chokugo) and later, the proclamation on the "Way of the Subject" (Shinmin 
no Michi) repeatedly imprinted the image of the ie on the public imagination, 
conflating filial obedience and harmonious family relations with good national 
subjectivity!' Notions of Japanese homogeneity and superiority were encapsulated in 
the notion of kokutai, or `national polity,' by which all Japanese people were 
included in a unique family state united around the emperor, in a structure which 
Eiko Shinotsuka, "Women Workers in Japan: Past, Present, Future," in Joyce Gelb & Marion L. 
Palley (eds.), Women of Japan and Korea (Temple University Press, 1994), 96 -98, and Sandra 
Buckley, "Altered States: The Body Politics of Being- Woman, "' in Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as 
History, (op. cit., 1993), 350. 
The majority tended to be unmarried women who quit work upon either marriage or, at the latest, 
following the birth of a first child. However, the increased demand for labour during the high growth 
years of the late 1950s and 1960s saw more women begin to return to work after marriage and 
childbirth; a pattern which was reinforced by the restructuring of the Japanese economy towards 
`tertiary' industries subsequent to the 1973 oil crises. The recent recession notwithstanding, this 
pattern continues to characterise women's employment in the 1990s, as reflected in the persistent "M 
curve" in female employment statistics. Eiko Shinotsuka, Josei ga Hataraku Shakai (Working 
Women in Society; Tokyo: Keisô Shobô, 1994), 18 -22. 
Gavan McCormack, Introduction to Denoon et. al. (eds.), Multicultural Japan (op. cit., 1996), 1 -2. 
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mirrored traditional, hierarchical relations between the (male) household head, and 
the other members of the idealised extended family!` 
As many writers on Japan have pointed out, the ie structure, like the `group model,' 
'arnae,' and other concepts invoked to explain Japanese society, is a highly selective, 
if not "invented" representation of Japanese social reality.52 Despite this, as the 
feminist scholar Etsuko Yamada argues, such images remain central to contemporary 
understandings of Japan. 53 If anything, she suggests, concepts such as ie have been 
reconfigured in the postwar period of Japan's economic ascent to suit new definitions 
of national interest, for example, through modem corporate practices which maintain 
the prewar ideal of dividing work and social roles along strictly gendered lines!` The 
prewar metaphor of the "country -as- family" (kazoku kuni) which obligated men to 
work outside the home (often as soldiers) and women to give birth and raise their 
children to be good citizens, has, Yamashita argues, been exchanged in the postwar 
era for that of the "company -as- family" (kazoku kigyô), according to which `company 
soldiers' in the service of large -scale corporations dedicate their working and social 
lives to the good of their company, while women take care of the housework and the 
children at home 55 In this way, the assumption that gender roles and relationships 
should be rigidly structured to serve the good of the larger state /corporate whole 
remains intact - encouraged, as Yamashita points out, by state and corporate 
Etsuko Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei: Shokuba to Kazoku no Henyô" (Women in Postwar 
Society: Changes in the Family and the Workplace), in Kazuko Tsurumi and Yamashita Etsuko (eds.), 
Otoko to Onna no Jikû (Timespace of Gender; Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 1993), 618. 
Chizuko Ueno, "Modern Patriarchy and the Formation of the Japanese National State," in Denoon et. 
al. (eds.), Multicultural Japan (op. cit., 1996), 220. 
Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei," 617. 
' Ibid., 619. 
Ibid., 620. Incidentally, the chacater for zoku in these expressions is not (as might be anticipated), 
the second character of the Japanese word for `family' (kazoku), which denotes `membership,' but a 
different character also read as `tsku,' or `sunawachi,' denoting conformity or settledness. 
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practices which reward those who conform to the social expectations of the ie norm.' 
As indicated above however, the actual patterns of women's employment in Japan, 
particularly in the postwar period, have moved very far away from the ie ideal. From 
a feminist perspective however, particularly one attuned to the broader CST 
awareness of theory as practice, the `theoretical' images privileged in ie ideology 
continue to pose problems for women, especially when it comes to career opportunity 
and job security!' What is even more interesting however, from a feminist IR 
perspective, is the way in which these gendered assumptions have been equally 
affirmed and replicated in dominant images of Japan as an international actor - 
most especially, in its image in the West as a global economic `superpower.' 
As political economists from Chalmers Johnson to Robert Cox have acknowledged, 
Japan's rapid postwar modernisation and high growth were achieved via a particular 
structure of production relations in which a broad economic 'periphery' of small and 
medium -sized enterprises provided 'flexible' labour supplies and conditions for the 
For example, in postwar legislation that grants significant tax concessions and special allowances for 
non -earning spouses, and "corporate welfare" such as company- sponsored housing and leisure 
activities which '`gather families in under the company umbrella." Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to 
Josei," 621 -22. 
Ueno, "Women and the Family in Transition in Postindustrial Japan," in Gelb and Parry (eds.), 
Women of Japan and Korea: Continuity and Change (op. cit., 1994), 27. Legal reforms such as the 
1986 Equal Opportunity Law have done little to rectify the situation, because they fail to impose 
adequate sanctions on firms which fail to promote women or place them in career -track employment. 
Teruko Inoue, "Nihon no Joseigaku to 'Sei Yakuwari "' (`Gender Roles' and Womens' Studies in 
Japan, in Teruko Inoue and Chizuko Ueno (eds.), Nihon no Feminizumu (III): Seiyakuwari (Japanese 
Feminism III: Gender Roles; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 16 -17. Similarly, there is little or no 
legal provision in Japan regarding issues such as child care or maternity leave for full -time workers, 
because of the implicit assumption that it is `natural' for women to put child -rearing ahead of career 
opportunities. Nakano Mami, "Ten Years linder the Equal Employment Opportunity Law," in 
AMPO: Voices From the Japanese Women's Movement (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 
71 -72. The superficiality of women's integration into the economic `core' as equal participants has 
been further exposed in the past few years, with women, both at the core and the periphery, usually the 
first victims of recession -prompted redundancy. Yamashita notes that any of the more promising 
trends of the late I980s and early 1990s, such as the increased hiring of women for career -track 
employment by large corporations, are currently in decline again. Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to 
Josei," 621. 
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conglomerate core as it developed through the 1950s and 1960s.58 Moreover, labour 
relations within this periphery (which continues to constitute the majority of Japanese 
production processes) are characterised by lower wages, the predominance of part- 
time and/or temporary employment, and minimised labour conditions (e.g., 
insurance, Ieave and workers' compensation).59 The point is, of course, that the 
majority of workers within this periphery are women, who have traditionally been 
more willing to accept the conditions on offer, due to constraints of time, education 
and opportunity.fi0 
In contrast, the most readily acknowledged characteristics of `Japanese' business 
management have only ever applied, in reality, to a minority of Japanese workers, 
within which women comprise an even smaller minority. These include the 
conditions accorded by large -scale Japanese corporations to their (overwhelmingly 
male) permanent workforces, such as lifetime employment, company -specific 
unionism and seniority -based promotion.61 Yet during the 1970s and 1980s when 
Japan's economic strength was at its peak, works such as Ezra Vogel's Japan as 
Number One, 1979), Robert Cole's Work, Mobility and Participation (1979), 
William Ouchi's Theory Z (1981) and James Abegglen's Kaisha: The Japanese 
Corporation (1985), represented precisely these practices, and the rather narrow 
sector of corporate Japan that they apply to, as the central reality of Japan's economic 
Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order," International Journal 44 
(1989: 824 -862), 845. 
Dorrine Kondo also explains these conditions, in Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of 
Identity in a Japanese Workplace (London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 35 -37. 
Yamashita, "Sengo Shakai to Josei," 622. 
Andrew Gordon, "Contests for the Workplace," in Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History, (op. cit., 
1993), 391. 
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miracle.62 In the process, Japanese women were doubly marginalised - not just `at 
home' by attitudes and expectations that restricted their participation in the economic 
core, but in images of Japan as an international actor that privileged, and continue to 
privilege a specifically male reality over the economic and social spheres in which 
women do participate. 
In a 1992 work entitled Feminizumu Mondai no Tenkan (The Changing Problems of 
Feminism), Kanai Yoshiko has confronted problems such as these by examining the 
potential for existing sites of resistance for Japanese women as part of their 
integration with economic and social change in the world.63 Kanai, who has written 
extensively on feminist theory and political movements, is particularly interested in 
the pursuit of what she calls "alternative relativity" (kankeisei no oruterunatibu), or 
interrelated modes of alternative economic, political and social Iife. Kanai sees 
Japanese women as a particularly important force in pursuing these alternatives, 
given their already established record of participation in local and regional initiatives 
such as recycling drives, consumer co- operatives, and environmental and peace 
movements 64 At the same time, she acknowledges that these spheres of action have 
largely been ignored by those wielding conventional political power in Japan. One of 
the problems, Kanai suggests, is that many local and regional organisations in Japan 
are currently developed by and for `housewives' whose participation is motivated 
largely by an immediate concern for the wellbeing of themselves and their families, 
and who have not thought directly or deeply enough about the broader 
political /social /economic structures which generate the need for their participation in 
Of these texts, Vogel's was the only one which explicitly proposed Japan as a model for the United 
States to follow. 
Yoshiko Kanai, Feminizumu Mondai no Tenkan (The Changing Problems of Feminism; Tokyo: 
Keisô Shobô, 1992), 86. 
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the first placeas 
Kanai's argument is interesting, I suggest, because it is clearly looking for other 
dimensions and sources of agency for Japanese women beyond the major (postwar) 
Japanese feminist concern with achieving parity within the male- dominated 
institutions of conventional political and economic power. From her perspective, 
women cannot be satisfied with working for change within existing parameters. 
Rather, they need to be aware of broader currents of thought and practice which 
challenge the status quo at the international, as well as the national and local level, 
from a variety of standpoints: ecological, racial, and economic. Women also need to 
work harder, Knnai argues, towards achieving a more inclusive, less `gendered' 
approach to issues of equality and security.66 "A good feminist politics," she writes: 
is not one which simply encloses all problems within the extant prism of `women's 
problems.' The `politics of sex' cannot only be about politicising `women's 
problems;' rather, it needs to achieve a more global perspective that takes into 
account many alternative patterns of work and economy.' 
Kanai's sentiments are echoed by other feminist writers who have turned their 
attention to the global dimensions of Japanese feminism - in particular, the extent 
to which `women's problems' connect to Japan's postwar status as a major economic 
actor in the world system. One result of this shift has been the enthusiasm with 
which feminist thought and practice in Japan has begun to debate what Ôgoshi Aiko 
terms a "feminism of human rights" (finken no feminizumu).68 While the theoretical 
Ibid., 88. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 90-93. 
Ibid., 90. 
Aiko Ôgoshi, "Kindai Nihon no Feminizumu no Kadai: `Sabetsu,' `Kankyô,' 'Ajia.' (Issues for 
Feminism in Modern Japan: `Discrimination,' `Environment,' `Asia') in The Femirôgu Association 
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underpinnings of `human rights feminism' are still being explored and developed 
from a number of angles, it is broadly centred on a shared perception that more needs 
to be done in Japan to understand and confront the ways in which discrimination 
against and exploitation of Japanese women is being replicated among other 
members of Japanese society, and also abroad through the internationalisation of 
Japanese economic practices. More controversially, it seeks to re -cast Japanese 
women as perpetrators, as well as victims of these internationalised patterns of 
repression and discrimination. 
A particularly important example of Japan's role in globalised patterns of 
exploitation and discrimination is the internationalisation of the sex trade. When 
Japanese companies began to invest more heavily abroad in Southeast Asia during 
the 1970s, Japanese tourism also increased, and with it, the phenomena of all -male 
`company holidays' (kaisha ryokô) to locations such as China, South Korea and 
Thailand. Purchasing sex on these holidays is not only permitted, but often 
encouraged by superiors and tour operators, as illustrated by the coining of the term 
"prostitution tour" (baishun tsûa, or baishun ryokô).b9 During the 1980s however, 
this trend became more internalised, as more women began to come to Japan from 
Southeast Asia, Latin America and even Russia, to work as hostesses, exotic dancers 
and prostitutes. Many of the Japayuki -san ( "Miss Going -to- Japans ") actually come 
to Japan on legitimate visas, due to a clause in Japanese immigration laws which 
(eds.), Fenzirógu 5: Fenzinizumu no Kadai (Femirôgu 5: Topics for Feminism; Kyoto: Genbunsha, 
1994, I53 -175), 156. 
Kyôko Kikuchi, "Shûen Toshite no Gaikokujin Josei Rôdôsha" (Foreign Women Workers on the 
Periphery), in Tsurumi and Yamashita (eds.), Otoko to Onna no Jikû, (Timespace of Gender; op. cit., 
1993), 573 -74. That this remains a contemporary phenomena is illustrated by the controversy 
generated over a 1994 Japanese tourism company's publication of the Tai Baishun Handobukku 
(Thailand Prostitution Guidebook), which provides directions and recommendations about brothels in 
Thailand to prospective Japanese purchasers. "Protest Over Brothel Guide," South China Morning 
Post 20 /01/1995, from Reuters Email News Services (Article no: 000585113953). 
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allow entry to work under the category of "religion, sport, and entertainment," in 
contrast to the huge, and even more peripheralised population of male foreign 
workers (gaikokujin rôdôsha) in Japan,70 who are mostly employed illegally at heavy 
manual jobs in construction and manufacturing. Despite this, the Japayuki are subject 
to the same exploitation and discrimination suffered by their male counterparts: 
lower wages than their Japanese colleagues, penalties for time missed due to illness 
or injury, and chronic overwork." Moreover, many of the women are tricked into 
coming to Japan by agents who promise them more legitimate `entertainment' 
employment as dancers or waitresses; once arrived, their passports are confiscated 
and they are forced into prostitution in order to pay back exorbitant agency `bonds' 
and transport costs.'' 
That Japanese feminism is becoming more aware of the broad context of these issues 
- i.e., the context of the general exploitation of Third World labour in a globalised 
economy - is illustrated not only in recent scholarship.' Movements which initially 
began struggling in the 1970s for government acknowledgement and restriction of 
"prostitution tours" by male company workers for example, have gradually 
broadened their agenda to include activities such as promoting the human rights of 
Both Japayuki and the more common term for foreign labourers, gaikokujin rôdôsha, are technically 
gender -neutral; however, the former always refers to female workers, while the latter is usually used 
for male workers. 
Kikuchi, "Shûen Toshite no Gaikokujin Josei Rôdôsha," 591 -93. 
Akiko Yamashita, "Sei rôdô wo dô kangaeru ka: sekushuariti to bunka to keizai no kankei" (How Do 
We Consider Sexual Labour? Drawing Connections Between Sexuality, Culture and Economics), in 
The Femirôgu Association (eds.), Femirôgu 5: Feminizumu no Kadai, (op. cit., 1994, 130 -148), 134- 
35. English accounts of internationalised prostitution in Japan include Okura Yuri, "Promoting 
Prostitution," and Murata Noriko, "The Trafficking of Women," both in AMPO: Voices From the 
Japanese Women's Movement, (op. cit., 1996). 
Such as Ôgoshi's essay, op. cit., and Ueno Chizuko's 1998 Nashonarizumu to Gendâ (Engendering 
Nationalism; Tokyo: Seidosha, 1998), which is discussed below. Kanai has also commented directly 
on this issue, pointing out that "if women in the first world can achieve their liberation only through 
exporting the problems related to the sexual division of labour in their own society, this is nothing but 
globalisation of the structure of sexism." Yoshiko Kanai, interviewed by Etsuko Kaji in "Politicised 
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exploited (mostly female) workers in Japanese -owned factories overseas, and for 
more accountability on the part of Japanese foreign investors towards problems such 
as environmental damage and the dislocation of small -scale local economies in 
regions that attract Japanese capital." Within Japan, organisations such as Asian 
Labourers Solidarity, the Asian Women's Association, and the Association of 
Concern for Asian Women in Japan address a wide range of concerns associated with 
the transnationalisation of the Japanese economy; including the economic and human 
rights of (male) foreign construction and factory labourers working in the Japanese 
black economy, Southeast Asian women trapped in the domestic sex industry, and 
the plight of Southeast Asian `imported brides' in rural Japan.75 They have also 
campaigned successfully for policy changes regarding sex tourism, such as the recent 
criminalisation of the overseas purchase of sex from minors.76 
Even more recently, Japanese feminism has started to address one of the most painful 
legacies of Japan's modem history: the "comfort women" who were drafted into 
brothels set up in Southeast Asía by the Japanese Imperial Army prior to and during 
WWII. Although exact numbers are not known, it is estimated that between 80,000 
and 200,000 women, of whom about 80% were Korean, were `recruited,' many of 
them forcibly, to serve as sex labourers to Japanese forces in Japan's occupied 
Women, Womanised Politics: Feminism in Japan," AMPO: Japan -Asia Quarterly Review 22:2 -3 
(1991: 26 -30), 27. 
Kaji, "Politicised Women, Womanised Politics," 30. 
See, for example, the special edition of AMPO Japan -Asia Quarterly Review (19:4, 1988), which 
contains essays on this issue, including Yamashita, "Japan imports brides: can isolated farmers buy 
consolation ?" (22 -3I), 28 -29; Shizuko Oshima, "Gathering the Fires of HELP" (32 -39), and Eiichiro 
Ishiyama, "Moving Beyond Simple Charity "(40 -43). Ishiyama's article also contains a guide to the 
network of regional organisations addressing issues associated with Asian labour in Japan (Ibid., 42). 
The law, which also criminalises child prostitution and pornography in Japan, was passed by the Diet 
on May 18, 1999. "Bill Banning Child Prostitution, Pornography Enacted;" Kyodo News Service 
Archives at http: / /home.kyodo.co.ip. An English translation of the law is available at the Japanese 
Ministry of Justice website, at http:// www .moojp/ENGLISH/CRAB /Iaw01.htm. 
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territories.'' It was not until the early 1980s however, that the comfort women's 
plight became widely publicised in South Korea; and it took another decade before 
some of the survivors of this policy began to come forward, seeking apology and 
redress through the Japanese courts.78 Their claims were consistently rejected by the 
Japanese government, until conclusive documentary evidence implicating the state 
directly in what McCormack has described as "probably the largest -scale state - 
sponsored rape in history," was unearthed and published in 1992.79 While the 
Japanese government finally admitted "deception, coercion and official involvement" 
in the comfort women scandal in August 1993, it declined to offer any official 
apology or monetary compensation to the women, arguing that all such matters had 
long been settled under Japan's postwar peace settlements with Southeast Asian 
nations.80 Successive administrations have persisted with this stance in the face of 
significant international pressure - including a 1994 recommendation by the 
International Commission of Jurists that the Japanese government formally apologise 
and pay compensation to surviving comfort women.8' 
Both Japanese women and women of other occupied territories (such as Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Burma and the Pacific islands) were also used as comfort women. Chunghee Sara Soh, 
"The Comfort Women Project" (at http: / /userwww.sfsu.edu/- soh/comfortwomen.html (1996 -97), 2. 
The first official action was lunched in December 1991 by a group of thirty five Korean women, 
followed by another group from the Philippines in September 1993. Ueno, Nashonarizumu to Gendâ, 
99. 
McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence, 249. The papers in question were discovered at 
the National Institute for Defence Studies by Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki, and published in the A.sahi 
Shimbun on January 11, 1992 (Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," 3), Until August I993, the 
official government line on the comfort women was that although the prostitution business existed, it 
had been run by private contractors. This position continues to be supported by a powerful coalition of 
conservative politicians and academics, including the controversial "Group to Make New History 
Textbooks" set up by Tokyo University academic Fujioka Nobukatsu. "Many Voices Join in Battle 
over 'Comfort Women'," Japan Times 20/05/1997 ( http:// www .japantimes.co.ip /home.html). 
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Kazuko Watanabe, "Militarism, Colonialism, and the Trafficking of Women: 'Comfort Women' 
Forced Into Sexual Labor for Japanese Soldiers" (in Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars 26:4, 1994, 
sourced online at http: / /csf.colorado.edu/bcas /sample /comfdoc.htm), 3-4. 
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The effects of the comfort women issue on Japanese feminism have been evident in 
the enthusiasm with which non -government associations in Japan, including those 
mentioned above, have campaigned for a formal official apology and compensation 
to the victims, while organising practical support activities such as collecting oral 
testimony from survivors, and providing financial and emotional support for those 
pursuing legal options.82 However, the comfort women's plight has also forced many 
Japanese feminists (and feminists interested in Japan) to confront new and often 
difficult questions, about history, nationhood, citizenship and ethnicity; and about the 
range of ethnical stances that emerge when different narratives of victimisation 
within the category of gender are taken seriously. 
On this latter issue, Chizuko Ueno, one of Japan's most prominent feminist thinkers, 
has argued that Japan's long silence over the comfort women is connected to, among 
other things, the tendency to gloss over (if not omit) the complicity of Japanese 
women (including many early `feminists') in the ideologies and propaganda that 
sanctioned the forced prostitution of women whose marginalised status (as both 
women and colonised peoples) made them the least eligible, and least able to resist 
being used and disposed of in the service of the state.83 The same feminist 
scholarship that has worked to have women acknowledged as agents in Japan's 
history rather than passive, `indoor' recipients of destiny, Ueno suggests, must now 
acknowledge their capacity as co- perpetrators, rather than innocent victims of the 
women system - including the South Korean government, which has discouraged acceptance of AWF 
money by former comfort women. Chung -hee Sara Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," 4 -5. 
Watanabe, "Militarism, Colonialism, and the Trafficking of Women," 7; and Yûko Suzuki, Sensô 
Sekinin to Gendâ: `Jyûshugi Shikan' to Nihongun 'Tanfu' Mondai (War Responsibility and Gender: the 
'Free History' Perspective and the 'Comfort Women' Problem; Tokyo: Miraìsha, 1997), 199 -200. 
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structures that produced the `comfort women.j84 Her comments are echoed by other 
writers like Sayoko Yoneda and Kazue Muta,35 as well as Yûko Suzuki, who has 
written extensively on the comfort women issue. Suzuki is particularly critical of 
what she describes as a tendency, even among Japanese feminists, to settle for 
"second best," resolutions of the comfort women issue (such as the controversial 
Asian Women's Fund) instead of continuing to push for full acknowledgement of the 
government's culpability, b 
There seems little doubt that Japanese feminists will remain committed to the 
struggles for social and political change that have always been integral to feminist 
theory and practice in its broader context. As I have shown, this necessarily involves 
challenging those images of the Japanese state that have marginalised and ignored 
women as passive, insignificant participants. To this extent, Japanese feminism has 
already confronted some of the issues seen as important in Western feminist 
challenges to International Relations - especially the mythical distinctions between 
`male' and `female' categories of social and political agency which lie at the heart of 
Realism's silent assumption of `statecraft as mancraft.' Inevitably however, and as 
Ueno, Nashonárizutnu to Gendâ, 30. As part of her argument, Ueno points to the fervent nationalist 
affiliations of some of Japan's most famous prewar feminists, including Ichikawa Fusae [1893- 19811, 
who was both a prominent prewar campaigner for women's sufferage, and an organiser of the United 
Women's Group, which was created to support the government's National General Mobilisation 
Strategy. Ibid., 39 -42, 
Yoneda's essay examines the nationalist Ieanings of one of Japan's most famous feminists, Hiratsuka 
Raichô (1886 -1971), arguing that her support of the imperial system was not forced upon Hiratsuka 
temporarily during the politically oppressive circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s, but was rather an 
integral part of her rather "bourgeois" feminism, which was centred around the rights of mothers, and 
heavily influenced by Swedish writers such as Ellen Key. Yoneda Sayoko, "Hiratsuka Raichô no 
` sensô sekinin' ron josetsu" (A Preface to the Debate over Hiratsuka Raichô's `War Responsibility'), 
Rekishi Hyôron 4 (1996). Muta Kazue's argument is a more general one, focussed on the need to 
examine how prewar and wartime distinctions between male and female roles in Japanese society, by 
eliminating women from 'direct' participation in the killing fields of WWII, have also subsequently 
helped to absolved them from a sense of responsibility for the war, despite their obvious complicity in 
wartime social and economic structures. Muta, "Senryaku Toshite no Onna" (Women as Strategy), in 
Teruko and Ueno (eds.), Feminism in Japan, Vol. ffi (op. cit.), 117 -18. 
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the comfort women debate illustrates, the re- working of images of Japan to include 
women as significant and powerful agents of change has broadened the feminist 
agenda, opening new categories of identity and victimisation. Japanese feminists 
now find themselves having to make ever more complex distinctions and 
connections, which demand the kind of continuously self -reflexive attitude integral to 
Critical Theory and postmodern approaches, and the general CST challenge to 
orthodox IR. 
One of the best expressions of this development comes from Ueno, who suggests that 
Japanese feminism is currently undergoing `transnationalisation' (kokumin kokka wo 
koeru feminizumu), as it encounters issues and narratives that cannot be dealt with 
within the convenient unit of the nation state. " By 'transnationalisation,' Ueno is not 
speaking of vague (and, to her, facile) concepts of 'international sisterhood' or `world 
citizenship' which, in enveloping us in a sense of international community just as 
"imagined" as that of the nation state" allow us to somehow shuffle off the burden 
of our specific histories. Rather, she writes, a transnationalised feminism is about 
understanding - and taking responsibility for - our identity and capacity for action 
as human beings composed of "a complex bundle of relativities (kankeisei); of 
gender, nationality, occupation, positionality, race, culture, ethnicity and so on. "89 
Just as none of these categories can be escaped from or denied, Ueno argues, neither 
can any one of them ever constitute an exclusive, fixed claim to identity in the world. 
In these terms, Japanese feminism has perhaps begun to understand the 
interwovenness of these categories; and as such I suggest, is emerging as a 
Ueno, Nashonarizumu to Gendâ, 185 -I87. 
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particularly powerful site of critical international theory and practice. 
3. The Myth of the Mono - Ethnic State: Race and Identity in Japan's 
International Relations. 
When theories of International Relations come into contact with the notion of `race,' 
they touch upon a set of assumptions that have gained wide acceptance only in the 
last 150 years or so. As Kwame Anthony Appiah argues, while nearly every known 
human society seems to have had views about what accounted for human and social 
difference, it was in mid -nineteenth century Europe that a "distinctively modern 
understanding of what it was to be a people" emerged90 This understanding, Appiah 
suggests, had at its heart not only the new scientific conceptions of biological 
heredity and evolution being developed by scholars such as Darwin, but also the 
understanding of people as a nation - defined by the shared essence that flows from 
a common cultural and linguistic descent - that had accompanied the emergence of 
modern European states (such as Italy or Germany). 
In this sense, the development of an image of the world as divided into a few, 
radically different ethnic groups, or 'races,' defined in terms of fundamental, 
biologically inheritable, moral and intellectual characteristics was not just an attempt 
to impose some sort of manageable order on the incredible human diversity in the 
world that had been revealed to European society over the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.9` It was also an intellectual framework for practices of inclusion and 
exclusion - practices that could be used to draw the `included' into the community 
of the modern nation -state. In short, concepts of race became increasingly 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Race," in Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin (eds.) Critical Terms 
for Literary .Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 274 -76. 
Morris -Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 81. 
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intertwined with concepts of nation, as illustrated in the work of scholars such as 
George Buffon (1866), who argued that different races developed out of the 
repetition of particular historical experiences, which gradually created diversity out 
of a single human species!' 
It is perhaps a measure of this intertwining of race and nation that, until quite recently 
in International Relations, `race,' along with related concepts such as `culture,' 
`civilisation' and `ethnicity,' has not generally been at the forefront of analysis of the 
essential dynamics of global life. As I explained in Chapters Three and Four, these 
dynamics are understood, first and foremost, in (Realist) terms of "the relative 
position of state units on a systemwide map of capabilities," 93 with the behaviour of 
states being determined by external, systemic forces (i.e., states are presumed to be 
uniform in behaviour, whatever they might be in composition). From this 
perspective, and until relatively recently, race, culture, civilisation and ethnicity have 
been, at best, important only as elements within the ill- defined phenomena of 
"nationalism," which, for most Realists and neo- Realists, functions at most as an 
exacerbator, not a primary cause of the fundamental tensions between states in the 
world system.94 
In the post -Cold War period, this relegation of race to a supplementary determinant 
of conflict between states has, to some extent, been reconsidered. The Balkans crisis, 
the turmoil in Rwanda and the religious /ethnic conflicts in Indonesia, to name a few 
Buffon, cited in Morris -Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 79. 
Sujata Chakrabati Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension," in Josef 
Lapid and Fritz Kratochwil (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996), 85. 
This is Lapid and Kratochwil's analysis of neo- Realist approaches to issues of nationalism, in 
"'Revisiting the 'National:' Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism ?" in Lapid and Kratochwil 
(eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, (op. cit., 1996), 111. 
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of the more obvious examples, suggest that "understandings of what it is to he a 
people" are no longer easily fitted into the extant territorial boundaries of nation 
states. Some of these understandings assume the same alignment between territory 
and ethnic /cultural identity that intertwines `race' with 'nation,' and from there, with 
the notion of the state. Others however, are less obvious. For example, in the case of 
the Ainu people of Japan (discussed below), or Aboriginal people in Australia, who 
can be depicted in terms of a hugely complex range of social, ethnic and territorial 
subdivisions, the spatial qualifications for statehood will probably never be achieved. 
Yet the demands of such people to be acknowledged as a separate `race,' are 
undeniable, and in some cases, have even garnered some (albeit limited) results. 
Meanwhile, everywhere within states there are ethnic and/or religious `minorities' 
whose sense of belonging transcends their location as citizens of a particular state. 
For some within the International Relations community of course, these multiple 
articulations of identity are quite resolvable within established parameters of 
knowledge. Racial tensions which have erupted into (often bloody) quests for new 
nations, for example, are resolvable within the major premises of IR theory and 
practice - in particular, the anarchy premise. Thus John Mearsheimer (1990, 1992), 
has argued that the `ethnic' nationalist tensions erupting and re- erupting in post - 
Soviet Europe are, if anything, confirmation of the neo- Realist logic of anarchy as 
still endemic to the international system, being part and parcel of the expanding 
global order that has replaced the tight, if artificial control of `unruly' forces that 
characterised the Cold War.95 More famously, Samuel Huntington (1994, 1996) has 
John Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton (eds.), 
Rethinking America's Security (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, I992), 216 -18, and `Back to 
the Future," 1990, in which he argues that' hypernationalism' is part and parcel of the expanding 
global disorder that has replaced the tight control of anarchic competition during the Cold War. On 
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offered a perspective in which broad, overarching alliances or `civilisations' (defined 
predominantly on racial /ethnic grounds) become the new global `paradigms' of an 
everlasting human conflict." In either case, the emergence of a different basis for 
belonging - what Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach call "different polities" - 
is explained away as epiphenomenal to more basic forces: namely, anarchy, the 
security dilemma, and power -balancing." 
In short, the `new' question being asked of race in IR is one that fits entirely within 
accepted categories and assumptions. David Campbell, whose work on this issue in 
Deconstructing Nationalism (1998) was covered in the previous chapter," has sought 
to explain why this is so by distinguishing between the concept of `Foreign Policy' 
(understood, in conventional International Relations terms, as the external policy 
orientation of pre -established states with secure identities),99 and the `foreign policy' 
practiced inside the borders of the sovereign state; that is, "all practices of 
differentiation or modes of exclusion... that constitute their objects as `foreign' in the 
process of dealing with them." `0° This foreign policy, Campbell explains: 
is divorced from the nation or the state as a particular resolution of the categories of 
identity and difference, and applies to confrontations that appear to take place 
between a self and another located in different sites if ethnicity, race class, gender or 
geography (with those sites themselves being constituted in the process). Operating 
at all levels of social organisation from the level of personal relationships through to 
this basis, Mearsheimer's proposed solution to the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia is the creation 
of ethnically separate states, thereby re- asserting the adequacy of neo- Realism as a framework for 
understanding interstate anarchy. Ibid. 
Huntington, Clash of Civilisations (op. cit., 1996), 6 -7. 
" Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Global Politics at the Turn of the Millennium: 
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global orders, foreign policy in this sense has established conventional dispositions 
through which new instance of ambiguity or contingency can be apprehended.'' 
In short, foreign policy works to secure the unified, autonomous national identity on 
whose behalf Foreign Policy operates. It is thus all about the (internal) containment 
of challenges to the national identity constituted by Foreign Policy practices.102 The 
discussion to follow takes up this theme in terms of the race and identity issue in 
Japan and the challenges posed to orthodox perspectives on these issues by a critical 
Japanese Studies. 
Race and Identity in Japan: The Myth of Tan' itsu Minzoku Kokka 
In those States in which ethnic religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1979, Article 27.' 
The right of any person to enjoy his own culture, to profess and practice his own 
religion or to use his own language is ensured under Japanese law. However, 
minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan. 
Japanese government report on human rights conditions, 1980. 
As the above exchange suggests, to try and speak about sub -national articulations of 
race and identity in a postwar Japanese context, is to confront some of the most 
powerfully embedded images of Japanese life and society, and in turn, of Japan as a 
Ibid. 
Cited in Takemasa Teshima, Toward the Shattering of the Myth of the Mono -Ethnic State: Japan, 
the Ainu and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Dissertation (PhD) submitted to the University of 
Washington, 1995 (Washington: UMI Dissertation Services, 1995), 196. 
Ibid. 
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geopolitical entity. The image of Japanese society as `uniquely' homogeneous and 
monocultural, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, has been a major 
influence in the development of postwar Japanese Studies, and perhaps the most 
important dimension of this image is the perception of Japanese people as racially 
homogeneous. This perception is often expressed by describing Japan as a tan'itsu 
minzoku kokka (literally, "a single race state "). Invoked in this phrase, the Japanese 
word for "race" (minzoku) is not unlike the concept described above by Appiah; 
namely, an "understanding of what it is to be a people," that goes beyond biological 
and evolutionary categories to incorporate broader notions of community defined via 
language and tradition, and, especially in the postwar period, notions of territorial 
integrity. WE 
A good explanation of this reading of minzoku is found in the writings of the 
historian Yoshihiko Amino, who has highlighted the way in which anthropological 
and archaeological images of the Japanese people as racially homogeneous are 
interwoven with dominant historical myths of Japan as an ancient, sharply defined 
geopolitical entity. Mainstream, or "common sense" (jôshiki) accounts of Japanese 
ancient history, Amino observes, invariably emphasise the special homogeneity that 
geographical Japan, as an "island country," (shimaguni) accorded the Japanese 
people, whose prehistoric physical origins are found in the Jômon civilisation that 
populated the Japanese archipelago between about 10,000 and 300 BC.I06 These 
05 McCormack, Introduction to Denoon et. al. (eds.), Multicultural Japan -(op. cit., 1996), 1 -2. 
Yoshihiko Amino, Nihonron no Shiza (The Origins of Nihonron; Tokyo: Kogakkan, 1994), 32 -34. 
Gavan McCormack writes that even the designation of the prehistoric Jômon people as `Japanese' is 
problematic, given that patterns of culture and authority sufficiently homogeneous for the 
consciousness of living in `Japan' to become widespread did not emerge until the twelfth century. On 
this basis (and as Amino also notes) "neither the culture and people of Jômon... or Yayoi..., nor the 
Yamatai kingdom of the Wa people, nor even Prince Shôtoku (574 -622), were, strictly speaking, 
'Japanese;' all were pre - Japanese' dwellers and civilisations of the archipelago." McCormack, 
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people, the jôshiki argument goes, eventually accepted and propagated the rice - 
growing culture that permeated Japan from the West sometime during the Yayoi age 
(ca 400 BC to AD 300), and which is now held to be `fundamental' to the ethnic 
identity of the Japanese people, via a universal set of rituals, values and hierarchies 
associated with the Japanese emperor, or tennô (who is sometimes referred to as the 
"Rice King ") 107 
The special (i.e., `unique') social, linguistic and cultural practices that characterise 
the Japanese as a monoculturaI, homogeneous, rice- growing and rice -eating `race,' 
are perceived to have remained more or Iess intact throughout the period of Japan's 
encounter with other, `foreign' civilisations. Orthodox Japanese history texts, Amino 
points out, tend to make much of the fact that, since `Japan' was formalised as a 
country name sometime in the late seventh century AD, the `Japanese people' have 
successfully resisted `foreign' invasion or domination.108 In this way, he writes, the 
notion of the Japanese as a `single race (tan'itsu minzoku) has become inextricable 
from the notion of Japan as a `single state' ( tan 'itsu kokka).109 
For Amino however, these "commonsense" perspectives narrate a particularly one - 
sided and static account of Japanese history; one that not only ignores the 
experiences of those `foreign' civilisations that were eventually invaded and 
subjugated by the modern Japanese state (such as Ainu society in the north, and the 
Ryûkyú Kingdom, or Okinawa, in the south), but which, more problematically, 
effaces the historical ambiguities within the development of this state. Amino's own 
"Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," in Denoon et. al. (eds.), Multicultural Japan 
(op. cit., 1996), 68. 
Amino, Nihonron no Shiza, 40. In English, see also Amino's essay on "Emperor, Rice, and 
Commoners," in Denoon et. al. (eds.), Multicultural Japan (op. cit., 1996), 235 -244. 
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explorations of ancient and medieval Japanese history indicate for example, that the 
location of Japanese ethnic and cultural identity in ancient and nationally uniform 
modes of agricultural production (i.e., the Japanese people as a `rice -growing' 
culture) is factually problematic. Even after the ninth century AD, when rice 
cultivation as the basis of a particular socio- political order had been imposed on 
significant areas of central Japan by the Yamato state,110 numerous surviving 
historical records and artefacts suggest profound regional variations in agricultural 
and other modes of production, with up to fifty percent of the population engaged in 
non -agricultural pursuits such as fishing, salt -making, shipping and artisan work. 
These trends continued as urban centres grew and the circulation of money came to 
permeate Japanese society. 
Moreover, Amino argues, it is worth bearing in mind that, until the mid to late 
eighteenth century when Japan began to have sustained contact with the West, most 
ordinary Japanese people would have had little or no cause to actively invoke a 
`Japanese' identity. Rather, identity was focussed on local and regional 
communities.°1 In short, he concludes: 
the argument that from Jômon times there has been in Japan a `single race' ( tan'itsu 
minzoku) and a `single state' [tan'itsu kokka] is a baseless fabrication. An 
appreciation of this makes any simplistic linear periodization of the Japanese 
archipelago problematic, to say the least. It is also obvious that, historically, views of 
Ibid., 67-68. 
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Amino, "Emperor, Rice and Commoners," 236 -9. 
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the emperor [tennô] and likewise of `Japan' (nippon) have been far from 
homogeneous throughout the Japanese archipelago. 
In another recent contribution to the discussion of Japanese identity, Tessa Morris - 
Suzuki also argues that the notion of tan'itsu minzoku is itself only one of the 
complex, sometimes contradictory ways in which "Japan" has been delineated and 
defined over the past few centuries. Until the early nineteenth century she points out, 
the relationship between the Japanese state and those regional communities who, 
according to their proximity or otherwise from the geopolitical centre, exhibited 
varying degrees of connection to core notions of `Japaneseness,' was based on a 
perception of these frontier regions as `foreign' or `exotic.'113 It was a perception 
heavily influenced by the Chinese world view of "a series of concentric circles of 
increasing strangeness," in which `foreignness' (expressed as `barbarity') was 
delineated according to spatial distance from the familiar centre. "4 
Japanese encounters with Europe from the late eighteenth century onwards, Morris - 
Suzuki writes, saw the foundations of this world view challenged by a profoundly 
different spatial vision - that of a post -Westphalian world divided into clearly 
bounded nation states whose location was defined in a universal mathematical 
language,15 As its peripheral frontiers came into closer and closer contact with 
European powers, Japan began to mould its own national boundaries against 
encroachment, incorporating `exotic' peripheral communities into a clearly defined, 
modern nation. In the process, their exoticness was re- interpreted in terms of 
"backwardness" rather than "foreignness" - that is, Morris -Suzuki points out, in 
Amino, Nihonron no Shiza, 85 -86. 
Morris-Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 10. 
Ibid., 15. 
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terms of time, rather than space.1i' 
The Japanisation of the Ainu as `foreign policy' 
One of the most notable examples of this shift in conceptualising difference and 
peripherality, concerns the fate of the Ainu people of what is now Hokkaido, the 
northernmost of modern Japan's four main islands. The exact ethnic origins of the 
Ainu remain a subject of ongoing discussion among anthropologists and 
archaeologists; but it is widely thought that what is now regarded as Ainu culture 
evolved in Hokkaido around the thirteenth century AD. Archaeological and 
anthropological studies show that Ainu society was originally structured around 
small communities called kotan, which conducted activities such as hunting and 
fishing in defined areas of land - without however, subscribing to concepts of 
private (individual or communal) ownership. "' Like many other aboriginal peoples, 
the Ainu did not keep written records, but developed a rich oral literature, structured 
around a complex set of spiritual relationships with the natural world upon which 
they depended. What has survived of this literature through the generations, hints at 
a complex and stratified society, with local cultural variations influenced by Ainu 
contact with other northern peoples living in the Sakhalin peninsula and the southern 
Kuriles. 6 
Prior to the nineteenth century, the Ainu were regarded by successive central 
Japanese administrations as a "barbarian" foreign race; who nonetheless controlled 
Ibid., 86. 
Ibid., 11. 
Richard Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," in Michael Weiner (ed.), Japan's Minorities: 
The Illusion of Homogeneity (London: Routledge, 1997), 21. 
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important resources that the Japanese people (wajin) desired_"' Cultural contacts, 
trade and armed clashes between `Japan' and ` Ezochi' (the Land of the Ainu) are 
thought by some scholars to date as far back as the sixth century AD;120 but it was 
with the rapid increase in Japanese settlement of the south -western coast of Ezochi 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that the economic and political 
relationship between the Ainu and the people they called Yuanshisam ( "Neighbours 
of the Land, ") began to assume the dimensions of colonial hierarchy. By the mid - 
eighteenth century, Ezochi had been divided into several trading posts by the wajin 
merchants aligned to Japan's northern feudal domains, with Ainu people relocated in 
their thousands from their traditional living grounds to provide labour in the trade 
and fishing ports, sometimes under conditions of semi- slavery.1Z1 The last systematic 
uprising of Ainu people against their dispossession and exploitation, the Kunashir- 
menash Revolt, took place in 1798.-22 
In the late eighteenth century however, as Westphalian notions of national territory 
began to embed themselves in the consciousness of Japan's ruling elite, and as 
Russian traders, missionaries and settlers began to make increasing cultural and 
linguistic inroads into northern Japan and what was then left of Ainu society, 
Japanese policy towards the Ainu underwent a sharp strategic change. In order to 
help consolidate and protect Japan's northern borders, Ainu people were strategically 
redefined as `Japanese,' and, in stark contrast to previous separatist policies, they 
were encouraged to learn the Japanese language and adopt Wajin customs over their 
Kôheì Hanazaki, "Mnu Moshir and Yaponeisa," in Denoon et. al. (eds.), Multicultural Japan (op. 
cit., 1996), 118. 
Teshima, Toward the Shattering of the Myth of the Mono -Ethnic State, 44. 
Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 22. 
I.e., only one year after Australia was claimed on behalf of the British Empire as terra nullis. 
Hanazaki, "Ainu Moshir and Yaponesia," 119. 
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traditional social and religious practices.123 While this assimilationist approach was 
temporarily reversed during the 1820s,`24 it was a forerunner to the more 
comprehensive Japanisation' of the Ainu periphery accomplished under the Meiji 
Restoration, which saw Ezochi fully incorporated into the modern Japanese state as 
`Hokkaido,' in 1869. Under Meiji Iegislation, the Ainu were officially recognised as 
Japanese subjects (heimin), but with the added stipulation of "former aborigine" (kyû 
dojin), inscribing the widespread perception of them as a doomed, primitive race, 
destined to either die out or be thoroughly assimilated into the more temporally 
advanced culture of the "Japanese people. °'25 
To facilitate this process of assimilation, the Ainu language was prohibited, as were 
"primitive" customs such as burning the houses of the deceased, tattooing around the 
mouths of women, and the wearing of earrings.126 Access to land became another 
powerful tool of `civilising' strategy; while some land was set aside in Hokkaido by 
the government for Ainu usage, it was ceded to them only at the discretion of the 
Meiji Imperial Development Agency (Kaitakushi) when the Ainu people involved 
were deemed to have made `adequate progress' towards civilisation - usually 
acknowledged when they agreed to use the Iand for growing crops rather than 
hunting or gathering. z, 
Prior to this, Ainu people had been forbidden to wear Japanese clothes or speak the Japanese 
language, and were discouraged from engaging in land cultivation - no doubt, as both Morris -Suzuki 
and Siddle point out, in order to emphasise their status as a subordinated `foreign' people. Siddle, 
"Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 222, and Morris- Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 18 -19. 
I.e., in response to the perceived withdrawal of the Russian menace. The northern domain, which 
had been temporarily placed under the central administration of the Japanese state, was briefly 
returned to the control of the local dat nyô. Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 230. 
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Teshima, Toward the Shattering of the Myth of the Mono-Ethnic State, 92. 
Ibid., 87 -89. The introduction of private ownership of land was a disaster for the Ainu, not just in 
the obvious sense that they were finally, fully deprived of their traditional sphere of existence, but also 
because the feudal trading zone system it replaced had at least provided the already dispossessed with 
a regular, if exploitative means of subsistence. As the Wajin population increased rapidly and 
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Here, in short, is a particularly excellent example of (Campbell's description of) 
`foreign policy' at work, whereby difference is suppressed within the borders of the 
state, to produce a unified, autonomous national identity. In this respect, and like the 
subjugation of women into specific gender -based social roles, the Japanisation of the 
Ainu was integral to Japan's `Foreign Policy,' in that it was carried out in the name 
of strengthening the Japanese state (in accordance with Realist logic) against the 
threatening world `out there.' 
Japanese Colonialism as Multiculturalism' 
This was also an enterprise enhanced by the expansion of Japanese power into 
Southeast Asia during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By the 1920s, 
Japan had extended its domain to Taiwan (1895), Kwantung (1905), Korea (1910) 
and the Pacific Mandated Territories (1919), and later, would achieve de facto 
control over large areas of Chìna.128 By this time too, Japanese feelings of resentment 
towards the West were becoming increasingly embedded in the concept of minzoku. 
The refusal of the Western powers to introduce a clause on racial equality into the 
Versailles Treaty, and the restrictions on Asian immigration imposed by Western 
countries (including of course, the White Australia Policy) encouraged and justified 
images of Japan as the victim of Western racism.129 One response of course, was the 
assertion of images of Japanese racial purity and homogeneity, which represented the 
Japanese people as blood descendants of a single (quasi- divine) imperial line.'30 This 
representation of Japaneseness drew heavily upon the writings of late Tokugawa 
development began to focus more and more on agricultural production, the value of Ainu labour 
decreased, meaning that Ainu people became even more marginalised. Ibíd., 84 -85. 
rEN 
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scholars such as Motoori Norinaga, who had argued the innate superiority of 
Japanese culture, encapsulated in the Japanese Spirit (Wakon) and preserved through 
the family of the Emperor.13' Incorporated into 1920s and 1930s nationalist 
discourse, these images of purity and uniqueness became an integral part of the 
notion of kokutai, or national polity, which both codified both the relationship of 
Japanese people to the state, and the divine right of Japan to lead Asía against the 
racist and corrupting influences of the West.132 
Yet notions of racial purity were by no means the only, or even the most influential 
dimension of minzoku debate during Japan's period of colonialism. Indeed, as 
Morris- Suzuki has argued, the everyday problems of colonial administration in Asia 
were particularly influential in prompting other scholarly explanations of Japanese 
race and identity - including those based on theories of Japanese racial hyhridity, 
which depicted the Japanese as having emerged from the integration of diverse 
peoples into an organically united society.i33 Thus, during the 1920s and 1930s, 
writers such as Kita Sadakichi argued that the `uniqueness' of the Japanese race lay 
not in actual, biological racial purity, but rather, in their unique ability to mould 
disparate ancestral groups into a single political and cultural community. 134 On this 
basis, Japan was both superior to the West, which attempted to represent white 
superiority as a `scientific' fact, and the most appropriate champion of the 'Asian 
peoples' because it was capable of broadmindedly integrating many different 
`foreign' influences. In short, it was superior because it represented the most 
McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," 268. 
Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 
12 -13. 
McCormack, " Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure," 269, and Dower, War Without 
Mercy, 1 -30. 
Morris- Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 90. 
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advanced point in "a universal progress whose actors were not individuals or ideas or 
social systems hut ethnic nations. "15 
As is well known, the realities of Japanese colonial rule in Asia were often at odds 
with this image of Japan as the vanguard of human progress and multicultural 
tolerance. Under the various slogans of Asian unity, inter- racial harmony and, of 
course, "co- prosperity," the subjects of Japanese colonial policy were subjected to 
terrible abuses and exploitation; in one of the worst wartime examples, nearly 4,000 
Chinese and Korean prisoners and peasants who were tortured and experimented on 
in the name of medicine at the infamous Unit 731 in Harbin, were denied even a 
human, let alone a racial identity, by being designated as mareta, or logs.'16 Within 
Japan proper, images of Asian unity sat in uneasy contrast to the treatment of Japan's 
long -established and substantial ethnic Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean 
communities, "7 where `incomplete' Japaneseness could be (and frequently was) 
equated with suspect political allegiances. This was tragically illustrated in the 
aftermath of the great Kantô Earthquake of 1923, when more than 2,000 Korean (and 
400 Chinese) residents in Japan were murdered by vigilantes, police and soldiers on 
suspicion of crimes such as inciting rebellion, or poisoning the water supply."' The 
correlation of Korean ethnicity, in particular, with `subversive' political 
commitments, was so entrenched in early twentieth century Japan, that it generated 
s 
Ibid., 106. 
Kita, cited in Morris -Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 91. 
McCormack, "Kokusaika: Impediments in Japan's Deep Structure.' 272. For a fuller account, see 
McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence, 262 -264. 
Vasishth, "A Model Minority: The Chinese Community in Japan," in Weiner (ed.), Japan's 
Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (op. cit., 1997), 127. 
a 
Ibid., 128. Ironically, the Chinese community of Yokohama eventually played a vital role in post - 
earthquake recovery, financing rebuilding projects and re- establishing businesses. Ibid., 128 -29. 
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the ubiquitous term futei senjin ( "Korean malcontent "). 39 During the war, Chinese 
and Korean residents were treated like enemy nationals, forcibly relocated away from 
militarily sensitive areas and sometimes confined to special ghettos."° And, as the 
war continued, Japan supplemented its domestic and colonial labour mobilisation by 
conscripting (mostly) Korean workers from the peninsula to serve in mines, factories 
and construction sites, often under appalling conditions. "` 
As Morris- Suzuki's work in particular demonstrates, these practices were not 
implemented under a single `theoretical' strategy, but rather, were part of a dense, 
convoluted network of different ideas and ideologies, in which notions of racial 
uniqueness, ethnic commonality and `universal' human civilisational advancement 
co- existed at different levels, and in which the sheer ambiguity of terms such as 
minzoku allowed "a continuous slippage backward and forward between different 
levels of justification. " "Z Thus, for example, the "melting pot" imagery of Japanese 
origins advocated by scholars such as Sadakichi Kita for could be used, on the one 
hand, to justify the assimilation of Korea and Taiwan into a 'multicultural' Greater 
East Asian Co- Prosperity Sphere. On the other, it could be (and was) used to impose 
hierarchies within the melting pot, via the logic that Japan's colonial subjects were 
still "incomplete" Japanese - in the process, as it were, of being merged into a 
Japanese minzoku that represented the most advanced point in "a universal progress 
179 
Kang Sang -Jung, Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon: Ajia Kara Tou Sengo 50 -Nen (Two Postwar Japans: A 
View from Asia Fifty Years On; Tokyo: Sainichi Shobô, I995), 40, and Morris -Suzuki, Re- Inventing 
Japan, 105. Conversely, the terms han- Nihonjin ( "half- Japanese ") and hikokutnin ( "non -national;" lit., 
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Vasishth, "A Model Minority," 130. 
While precise numbers were not recorded, it is estimated that around 725,000 Korean ordinary 
labourers and 145,000 military labourers were mobilised and sent to mines, construction sites and 
factories in Japan, China, Sakhalin, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Ibid., 129. 
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whose actors were not individuals or ideas or social systems but ethnic nations. "'" 
Accordingly, while Korean and Taiwanese subjects were classified as `Japanese' 
under the Meiji Family Registration Code, like the Ainu, they fell into a special sub- 
category of "overseas residents. " " As `Japanese,' they were subject to military and 
labour conscription; yet their `impure' Japaneseness also marked them down as 
subject to different treatment where convenience dictated - for example, as 
providers of cheap, disposable Iabour and, in the case of the comfort women, free 
disposable sex.15 
Postwar Discourses of Identity in Japan: The Mínzoku Legacy. 
I will return to the flexibility of notions of `Japaneseness' in the following chapter. 
For now, my point is that the homogeneous image of Japan encapsulated in tan'itsu 
minzoku turns out to be highly contestable even, as Morris-Suzuki's work 
demonstrates, in terms of its universal appeal among those who have sought to pin 
down `Japaneseness' in the past. So why then, does it remain so strongly associated 
with contemporary Japanese identity? One of the reasons for this, I suggest, has to 
do with the much simpler understanding of collective identity that was adopted by 
postwar Japan, as part of its role in U.S. Realist theory and practice. Within this 
discourse, as I argued in Chapters Three and Four, 'Japan' could be understood only 
in one way - as a coherent, sharply bounded nation state in an anarchic world 
system, where the security and well -being of human communities could only be 
achieved by defending the territorial boundaries of the state against external threats. 
145 
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This was particularly true of the immediate postwar period, when the circumstances 
of Japan's defeat and its aftermath saw Japan subjugated to this understanding to a 
unique degree. Japanese identity, `racial' or otherwise, simply did not matter to the 
Occupation authorities, beyond the fact that it coloured in the boundaries of a 
particular spatial unit that was to be moulded into a dependable ally on the `right' 
side of the U.S.- Soviet confrontation. To this extent, as I have shown, Japanese 
tendencies towards `Asian' group mentality and conformity had to be manipulated in 
the `right' direction,146 but little or no attention was paid to the complex interwar 
debates on race and ethnicity that had formed the intellectual background to Japan's 
disastrous wartime ventures. 
One important result of the preoccupation with making Japan into a dependable 
frontline ally of course, was the Occupation's rapid reinstatement of the conservative 
ruling elite who had engineered these ventures, and who were, not surprisingly, 
disinclined to pursue issues of domestic responsibility for the war; far Iess, the 
complexities of wartime minzoku discourse. Instead, emphasis was placed on the 
need for Japan to look to the future and rebuild its strength, this time without the 
inspiration (and responsibilities) of imperial glory."' The stripping back of Japan's 
colonial possessions thus induced a return to narratives of racial unity, even purity, 
that was, in many instances, encouraged by an Occupation policy already prioritising 
Japan's role as a strong link in Kennan's `great chain.' Under the 1952 peace 
settlement for example, the some two million Korean, Taiwanese and other colonial 
subjects who remained in Japan were shorn of their Japanese citizenship - and with 
See Chapter One, 15. 
John Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," in John Dower (ed.), Japan in War and 
Peace (op. cit., ), 287. 
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it, of course, the right to Japanese war and disability allowances.1a8 Later, U.S. 
patronage also facilitated the normalisation of Japanese relations with Southeast Asia 
under comparatively favourable terms for Japan; in particular regarding wartime 
reparations, which were kept to a minimum to aid Japanese recovery and 
development. i49 
Perhaps most influential of all however, in terms of postwar Japanese identity debate, 
was the retention of the wartime emperor. Hirohito's absolution from criminal 
responsibility for the war was an integral aspect of the peace settlement, and his 
reinstatement (albeit in modified terms) as the spiritual foundation of Japanese racial 
identity would provide a key postwar rallying point for conservative visions of 
national unity.150 Gavan McCormack suggests that it is, ironically, the much- vaunted 
`symbolic' status of the postwar imperial institution which has discouraged critical 
Japanese incursions into the mythologies of racial superiority and homogeneity (such 
as kokutai) that it encapsulates, despite their obvious continuing influence in 
Japanese social and political life.11 The postwar popularity of the "common sense" 
historical narratives criticised by Amino (see above), which chart the origins of 
primordial Japaneseness and weave them into a persuasive vision of Japan as a 
tan'itsu minzoku kokka, are one aspect of this influence, as are the nihonjinron 
(Japanese civilisation theory) perspectives mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
which openly correlate Japanese `uniqueness' and homogeneity with the 
achievements of the postwar Japanese economy. 
McCormack, Introduction to Denoon et. al., Multicultural Japan (op. cit., 1996), 1 t. 
Yasuaki Ônuma, Tan'itsu Minzoku Shakai no Shinwa wo Koete: Zainichi Kankoku/Chôsenjin to 
Shutsuryûkoku Kami Taisei (Overcoming the Myth of the Mono- Ethnic State: Korean Citizens of 
Japan and the Immigration Bureaucracy Regime; Tokyo: Toshindo, 1986), 32 -37. 
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In the 1980s, Japanese racial identity became an international issue as the friction 
caused by Japan's assault on U.S. economic hegemony prompted accusations of 
`racism' on either side of the Pacific. Nakasone's 1989 comparison of the 
achievements of `homogeneous' Japan with the rampant social problems of polyglot 
America, which was relayed indignantly around the Western world, remains perhaps 
the most famous articulation of tan'itsu minzoku kokka.152 Yet the image of Japan his 
remarks called up was, as I argued in Chapter Three and the beginning of this 
chapter, already deeply ingrained in Western discourser homogeneous, unified; in 
short, the example par excellence of "territorial and cultural alignment," that had 
been praised while Japan still fit the definition of `junior partner;' but which now 
stood as an indictment of Japanese `unfairness' and 'deviousness.' 153 
Post -Cold War Shifts in Thinking about `Tapaneseness' 
In the post -Cold War period however, these holistic articulations of Japanese national 
identity look less and less convincing - and the simplistic assertion of unique and 
unified Japanese `difference' from the rest of the world, an increasingly problematic 
basis on which Japan might pursue a meaningful international role. It is in this 
atmosphere I suggest, that the unresolved vicissitudes and ambiguities of prewar and 
wartime minzoku discourse have returned to haunt the debate over `Japaneseness.' 
To borrow Campbell's terminology, it is not just Japan's Foreign Policy that is under 
pressure in the search for a global role, but also its `foreign policy' - the policies of 
Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," 279. 
Dower notes the breathtaking speed with which totalising racial images swing from negative to 
positive and back again, without losing any continuity in the process, has been illustrated in John 
Dower's superb essay on how the racial imagery invoked at the height of `Japan bashing' - the 
Japanese as "tribal," "robot- like," and "unstoppable" - duplicates the racist stereotypes that 
dominated Anglo- American thinking about Japan during World War II. "The superman," Dower 
writes, "has been resurrected as the superpower, and again it is suggested that occult powers lie behind 
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exclusion /inclusion that determine what it is to be `Japanese' in the world. 
Some of the immediate signs are promising for those who have laboured, over many 
years of neglect and marginalisation, to achieve better understanding and 
acknowledgement of the many sub -national understandings of "what it is to be a 
people" that exist within the spatial borders pf the Japanese nation state. In recent 
years in particular, the expansion of international communication networks and better 
dissemination of information has enabled many minority groups in the world to 
garner support for their agendas beyond national boundaries. This is certainly the 
case with the Ainu activists who, since the late 1980s, have effectively used 
international forums and links with other groups of indigenous peoples in the world 
(such as Australian Aboriginals and Inuits) to successfully lobby for government 
recognition and protection of their identity.'54 In the most significant development to 
date, in May 1997, the Japanese government passed the Ainu Cultural Promotion 
Law (replacing the 1899 "Former Natives Protection Act "), which aims: 
to realize the society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu people is respected and to 
contribute to the development of diverse cultures in our country, by the 
implementation of the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture... the spread of 
knowledge related to Ainu Traditions, and the education of the nation, referring to the 
situation of Ainu traditions and culture from which the Ainu people find their ethnic 
pride. 
new law is by no means completely satisfactory to many Ainu people; with many 
arguing that it does not go far enough to recognise the distinct rights of the Ainu as 
this accomplishment - miracle men, secrets of success, an inscrutable Zen of management, and 
indomitable and inimitable Japanese spirit." Dower, "Race, Language and War in Two Cultures," 283. 
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indigenous people.156 Yet it is still important, in that it explicitly recognises the 
existence of Japan as an ethnically and culturally diverse nation (in a complete 
reversal of Japan's 1980 response to the ICCP, cited above). Moreover, it does so in 
a way that is different from the prewar acknowledgement of Japan's `multicultural' 
origins, because rather than using multiculturalism to assert the validity of Japanese 
leadership in an ongoing process of assimilation, the law acknowledges and, to some 
extent, defends the concept of a racially and cultural diverse Japan. 
Elsewhere however, progress towards acknowledging a more `multicultural' or 
`multiracial' Japan remains slow, if not stagnant. One particularly important 
example is the treatment of the descendants of Korean people who either migrated to 
Japan or were conscripted as forced labour between 1910 and 1945. Most of the 
second and third generations of zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin (literally, "South and/or 
North Koreans resident in Japan ")157 are indistinguishable from `Japanese' citizens, in 
that they were born in Japan, speak Japanese as their first, if not only language, and 
in many cases, have assumed Japanese names.156 Despite this, they are designated 
foreigners, who, from the age of fourteen must carry the same alien registration card 
Siddle, "Ainu: Japan's Indigenous People," 46. 
The nationality of zainichi chôsenjin (North Koreans resident in Japan) is something of a grey area 
in Japanese law, due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. As Yoshihiro 
Sorano has pointed out for example, children of de facto relationships between North Korean men and 
Japanese women lose their Japanese citizenship upon gaining formal recognition from their fathers. 
Sorano, introduction to Yoshihiro Sorano and Kô Changyu (eds.), Zainichi Chôsenjin no Seikatsu to 
Jinken (The lifestyles and human rights of North Korean citizens in Japan; Tokyo: Asahi Shoten, 
1995), 14. See also Chong Yong -Hye's comments on this issue, below. 
Usually to avoid discrimination; for example, according to Nakagawa Nobuo, over ninety percent of 
zainichi chôsenjin children who attend `Japanese' schools assume false Japanese names, an 
arrangement given tacit consent to by school staff because of the potential for such students to fall 
victim to racist bullying. Nakagawa, "Nihonjin Gakkô ni kayou chôsenjin seitotachi" (North Korean 
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issued to other, more short-term foreign visitors to Japan.'59 More seriously, zainichi 
kankoku/chôsenjin continue to face significant discrimination when it comes to 
educational, employment and even marriage opportunities in Japanese society. Apart 
from being legally barred from many public service appointments, they face more 
subtle discrimination from many of the larger private Japanese corporations. Many 
of these companies use the results of company entrance examinations, or even 
privately circulated name lists, to weed out applicants from `undesirable' 
backgrounds: not just zainichi kankoku/ chôsenjin, but also burakumin, descendants 
of atom -bomb and pollution victims, and those whose families are tainted by 
illegitimacy or divorce.160 
Kaori Okano's 1994 case study of the employment choices of zainichi and other 
minority high school students (particularly those from lower socio- economic strata) 
suggests that this tends to create a ghettoising cycle, whereby `disadvantaged' 
students do not attempt to break down invisible discriminatory barriers, but resign 
themselves to pursuing employment in areas where they know they will he accepted 
- such as Korean -owned banks and businesses.'61 And, while there are some 
statistical indications of an improvement in public perceptions of zainichi, inasmuch 
as they can be measured, the persistence of racial stereotypes remains evident. As 
recently as 1995 for example, in incidents distressingly reminiscent of the 1923 
lynching of suspected futei senjin, anger and concern over North Korea's suspected 
All foreign nationals who enter Japan for more than 90 days are required to register with the 
Department of Immigration, after which they are issued with a gaikokujin tôroku shômeisho, or Alien 
Registration Card, which carries a fingerprint of the owner. 
Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (op. cit., 1990), 200; and Morris -Suzuki, Re- Inventing 
Japan, 196. 
Kaori Okano, "`Modern' Japan and Social Identity: Minority Youth in School to Work," in Alberto 
Gomes (ed.), Modernity and Identity: Asian Illustrations (Bundoora: LaTrobe University Press, 1994), 
216 -220. 
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nuclear missile program provided yet another motive for thuggish attacks on zainichi 
chôsen high school students.162 
Overall, and especially since the 1980s, the problems faced by zainichi kankoku 
chôsenjin have attracted greater attention in Japan, and a substantial network of 
lawyers, writers and lobby groups has made some headway in raising public 
awareness of racial discrimination. '° More recently too, in a development of 
particular interest to this thesis, some zainichi writers have begun to link the status of 
zainichi kankoku chôsenjin to a broader, more `international' debate about states, 
nations and (post -colonial) identity that relates closely to the themes introduced at the 
beginning of this section. One of them is the writer and political theorist Kang Sang - 
Jung, who has invoked Edward Said's arguments about Western Orientalist 
stereotyping, to show how the problems faced by zainichi kankoku chôsenjin cannot 
be debated separately from the construction of `Korea' and Koreans' in nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Japanese colonial policymaking.164 `Korea,' Kang argues, 
was to modern Japan what the (Middle Eastern) Orient was to Europe - i.e., a 
terrain of inferior, even barbarian backwardness, that helped to define Japan's 
identity as a modern, "European style" colonial power, and justify its expansionist 
Maeda Akira, "China Chogori shûgei jiken e no torikumi" (Taking action against acts of chima 
chogori violence), in Sorano and Kô (eds.), Zainichi Chdsenjin no Seikatsu to Jinken (op. cit., 1995), 
162. The victims are nearly always female students of (North) Korean -run high schools, who are 
easily identifiable as zainichi chôsenjin because of their distinctive school uniforms based on the 
chima chogori, or Korean national dress. As of 1994, over 160 recorded "chima chogori incidents" of 
aggression had been recorded, including verbal abuse, surreptitious cutting of hair and uniforms with 
scissors, and physical violence. Ibid., 165. 
For example, lobby groups have successfully campaigned for modification (if not abolition) of the 
Alien Registration Cards carried by zainichi citizens, the right of local councils to appoint foreign 
citizens to some public positions, and the modification of textbooks carrying offensive terms. In one 
case for example, the term bakachon, a slang term for `stupid Korean' was removed from a commonly 
used high school English language textbook after protests initiated by a high school English teacher. 
Nakagawa Nobuo, "Nihonjin Gakkô ni Kayou Chôsenjin Seitotachi," 174. 
Kang, Futatsu no Sengo no Nihon, 28. 
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policies.165 In the postwar period, he writes, the image of bankoku chôsen, or 
"backward Korea," has been maintained in the discursive practices of the Japanese 
state - both indirectly, via the retention of institutions and symbols (flag, anthem, 
[Yasukuni] shrine and above all, emperor) which embody (however "symbolically ") 
the myth of monocultural, monoracial Japanese purity, and more directly; for 
example, via the narratives of Korean and Japanese `history' privileged in the high 
school textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, which tend to highlight 
Japan's `civilising' influence on Korea, and represent the war as an unfortunate 
intervention in an otherwise well- meaning attempt to propel `Asia' forward into 
modern strength and solidarity.166 
For Kang, as for many other scholars, the failure of Japanese people to confront 
other, less sanguine readings of their past and relate them to present practices of 
exclusion and discrimination makes a mockery of the continuing quest for an 
"international contribution" (kokusai kôken) or "international responsibility" (kokusai 
sekinin) for Japan - catch -phrases of government and media debates over Japan's 
international relations since the early 1990s. "Surely," he asks, "the just settlement 
of the past is the first 'international responsibility' that Japan must fulfil if it is to 
participate in a peaceful international order? What sort of `international 
contribution' can Japan possibly hope to build on the deliberate neglect of this 
task ? "'6' Kang's questions are particularly relevant I suggest, given Japan's ongoing 
ibid., 34-37. 
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preparations to participate in the Theatre Missile Defence Agreement, which is 
regarded by many within Japan's defence establishment as being necessary to deter 
the `North Korea Threat' to Japan.15a 
A slightly different, but interrelated, perspective is offered by another zainichi writer, 
Chong Yong -Hye, whose writing is also influenced heavily by the themes of 
postcoloniality and hybridity, particularly as addressed in the works of writers such 
as Trin Minh -ha, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Julia Kristeva. In a 1996 essay 
entitled "Overcoming Identity," Chong sets out to question the particular world -view 
implied in the very attempt to categorise succinctly between `Korean' and `Japanese' 
ethnic identitìes.`69 The very term zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin, Chong suggests, is 
problematic as a basis for contesting discrimination against Korean citizens, because 
it was created in the first place to help define and sustain a particular concept of 
`pure' Japaneseness - that embodied in the phrase tan'itsu minzoku kokka.°0 
Translated literally into the Korean language, she points out, zainichi 
kankoku/chôsenjin becomes an unwieldy and unnatural, even nonsensical, term. 
Even in the Japanese in which it was originally invoked, it resists definition, being 
almost as ambiguous as the notion of `blackness' in contemporary America and 
Western Europe.Q1 Moreover, Chong argues, the attempt to categorise difference in 
this way - in neat, `ethnic' bundles that fit comfortably within the boundaries of the 
nation state, discourages us from thinking about other `sub -discriminations' and 
See the June 2, 2000 Global Beat debate: "What is Really Driving the Missile Defense Debate ?" at 
htty://www.nyu.edu/alobalbeatipubstib59.html 7 -8. 
Chong Yong -Hye, "Aidentiti wo koete" (Overcoming Identity), in Shun Inoue, ed., Sabetsu to 
Kyôsei no Shakaigaku (The Sociology of Discrimination; Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 5. 
Ibid., 14 -15. 
Some of the categories which make questionable the basis of zainichi definition, Chong writes, 
include the children of mixed Korean- Japanese parentage, the Korean citizens who have become 
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abuse within `minority' categories. As an example, she cites the widespread and 
well- documented sexism within the zainichi movement, which continues to be 
predominantly male- oriented, and which has traditionally turned a blind eye to issues 
of sexual and physical abuse.in 
Chong's point here is not to dismiss the importance of struggles to reclaim 
marginalised and suppressed identities, nor is it to deny her own Korean heritage. It 
is, rather, about the dangers of accepting victimhood based on predefined `minority' 
categories, which, ultimately, help to reify the boundaries of the `majority.' "It is not 
as if I myself," she points out, "was somehow `born' a zainichi kankoku/chôsenjin." 
Rather: 
I became one through the discrimination that is so widespread within Japanese 
society, and through the movements which try to struggle against that discrimination. 
In other words, I learnt how to be a `zainichi.' Accordingly, if I refer to myself as a 
`zainichi,' I am only proclaiming that I will take upon myself the role that has been 
defined for me by this [discriminatory] Japan." ' 
Chong's answer to this dilemma is to reject both the notion of a `pure' Japaneseness, 
and the `minority' categories it needs to justify itself, defining herself instead as an 
'impure Japanese,' and thereby circumnavigating altogether the myth of tan'itsu 
minzoku kokka, and its defining `opposite' categories (of Chineseness, Koreanness, 
and so on). J° Should this sense of self start to proliferate in Japan, she suggests, the 
whole notion of sharply defined `Korean' and 'Japanese' identities will become 
naturalised Japanese citizens, the Japanese women who married Korean citizens long before the 
division between North and South, and zainichi who go to live in other countries. Ibid., 16. 
Ibid., 10 -11.. 
Ibid., l7. 
Ibid., 18. 
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"worm -eaten. "15 This is important, for it takes the struggle against discrimination 
beyond the crucial first step of self- assertion by `minorities: 
"Coming out," and reclaiming or establishing one's identity, is not in itself 
emancipatory, and cannot therefore constitute an end in itself. Rather, it is only the 
first step, and only one method for attacking the discrimination that is built into the 
very structure of identity. The real challenge starts after that step. What really 
liberates one in the struggle against discrimination, is to demand, and realise, freedom 
from having any identity forced upon one, and the freedom to come and go as one 
pleases across all boundaries. 'G 
As this chapter suggests, the confrontation of these issues in a Japanese Studies 
context is a relatively recent exercise - recent, in the sense that while there has 
always been some resistance to the dominant image of `homogeneous Japan,' it is 
only now that these critical perspectives are beginning to make their impact widely 
felt, both within Japan, and elsewhere, among those receptive to the idea that notions 
of `Japan' and `Japaneseness' are constantly being re- interpreted and re- imagined by 
people, motivated and constrained by a myriad of different circumstances. 
To acknowledge these different Japans, I argue, is to participate almost automatically 
in the broader CST approaches outlined here and in the previous chapter, and their 
rejection of Realism and neo- Realism as the only way to understand the world. 
Moreover, to show that issues of Japanese identity have implications and effects 
beyond the spatial boundaries that formally contain and define them under the entity 
of `Japan' is to question the logic of representing global life only in terms of "the 
relative position of (nation] states on a systemwide map of capabilities. ""' It is, in 
short, to resist the (illusory) sense of certainty offered by clearly demarcated lines 
Ibid., 14. 
Ibid., 19. 
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that delineate homogeneity and unity within the nation state, difference, conflict and 
uncertainty without, and which deny the power and relevance of attempts to 
transgress these lines and seek new formations of community and citizenship in the 
world. n8 
While the continuing power of dominant demarcations (Japan as state, Japan as 
nation) should not be overlooked, the pressures on them described above will surely 
survive and continue to grow, and with them, the debate over terms such as 
kokusaika, kokusai kôken, and kokusai sekinin (internationalisation, international 
contribution and international responsibility). In the process, contests for the 
definition of `Japan' start to intersect with broader strains of thought about the 
shifting, changing nature of the 'international' realm. This, I suggest, is the space in 
which Japanese Studies encounters one of the hottest concepts in the contemporary 
International Relations lexicon: globalisation - and this is the topic of my next, and 
final, chapter. 
177 
Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory," 85. 
ux 
This is also Walker's point of course, elaborated in Inside /Outside, 174 -76. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GLOBALISATION, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND JAPAN 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It follows on from the two previous chapters, 
where I focussed on the challenges to orthodox IR posed by CST literature, and the 
way in which this debate is influencing a critical Japanese Studies literature which 
seeks to understand Japanese life, society and identity in more complex, incisive 
ways. In this chapter, my aim is to further explore this thematic intersection via the 
theme of globalisation, providing, in the process, some initial conclusions about the 
possibilities for expanding future debate on Japan's international role in the 2l Sc 
century. 
Globalisation can be seen, I suggest, as both a strange, and a particularly apt site for 
this discussion. It is strange because many of the dominant images of what 
globalisation is and how it works, seem to transcend the framework within which it is 
possible to speak about a cohesive "global role" for Japan. These are the images 
which, as Jan Aart Scholte argues, depict globalisation, for better or for worse, as the 
increasingly "supraterritorial dimension of social relations."' Scholte identifies four 
contexts for this " supraterritoriality." Ecological supraterritoriality occurs through 
planetary climate change, ozone depletion, worldwide epidemics and the decline of 
biodiversity.2 Economic supraterritoriality has seen the increasing removal of 
government restrictions on the movement of capital and goods between countries, as 
well as the establishment of twenty- four -hour, round -the -world financial markets, 
Jan Aart Scholte, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization," in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian 
Youngs (eds.), Globalization: Theory and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), 46, and Globalization: A 
Critical Introduction (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000), 16 -17. 
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whose location is rendered irrelevant through technology's temporal annihilation of 
geographical space.3 Normative supraterritoriality occurs through the expansion of 
worldwide standards, e.g., of measurement, human rights, as well as the spread of 
non -territorial networks of solidarity among groups such as women, the disabled, and 
indigenous peoples (see previous chapter).4 Finally, Scholte writes, there is a 
psychological dimension to globalisation, evident in "a growing consciousness of the 
world as a single place, an awareness reinforced by everyday experiences of diet, 
music and dress, as well as by photographs from outer space showing planet earth as 
one location. "5 
While many have celebrated the perceived trend towards a "borderless world," 
regarding it as the beginning of a more peaceful, prosperous age,6 others are far more 
ambivalent, even pessimistic about it; arguing that the opportunities it offers 
continue, in practice, to be available only to a minute proportion of the world's 
people, and are being achieved at the cost of the marginalisation and impoverishment 
of an expanding socioeconomic periphery.? Moreover, there are many commentators 
on the globalisation debate who are sceptical of the extent to which globalisation has 
actually proceeded, pointing to supposedly `global' processes which remain 
embedded in the logic and structure of interstate relations. Thus Stephen Krasner, for 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., and see my comments in Chapter Six. 
5 Scholte, "Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization," 46. 
6 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the later- linked Economy (London: 
Fontana, 1990). An even more famous expression of this `celebratory' tone comes from Francis 
Fukuyama, who, in 1992, suggested that the end of the Cold War spelled the beginnings of a new, 
more peaceful and prosperous age of Western liberal -democratic hegemony. Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 
7 E.g. Richard Falk, in Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 50. 
Scholte, for example, cites data collected by UNCTAD which suggests that the world's 48 poorest 
countries will collectively loose $300 -600 million per annum as a result of reduced exports and 
increased food imports under the Uruguay Round agreements. Scholte, Globalization: A Critical 
Introduction, 215. 
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example, has argued that what we treat as a new phenomena under the rubric of 
"globalisation," is in reality nothing more than the economic interdependence and 
neoliberal regime behaviour that has been a feature of international life for many 
years.s From this perspective, "globalisation" does nothing to alter the basic realities 
of world politics, in which states remain the primary actors. So- called "global" 
corporations, for example, ultimately remain located within territorial states, and 
their actions subject to control by state authorities. Similarly, institutions of 
supposedly transnational governance such as the UN have not exercised power 
independently of their state members. 
Ian Clark has added an interesting dimension to this debate by suggesting that 
globalisation in IR theory and practice remains dominated by the ontological "Great 
Divide" that delineates a fundamentally different nature of life within, and without, 
the boundaries of the nation state. For Clark, this continuing demarcation of 
inside /outside ensures that, for most people, globalising processes (whether 
economic, ecological, social and technological), are presumed to be fundamentally 
separate from the state - whether one is `pro' globalisation or `anti,' it; and 
regardless of whether one believes that the state is a subject of globalisation, or a 
principal agent in its management. As a result, debates over globalisation in IR have 
become overwhelmingly focussed on (a) the resilience or otherwise, of the sovereign 
state to global processes; and (b) the nature of globalisation as "cause or effect." 
Throughout such exchanges, thus: 
we are repeatedly confronted with simple choices that revolve around the state as the 
subject or object of globalisation. Substantively, we are invited to choose between 
8 Stephen D. Krasner, "Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood," in R. H. Jackson and 
A. James (eds.), States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), 301 -2. 
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the state as the indispensable political framework for the maintenance of 
globalisation, and the state as the hapless victim of the globalising forces that threaten 
it from outside.9 
In contrast, Clark suggests, globalisation could be better understood in terms of a 
continual reconstitution of the state, "within the vortex of social forces that surround 
and suffuse ít. ""0 From this perspective, globalisation is not merely about a series of 
transnational or international processes, but rather, about the form of the state itself 
occurring "simultaneously within states, and also at the interstices where they 
encounter each other"" (emphasis added). Thus, Clark observes 
...only by a consideration of the state caught between the competing pressures 
emanating from both fields [i.e., domestic and international] can the impact of 
globalization, and its likely future development, be understood. To make sense of the 
international structure, one must look at the identities of the states that help to create 
it. To comprehend the behaviour of states we need to see them as repositories of 
distinctive international orders. (emphasis added)t2 
This understanding of globalisation, I argue, speaks directly to the `connection' 
project of this thesis, and, in these terms, globalisation becomes an apt site for this 
final discussion of it, because it acknowledges an international system in which states 
such as Japan will continue to seek power and agency, but, like the CST perspectives 
examined in Chapter Five, rejects the idea that this system is somehow fixed and 
knowable via the assumptions of (neo- Realist) IR orthodoxy. From this perspective, 
the `many Japans' spoken of in the previous chapter are important in understanding 
the world in which Japan moves as a global actor. In short, if we begin to understand 
the relationship between the (e.g. Japanese) state and the global structure which both 
9 Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 51. 
lc' Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, 10. 
I I Ibid., 66. 
12lbid., 68. 
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defines it and is defined by it as part of a "mutually constitutive and transformative 
process, "13 it becomes vital that IR engages with the knowledge about different 
Japanese realities provided by Japanese Studies. The discussion to follow seeks to 
tease this theme out of various elements of the debate on Japan in the global era. 
1. Globalisation and Japan: Takashi Inoguchi and the `Dialectics' of Post -Cold 
War World Order. 
Anyone seeking a departure point for a discussion encompassing globalisation, 
International Relations and Japan, could do worse than the recent work of a 
prominent and prolific contributor to all of these topics, Takashi Inoguchi. Up to the 
early 1990s, Inoguchi's perspectives concerning Japan's international role tended to 
stress the importance of maintaining order and stability via continued U.S. 
hegemonic dominance.14 Since the end of the Cold War however, he has sought a 
more adventurous theoretical framework, influenced by the CST perspectives 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six. More specifically, Inoguchi has adopted what he 
terms a "dialectical model" of global change, which acknowledges not only the major 
forces shaping world politics in the post -Cold War period, but also the contradictions 
and anomalies contained within these forces. Such a model, he argues, eschews the 
13 Ibid. 
14 In 1984 for example, Inoguchi argued that international roles for states outside that of hegemon 
divided into the categories of "challenger," "free rider," "supporter," and "spoiler," suggesting that 
Japan fell naturally into the role of "supporter." Takashi Inoguchi, "Keizai Gijitsu Taikoku no 
Sentakushi" (Japan's Images and Options: Not a Challenger But a Supporter), Chu /5 Kôron (October, 
1986): 96 -1I4, on p. 98. Reiterating and expanding this stance a few years later, Inoguchi presented 
four possible future models of international order: "Pax Americana II" (the status quo, anti -declinist 
scenario of scholars such as Russet and Strange), "Bigemony" (joint U.S.-Japan management of the 
international system favoured by Gilpin and Brzezinski), "Pax Consortis" (a global regime where no 
single actor dominates), and "Pax Nipponica" (e.g. Vogel's vision of Japan as "number one "). 
Inoguchi, "Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future." in Kathleen Newland (ed.), The International 
Relations of Japan (London: Millennium Publishing Group, 1990), 215. Here, Inoguchi designated 
Pax Americana II as the most feasible and "most desirable" option for the short -to- medium term, 
because it entails fewer risks to the United States as well as to the rest of the world," and because "a 
large majority of responsible Japanese leaders have found it virtually impossible to think beyond a 
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traditional "Newtonian" dynamics of mainstream IR narratives, which represent 
change in unilinear terms, and instead, seeks to bring to light "the mutual action of 
inherently contradictory factors within the same process. "ts 
Inoguchi has explained his dialectic model at length in two key post -Cold War 
publications: Gendai Nihon Gaikô(Contemporary Japanese Foreign Policy, 1993) 
and Sekai Hendô no Mikata (The Standpoint of Global Change 1994).16 In both 
works, he begins by extending Fukuyama's metaphor of the "end of history," 
representing the uncertainty and instability characterising post -Cold War global 
politics in terms of not one, but three "ends:" the "end of the Cold War," the "end of 
geography" and the "end of history. "17 These "ends," Inoguchi explains, refer to "the 
primary features of change unfolding on a global scale in the three areas of 
international security, the world economy, and domestic societies. "ts Thus: 
The "end of the Cold War" refers in particular to the current unease of the United 
States as it realises the long -term decline of the technological and economic 
competitiveness that underwrites its hegemonic status, even as it retains, for the 
foreseeable short -term, its current global military supremacy. The "end of 
geography" encompasses the uncertainty and unease that has accompanied the 
isolation of national economies and particular regional economic sectors from the 
power of global capital, even as the barriers to a borderless global economy and 
single world market governed by uniform standards are removed. And the "end of 
history" refers to the often violent and unstable results that have accompanied the 
decline of centrally planned economies and authoritarian governance» 
world where the United States is of primary importance to Japan and where the Japan -U.S. friendship 
is a major pillar of global stability." Ibid., 220 -21. 
15 Inoguchi, Sekai Hendô no Mikata (The Standpoint of Global Change; Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 
1994), 36. 
16 Takashi Inoguchi, Gendai Nihon Gaikô: Seikimatsu Hendô no Naka de (Tokyo: Chikuma Shob(i, 
1993). Available in English under the title Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
t7 Inoguchi, Gendai Nihon Gaikô, 5-7, and Sekai Hendô no Mikata, 36. 
t 8 Inoguchi, Sekai Hendô no Mikata, 37. 
t9 Inoguchi, Gendai Nihon Gaikô, 6, and 115 -1I7. 
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As he later explains, Inoguchi is actually using the metaphor of conclusion here to 
critique Fukuyama's triumphalist approach, and the presumptions of any sort of 
`endism' in the face of so much uncertainty and instability.20 Thus, in Inoguchi's 
dialectic model, these `ends' do not represent literal end states, but ongoing, 
competitive processes that are generated and sustained by fundamental, 
transformative forces working within and across the conventional dimensions of IR. 
concern - national security, global economy and state sovereignty. The result, he 
asserts, is a series of continual challenges, and counter -challenges to the way we view 
these categories, and the practices associated with them. 
Overarching these categories is the fundamental force of technology. Thus, Inoguchi 
argues, military technology such as ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and the recent 
Theatre Missile Defence Systems project, has rendered concepts of national security 
obsolete and with them, the traditional (Realist) image of an anarchical world.21 
Satellite technology has similarly transformed the nature of economic activity and the 
market, by making long- distance transactions both instantaneous and continual, thus 
intensifying the removal of control over economic processes from the sovereign state 
to a global financial elite 22 Finally, technology has transformed domestic political 
processes through the advent of a global media network.23 In Inoguchi's model then, 
technology is represented as the key force effecting what Scholte refers to as 
"supraterritoriality," although Inoguchi does not refer to global change in this way. 
Instead, he speaks about the ever -increasing "relativisation (sôtaika) of the sovereign 
2o Ibid., 115. 
21 Inoguchi, Sekai Kendô no Mikata, 100-103. 
22 Mid., 128. 
23 Ibid., I58. 
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state," through the pervasive power of technology. First and foremost, he argues, it is 
technological progress which: 
has forced us to look at security in terms of `international,' not `national' security. 
Technological progress means that the `national economy' is meaningful only within 
the context of the `international economy.' Similarly then, technological progress 
means that the government of a domestic society is only meaningful within the 
context of a relativized state sovereignty.24 
In keeping with Inoguchi's broader dialectic perspective, the very "relativising" 
processes engendered by technology are acknowledged as producing powerfully 
destabilising consequences, as structural adjustments lead to the growth of forces that 
resist and challenge globalisation. For example, he argues, one can see the increasing 
pressures on United State hegemony exerted by the proliferation of nuclear weaponry 
which has seen, among other things, the emergence of a new "backlash" generation 
of traditional Realists and hegemonic stability theorists, re- asserting the endemic 
anarchy of the international system and the need to shore up national security.25 In an 
economic context the pressure towards uniform global `rules' for economic 
behaviour prompts both national and regional responses of economic protectionism, 
especially in areas "where labour and capital cannot be re- allocated adequately 
enough to offset the social costs of market liberalísatíon, "26 Finally, democracy 
within the state is being re- worked via new sites of political articulation, mainly at 
local, grass -roots levels as the management of state affairs is increasingly affected by 
24 Mid., 159. 
25 Ibid., 106 
-7. This is a good point, and one which is borne out, I suggest, by the re -birth of Star 
Wars via the Theatre Missile Defence Project, which, for all its emphasis on transnational security 
cooperation, is emphatically nationalist in focus. 
25 [bid., 192 -94. In a separate essay on his `dialectics' theme, Inoguchi connects the rise of Islamic 
social movements in Egypt and Algeria in the 1990s to the fact that global economic liberalism has so 
far done little to improve the lot of an impoverished majority in these countries. Inoguchi, "Dialectics 
of World Order: A View from Pacific Asia," in Hans -Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.), Whose 
World Order? Uneven Globalisation and the End of the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 
122 -23. 
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global forces and the minuscule "global elite" (i.e., those with access to cutting edge 
technology) who control these forces).27 In this context, Inoguchi argues, while some 
issues such as welfare, education, health and the (local) environment will come to 
depend more on local, rather than national democratic systems, in other areas, such as 
international aid, the processes of development will, increasingly, be linked to the 
activities of international corporations.28 As a result, state politics will increasingly 
be defined in terms of a continual series of adjustments between "global" and "local" 
interests. Thus: 
Instead of "think globally, act locally" the opposite, "think locally, act globally" will 
become the catchphrase of the next century. Undoubtedly, this mindset will become 
important not only for say, environmentalists, but for the global economic and 
financial elite as well. Politicians in local democratic polities will most likely have to 
learn to exist within the definition of global interests.29 
Within the broader model of global change proposed by Inoguchi, Japan's 
international role becomes a similar issue of balance and adjustment between various 
dialectical forces - not just the competing forces of globalisation and resistance 
mentioned above, but the specific historical and political constraints that have 
influenced Japan's international relations during the Cold War. Japan's fate in WWII 
and its subsequent role under U.S. Cold War strategy, Inoguchi observes, prevented it 
from taking a major global or regional "leadership" role in the postwar world.30 In 
the post -Cold War period however, the indicators of international " Ieadership" have 
changed, as military and even economic hegemony become less important than the 
power of input into the structures and institutions that facilitate and govern global 
27 Perhaps, according to Inoguchi, as few as 0.01% of the world's population. Inoguchi, Sekai Hendô 
no Mikata, 80. 
28 ibid., 197 -200. 
291bid. See also Gendai Nihon Gaikô, 185 -195. 
3o Inoguchi, Gendai Nihon Gaikô, 200. 
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integration. From Inoguchi's perspective, it is this power of "global formatting" that 
Japan most needs to cultivate in order to develop the type of international role that 
has been expected of it since the Gulf War first precipitated the debate of post -Cold 
War `responsibility'.31 
While this may sound like familiar ground (see Chapter One), Inoguchi develops this 
point in Sekai Hendô in an interesting way, particularly with reference to Japan's 
potential role in the global economy. The initial post -Cold War perception of a 
simple capitalist "victory" over communism, he argues, is having to give way to a 
more complex vision of many different capitalisms (shihonshugi no samazama no 
ruikei), all influenced by various cultural, geographical and even linguistic 
contexts,32 and all increasingly in competition with each other for the power to 
"construct the rules of the global economy. "33 Yet while the "end of geography" and 
the march towards a single world market has intensified the pressure to adopt 
uniform global financial and economic norms Inoguchi argues, it is by no means 
clear which particular combination of these norms wiII dominate. 
All current "variants" of capitalism Inoguchi suggests, exhibit strengths and 
weaknesses; Japan's particular strengths for example, include "pragmatic emphasis 
on the market, a significant state role in the equipment of vital social infrastructure, 
and a national tendency towards self -reliance and hard work. "34 Inoguchi is 
concerned however, that Japanese, or indeed any non -Western "capitalist values" 
exert minimal influence in global economic and financial decisionmaking: witness, 
for example, the ongoing struggle for an enhanced Japanese role in the World Bank 
31 Ibid. 
32 Inoguchi, Sekai Hendô no Mikata, 141. 
33 Mid., 144. 
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and the IMF, and the way in which the major states of the EC have "passed- over" 
Japanese advice on Russia's post -communist economic restructuring by European 
nations. 35 This state of affairs is further illustrated, he suggests, by the failure of 
Japan to emerge as a "political great power" with respect to foreign aid.36 
Global Governance and Global `Formatting Power' in a Supraterritorial World 
Inoguchi's work, I suggest, provides a good overview of the themes and concerns 
that are prevalent in many Japanese discussions of globalisation. In particular, the 
`global formatting' theme he raises in Sekai Hendô reflects an increasingly 
commonly held view in Japanese circles about where real national power lies in a 
"supraterritorial" world. It is evident, for example, in the Diplomatic Bluebooks 
published annually by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). For some years 
now, MOFA's analysis of Japan's foreign policy options has been structured first and 
foremost around "transborder issues" (terrorism, arms proliferation, the movement of 
capital, environmental concerns, international immigration and so on), organised in 
terms which broadly correspond to Inoguchi's `three end' dimensions of economy, 
geography, and security 37 
34lbid., 51. 
35 Ibid., 152. In the case of the Russian economy, Inoguchi claims, recommendations from Japan's 
Economic Planning Agency for a slower, more gradual shift from the state -controlled economy to a 
free market were largely ignored by major players who favoured a "shock transition." Bid, 153. 
36 Inoguchi, Sekai Hendô no Mikata, 154. Despite Japan's current status as the world's biggest donor 
of foreign aid, its government remains curiously unable to implement the type of "political 
conditionality" (such as tying aid to democratic reform and human rights improvements in target 
countries) that has emerged as a major element in the financial programs of the IMF and World Bank 
- i.e., in the institutions where Japan most needs to increase its profile if it is to have a significant 
input into the formatting of global structures and practices. Ibid. 
37 Diplomatic Bluebook 1998: Japan's Diplomacy Toward the 21" Century - New Developments and 
New Challenges Facing the International Community (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
1998). Sourced online at the MOFA website, at 
http://www.mofa.gojn/policviother/bluebook/index.html. 
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The 1999 Bluebook for example, cites "diversification of threats," "diversification of 
national power," and "the progress of globalization" as the three most pressing 
themes for Japan at the end of the 20th century.38 In short, the book notes: 
The wave of globalization is irreversible, and total control over the curl of that wave 
is impossible. Bearing these realities firmly in mind, we need to sustain an inventive 
approach to globalization which will make maximum use of the dynamism of this to 
further promote world stability and prosperity.39 
As subsequently explained, MOFA's "inventive approach" to maximising Japan's 
opportunities in the irreversible wave of globalisation is not unlike that advocated by 
Inoguchi - most particularly, with regard to the focus on `formatting' power within 
existing international institutions. Not surprisingly, foremost on the Bluebooks' 
agenda for increasing Japan's formatting power is reform of the United Nations, 
which, MOFA argues "can no longer avoid enhancing its functions so that it may 
respond adequately to challenges towards the 21St century. "40 While reform is 
needed in several areas, the one which most interests MOFA is reform of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC).41 More specifically, the issue of a permanent seat 
for Japan on the Council, which has been brought up annually in the Bluebook since 
1997, and which, as I argued in Chapter One, is seen as one of the most crucial trade- 
offs for Japan continuing to increase its `global responsibility.'42 Elsewhere, other 
signs of the concern with formatting power include the Ministry of Finance's project 
38 "The Progress of Globalization," Diplomatic Bluebook, 1999: Japan's Diplomacy With Leadership 
Toward the New Century. Sourced online at the MOFA website (op. cit., I999) 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., Chapter 1, Section D: "Global Efforts and the Role of Japan - The United Nations." 
41 The other areas cited are financial reform (primarily due to delayed payments from the US) and 
better management of development assistance. 
42 "Japan Lines Up 141 Countries for U.N. Plan," The Japan Times, Saturday October 28, 2000. 
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to promote the further internationalisation of the yen,43 the (successful) campaign by 
a Japanese national to secure the UNESCO directorship, and the general push by 
both MOFA and MITI to increase the number of Japanese citizens working for 
international organisations 44 
As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the preoccupation with issues such as 
these is connected to dominant images of globalisation in IR, as "supraterritoriality," 
or, in Inoguchi's terms, the increasing "relativisation" of state sovereignty. In this 
respect, the concerns expressed above are very much a continuation of the neo- 
Realist/neo- liberal perspective discussed briefly in Chapter One.45 They propose that 
international institutions are the most effective way of maximising and managing 
interdependence among states (especially economic interdependence), and that 
Japan's options as a global actor are dependent on the extent to which it can 
maximise its role in these institutions, and the supraterritorial regimes they create. 
The sovereign state thus remains the main actor in globalisation, despite its reduced 
power to act independently to pursue its interests. 
This is true, to some extent also, of Inoguchi's model, which, for all its emphasis on 
the dialectic nature of globalisation, and the 'relativisation' of traditional state 
sovereignty, still regards the former predominantly as an interaction between state - 
based elites and economic forces `out there' in the world system. This view is borne 
out in Inoguchi's conviction that "localised" reactions or resistances to globalisation 
can never ultimately overcome its power. Any impact that critical resistance might 
have can, he suggests, be effective only within the framework that (technology- 
43 "Internationalization of the Yen for the 214 Century: Japan's Response to Changes in Global 
Economic and Financial Environments," published on the Ministry of Finance Website at 
http: / /www.mof.go. íp/ englishliffe I b064b.htm. 
44 Hanai, "English is Not the Answer" (op. cit., 2000), 2. 
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driven) globalisation defines, given that such groups are without the power accorded 
to states and other major actors (such as international corporations), who can play a 
"formatting role" in global institutions 46 
The problem with this perspective on globalisation, I suggest, is that it lacks any 
sense of the "mutually constitutive and transformational" relationship between 
globalisation and the state which I touched on at the beginning of this chapter. As 
such, both Inoguchi's `dialectic' model and the more widespread emphasis it 
encourages on increasing Japan's "formatting power," fail to cover two important 
aspects of globalisation. The first concerns the extent to which particular forms of 
the Japanese state, especially postwar Japan, have already contributed to particular 
global regimes and processes. The second concerns the impact of globalisation 
within Japan - in relation, for example, to the critical social struggles on Okinawa 
which represent both sub -national and supraterritorial implications in the global age. 
This is not about the 'relativisation' of Japanese sovereignty by global pressures, as 
Inoguchi's work implies. Rather, it concerns the changes taking place in Japanese 
society and identity which both affect, and are affected by global transformations 
taking place on the 'outside.' As does the increasingly important issues associated 
with migrant workers in contemporary Japan. 
I will touch on both of these themes shortly, to illustrate how these aspects of 
globalisation testify to the "mutually constitutive and transformational" dimensions 
of the dilemmas facing Japanese people in the post -Cold war world. For the moment 
however, I want to connect this present debate to themes introduced earlier, by saying 
45 See Chapter One, 38 -40. 
46 Thus, in Gendai Nihon Gaikô, Inoguchi dismisses the potential international agency of groups such 
as "human rights movements and peace movements," which, he argues, "tend to be viewed [in Japan] 
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something of the way in which Robert Cox's Critical Theory perspective has 
contributed to this kind of understanding of Japan's global role in the 21't century. 
2. `Middlepowermanshíp:' A Critical Theory Approach to Japan's Role in the 
New Global Order. 
Here, it is Cox's interest in the emergence of Japan as a potential "middle power" 
that is most important, a role, he emphasised, in 1989, that was not simply a 
supporting `satellite' role within an extant hegemony commonly associated with 
orthodox foreign policy thought and practice. 47 Rather, a genuine 
"middlepowermanship" role for Japan would be founded on its ability to facilitate the 
shift to an altogether different type of (post -hegemonic) world order, in which power 
would not be confined to dominant states, or even states per se, but is diffused among 
multiple levels. Because structural change per se was not `fixed,' or determined 
according to historical inevitability, middlepowermanship, Cox argued, was 
"something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state 
of the international system. "48 
More specifically, for Cox, this meant that the tensions and dislocations that were by 
then becoming more evident in Japan's postwar politico- economic system, were both 
a function of shifts in the global structure of production, and an opportunity for 
alternative social forces within Japan conducive to the emergence of a multi -level 
world order. Consistent with his broader position, Cox emphasised that this 
structural change was not something that had `just happened' to Japan. If anything, 
as radical groups and are mostly pushed into the corners of society." Inoguchi, Gendai Nihon Gaikô, 
188. 
47 Robert W. Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order." International Journal 44 
(1989): 824 -862. 
48 Ibid., 825. 
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he suggested, postwar Japan had played a key role in the post -1970s restructuring of 
the global economy, through its part in the development of a "post Fordist" mode of 
production, in which large -scale mass production was displaced by more flexible, 
complex production systems, able to produce a variety of outputs quickly in a global 
market. indeed, in a certain sense: 
Japan pioneered this kind of production organisation with its dual structure for the 
labour force, part established and secure, part non -established and precarious. The 
global restructuring process has taken over Japanese practice (but without its 
commitment to social and employment stability) and has extended it by reducing the 
privileged core and expanding the segmented peripheries of employment. The result 
has been a global shift in power relations to the advantage of capital and the 
disadvantage of labour. (emphasis added)49 
From Cox's perspective, thus, the changes underway within the Japanese state, and 
the changes within a globalising international political economy, are essentially 
symbiotic and codependent, rather than dichotomous or antagonistic. This is 
important, not least because Cox's perspective generates quite different questions 
about power and agency in global change, than does Inoguchi's. Like Inoguchi and 
MOFA, for example, Cox regards international institutions as important in the 
management of structural change. Yet he is able to recognise that these institutions 
themselves, as creations of the Westphalian state system, are necessarily limited as 
agents of change as long as they remain ultimately answerable to existing states. The 
interlocuteurs valables for the social forces at work transforming states, Cox argued, 
cannot be the centres of accountability to states.50 Rather, he suggested, what was 
needed was; 
49 Ibid., 846. 
50 Ibid., 836. 
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a decentred, fragmented structure of international institutions in which some 
relatively autonomous segments of international organization become agencies of 
reflection and dialogue that can respond to emerging social forces and help work out 
strategies and goals for change in polity, economy, and society.51 
On this basis too, Cox saw the type of political culture in Japan dismissed by 
Inoguchi as `local' (and therefore ineffective in resisting global change), as 
potentially important in facilitating commitment to counter- hegemony and the 
middlepowermanship ideal. If the impetus for structural change, he argued, does not 
just come from forces `out there' in the world, then nor is it generated solely through 
existing state institutions and the `multinational' business elite. It can also come 
from new sites of political culture, developed by people whose concerns encompass 
both local and global concerns: the environment, human rights, unequal social 
development and even multiculturalism.52 For Cox, in the late 1980s, the power of 
this alternative political culture in Japan remained uncertain and underdeveloped, and 
its future direction indeterminate. His point was however, that it should not be 
ignored - that it represented something more than a fragmented, perpetually 
marginalised response to irresistible global forces `out there.' 
This insight continues to ring true today, as I will try and illustrate in the latter half of 
this chapter, by again engaging directly with the mainstream debate on Japan's global 
role which, as I argued in the first half of this thesis, has to be understood in the 
context of its role in the Cold War security framework of the United States, and the 
`Japanese' identity connected with this role. In the following discussion, I will look 
at two ways of confronting this identity question in the global era. The first is drawn 
from the `mainstream' response to globalisation described above; i.e., in terms of a 
5 t Ibid. 
52Ibid., 859-61. 
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fundamentally competitive relationship between the sovereign identity of the state, 
and the forces of globalisation. The second however, connects to the discussion 
begun in the previous chapter, by showing how groups within Japan who have 
traditionally been excluded from a majority `national' identity (e.g., on Okinawa), as 
well as to those who are coming to Japan as a result of global forces (e.g., migrant 
workers), are perhaps changing Japan from the `inside' in ways which will impinge 
upon its identity and role as a global actor. 
3. Globalising Japanese Identity: Japan's Global Role from the `Inside.' 
One of the most interesting recent statements on globalisation and Japanese identity, 
I suggest, can he found in the writings of Eisuke Sakakibara, a former deputy finance 
minister for international affairs, and until recently, a candidate for the directorship of 
the International Monetary Fund.53 Sakakibara first shot to domestic and 
international prominence in the early 1990s when he published a book asserting that 
Japan has developed a different "regime" of capitalism from the `West,' derived from 
and reflecting the specific characteristics (and merits) of Japanese society. The 
principles of this regime, Sakakibara argued, which include, among other things, 
"putting people first" and "merit -based equal opportunity which rejects hereditary 
rights and the control of capital," constitute a particular socio- economic "paradigm" 
which needs protection from the relentless pressure on Japan to assimilate its 
economic practices with Europe and the United States.54 
53 International Monetary Fund Press Release 00/18: "IMF Board Receives Nomination for IMF 
Managing Director." Sourced online at http: / /www.imf.org/external /index.htm. 
54 Eisuke Sakakibara, Bunmei toshite no Nihon -gata Shihon Shugi: Torni' to `Kenryoku' no Kôzu 
(Japanese -style Capitalism as Civilization: the Structures of `Wealth' and `Authority.' Toyko: Toyko 
Keizai Shinposha, 1993). Also, Shihonshugi wo Koeta Nihon, iii -iv. 
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In 1998, Sakakibara reiterated and updated this argument in a work with the rather 
imposing title, Structural Reform for the New Century: From Progress to Symbiosis, 
in which he debates the dangers and opportunities facing Japan's socio- economic 
"paradigm" in a rapidly globalising world economy.55 The "progress" of 
Sakakibara's title refers to a linear, (Newtonian) sense of universal progress, 
associated unequivocally with the post -Enlightenment West, and portrayed by 
Sakakibara as endlessly striving toward "an ultimate, ideal world order. "S6 In the 
post -Cold War world, he argues, this "universalist progressivism" (shimpô shugi) is 
reflected in the increasing rationalisation of the global market and the 
homogenisation of economic and financial practices, especially via the "cyberisation" 
(saibâ -ka) of economic transactions via computer technology.57 The result is a type 
of "capitalist fundamentalism" or "market fundamentalism" (shihon genrishugi /shijô 
genrishugi) which Sakakibara perceives as being more or less directly derived from 
the postwar politico -economic hegemony of the United States, and which, he argues, 
is potentially destructive of human society and identity in many parts of the world. 
Sounding rather like Huntington in reverse gear, Sakakibara asserts that "it is 
probably these `fundamentalisms' and not Islamic or communist fundamentalism, 
which now pose the greatest threat to the twenty -first century world. "58 
Here again are many of the themes which permeate the broader (mainstream) 
globalisation debate, and which have already been discussed above - technology, 
economic interdependence, and above all, the tension between increasing 
"supraterritoriality," and the sovereign identity of the state. From Sakakibara's 
55 Eisuke Sakakibara, Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku: Shinpo kara Kyôsei e (Structural Reform for the 
New Century: From Progress to Symbiosis; Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1998). 
56 Sakakibara, Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku, 33. 
57 Ibid., 40. 
58Ibid., 166. 
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perspective however, these tensions necessitate something more than the assertion of 
"multiple capitalisms" (Inoguchi), or the need for UN reform (MOFA), given that the 
issue at stake, he argues, is not just the future structure of the world political 
economy, but the very shape and character of "human civilisation itself." At a time 
when integrative global forces are exerting unprecedented pressure on state 
sovereignty, Sakakibara warns, societies which don't reach beyond generalist 
"ideologies" such as "Western-style democracy, peace, and the omnipotence of the 
market" to assert a national and/or regional identity have no useful role to play in the 
global network of the future. They will be absorbed by other regions and other 
countries. 59 "Only the countries and regions able to assert and, to a certain extent 
universalise (emphasis added) their distinct cultures and histories" Sakakibara 
concludes, "will become important players in the new, globalised international 
system. "6o 
It would be wrong to deduce from this that Sakakibara is against globalisation per se; 
for he is not. He is fiercely critical however, of the extent to which the structures that 
govern global forces - the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, 
among others - remain dominated by `Western' values and assumptions. 
Accordingly, while conceding that many of the integrative processes associated with 
globalisation and global regimes are inevitable and even positive, Sakakibara is 
concerned about the need to promote, and increase the `hybrid' nature of global 
regimes. What is needed, he argues, is a fundamental shift in "intellectual 
frameworks" - away from the unilinear, unidirectional (Western) "progressivism" 
that currently dictates globalisation, and towards a state of "symbiosis" (kyôsei) in 
591bid., 32-34. 
6o Ibid., 169. 
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which there is room for many different modes of socio- economic organisation to co- 
exist.61 Explaining further, Sakakibara describes this proposed shift in religious 
terms: away from the "monotheism" of Western liberal- democratic progressivism, to 
a "polytheism" of many different politico- economic civilisations (seiji keizai bunmei) 
- in short, a state of "multicivilisational symbiosis" (tabunmeishugiteki kyôsei) 62 
It probably comes as little surprise that Japan is the country that is foremost in 
Sakakibara's mind when it comes to resisting and challenging `Western 
progressivism.' Like other Asian countries he argues, Japan was subject to a long 
period of "enforced (Western) modernisation" (kyôsei sareta kindaika) when it came 
into contact with Western power during the eighteenth century ó3 During the postwar 
period however, when most other Asian countries were employing the benefits of 
modernisation to reject colonial rule and forge strong, cohesive national identities, 
Japan, Sakakibara points out, was being subjugated to the ideological framework of 
the United States in the name of the Cold War. The result, he argues, is that Japan, 
for all its remarkable postwar achievements, has failed to develop the secure sense of 
national identity (kunigara) or national awareness (kokumin ishiki) that will be vital 
in weathering the effects of global integration. More damagingly, it has failed to take 
advantage of the tools and techniques that now constitute real power in an 
increasingly integrated world. Like Inoguchi, Sakakibara believes that these tools are 
centred in technology, and in particular, the "information revolution" of the late 
twentieth century. 
G1 Ibid., 34. 
62lbid., 36. 
63 Ibid., 82-84. 
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Sakakibara is particularly concerned by the extent to which Japan remains an 
"information- closed -country" (jôhô sakoku) - a phrase that refers scathingly to the 
period of Japan's international isolation (sakoku) prior to the arrival of Admiral Perry 
in the mid -nineteenth century and Japan's subsequent emergence as a modern nation 
state in the state system. For Sakakibara, this closure is signified not only by actual 
levels of engagement with technology (for example, the low rate of internet usage 
within Japan compared to other OECD countries),64 but also by issues such as the 
general ineptitude of Japanese people in foreign languages - especially English, 
"the de facto language of communication on the Internet, and in the global 
economy. "65 
Japan as a Globaliser of Values? 
Many scholars of Japan, I suspect, would be inclined to dismiss Sakakibara's 
arguments as yet another nationalist diatribe on nihonjinron, or Japanese uniqueness, 
and certainly there are elements of this stance in his work.66 Even were this not the 
case, it is difficult to overlook Sakakibara's tendency (much like Inoguchi) to 
64lbid., 132. 
65 Ibid., 171. 
66 Most Japan specialists would be aware of the significance of the textual influences cited by 
Sakakibara in the opening pages of Shinseiki, which include the work of the Japanese naturalist 
Imanishi Kenji. Kenji's 1950s studies of the social behaviour of monkeys and other animals disputed 
the (Western) Darwinian notion of evolution and natural selection, arguing instead for a natural order 
of coexistence (sumiwake), that living creatures create instinctively within their natural habitat 
(Imanishi, cited in Sakakibara, Shinseiki no Kôzô Kaikaku, 28 -29). Sakakibara's extension of this 
notion of coexistence to human societies, whereby "human social and economic systems are created 
out of the traditions and instinct for co- existence of human beings "(ibid., 29) is also a borrowed idea; 
this time, from the famous (and conservative) Japanese social theorist Kawakatsu Heita. Kawakatsu, 
whose writings have been profoundly influential in debates on national identity in Japan, is probably 
most famous for his assertions about the influence of geographical space on the formation of cultural 
and racial identity, and in turn, the impact of culture upon the human economy (for a synopsis of his 
arguments, see Morris -Suzuki, Re- Imagining Japan, 145 -149). From Sakakibara's perspective, a 
healthy world order involves a multiplicity of these cultural -social- economic structures, co- existing 
with each other, as opposed to a single, universal structure informed by the paradigm of "Western 
progressivism," (Sakakibara, Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku, 32). In order that this state of 
multicivilisational symbiosis can be achieved however, the non -Western societies that have held 
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effectively ignore Japan's role in creating the very processes he damns as "Western 
progressivism." Despite this however, Sakakibara's work is interesting, I argue, for 
what he is really trying to come to grips with in Shinseiki, and in a far more forthright 
way than many others who have tackled this topic, is nothing less than the 
globalisation of values. More specifically, he is asking if it is possible for Japan to 
survive without managing to project, or at least protect, one of the key aspects of 
state sovereignty as traditionally defined: the state as a source of values, and 
accordingly, identity. 
In this respect, Sakakibara's argument invokes some of the most powerful tensions 
surrounding the contemporary globalisation debate. As many scholars have noted, 
some of the most compelling evidence for globalisation revolves around the 
emergence of institutions of global governance which, by definition, presume some 
degree of normative consolidation and universalisation.67 Thus, many discussions of 
globalisation invoke the emergence of some sort of global civil society, in which 
certain broad values (democracy, human rights, peace, protection of the environment) 
are, increasingly, being universalised through the aspirations of organisations such as 
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, or even Amnesty 
International.68 On the other hand, there are those who argue that because the effects 
(particularly the beneficial effects) of globalisation are so profoundly uneven, the pull 
of forces which help define communal identity (race, culture, nationality, proximity 
from the wealth- creating processes of the global economy) are becoming ever more 
themselves in thrall to the Western, progressivist ideal of an ultimate `end state' of homogeneous 
liberal democracy must re- assess and re- assert their post -Cold War identities. Ibid., 54. 
G7 Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, 127. 
68 Ibid., 129. 
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complex, ensuring that social values become a major site of contestation G9 As 
Claude Ake puts it: 
Globalization produces many losers and many more who worry about losing. It alters 
economic and political relations in the local space, it threatens cultures. Some are 
universalised, but even this is a threat, for in universalising, it also transforms. It 
eradicates some, museumises others. It collapses distance and conjures proximity that 
can be discomforting. In universalising certain values, globalisation can exacerbate 
scarcity, competition and conflict.70 
Both of these perspectives, I suggest, are resonant not only within Sakakibara's 
argument, but in general debate over Japan's role in a globalising world. As 
mentioned above, the Diplomatic Bluebooks, and other official articulations of 
Japan's global role contain frequent references to Japan's role in achieving "human 
security" - the 1999 Bluebook devoting an entire section to the discussion of 
Japan's "efforts toward the realisation of a better global society. "71 "Human 
security," in this context, covers: 
all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity - for example, 
environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational organized crime, 
illicit drugs, refugees, poverty, anti -personnel landmines, and other infectious 
diseases such as AIDS and strengthens efforts to confront these threats. As these are 
all cross -border issues, coordinated action by the international community will be 
important, as will linkages and cooperation among governments, international 
organizations, NGOs and other parts of civil society.72 
On the other hand, and as Sakakibara's work suggests, there remains a strong 
perception that the mapping out of contemporary global "civil society" remains very 
much a Western (or, more truthfully, U.S.) enterprise, in which the universalisation 
69 Ibid. 
7o Claude Ake, "The New World Order: A View From Africa," in Holm and Sorensen (eds.), Whose 
World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (op. cit., 1995), 27. 
71 Diplomatic Bluebook 1999 Chapter II Section 3: "Efforts Toward the Realization of a Better Global 
Society." 
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of certain values and norms rides roughshod over the cultural claims of non -Western 
communities and homogenises them into a global (economic, social, cultural) whole. 
Sakakibara of course, is not the first Japanese commentator to suggest this, and in 
this respect, his comments are only the latest instalment in a discussion that dates 
back to Japan's first sustained encounter with the West, 
The notion that Japan needs to adapt the tools of global management (IT, 
membership of international organisations, an ODA program committed to furthering 
"global civil society "), even as it strives to resist and reject "Western progressivism" 
for example, is strikingly akin to the efforts of late Meiji and early Shôwa 
intellectuals to define a world view in which Japan was recognised as culturally 
different but equivalent to the West.73 As Stefan Tanaka has argued, this involved a 
sharp distinction between the absorption of `universal' tools and technologies that 
were deemed vital to Japan's survival in the modern state system, and the absorption 
of "Western" culture and values. Thus, he suggests, the Meiji historian Taguchi 
Ukichi's assertion that Japanese scholars "study physics, psychology, economics, and 
other sciences not because the West discovered them, but because they are the 
universal truth" [emphasis addedj.74 On the same basis, I suggest, Sakakibara is 
eager for Japanese people to accept tools and techniques (even the English language!) 
that will fortify Japan's participation in the power processes of an increasingly 
`glohalised' world order structure, while maintaining that "national identity" is 
something fundamentally separate from this project. To put it another way, from 
Sakakihara's perspective, the tools of globalisation are precisely what Japan needs in 
72 Ibid. 
73 Stefan Tanaka, Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993), 47. 
74 Taguchi Ukichi (1855- 1905), quoted in Tanaka, Japan's Orient, 37. 
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order that it can export the core values of Japanese identity - thereby not only 
surviving the globalisation process, but enhancing it, on Japan's terms. 
The idea that re- discovering a Japanese identity is not merely to benefit Japan, but is 
important in preventing the homogenisation of other non -Western societies is 
significant. Among other things, it explains the recent tendency to represent 
`Japanese' values and identity more broadly, as `Asian' values.75 Sakakibara, for 
example, notes the "natural affinity" between Japan and other Asian societies, which 
makes Japan a potential leader in the championing of multicivilisational symbiosis.76 
In this respect too, his arguments tap an already substantial body of opinion. In 1993 
for example, another distinguished Japanese bureaucrat, Ogura Kazuo, argued that it 
was not sufficient for Asian countries to master `Western' economic, political and 
cultural practices77 Rather, he stated, it was high time that "the traditional spirit of 
Asia" began to "export values of a universal world nature." 78 Elsewhere, Takeshi 
Nagano has explained how the unique "Japanese -style management" of the 1980s 
(nihon -teki keiei) is set to become "East Asia -style management" (tôyô -teki keiei); 
while Minobu Honda and his colleagues have argued the existence of a particular 
and unique "ethos" that underpins "Asian progress. "79 
75 For discussions on this topic, see Hein and Hammond "Multiculturalism in Japanese Perspective," 
The Journal of American -East Asian Relations 1 (Summer 1992): 145 -169; David Wright -Neville, 
"The Politics of Pan Asianism" (op. cit., 1995), Morris- Suzuki, Re- Imagining Japan, 178 -79, and 
Gavan McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence (op. cit., 1996), 167 -68. 
76 Sakakibara, Shinseiki e no Kôzô Kaikaku, 200 
-201. 
77 Kazuo Ogura, "'Ajia fukken' no tame ni" (For the `restoration of Asia'). Chuô Kôron 7:1993, 60- 
73, on pp. 61 -63. Ogura cites the East Asian economic boom, the achievement of "more or less 
democratic" political systems, and the proliferation of Asian musicians in Western classical orchestras 
as respective examples of Asian mastery of `Western cultural practices.' Ibid., 61. 
78 Ibid., 64. Like Inoguchi and Sakakibara, Ogura also appreciates the importance of "formatting 
power," arguing that, while the self -evident worth of Asian values will ultimately aid their global 
dissemination, more active promotion strategies (such as the setting up of more institutes within Asia 
to encourage the study of Asia by foreigners) are also needed. 
79 Takeshi Nagano, "Nihon -teki keiei kara Tôyô -teki keiei e" (From Japanese Management to East 
Asian Management), Bungei Shunju June 1992, 142 -49; and Minobu Honda et. al., Alla Flatten no 
Etosu (The Ethos of Asian Progress; Tokyo: Keisô Shobô, 1995). For a good discussion of these and 
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As Morris- Suzuki has pointed out, the actual definition of `Asian values' in examples 
such as these has been consistently vague.80 "In many new Asianist writings," she 
observes, "Asia itself appears less as a clearly defined reality than as the goal of an 
inchoate longing which combines nostalgia for lost values and traditions with the 
dream of a yet- undefined alternative model of modernity. "81 My own perspective is 
that such vagueness also fulfils a more specific purpose, providing as it does a 
conveniently flexible conceptual framework for resisting the incessant, homogenising 
pressures of global forces `out there' in the world - one that works on both 
`regional' and `national' levels, as convenience dictates. This is particularly 
important in a Japan context, because in many cases, efforts to produce a cohesive 
Japanese national identity have, not surprisingly, sought inspiration from the period 
prior to Japan's postwar subjugation to "western progressivism" - the period of 
Japan's conquest of Asia prior to and during WWII. 
Thus for example, the Japanese government recently passed a bill which formally 
endorses the hinomaru flag (the "Rising Sun;" red circle on a white background), and 
the song kimigayo82 as official national symbols.83 The `official' status of both song 
and flag as national symbols is longstanding; both date back to the Meiji restoration. 
In the wake of WWII however, they were widely rejected by Japanese people, as 
symbols of emperorism and militarism, and accordingly, of the havoc and suffering 
visited on so many Japanese and Asian people during the first half of the 2O`' 
other similar works in English, see Laura Hein and Ellen H. Hammond, "Homing in on Asia: Identity 
in Contemporary Japan," Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars 27:3 (1995): 2 -17. 
80 Ogura's list of "universal" Asian values for example, ventures no further than a series of generalised 
remarks about diligence in work and education, respect for the aged, and emphasis upon family ties 
and group harmony over the wishes of the individual. Ogura, "Ajia Fukken," 68. 
81 Morris -Suzuki, Re- Imagining Japan, 179. 
82 Translated as "Thy Reign," the song is a vow of loyalty to the Emperor of Japan. 
83 Asako Murakami, "The Rising Sun Rises Again," New California Media Online, at http: / /www.ncm 
online.com/in-depth/I999-08-13/rising.html. 
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century. Consequently, although both have routinely been brought out to represent 
Japan at `international' venues such as the UN, or the Olympic Games, the 
government's position prior to the passing of the bill (in August 1999) was that Japan 
did not actually have an `official" flag or anthem.84 Public acknowledgement of their 
`official' status is therefore a significant move, and while it remains a hugely 
controversial one among some sectors of Japanese society,85 there is also little doubt 
that for many, it represents a positive step - a way of fortifying community, of 
celebrating some level of national cohesion in the face of so much that is uncertain 
and fragmentary. 
Another important sign of attempts to enhance a particular sense of "strong" national 
identity, and one that is deeply interwound with the hinomaru /kimigayo issue, has 
been the renewal of debate over the teaching of wartime history in Japanese 
secondary schools. As previously indicated, the broadening of the "comfort women" 
debate, following the end of the Cold War did bring about a measure of government 
openness on previously taboo topics, including some moderate revisions of school 
textbook guidelines by the Ministry of Education to allow the (albeit limited) 
inclusion of references to wartime acts of Japanese aggression.ß6 Since the mid 
ß4 This itself is a dubious proposition, given the ubiquity of both the hinomaru and kimigayo at 
national and international venues. A particularly good discussion of this ambiguous status can be 
found in Norma Field's In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (op. cit., 1990), 15 -40, where she examines 
the case of an Okinawan activist prosecuted by the government for burning the flag at a national 
athletics meet. 
85 Rejection of both flag and song has always been particularly strong in Hiroshima, where wartime 
pain and suffering came to be epitomised in the atomic bombing, and in Okinawa (see below). 
According to the Ministry of Education, only about 18 percent of Hiroshima high schools sang the 
anthem at school graduation ceremonies in 1998, as opposed to a national average of 80 percent. In 
March 1999, the principal of Sera High School in Hiroshima committed suicide after pressure from the 
local school board to have the anthem sung at the 1999 graduation ceremony. Newsweek 
International, "When a Flag Is Not a Flag," March 29, 1999. Sourced online at 
htto:// www. dailydavos .com/nw- sry /printed/int/ asiaiov3213- 2.htm. 
86 From April 1997, school history texts were approved for use, which refer to the "forcible abduction 
of comfort women," as well as accounts of the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities. Gavan 
McCormack, "Holocaust Denial à la Japonaise" (Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 
38: October 1997), 2. 
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199Os however, these gradual moves by the state to face up to responsibility have 
been met by a strong backlash, led in part by two university -based groups: the 
Association for the Advancement of Liberalist View of History (Jyûshugi Shikan 
Kenkyûkai), founded in 1995, and the Society for the Making of New School 
Textbooks in History, founded in December 1996.87 The central figure in both these 
organisations is a Professor at Tokyo University, Nobukatsu Fujioka, who, according 
to the Association's official website, "has worked for public awareness of grave 
masochistic slants in Japanese history education. "88 Like Sakakibara, Fujioka is 
profoundly concerned by what he sees as the failure of postwar Japan to develop a 
strong sense of national identity - although in his case, the origins of this failure are 
represented more specifically as the loss of a "distinctive Japanese historical 
consciousness:" 
Today, Japan has a well- developed economy and is in a position to make great 
contributions to world peace and prosperity, if she so chooses. However, I believe 
that our conventional historical self -perception is actually pulling us away from a 
sense of international responsibility and true integrity. ...Modern Japan seems to lack 
a strong self -image of what she is, what kind of country she wishes to become, what 
ideals she cherishes. These are all matters deeply related to the prevalent view of 
Japan's history, which I and my colleagues call the masochistic view.ó9 
The sentiments expressed by Fujioka are neither new nor insignificant. As I have 
argued previously (Chapters Four and Six), the circumstances of Japan's postwar role 
ensured the preponderance of a conservative, nationalist political elite, many of 
87 Ibid. 
88 "At The Frontlines: Professor Fujioka Speaks Out on Education Issues, Comfort Women, Creation 
of a New Textbook," Jyíîvhugi Shikan Kenkyûkai English website, at http: / /www.jyuu- shikan.org/e/. 
The Jyûshugi Shikan Kenkyûkai site provides a number of links to like -minded organisations online, 
such as the anonymous "The Other Side" site, at 
http: // members. tripod. com/-- funkytomoya/massacre /sampleOl. htm, and the Japanese site, "Comfort 
Women's Issue: Presenting the Idea That the Japanese Government is Not Responsible, at 
http: / /www.wink.co.ip/ yosiinwatch/comfortwomen.html. 
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whom were openly opposed to the "one country pacifism" enshrined in Article Nine 
(see Chapter One). Throughout the Cold War years, the LDP harboured a powerful 
clique committed to the restoration and/or further empowerment of signs, symbols 
and practices associated with the prewar Japanese state: army, anthem, flag, 
(Yasukuni) shrine, and emperor (in the form of an enhanced role for the imperial 
institution in government).90 Above all, these people have favoured the revamping of 
the Japanese educational system, with the aim of installing a "proper" understanding 
(and veneration) of the ahovementioned symbols. Such an understanding, as 
McCormack has pointed out, involves a distinct shift in emphasis and interpretation 
of the war; more towards the old prewar Shôwa vision of Japan's "liberation" of Asia 
from Western imperialism, with decreasing emphasis on issues such as Imperial 
Army atrocities.91 
Whose Japan? Whose Values? 
All of the examples cited above are integral to the debate over `rear responsibility 
and Japan as a genuine global player in conventional (i.e., neo- Realist terms) that has 
been followed throughout this thesis. Flag, anthem, a `proud' ( "non- masochistic ") 
sense of history - one might even go so far to say that Japan could not participate in 
its new, more "responsible" role in the US -Japan defence partnership without first 
settling such issues, because such symbols are vital underwriters of the notion of 
territorial and cultural alignment. They are part of a state- centred identity that 
confers the capacity to be taken seriously as a military, political, or economic 
89 Nohukatsu Fujioka, lecture given to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan, February 25, 1999. 
Sourced online at the Jvûshugi Shikan Kenkyûkai English website (op. cit.). 
90 Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present" (op. cit., 1993), 75. 
91 McCormack, "Holocaust Denial à la Japonaise," 6 -7. 
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`actor.'92 In this respect, the timing of Japan's "resurgent nationalism" (a favourite 
phrase of media coverage of this topic) is not hard to understand. Yet as 
Sakakibara's work illustrates, the regeneration of past national symbols is something 
more than the staking of a claim to global responsibility. It is also about the effort to 
shore up Japanese identity against the forces of globalisation. 
This is true, moreover, not only in relation to the threats to Japanese sovereignty 
perceived in the increasing supraterritoriality of international society. The 
regeneration of national symbols are also a response to the globalisation of the 
Japanese state from within - to the 'relativisation' of state authority not from the 
exogenous forces of economic liberalism, or `Western progressivism,' but from 
increasingly disparate focal points of identity on the inside of the state, many of 
which, in recent years have begun to acquire `supraterritorial' dimensions of their 
own. 
Some of these sources of identity were discussed in the previous chapter: the Ainu 
people's struggle for recognition, feminist concerns, and the citizenship issues raised 
by ethnic minorities. Such examples, as I argued there, belie the temptingly either 
argument that `restoring' a single, unified sense of Japanese national identity is both 
possible, or necessary to ensure Japan's survival in the globalised world of the future. 
The possibility of multiple `Japans' however, cuts directly to the `theoretical' 
problems raised in this chapter and throughout this thesis, of continuing to 
conceptualise the state's agency primarily in terms of its engagement with global 
forces `out there.' Such a possibility indicates that the way in which the state 
responds to ` globalisation from within,' how it attempts to control and direct the 
92 This view is supported by Fujioka himself, who has described the personal "revelation: (tenkô) he 
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different reactions of people to both the dangers and the opportunities posed by 
globalisation, is a much more complex issue than any simple response to `external' 
forces. To illustrate more precisely what I mean, I will conclude this chapter with two 
final examples of Japan's 'globalisation from within,' both of which have significant 
things to say about Japan's capacity as a global actor. 
Okinawa: Sub -National Identities in an Era of Globalisation 
Properly speaking, "Okinawa" is the name of only the largest island in the Ryúkyfi 
archipelago, a 400 mile chain of one hundred and forty -odd small islands that snakes 
Southwest into the Pacific Ocean, following the bulge of southern China towards 
Taiwan. Since 1879 however, "Okinawa" has also been the formal title of the 
prefecture which incorporates most of the Ryakfis into the Japanese state, and, via the 
(Realist) correlation between territoriality, sovereignty and security, places Japan in 
strategic geographical proximity to Southeast Asia.93 This location has shaped 
Okinawan history, and in turn, what is generally referred to in Japanese political 
discourse as the "Okinawa Problem" (Okinawa Mondai). 
Like Hokkaido (see Chapter Six), Okinawa was initially regarded by Japan's ruling 
elite as an exotic, peripheral foreign territory, but was assimilated and rapidly 
`Japanised,' as the Westphalian state system began to impact on Japanese world 
underwent during the 1991 Gulf War, when it became evident to him that Japan was fundamentally 
emasculated as an international actor. Ibid., 8. 
93 The Okinawan capital Naha is actually closer to Taipei (635km), Shanghai (830km) Seoul 
(1350km), Manila (1465km), and Hong Kong (1465km) than it is to the Japanese administrative 
capital. The closest large Japanese city to Naha is Fukuoka (780km). 
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views from the late eighteenth century.94 As with the Ainu however, the degree of 
Okinawa's integration into Japan proper was always ambiguous. During World War 
II, this ambiguity had devastating consequences for Okinawan people as, on the one 
hand, they were pressed to sacrifice their lives and livelihoods as loyal Japanese 
subjects; while on the other, they were subject to systematic discrimination and 
sometimes horrific abuses by Japanese army troops, particularly as the war situation 
became more desperate.95 And, when invasion by the US became inevitable, 
Okinawa was deemed expendable in the final defence of what (then) Prime Minister 
Konoe termed the `integral mainland' or koyu hondo.96 In this way, the stigma of 
"incomplete" Japaneseness that had been attached to Okinawan people since Meiji 
times, was conveniently re- invoked to justify the prolongation of the war in order to 
obtain an honourable settlement - i.e., one which would not ultimately compromise 
the sovereign identity of 'integral Japan.'97 
94 Steve Rabson, "Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and `Reconstruction" 
Japan Policy Research Institute Occasional Paper No. 8, October 1996, sourced online at 
http: / /www.ipri.org/. In the twelfth year of the Meiji era (1879), the Ryûkyûs, which had effectively 
been under Japanese control since 1609, became Okinawa Prefecture. The formal transformation of a 
distant island outpost to an integral part of the Japanese empire necessitated the transformation of its 
people into `civilised' Japanese nationals and loyal imperial subjects; and Ryûkyûan people thus 
became the targets of a sustained campaign by Meiji modernisers in Tokyo to eradicate indigenous 
language and any other "backward" cultural practices seen as incompatible with Japanese citizenship. 
Aniya Masaaki, "Kindai Nihon to Okinawa" (Modern Japan and Okinawa), flôgaku Zeminâ 505 
(January 1997): 22 -25, on pp. 23 -24. The suppression of Okinawan language in particular was carried 
on well into the postwar period, with local schools required to punish children who spoke `dialect' as 
late as the late 1950s. Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (op. cit., 1990), 72. 
95 Few Okinawans conscripted for the war effort for example, ever actually received proper military 
training, but were assigned instead to "military labour," which meant tasks such as digging trenches, 
building airstrips, and carrying supplies. Following the invasion and during the Battle for Okinawa, 
many Okinawan civilians were ejected by Japanese soldiers from the caves and tombs in which they 
had sought shelter, forced or persuaded to commit group suicide (a phenomena subsequently 
celebrated in official history textbooks as patriotic "collective self -determination "), or simply executed 
outright as suspected `spies.' Kôji Aikyo, "Okinawa ga tô Kokumin Kokka," (Okinawa Questions the 
`Nation State'), in Hiroshi Nakaji and Asaho Mizushima (eds.), Okinawa to Kempô (Okinawa and the 
Constitution; Kyoto: Hôritsubunka -sha, 1998), 29. 
96 Ibid. The questionable geographical logic of referring to a `mainland' within Japan, a nation of 
small islands, is a tradition which persists among both Okinawans and 'mainlanders' today; made 
meaningful by its demarcation of the psychological, as well as geographical distance between core and 
periphery. Thus, Okinawan dialect refers to Okinawan people as "uchinanchu" (inside people) and 
mainland Japanese as "yamatanchu" (those from Yamato), "Yamato" being another term for "Japan." 
Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, 76. 
97 Ibid. 
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This flexible conceptualisation of `integral Japan' was again evident in the 
Occupation and its aftermath, when Okinawa was bound over indefinitely to the 
U.S. as a major military base site in return for the restoration of Japanese 
sovereignty.98 While U.S. bases were established throughout postwar Japan, those 
located on the Japanese mainland were subjected to an entirely different set of miles, 
with the terms and conditions for introducing U.S. forces and equipment subject to at 
least nominal prior consultation. Okinawa however, was subject to no such 
provisions, and in time, it became a strategically vital deployment site for many of 
the United State's more controversial forms of weaponry, including biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons.99 In this respect, Okinawa's continued suspension 
from Japanese administration (long after the restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 
1947) was also useful in balancing Japan's obligations under the Security Treaty, 
with the postwar commitment to a national identity based on peace and non - 
nuclearism - ironically, the very identity which contemporary commentators from 
Hashimoto (see Chapter One) to Sakakibara now reject as incompatible with a 
genuine `global role' for Japan.199 
As many scholars have pointed out, citizen's protests over the scale and nature of the 
U.S. military presence in Okinawa were predicated by and large on the demand for 
Okinawa to be returned to Japan, and throughout its occupation, Okinawan affinity 
98 Initially, land deemed necessary for U.S. military purposes was simply confiscated; however, under 
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Settlement, this was replaced by a compulsory leasing system which 
guaranteed indefinitely the right of the U.S. "to exercise all and any power of administration, 
legislation and jurisdiction" over Okinawa and the rest of the Ryûkyûs. Article 3 of the San Francisco 
Treaty, reproduced in Kihon Jôyaku/Shiryôshû (Basic Documents of International Law), 2nd edition 
(1992), 477. 
99 John Michael Purves, Island of Military Bases: A Contemporary Political and Economic History of 
Okinawa. Published on the Contemporary Okinawa: Politics, Economy and Society website created 
by John Purves at http: / /www2.gol.com /users /johnrach/Base.html. Chapter 1I -1 -4. 
IM For example, Okinawa could not be included when the Satô administration introduced Japan's 
"three nos" antinuclear policy (no construction, no possession, and no introduction of nuclear 
weapons) in December 1967. John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems, 25 -27. 
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with Japan persisted in the face of U.S. attempts to weaken it.101 When reversion to 
Japan was finally achieved in 1972 however, Okinawan hopes for a genuine "parity 
with the mainland" were shattered.102 As it became clear that reversion would 
facilitate neither the de- militarisation, nor the "de- Americanisation" of Okinawan 
economy and society, Okinawans from all walks of life and many different political 
persuasions expressed their betrayal by both the U.S. and Japan. As one 
commentator put it: 
During the war Okinawa acted as a shield for the defence of the homeland, and over 
100,000 of our comrades lost their lives in that effort. After the war Okinawa became 
a spoil of victory, a means with which to settle the problem of defeat. Okinawa was 
sacrificed and entrusted to the rule of an alien people. Now it is to be placed in the 
uncertain position of becoming a keystone of the Japan -UJ.S. Mutual Security Treaty, 
o that it may help to protect the peace and safety of Japan and the Far East. To this 
day Okinawa is, as it has always been, the sacrificial lamb of state power.1o3 
None of this is intended to simplify what was, and remains, a complex relationship 
between Okinawan people, the bases, and mainland Japanese society. The perceived 
economic benefits that the bases bring to Okinawa have always competed with their 
environmental and social impact; and prior to the end of the Cold War at least, the 
bases were regarded by many Japanese and even Okinawan people as making a real 
and necessary contribution to Japan's security in the region and the world. With the 
end of the Cold War however, ambivalence about the bases has increased 
dramatically, leading many to question the foundation on which so many different 
tot Morris- Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 180 -181, and Gabe Masaaki, Nichibei Kankei no Naka no 
Okinawa, (Okinawa in U.S. -Japan Relations; Tokyo: Sanichi Shobô, 1996), 95. 
102 "Parity with the mainland" was a catchphrase of anti -base protests throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Today however, Okinawa continues to host approximately 75 percent of the total number of U.S. 
military forces stationed in Japan under the Security Treaty terms (a figure that is invariably coupled 
by journalists and critics with the fact that Okinawa constitutes less than one percent of the total land 
mass of Japan). L. Eve Armentrout Ma, "The Explosive Nature of Okinawa's `Land Issue' or `Base 
Issue,' 1945 - 1977: A Dilemma of United States Military Policy," Journal of American - East Asian 
Relations 1 (Winter 1992): 435 - 463, on pp. 440 -44. 
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aspects of human security for a community deemed to be an "integral part of Japan," 
are to be deferred indefinitely in the name of national security1o4 
There is no sign for the foreseeable future of any genuine reduction in the U.S. 
military presence, with the bases deemed by both the Japanese and U.S. government 
as vital to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Recently however, there are 
many signs of a resurgence of `Okinawan' identity which, like other formerly distinct 
national entities (for example, Wales in Great Britain), seeks to revitalise Okinawan 
culture, language and art. Even more interestingly, there are many signs that 
Okinawa is seeking to engage the globalisation phenomena independently, in order to 
try and decrease its chronic economic dependence on both the bases and the 
mainland. Thus, in recent years, there has been a marked interest in proposals such 
as that for a "New South China Economic Zone" which would seek the relaxation of 
immigration and other legal restrictions in order to allow Okinawa to attract more of 
the wealth created by China's increasing participation in the global economy.'05 
At its most ambitious, this proposal envisions Okinawa as the potential `hub' of a 
regional grouping not unlike the EU, whereby Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
103 Chobo Yara, cited in John Purves, Island of Military Bases III -6:1, at 
http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/base/chap3-5.html. 
104 Problems routinely cited by Okinawan people protesting against the U.S. military presence include 
restriction of movement (due to military manoeuvres and restricted access to base sites), noise 
pollution from training exercises, pollution from the dumping of weapons -related waste, the injury and 
death of civilians in military training accidents, and incidents of violence and/or intimidation of the 
civilian population by U.S. military personnel. In September 1995, the latter issue was briefly 
catapulted to international attention following a particularly repugnant act of violence against an 
Okinawan child by three US marines. Even before this incident however, opinion polls returned 
extremely low levels of support for the bases: e.g., in a poll conducted by the Prime Minister's Office 
in March 1995, only 7.8 percent of Okinawan respondents expressed "positive support" for the bases. 
The remainder were divided between "reluctantly accepting" the bases (31 %); feeling that the bases 
were "unnecessary" (24.9%); and being "completely opposed" to them (29.4 %). Yomiuri Shimbun, 
March 5, 1995, cited in Purves, Island of Military Bases III -6:I (op. cit.). 
105 Yoshikawa, 
"Okinawa/Fukkien Keizai Keniki no Kôsô to Jitsugenka" (The Conception and 
Realisation of an Okinawa/Fukkien Zone: Towards Co- Existence with China), in the Public Lecture 
Committee of Okinawa International University (ed.), Ajia no Dnynamizumu to Okinawa (Okinawa 
and Asian Dynamism; Anamí Ren Shôichi, 1997), 12. 
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Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand would be bureaucratically unified by 
what Kenichi Ohmae terms a Yuimâru, or "Region State Parliament. '106 Equally 
important however, are proposals to diversify the Okinawan economy from the 
`inside;' including initiatives such as locally controlled eco- tourist enterprises, and 
the expansion of the local manufacturing sector. These type of initiatives tend to 
garner broader public support, because they are aimed specifically at redressing the 
outflow of profit to large, mainland corporations (a particularly pressing issue with 
regard to the tourist industry), and tend to be more attuned to concerns over 
environmental sustainability. 107 
While it remains difficult to predict the future of any of these projects, it seems 
probable that Okinawan people will continue to seek beyond the `Japan' of which 
they remain part, for solutions to improving their communities and their lives.108 
And this, I suggest, is where the role of the state in relation to globalisation becomes 
something other than a unified `national' response to external forces, whether this is 
manifest in the quest for global `formatting power' (via institutions of supraterritorial 
governance), or in the maintenance of a cohesive national identity against the 
homogenising effect of supraterritoriaI values. It becomes, rather, and as I have 
argued above, about the control of globalisation from within the state. In this 
context, the reaction of the Japanese central government to the emergence of a 
localised `Okinawan' identity, and its tolerance, or otherwise of the conditions which 
106 Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," Foreign Affairs 72:2 (Spring 1993), 79. 
107 While tourism currently ranks second only to central government transfers in terms of Okinawa's 
balance -of- payments receipts, it remains controversial in terms of the environmental damage it causes, 
and because the majority of revenue from tourism and related industries continues to flow back to the 
mainland corporations with the capital to invest in infrastructure. During the I980s, spiralling land 
prices saw many Okinawan people squeezed even more tightly between the land demands of military 
bases and luxury resort hotels. Hiroshi Kakazu, Sustainable Development of Small Island Economies 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 137 -8. 
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will allow this identity to flourish, is only one potential litmus test of how genuinely 
"innovative" its global agency can be. 
Multicultural Japan? Citizenship, Immigration and Japan's Global Role 
Another critical example of Japan's global agency in relation to the `inside' concerns 
one of the most poignant aspects of globalisation in its contemporary phase - the 
globalisation of human movement. In March 2000, Japan's Ministry of Justice 
issued a long and detailed document titled the "Basic Plan for Immigration 
Control. "109 In its introduction, the Plan explains that: 
The number of foreigners entering and living in Japan has increased and the 
relationship between the Japanese people and foreigners has become closer, resulting 
in foreigners having a greater influence on Japanese society. As a result, it has 
become difficult to realize [the] proper administration of immigration control by 
simply determining whether or not to permit foreigners to enter and stay in Japan one 
by one... Moreover, as a result of the increased awareness of foreigners in Japan, the 
numerical increase of foreigners and the expansion of their activities, the immigration 
control administration is increasingly calling for ways the Japanese people should live 
with foreigners in harmony» t0 
The trend of immigration to postwar Japan began in the 1960s, when Japanese capital 
began to flow outwards to the Asian region and beyond. As the Basic Plan 
acknowledges however, not just the volume, but the nature of this immigration has 
changed dramatically in the 1990s. Whereas previously, the emphasis was on the 
intake of industrial and corporate "trainees" who were expected to eventually return 
permanently to their country of origin, today more people are coming to Japan for far 
los This is also happening at the opposite end of the Japanese archipelago, where the end of Cold War 
tensions has seen a renaissance of trade relations, as well as various cultural and educational 
exchanges. Morris- Suzuki, Re- Inventing Japan, 177 -78. 
109 "Basic Plan for Immigration Control" (provisional English translation), sourced online at the 
Japanese Ministry of Justice website, at ht tp:// www .moj.go.ip/ENGLISH/index.htm. 
110 Ibid. 
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longer periods of time."' In 1998, the number of foreigners "registered to live in 
Japan "112 hit an all time high of 1.51 million, or about 1.2 percent of the total 
population -a figure which does not include the people who come to Japan illegally 
to work (see below).n3 
The dilemma of how to achieve a balance between the inflow of globalising 
influence to the state, and the maintenance of a national identity that allows the state 
to persist as an effective actor in the world is never more apparent than when the 
`inflow' to the state consists of human beings. Like many other wealthy societies, 
Japan is dogged by the demographics of a declining birth rate and a rapidly ageing 
society.114 It faces a chronic shortage of labour in the next half century, particularly 
in `unskilled' labour in the manufacturing, construction and service industries. This 
means that not only will the inflow of "permanent residents" to Japan continue to 
increase, but, as globalisation continues to deepen the gulf between wealthy and poor 
nations, so too will the influx of people seeking, legally or otherwise, to become part 
of Japan's economic periphery. Either way, the dominant, if largely mythical image 
(see previous chapter) of an "homogeneous" Japanese society - the Japan integral to 
the nationalistic visions of the Oguras, Sakakibaras and Fujiokas - wiIl surely be 
placed under increasing strain. The Japanese government's response thus far, and it 
is exemplified in the Basic Plan for Immigration Control, is to try and resolve this 
dilemma via exert ing strict control over the foreigners who must be allowed to come. 
II "Basic Plan for Immigration Control," 3. 
112 Japan's Alien Registration Law (1947) requires any foreign national entering Japan for a period of 
more than 90 days to be registered with Immigration Control and issued a fingerprinted Alien 
Registration Card. 
113 Of this number, around 35% are "special permanent residents," or zainichí chôsen/kankokujin (see 
previous chapter). `Basic Plan For Immigration Control," 4. 
114 `Japan Must Open Up to Immigration: Study," The Japan Times October 12, 2000. Sourced online 
at The Japan Times Archives, at htto://www.iaoantimes.co.ip/cgi- 
b i n/getarticle. pl5 ?nn20001012b5.htm. 
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In practice, this has resulted in initiatives such as the easing of legislation to grant 
special visa status to foreign nationals of Japanese descent, enabling them to work 
legally in Japan.115 The reasoning behind this move is clear enough: those with 
Japanese blood in their veins will be easier to assimilate into Japanese society, and 
are less likely to cause "friction in Japanese society" through their visible 
`foreignness." Inevitably however, the reality has been somewhat different. The vast 
majority of foreigners who have sought to take advantage of this type of visa are 
South Americans whose parents or grandparents became part of the huge Japanese 
exodus to Brazil, Peru, Argentina and Mexico prior to WWII. Culturally and 
linguistically Latin, their lives in Japan have often been made more difficult by the 
expectation that because they look Japanese, they will somehow find it easier to 
integrate into Japanese society.116 
The preference for assimilationist (rather than `multicultural') solutions to the 
globalisation of human movement is also apparent in the Japanese government's 
approach to those who don't qualify for entering Japan legally, but who come 
anyway, driven by desperate economic circumstances in their own countries. Such 
people, as Hein and Hammond have noted, tend to be "darker- skinned Asians, from 
poor, often formerly colonial, and often ethnically diverse nations, "117 who come to 
Japan on tourist visas and find work in the 'black' economy, usually as unskilled 
labour (or, in the case of women, in the `entertainment' industry; see previous 
115 Ellen Hammond and Laura E. Hein, "Multiculturalism in Japanese Perspective," The Journal of 
Atnerican -East Asian Relations 1 (Summer 1992: 145 -69), 155 -56. The same law that made it easier 
for foreigners of Japanese descent to gain working visas prescribes fines and prison terms for 
employers caught hiring illegal immigrants. 
116 Additionally, and ironically, this move has caused discomfiture among many conservative 
Japanese commentators (i.e., those most opposed to "multiculturalism" in Japan), because they cannot 
come to terms with the idea that people who look "Japanese" can now be classed as gaikokujin 
rôdôsha (foreign workers), because the term has such derogatory implications. Ibid., 157. 
117Ibid., 158. 
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chapter). Because of this, their presence in Japan is often invoked by conservative 
commentators to argue against relaxing immigration requirements.118 In such 
debates, negative Japanese images of (in particular) U.S. multiculturalism are never 
very far from the surface, and have often been quite openly invoked to argue against 
the creation of a similarly large, "foreign" social underclass in Japan.'19 
This stance is echoed by the Basic Plan, which argues that while "several other 
countries" may have granted periodic amnesties to illegal foreign residents, such 
measures are nothing more than the attempt to "maintain law and order to the 
end. "120 The swift processing and deportation of "illegal" residents, it continues, is 
just as imperative to Japan's successful internationalisation as the encouragement of 
legal immigration to maintain economic dynamism.121 The report also concedes 
however, that in "exceptional circumstances," where the illegal resident in question 
has established a "close relationship with Japanese nationals," and/or "a deep 
connection with the Japanese community," that person may be granted a special 
permit to remain in Japan.122 Interestingly, the Basic Plan affords barely two 
paragraphs to the handling of political refugees and asylum seekers, in which it notes 
the importance of "swiftly stabilizing the status of a person who needs protection as a 
genuine refugee," and continuing to prevent the "abuse" of the refugee recognition 
system.123 
118 Ibid., 160. 
119 See my comments on "America bashing" during the 1980s in Chapter Four; also the more recent 
examples cited by Hein and Hammond (op. cit.), 158 -61, and Gavan McCormack's remarks on the 
multiculturalism debate in his introduction to Denoon et. al, (eds.), Multicultural Japan: Palaeolithic 
to Postmodern (op. cit., 1996). 
120 "Basic Plan for Immigration," 29. 
121 ¡bid. 
122 Ibid, 
123 Ibid., 31 -32. 
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On the one hand then, the Basic PIan emphasises the sharp distinction between 
"foreigners" and "Japanese," and the strict control over the conditions under which 
the former may enter and stay in Japan. Yet on the other, as we have seen, it also 
concedes intriguing gradations of "foreignness," for example, by allowing some 
people easier entry to Japan because, although foreign, they claim a residual genetic 
" Japaneseness." Even more importantly, it concedes the possibility of even "illegal" 
foreigners (some of whom presumably have no such genetic connection) attaining 
some level of Japaneseness - through marriage to Japanese people, or simply 
through "a deep connection to Japanese society." As I illustrated in the previous 
chapter, this ambiguity has a long history in Japanese debates over national identity, 
where assertions of distinct national characteristics were, particularly during Japan's 
colonial period, often juxtaposed against statements about the capacity of Japan to 
absorb and assimilate many different ethnic groups.124 
In the current era however, when the number of people to be subjected to this 
assimilation process seems likely to increase dramatically, such ambiguity cannot 
mask difficult questions about the future form of the Japanese state. Allowing 
foreigners to stay in Japan, and to integrate permanently or semi- permanently into 
Japanese society is one thing; according them the full privileges of Japanese 
citizenship, including the capacity to participate in the political institutions and 
processes which help form the state (e.g., through voting, or through public office), is 
quite another. Under current Japanese legislation, children born in Japan are not 
automatically granted Japanese nationality unless they have at least one Japanese 
parent. Foreigners who wish to become naturalised Japanese citizens have to meet 
124 Morris- Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan, 170 -171. See Chapter 6. 
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an arduous array of conditions (including changing their surnames to a Japanese 
surname that can be written in Chinese characters). 
My point here is that this distinction between `real' Japanese people and those who 
are there merely to make up the economically necessary numbers, can only become 
more uncomfortable as the numbers of the latter continue to increase. This is not to 
say that the Japanese state will continue as it is, impervious to the changing nature of 
Japanese society,t25 but it is to reiterate a theme central to this chapter, which is that 
the relationship between global forces and the state is multidimensional. 
Consequently, the issue of Japan's global role is as much about how it manages the 
occurrence of globalisation within its borders, as it is about any coordinated, state - 
based response to the world `out there.' 
Thus, it is revealing that, in a period when over 60 percent of the foreigners legally 
resident in Japan (as well as the vast majority of illegal foreign workers) come from 
Asian countries,126 46 percent of respondents to a recent opinion poll stated that they 
"don't have positive feelings" towards China, and 49 percent gave the same 
statement for the ASEAN countries.127 Similarly, when asked which countries or 
regions of the world are "friendly," the top five responses were, in order of 
preference, Hawaii, the West Coast of the U.S., Australia, and the UK. (Taiwan was 
125 There is, for example thriving activism among zainichi chôsen/kankokujin (see previous chapter) 
for greater participation in the political process, and where such participation depends upon local, 
rather than central authority (for example in local councils), differing degrees of progress are apparent. 
Tamakichi Kajita, "Gaikokujin sanseiken: Seiô no keiken to Nihon ni okeru kanôsei (The 
Enfranchisement of Foreigners: The Experience of Western Europe, and Possibilities for Japan), in 
Takashi Miyajima and Tamakichi Kajita (eds.), Gaikokujin Rôdôsha kara Shimin e: Chiikí Shakai no 
Shiten to Kadai Kara (From Foreign Workers to Citizens: Problems and Perspectives from Regional 
Society; Tokyo: Yûhikaku, 1996), 99 -122. 
126 Japan Information Network athtto:// iinjcic .or.ip /stat/stats /21MIG22.html. 
127 Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs, Public Relations Office, Prime Minister's Office, asking "Do 
you have positive feelings toward the United States, the Peoples Republic of China, the EU member 
countries and the ASEAN countries ?" Sourced at the Japan Information Network, at 
http: / /www.jinjapan.org/stat/ stats /22OPN45.html. 
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ranked equal sixth with Italy, Singapore came ninth, and Korea tenth). Responses for 
the countries that Japanese people consider "safe," were also interesting, with 
Singapore the only Asian destination to make it into the top ten.'28 
The resulting impression that, for many Japanese people, 'Asia' remains associated 
with the unfriendly, unsafe dimensions of the world `out there' may be a superficial 
one, but it connects uncomfortably well, I argue, to state policies that currently either 
accept Asían people under strictly controlled conditions, partially assimilating them 
as `not -quite- Japanese' members of Japanese society, or criminalise their existence, 
thus containing them `inside Japan,' but as part of its unsafe, unfriendly socio- 
economic periphery. 
4. Pending a Conclusion: Re- working "What Matters" About Japan from a 
Globalisation Perspective. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show how and where debate on Japan's 
global role intersects with the debate over globalisation. More specifically, I have 
argued that globalisation, for Japan is about a far more complex configuration of 
processes and ideas than can be incorporated into conventional visions of 
international agency, and the (state) identity assigned to it. To recognise this, I 
suggest, is not necessarily to subscribe wholeheartedly to views about the 
relativisation of state sovereignty pinpointed by Inoguchi, nor is it to succumb to the 
either /or choice posited by scholars such as Sakakibara and Fujioka, between a re- 
strengthened state identity and an homogenised, powerless void. As I have 
endeavoured to show here and in the previous chapter, the diversity and mobility of 
128 Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs, Public Relations Office, Prime Minister's Office, asking 
respondents to list "Countries or Regions that are safe." The results were: Hawaii (42.2 %), 
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human beings, and their capacity to adapt to "supraterritorial" and/or localised 
dimensions, are as evident in Japan, as they are everywhere in the world. The 
Japanese state is not made redundant by this diversity, any more than it is 
emasculated by global forces 'out there' in the world. However, it seems 
increasingly clear that Japan's global role is now as much about what happens inside 
Japan as it is about forming responses to processes and phenomena that occur beyond 
the territorial borders of Japan. To put it another way, globalisation is not just 
something that happens to Japan, it is also, quite literally, what Japan makes of it. 
To approach globalisation in this way I argue, also highlights the question that I 
introduced in Chapter One, concerning "what matters" about Japan as a global actor. 
In the first half of this thesis, I argued that this question has been, and continues to 
be, asked and answered on the basis of a broader set of assumptions concerning 
"what matters" in International Relations. The history of Japan's global role, as I 
showed in Chapters Three and Four, is bound up with the history of IR, or more 
precisely, the history of Realism, and the process by which it came to dominate IR 
thought and practice in the post -WWII period. Less obviously, it is an intrinsic part 
of the discursive processes by which Realism excludes particular areas of knowledge 
from discussion, by dint of their relevance to the "international." In this context, 
relevant knowledge about the `outside' is IR; knowledge about the 'inside' is 
political theory, or, when the state in question is Japan, it is Japanese Studies. In this 
way, `Japanese Studies' finds itself represented in IR through a standard, and fairly 
limited set of questions about the Japanese state and its policymaking elite, and the 
particular political /economic institutions that structure Japan's Foreign Policy. 
Switzerland (24.9 %), Australia (23.8 %), United Kingdom (22.2 %), Canada (22.2 %), Singapore 
(20.9 %), Guam (18.8 %), Germany (14.5 %), New Zealand (14.4 %) and Saipan (12.5 %). 
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In the latter half of this thesis, I have argued that this approach is insufficient, from 
two, interrelated perspectives. The first, developed in Chapter Five, used CST - 
inspired critiques of conventional IR theory and practice, to show how and why 
Realism per se is an inadequate representation of "what matters" about global life in 
general. The second perspective, which was developed in Chapter Six, but which has 
also stretched into this chapter, uses a range of critical Japanese Studies literature to 
illustrate that "what matters" about Japan is also an increasingly complex and volatile 
issue. Both of these literatures are important in expanding the discussion on Japan's 
global role. In short, if `Japan' is not reducible to a single, "black box" entity, then 
neither is its global role encompassed by a given set of issues and concerns. 
This is not to suggest that the conventional themes and issue associated with Japan's 
global role - security, agency, politico -economic power - have somehow become 
redundant. It is merely to acknowledge that the circumstances under which these 
conditions are sought and implemented are not timeless and irreducible; they shift 
and change, and they have different meanings for different people. Globalisation, or 
rather, the interpretation of globalisation that I have pursued in this chapter, is an 
important way of coming to terms with this fluidity, by allowing us to grasp the fact 
that even as states act to mitigate and/or control the effects of globalisation, they 
reconstitute themselves to accord with the changes wrought by these effects. This 
political dynamic is as relevant to Japan as it is to any other society, and it makes it 
more important than ever that, in Clark's words, we take for granted "neither the 
identity of the state nor the identity of the system. "129 It is in this sense that 
globalisation affords the framework for the enhanced, more inclusive dialogue 
129 Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, 174. 
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between Japanese Studies and IR that is crucial in enriching debate on Japan's global 
role. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE BEGINNING OF A CONVERSATION? 
The decisions made by the Japanese state about Japan's global role, now and in the 
future, will continue to be one of the most important areas of concern in International 
Relations (IR). At present however, discussion of this role continues, I suggest, to 
remain isolated from many of the profound changes taking place within Japanese 
society. The problem is not that literature on these changes does not exist, but that it 
rarely, if ever, is included in mainstream IR discussions of Japan as an international 
actor. Hence the `connection' project of this thesis, which has sought to show why this 
situation exists, and how it might be changed. 
I have approached this project from three angles. The first, developed in Chapters Two 
to Four, sought to illustrate how and why discussion of contemporary Japan in IR 
developed the way it did. The central issue here, I argued, was Japan's incorporation 
into a post -WWII world order defined by US Cold War strategic interests, and by its 
incorporation also within a Realist articulation of US foreign policymaking perspectives, 
which, as Chapter Two sought to illustrate, is derived philosophically from a broader 
(positivist) set of assumptions about `real' knowledge and the capacity for objective 
responses to a world of anarchical states `out there.' 
Japan's stupendous recovery from the devastation it suffered during the war was very 
much a product of these Cold War interests, as the U.S. poured capital and resources 
into ensuring Japan's role as both geostrategic and geo- economic ally during the Cold 
War Years. However, as I argued in Chapter Three, it was via the Realism that infused 
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`Western' Cold War thinking in IR that Japan was represented as just another analytical 
`black box,' the (social) inside of which was of minimal importance in understanding 
and responding to the issues deemed important in its capacity as an international actor. 
Even when the inner dimensions of Japan were addressed, the Japanese Studies literature 
that undertook this task tended to complement the broader Realist framework, by 
depicting Japanese life and society in more or less homogeneous terms (e.g., through 
Reischauer and the Modernisation Theorists). As Japan began to grow out of the role 
initially envisaged for it in Cold War strategy, the resulting tensions saw some opening 
of the Japanese Studies agenda, and some (albeit limited) attempts to take into account 
the profound differences between Japanese and `Western' society, which had influenced 
Japan's particular postwar trajectory (e.g., via Chalmers Johnson). Yet the result, 
especially in IR circles, did not promote any fundamental re -think of `what mattered,' in 
relation to Japan as a global actor. Rather, and as I explained in Chapter Four, IR 
continued to frame its response to the `Japan' question in Realist terms, albeit via an 
updated neo- Realist theory, which took into account some of the issues (e.g., economic 
interdependence) affecting international politics in the post -Vietnam era. 
This is where the second angle on the connection project becomes important. It involves 
an often complex debate concerning the changes that were, by the 1980s, going on 
within IR circles, as Realism came under a range of critical challenges which I referred 
to under their umbrella term as Critical Social Theory (CST). My major concern here 
was to illustrate how CST approaches have forced us to re- consider what and who 
`matters' when we seek to understand international politics in the contemporary era. 
Particularly the requirement that IR theory and practice be discussed as something other 
than the determined (security dilemma) movements made by `black box' actors in a 
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structuralist (neo- Realist) world order. In this regard I argued, CST approaches connect 
usefully to literature which has taken on the task of opening up the homogeneous, 
holistic images of Japan and illustrating its internal complexities. 
The third and final angle of the connection project concentrated, consequently, on this 
critical Japanese Studies literature and its explorations of the other Japanese `realities' it 
depicts. In Chapter Six, this task was carried out in terms of two particular categories 
(i.e., gender and race), in order to illustrate the multifaceted actuality of Japanese society 
and identity. Moreover, this chapter sought to show how the critical Japanese Studies 
perspectives, in this context, complemented the broad CST -inspired critiques of 
orthodoxy in the larger IR context. They do so, in particular, I proposed, when they 
force us to re -think the assumptions which divide knowledge in terms of either an 
`inside' dimension of the state, or as external relations between states. This 
reconsideration of the inside /outside dichotomy, as I indicated in Chapter Five, is a 
major concern of CST approaches to IR. A critical Japanese Studies also becomes a 
vital factor in confronting this either /or divide, by illustrating how many of the `internal' 
dimensions of everyday Japanese society have important implications beyond the 
orthodox geospatial borders of the Japanese state. 
Chapter Seven developed this theme further, in the context of the current era of 
globalisation. In particular, I sought here to demonstrate how globalisation becomes a 
potential and important site of political and intellectual connection for IR scholars and 
Japan specialists when the relationship between `inside' and `outside' is understood in 
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"mutually constitutive and transformative" I terms. Or, in other words, when the forms 
and identity of the state itself are acknowledged to play a fundamental role in the 
production and direction of `supraterritorial' or `transnational' forces, even as they are 
simultaneously affected and changed by these forces. 
This reading of globalisation, I argued, can promote significantly different 
understandings of Japan as global actor. One which acknowledges that Japan's `global 
role' is as much to do with the reaction to change on the `inside,' as it is about state - 
coordinated policies aimed at coping with increasing interdependence and 
transnationalisation on the `outside.' Chapter Seven sought to demonstrate how this 
occurs, by focussing firstly on the increasingly `supraterritorial' dimensions of sub- 
national articulations of identity (e.g., on Okinawa), and secondly, through changes 
taking place in Japanese society as it responds to an influx of foreign workers seeking to 
take advantage of (and become part of) Japan's globalising economy. Issues such as 
these, I argued, make it impossible to take the identity of the Japanese state for granted 
when speaking about its global role. Rather they make it imperative that any IR 
perspective seeking to speak of this role remains engaged with the broader literatures 
and perspectives which chart these shifting and volatile `internal' dimensions. In short, 
they necessitate a better `conversation' between IR and Japanese Studies. 
I have sought to contribute to this conversation throughout this thesis, albeit in terms 
which sometimes might appear rather esoteric and perhaps rather detached from the 
everyday realities of Japanese life and of IR which they refer to. My point has been, 
though, that, difficult as the task is, it is necessary to try and expose and `speak' the 
Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, 68. 
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(theoretical) first principles underlying these everyday issues in order that their power 
and influence be acknowledged and perhaps superseded. A final anecdote might explain 
this necessity, even in more enlightened times. It relates to a conference on Japanese 
Studies I attended recently at the University of Warwick in the UK where, for three 
days, I sat and listened to a fascinating series of debates, which ranged from the hidden 
political meaning of Japanese postage stamps, to the progress of the Theatre Missile 
Defence Program. What interested me most however, was the debate which took place 
on globalisation and Japan. Here, interpretations varied among the speakers about what 
globalisation meant, but they were agreed that whatever it meant, it had important 
implications for understanding Japan in the present and future. It was not enough, one 
of the speakers suggested, just to conceptualise Japanese foreign policy in relation to 
global forces on the outside. Rather, Japan specialists, whether they were economists, or 
defence analysts, or political theorists, had to be aware of how global change was 
affecting Japan on the inside. 
And while there was a bit of uncomfortable shuffling of feet and papers, there was 
acknowledgement, it seemed, that other dimensions were indeed required if the `Japan' 
question was to be adequately dealt with in the global context. At this moment however, 
a particularly illustrious member of the audience proposed that, in his opinion, there had 
been "a bit too much IR" in the debate. The problem, he argued; was that if Japanese 
Studies scholars spent too much time discussing "IR theory," they would not be able to 
remain adequately engaged with an understanding of Japan. More shuffling of papers 
and feet ensued, and a decision was taken to accept the orthodox wisdom. But perhaps a 
conversation has begun, nevertheless. 
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